The mysteries of Turkey

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PILDAT is an independent, non-partisan and not-for-profit indigenous research and training institution with the mission to strengthen democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan. PILDAT is a registered non-profit entity under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860, Pakistan. Copyright Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency PILDAT All rights reserved Printed in Pakistan Published: December 2013 ISBN: 978-969-558-398-2 Any part of this publication can be used or cited with a clear reference to PILDAT Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency - PILDAT Islamabad Office: No. 7, 9th Avenue, F-8/1, Islamabad, Pakistan Lahore Office: 45-A, Sector XX, 2nd Floor, Phase III Commercial Area, DHA, Lahore, Pakistan Tel: (+92-51) 111-123-345; Fax: (+92-51) 226-3078 E-mail: info@pildat.org; Web: www.pildat.org

REPORT CONTENTS Foreword In Turkey, political Islam vs secularism 07

REPORT Foreword Study Visit to Turkey was organized by PILDAT from November 10-16, 2013 by including key members of A Pakistan's Parliament and members of PILDAT Dialogue Group on Civil-Military Relations to study the developments in Democratic Civil-Military Relations and Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey. Individual delegates have penned down their learning and analyses based on the Study Visit. This paper titled The Mysteries of Turkey has been authored by Ghazi Salahuddin, Senior Analysis. We at PILDAT are grateful to him for sharing his analysis and are happy to publish it for a wider dissemination. Disclaimer Views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of PILDAT. Islamabad December 2013 05

REPORT In Turkey, political Islam vs secularism A Friday it was, and we were in Konya, the city of the world's most revered Sufi poet Jelaluddin Rumi. Though our delegation spent less than a day in those mystical surroundings, lingering mostly at the Rumi's tomb of turquoise tiles, it was surely one of the highlights of our very hectic and intellectually demanding tour of Turkey. Because we had to fly to Istanbul in late afternoon and that was the last working day of our tour we could not attend the fabled dance of the dervishes. Konya's whirling dervishes are the real stuff, not the touristic replication that is served, for instance, in Istanbul. But late at night on the same day, some of us were able to become participants in another kind of frenzied activity. We joined the feisty crowd on Istanbul's Istiklal Street, the pulsating heart of the city's night life. We were there, just across the celebrated Taksim Square, the site of the violent protests in in the summer of 2013 that have become relevant in any serious attempt to understand the present Turkey. Noisy bars were spread in adjoining lanes. Trendy young people, including women in western attire, were in a boisterous mood. It was a milling crowd and we did lose one of our companions. So, in the space of a day, we encountered two extreme poles of the Turkish society. I have ventured to launch the report of my study tour of Turkey with these two separate images to illustrate the conflict that I see brewing in Turkey. One may describe it as the conflict between the Islamists and the secularists. The question, however, is: where does Turkey's soul reside? In a somewhat literal sense, it resides in Konya. We have to be mindful of the fact that Konya has gained attention in recent years. At the same time, the Istiklal Street is a more vibrant and meaningful manifestation of Turkey's energy, creativity and economic prosperity. Istanbul is an astoundingly modern city, as great a magnet for the world's tourists as any other city of history in Europe. In addition to its ancient history and monuments, it also showcases the glory of the Kemalist revolution founded on a secular system. Obviously, it can be presented as a model for a Muslim country, though secularism is an anathema in most other Muslim countries. Pakistan, in the grip of religious extremism, has a particular aversion to secular and pluralist ideas. A twist in the tale is that the success of the present Turkey is the achievement of a party that is founded on political Islam. The ruling Justice and Development Party AKP is manifestly conservative and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is seen to be using authoritarian tactics to promote his agenda. We will have to return to this tension that is building up in Turkish society and it may have far reaching consequences that may even have some impact on the role of the presently restrained military. In Konya, we could hardly find a woman without a headscarf. After the call of the muezzin for the Friday prayers, many shopkeepers pulled down the shutters. In the cobbled courtyard of an old mosque, there were long rows of worshippers. This had to be unlike any other city in Turkey because Konya, situated in central Anatolia, is certified as the country's most conservative city. It is akin to what the western media would describe as the 'Bible Belt'. At the railway station we had taken a fast, 250 kilometres an hour train for the two-hour ride from Ankara we saw groups of pilgrims, many of them from Iran. Rumi, of course, wrote his poetry in Persian. Konya's population is about one million and twice as many visitors come every year. A tourist guide would tell you that the Mevlana's tomb is the second most-visited tourist attraction in Turkey, after Topkapi Palace. Our study tour of Turkey, organised by PILDAT, was essentially meant to probe and understand the democratic development of Turkey, with a specific focus on civilmilitary relations. The 16-member delegation was led by Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed and included some key members of the Parliament and opinion leaders. Two of its members were from the media. The week-long visit was conducted in the middle of November 2013. At the outset, it is important to be aware of the deeply emotional relationship that has existed between Turkey and Pakistan. It has its esoteric roots in the Khilafat Movement launched by the Muslims of the British India in early twenties of the last century. It may seem paradoxical that while modern Turkey was born in rejection to the pan- Islamic campaign directed to save the Khilafat of the Ottoman Empire, the leadership of Kemal Ataturk was later enthusiastically applauded by our forebears. As an aside, we may recall the great admiration that Mohammad Ali Jinnah had for Ataturk. It was in London in 1932 that he read H.C.Armstrong's biography of the 07

REPORT Turkish leader titled 'Grey Wolf' and was so possessed by it that his daughter Dina, then only 13, began calling her father 'Grey Wolf'. If this was some kind of a premonition, it survived only in the words that the Founder of this country spoke on August 11, 1947. However, there was another, fleeting reference to Ataturk rather recently when General Pervez Musharraf staged his coup in 1999 and praised Turkey and its leader in a soon to be reversed liberal stance. In any case, the linkages that have been fostered in recent decades are more relevant now. Leaders of the present ruling party at the centre and the Punjab are forging close working relations with Turkey in the economic field. Turkey is one country where love and affection for Pakistan at the popular level has survived our recent waywardness. It is hard to imagine any other country where a Pakistani may claim his or her national identity without any hesitation. Yes, they still love and respect us in Turkey. We had a good measure of this relationship when the delegation had its audience with President Abdullah Gul. That the brief meeting was actually held was in itself an expression of goodwill for Pakistan and an appreciation of the high-profile delegation's interest in Turkey. In fact, Abdullah Gul almost summed it up when he began his remarks by saying that when we talk of Turkey-Pakistan relations, any third party will not be able to understand it. That visit to the Presidential Palace in Ankara's imposing administrative district became a very useful projection of the quality and stature of Turkey's present leadership. The entire ambience was reassuring and inspiring. Abdullah Gul is a former foreign minister and, in his style, not as combative as Erdogan. There is speculation that he might become Turkey's next prime minister. According to rules adopted by the ruling party, Erdogan is barred from seeking a fourth term as a member of the parliament and he may want to contest the presidential elections next year, which for the first time will be held by popular vote. Hence, the two leaders may swap positions. Embedded in this possibility is a sense of drama because the two leaders have separate images in the context of their approach to political and social issues. Erdogan, who certainly is leading the party, is more conservative and aggressive in his style than Gul. It will be interesting to see whether the unfolding confrontation between Erdogan and the Kemalist forces would create some space for a moderate position that Gul represents. Against this backdrop, the opportunity to have a personal glimpse of Gul had its own importance. Even though the president's role is largely ceremonial and observers expect that if Erdogan is willing to take that position, he would want it with enhanced powers Gul had a very striking presence. Looking at both countries' political past, he was right to mention military coups and economic travails. Noting that we got our economy back on track, he hoped that Pakistan would be able to do the same. He also cited recent contacts between the two countries and recalled his own visit to Lahore. We were touched by how be referred to Pakistan's troubles in a rather compassionate tone. He hoped that Pakistan would be able to do what Turkey had done ten years ago. He said that it is very necessary that we first put our own house in order. This was his message for Pakistan. Here, then, were some intimations of similarities between the historical experiences of the two countries. What is glaring is an almost similar record of military interventions. In both countries, the military has exercised influence that impudently exceeds its legitimate authority. Before we come to how Turkey has put the military in its place through a long process of incremental reinforcement of civilian authority, let us have a brief look at the past. First, however, we should take note of a fundamental difference in the role of the military in the two countries that is generally not properly appreciated. Pakistan came into being as a result of a democratic political struggle. Its founder was a politician who, at the very outset, strongly urged civilian supremacy over civil and military bureaucracy. Modern Turkey, on the other hand, was created by a military leader. It was truly a War of Independence, led by Kemal Ataturk. Turkey became a republic in 1923, though the clause in the constitution that retained Islam as the state religion was removed in 1928 and, consequently, Turkey became secular. It did matter that Ataturk was able to lead the country until 1938, when he died. He was the one who designated the military as the guardian of secular democracy and after his death, military was also the guardian of Kemalist ideology. It is interesting that almost following Pakistan's example, Turkey has had four coups since the founding of the Republic. The civilian rule was overthrown, temporarily like in Pakistan, in 1960 and 1980. After all, military leaders in both countries have consistently professed their love for democracy. In addition, events have repeatedly 08

REPORT demonstrated the limits of military power in both countries. The Turkish military also used its power to force the resignation of a government and its replacement by another in 1971 and 1997. The Turkish constitution of 1961, enacted after the 1960 coup, had created a National Security Council to be chaired by the president and with equal members from the civilian government and the armed forces. A number of other amendments enhanced the power of the military. While the purpose here is not to recount the history of civilmilitary relations in Turkey in any detail, we need to understand how the civilian government established its authority over the military, resulting in a dramatic decline in military's influences. At one level, the shift in the power balance has come simply from the achievements of the AKP government, after it came to power in 2002. It is on the basis of its economic performance that the party has won three elections, with a landslide. It is only when the civilians do not perform that the military finds its excuse to intervene. The AKP government instituted far-reaching economic reforms. It privatized billions of dollars' worth of stateowned enterprises. Turkey's GDP per capita has nearly tripled since 2002. Now Turkey is a shining model of progress among Muslim countries. There were widespread infrastructural development projects and new plans were introduced in the educational and social domains. The party then used its leverage to dismantle the threat of the military. A landmark date, in this process, was April 4, 2012, when two surviving generals of the 1980 coup went on trial for the overthrow of the civilian government. It became possible after amendments were made to the constitution of 1982 as a result of a nation-wide referendum in 2010. One contentious amendment was the abolition of Article 15, which banned the prosecution of 1980 coup leaders. We in Pakistan are familiar with the stratagems that provide constitutional immunity to military rulers. In Turkey, AKP was able to snatch this immunity from the military on the basis of strong popular support. There were other developments, starting with the launch of Ergenekon trials in 2008. The Ergenekon trials refer to a series of arrests following the discovery of an alleged Kemalist and ultra-nationalist underground organisation with hundreds of members including military officials, politicians and civilians. It is an on-going process. A number of senior former military officers are under arrest. Turkey's ambition to join the European Union has also created a political need to strengthen democratic institutions and establish greater civilian control over military matters. Reforms that have been the part of the ongoing EU-accession process are likely to further limit the influence of the military. In that sense, observers have defined Turkey's nation-building model as a work in progress. While dwelling on the issue of how the civilian government has put the military in its place with some bold measures, one cannot ignore the impression that the authority of the ruling party is now being challenged by circumstances that are of a varied nature. To a large extent, Erdogan's times of troubles began in the summer when massive protests were held in Istanbul's Taksim Square. What later became a country-wide protest against the government began over the proposed redevelopment of Gezi Park, adjacent to Taksim Square. Erdogan's government used excessive force to break the protest and in the initial phase, four persons were killed and thousands were arrested. Soon, the protests caught international attention and observers wondered if this would be Turkey's Arab Spring invoking the example of the protests that began in Cairo's Tahrir Square and led to the overthrow the Husni Mubarak regime. But even though the Erdogan government survived the onslaught and was never in serious threat, the impact of the agitation on the country's mood and politics has been considerable. What emerged from these protests was the impression that Erdogan was becoming increasingly authoritarian. One interpretation of the crisis is that it is rooted in Erdogan's attempt to impose conservative Islamic values on a secular state. However, Erdogan blamed the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP) for the unrest and refused to come under pressure. He has persisted with his promotion of political Islam. There were some curbs on the sale of alcohol and anti-abortion laws were introduced. While we were in Turkey, a lot of debate was going on Erdogan's remarks about unsegregated dormitories for university students. It so happens that Turkey has suffered some set-backs during 2013, enhancing doubts about the country's sense of direction under Erdogan's rather dictatorial rule. In the first place, the economy is not doing so well. It has been reported that the Turkish growth rate has fallen to three per 09

REPORT cent. Considering the fact that it was largely the economic success of the last ten years that had bolstered the AKP rule, the emerging confrontation between political Islam and Kemalist secularism is likely to acquire a new edge. Another challenge for Turkey is the existing cycle of disorder in its neighbourhood. The situation in Syria has become increasingly bothersome and foreign policy experts in Turkey concede that the Erdogan government's policy on this issue was flawed. It is obviously not leading anywhere in the foreseeable future. While Turkey and Syria have had good relations in the recent past, Turkey openly called for the overthrow of President Bashar al-assad when the civil war began in Syria two years ago. It also actively sponsored the opposition. This led to an inflow of Syrian refugees in the country. It was felt that the Turkish Kurdish separatists could exploit this situation, putting pressure on Turkey's territorial integrity. While talking about Turkey's relations with Middle-Eastern countries at a time when the region is in a state of turmoil, we may take a pause to look at an entirely unexpected influence that Turkey has earned in the Arab world. We, in Pakistan, should be very familiar with the popularity of Turkish soaps in Pakistan. Dubbed in Urdu, these shows have captured the imagination of the middle-class viewers of television, particularly of women. So much so that the touristic appeal of Istanbul has also increased. They want to look at the locations where the soaps have been filmed. Now, these soaps have also captivated the Arab audience. There is a paradox here because Arabs would not be happy to recall that until about one hundred years ago, the Turks the Ottoman Empire were the rulers of the region. Anyhow, let me just mention in passing that Al Jazeera recently made a documentary to explore the impact of Turkish soap operas on women across the Arab world. This is worth mentioning also in the context of the ideological conflict taking place in Turkey itself. When the soap about the Ottoman ruler Suleiman that is titled 'Mera Sultan' in Pakistan was launched in Turkey two years ago, even Erdogan had expressed his displeasure and the Islamists had protested against the depiction of the Ottoman era. Apparently, some religious references were later added to the soap. Be that as it may, the producer of the Al Jazeera documentary said that she wanted to discover how these taboo-breaking soaps are helping women across the region to transform their lives. Does this also mean that the liberal and progressive values that are ingrained in the Turkish society would not be easily subverted by the Islamists? Talking about Turkish soaps would appear to distract us from a seminal analysis of Turkey's democratic experience in the context of the evolution of civilian control of the military. Indeed, the study tour was meant to explore this issue in some detail. For this purpose, the tour was meticulously designed and we had the opportunity of interacting with experts of the leading think tanks and relevant parliamentary committees. We were able to gain some valuable insights into Turkish affairs. One option, thus, was to do a short reportage of the tour with reference to notes taken during our formal meetings. But these encounters were shared by all members of the delegation. Hence, to stay away from any chance of repetition or duplication, I have resorted to some subjective impressions born of our shared engagements. It should be worthwhile to sum up the reality of present Turkey in the mirror of our own history and circumstances. A number of knotty questions arise when we look at Turkey as a Muslim country, particularly in the framework of the rise of political Islam and a conscious attempt to encourage conservative values by Erdogan and his party. There are a number of reasons why the civilian rulers of Turkey have been able to put the military, so to say, in its place. Essentially, it was the economic performance of the ruling party and its dividend in the form of large popular support that made it possible. Meanwhile, we should not ignore the fundamental strengths of Turkish society that set it apart from other Muslim countries. Socially and culturally, Turkey is endowed with exceptional resources. In casual conversations, wherever linguistically possible, I found that the Turks are very proud of their ancient heritage and their ability to keep pace with the modern world. As the influence of Turkish soaps that I have underlined would show, women in Turkey are emancipated and confident, including the ones who wear scarves. For me, one shining example of Turkey's cultural superiority is the fact that its leading novelist Orhan Pamuk won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2006, becoming the second Muslim to earn this honour. Earlier, Egypt's Naguib Mahfouz was awarded this prize in 1988. Another creative writer I admire is Elif Shafak. The literary scene is otherwise very vibrant and expansive in its scope and 10

REPORT excellence. Many names of gifted writers are cited with whose work we are not acquainted. It is the same in other cultural sectors. In this respect, I am tempted to quote from an old article in the New York Times about the astounding historical heritage of the land that is now Turkey: It was home to Homer and Herodotus, King Midas and King Croesus, St. Paul and St. Nicholas. Here Aristotle taught philosophy and Diogenes searched for an honest man. Some of history's greatest conquerors swept through this great expanse, among them Darius, Tamerlane, Hannibal and Saladin. It is where Alexander cut the Gordian knot and Julius Caesar said 'Veni, vidi, vici. Then, of course, there was the historically recent glory of the Ottoman Empire. In spite of the confidence that comes from this sense of history, Turkey now, I feel, is becoming a bit unsure of where it is going. Recent developments in the country and the region may even have prompted a crisis of identity. There is also uncertainty about the choices that Erdogan must make in the coming months. The manner in which he suppressed the Taksim Square protests has brought out his authoritarian streak in sharp focus. His relations with the media and human rights groups have become very abrasive. It is possible that these factors would have an impact on the popular support that his party has retained for the past decade, though the opposition remains fractious. The main opposition party, Republican People's Party (CHP), lacks a leader with any charismatic appeal. Some indications of the mood of the people will be available in March when local elections are held. One major failure of the Erdogan government is located in its Middle East policy to which I have already alluded. Turkey was hoping to lead a Sunni axis in the region to counter the influence of Iran and Iraq. It was hoping to oust the Assad regime in Syria and had openly armed some factions of the Syrian rebels. When elections were held in Iraq in 2010, Turkey had supported the secular/sunni block but it lost to the Shiite dominated party of Nouri al- Maliki. Egypt served another set-back when the Muslim Brotherhood's government was removed after popular upheaval. In its ambition to lead the region by establishing a Sunni alliance, Turkey had supported the Brotherhood. US. Would it now want to diversify its security relations, obviously with Russian and China? In any case, this chaotic situation may add another dent in Erdogan's popularity. His mantra of 'zero problems' with neighbours was not very fruitful. One scholar affiliated with the ruling AKP was quoted as saying: There is no doubt that romanticism about the Middle East is gone. It may have been this realisation that took Foreign Minister Ahmet Davotoglu to Baghadad wearing black in the month of Moharram where he said that there is no limit to cooperation between the two countries. We have another dimension of Turkey's crisis of identity in terms of its simultaneous linkages with Asia and with Europe. This is certainly a unique location, geographically as well as politically and culturally. At another level, Turkey has also to contend with its past. There, for instance, is the Armenian question and Orhan Pamuk is not popular among a certain kind of patriots because he has raised issues that have faded from Turkey's collective memory. (I see Malala's image in this rejection of a national hero by bigots.) Add to this the Kurdish question, said to be one of the world's longest running ethnic conflicts. Even though Kurds constitute about 20 per cent of the population, Pro- Kurdish and other small parties are not represented in the parliament because of the condition that a party must win 10 per cent of the votes to enter the parliament. What all this means is that the political situation in Turkey is in a state of flux. It is possible that all the issues that Turkey confronts at this time get absorbed in the larger conflict between Islamist and secularist forces. A likely option for AKP is to choose the path of moderation and the face of Abdullah Gul. The latest blow to Turkey's influence in the region is the US- Iran deal that came after we returned from Turkey. It is natural for Ankara to fear that this deal would bolster the Shia axis in the Middle-East. As a member of NATO since the fifties(1950s), Turkey has had very close ties with the 11

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