REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS REVIVAL RELIGION, SECULARIZATION, GLOBALIZATION By Nonka Bogomilova Nonka Bogomilova Todorova is e Chairperson of e Anropology Department of e Institute for Philosophical Research; Editor in Chef of e Philosophical Alternatives magazine; Part-time lecturer at e New Bulgarian University, Dept. of Political Studies and Dept. of e History of Europe and e Balkans. She received her B.A. and Ph.D. at Sofia University Klement Ohridski and e Dr. Dr.Habil. at e Institute for Philosophical Research in Sofia, Bulgaria. Among her publications are Longing for e Absolute, Identities, The Universal and e National in e Bulgarian Culture, Religion Spirit and Institution, and Vitality and Renewal (forcoming). Fields of research interests are Anropology of Religion; Identities; Religion and Politics in e Balkan Countries. This article was previously published in Teme (Niš, Serbia), Vol. XXVII, No. 4 (2003), pp. 513-522 and is reprinted wi e permission of e editor and e auor. The close connection and subordination of traditional religions and churches wi/to some contemporary social-political projects, besides being a consequence of secularization, is also one of e dimensions of globalization. As a process in which religious ought, practice, and institutions tend to lose eir social significance /B. Wilson/, secularization raises a dilemma before traditional religions and churches: eier modernize and become part of e changing socio-cultural environment, or become marginal and remain but a remnant of e past. According to e eminent sociologist of religion, Peter Berger, e subordination of religion and e church to modernization would be tantamount to a kind of cultural suicide. If religion were reduced to being a tool of e political, e enic, e existential, it would lose its specific cultural features and mission. The latter could only be preserved rough a creative and selective attitude to e values of modernization. P. Beyer expects at two basic trends in e process of inclusion of religion in e global world will be realized, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. The first is related to e privatization of e religious, its transformation into a private matter, an element of e formation of personal identity. The oer unfolding tendency is e politicization of religion and e churches, eir linkage to collective (national, enic) identities. In is process e nation, not religion, becomes e fundamental value. Religion becomes a means, an instrument, and turns into a kind of civic RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 4 (AUGUST 2004) page 1.
religion. The Church is left wi a symbolic auority, while e real auority is shifted to e state. 1 Unfortunately e term religion is often employed wiout preliminary discussion of e contents of religiousness and wiout e necessary distinction between it and its social uses as a motivation, emblem, and an emotional mobilizing factor in conflict situations, as a form of secondary and arbitrary sacralization of various associations and human activities. In such cases e external and formal marks of e religious, such as affiliation, delimitation from oers, identification wi a territory and community, are put to functional use; e contents of religion at once determined its origin, such as adhering to a certain eos and observing a specific moral code (particularly characteristic of Christianity) remain in e background. The secularization paradigm, which was basic in e scientific approach to religion during most of e 20 century, is undergoing serious revision today, in e time of globalization. Peter Berger considers it not a paradigmatic characteristic, but as one of e 2 cultural dimension of contemporary religion. The processes involving decrease of e unifying force of e nation-state, e revival of local forms of identity and sociality (enic, religious, cultural communities), of regional and trans-national alliances, have served to animate religious feelings and have redefined e cultural borderlines of religion. Some of e phenomena at demonstrate most convincingly e return of religion to e global public scene are: 1) e trans-national spiritual and institutional networks, created by traditional religions and churches--especially e Caolic Church; 2) e increasing inclusion of religious affiliation among e constituting and unifying symbols of enic and cultural communities and identities; 3) e appearance of religious movements and associations not committed to any religious tradition, any nation or enic group, but often representing a kind of synesis, a bricolage of various religious ideas and practices. 3 This specific property of religion to serve as an emblem of trans-national unities, as well as its universalistic spiritual dimension, are actively utilized in e formulation of 1 Beyer, P. Privatisation and Politicization of Religion in Global Society. Implications for Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe. In Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe. Krakow, 1999, pp. 21-25. 2 Berger, P. Reflections on e Sociology of Religion Today. In Sociology of Religion, vol. 62, No. 4, 2001, pp. 425-429. 3 Casanova, J. Religion, e New Millennium and Globalization. In Sociology of Religion, vol. 62, No. 4, 2001, pp. 425-429. RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 4 (AUGUST 2004) page 2.
paradigms of e new world order. Politicians, humanitarians, religious leaders have repeatedly stated at Christianity is e value and spiritual emblem of a united Europe. A proposition coming from Poland would have e belief in God be included in e text of e Constitution of United Europe as a uniting value for Europeans. Even as large-scale a cultural genre as e philosophy of history has also been resorting to e uniting/dividing potential of religion and has defined e new borderlines between civilizations on e basis of religious divisions (S. Huntington, some Russian religious philosophers, bo past and contemporary). Different Religions, Similar Changes I see is tendency as reflecting e essence of e much debated process (notion) of secularization. Understood in is way, secularization is a tendency evident even in Islamic countries, where religion is increasingly connected wi political, national, social projects and interests. It is a known fact at in Modern times politics, law, and e state have gradually taken over e educational, moral, protective functions of e Church and of religion. Alough carried out by different means and in various forms, is process is evident roughout e 20 century in almost all countries wi a predominantly Christian population. Sociological surveys in e 20 century have stressed e similarity in e tendencies in most of ese countries in e following respects: 1) a decreasing number of religious believers; 2) a decreasing number of participants in religious rituals; 3) an increasingly personal, individual vision of God, etc. We may conclude at, as far as e social and cultural status of e separate confessions of Christianity are concerned, all ree divisions have been undergoing similar changes. Various researchers have shown at e declared level of religiousness and e degree of participation in Church rituals are higher in proportion to e degree to which religion serves as an integrating factor for e community. Here e transcendent entity of which e individual becomes a part is e group, and erefore religion becomes mostly a form of belonging to a group. The Orodox Religion and e Orodox Civilization Many Orodox religious philosophers, especially e Russians of e late 19 and early 20 centuries (Berdyaev, Solovyov, Florenski, etc.) relate Orodoxy and Orodox culture to a kind of spirituality, emotionality, community feeling in which moral values are prevalent, us placing Orodoxy in opposition to e predominantly utilitarian values of RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 4 (AUGUST 2004) page 3.
Western Christian culture. This line of inking often leads ese auors to distinguishing an Orodox cultural zone (civilization) as a separate cultural-historical entity. According to many of ese inkers, Orodoxy is spiritually superior to Western Christian civilization and has better prospects for e future. While some of ese observations are true and perceptive, e conclusions of such religious-philosophical ideas often serve to justify e century-long rivalry between e two parts of e Christian culture. This type of inking has e quality of inertia in making of Orodoxy a distinguishing trait, an emblem of a comparatively homogenous, closed cultural and social system, radically different from e Western Christian one. This attitude is often expressed in e formula eier-or. O. Spengler a century ago and S. Huntington recently have reanimated a more modern version of is kind of myology. Intermediate in time was A. Toynbee, who defined e two branches of Christianity as sister civilizations. But ere are many arguments against at form of cultural division: 1) Alough ey have many common socio-cultural features, e separate countries of so-called Orodox civilization have important economic, political, and cultural differences, which led to e formation of eir separate national states in e 19 and 20 cent.; 2) eir common Orodox creed not only failed to harmonize relations between ese states, but became a spiritual and ideological cause for rivalry during e centuries; at various times Bulgaria, Russia, Greece, Serbia, and Romania have competed for leadership as e center of Orodox statehood; 3) e close link between Orodoxy and e national statehood in all Orodox countries was destroyed at e time of e totalitarian regimes (except in Greece) and Orodoxy lost much of its social support; 4) e revival of Orodox religiousness after e fall of e totalitarian regimes is a raer complex phenomenon, and to all appearances it will follow some of e basic tendencies in contemporary religiousness in Western countries, i.e. e individualization of fai, religious pluralism, implicit religion, e phenomena of believing wiout belonging and belonging wiout believing. Of course, ere are many features common to e countries of e so-called Orodox civilization, characteristics related to e economic, political, cultural specifics and traditions, whose historical origin can be analyzed concretely. For instance ere are many spiritual and moral features ascribed to Orodoxy at are due raer to national mentality, to e paternalistic communitarian traditions, which Orodoxy has adapted to raer an initiated. In oer cases a process of interaction and interweaving of factors has taken place, in which it is hard to distinguish cause and effect, essence and form. Many researchers point RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 4 (AUGUST 2004) page 4.
out e existence of a strong pagan cultural substratum behind e refined facade of e Orodox doctrine; medieval heretical movements have also restricted e social and spiritual space of official Orodoxy. But, as we know, similar processes have taken place in Western Christianity as well. The Religious Revival in e Post-Communist Countries In every one of e post-communist countries, immediately after e start of e democratic changes ere was a rapid process of stratification and division of society based on material, political, enic, cultural-religious, etc., status. The traditional confessions and Churches, especially in countries wi a single predominant confession, proved to be potential and actual bearers of a kind of unifying, consolidating spiritual and institutional resource. In e post-totalitarian period, e presidential institution, seeking a stabilizing, unifying foundation for society amidst pluralism and strife, and concerned by e instability of state power, was particularly prone to resort to e Church: by definition e traditional religion personified e much needed social fundament. In face of e social demand for a unifying resource, not all national Churches were capable of assuming such a role. Besides traditional cultural-historical auority rooted in e remote past, national Churches needed to have also won moral auority by eir behavior during e totalitarian regime. The conclusion at a revival of religiousness is taking place in most postcommunist countries has often been argued on e basis of sociological inquiries, carried out regularly since 1990. Immediately after e start of democratic changes, a quick grow in e number of religious believers was registered in ese studies, togeer wi a growing interest in e Church and hopes about its social role. According to e findings of e large-scale 4 European Values Study of 1999, e religious identification in e period 1990-1999 does indeed display an upward trend in Russia, Latvia, Bulgaria, and, to a lesser degree, in Hungary and Czech Republic, but also a downward trend in Slovenia and e Eastern part of Germany. A comparison wi corresponding trends of change in oer European countries shows at post-communist countries are not in a particular, exceptional situation. For instance some grow in religious identification for is period can also be observed in Italy 4 Tomka, M. Tendances de la religiosité et de l orientation vers les Eglises en Europe de l Est. In Social Compass, vol. 49, N4, 2002, pp. 540, 544-545, 547. RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 4 (AUGUST 2004) page 5.
and Sweden, while in Great Britain, Spain, Austria, France, and e Western part of Germany ere is a more or less perceptible decrease in is respect. The post-communist countries include countries wi some of e highest degrees of religiousness in Europe (Poland, Romania, Croatia) as well as some of e lowest values for is parameter (Slovenia and Czech Republic). There are certain differences between post-communist and oer European countries wi regard to expectations and hopes regarding e social and cultural role of e Church. The highest shares of respondents in Romania (74.7%), Liuania (74.4%), e Ukraine (63.1%), and Poland (62.7%) feel at e Church can contribute significantly to solving e moral, family, spiritual, and social problems of society. Among e most skeptical about e role of e Church in solving ese problems are: e Eastern part of Germany (27.6%), Bulgaria (33.9%), Czech Republic (36.4%), Estonia (38.5%). In e middle range of e scale are Hungary (42.3%), Belarus (44.5%), Slovenia (46.8%), Latvia (52.8%), Russia (55.1%), Slovakia (59.7%), and Croatia (60%). The decade since e beginning of democratic changes has been marked in most countries by e loss of trust, by crisis and concussion in e changing institutions and spheres at are e support of collective and individual identities, i.e. e state, e school system, e judiciary, culture, e armed forces. This was one more cause for e trend of rechanneling e need for security and stability of e individual and society toward religion and e Church, a traditional institution less liable to abrupt changes and shocks. Hence arose higher trust in e Church (compared wi oer institutions) in most post-communist countries an in most West European ones. The citizens of Austria, France, Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Spain, Denmark indicate smaller degrees of trust in eir respective Churches an 5 in oer public institutions, as evidenced by e European Values Study of 1999. According to e data of at survey, in most post-communist countries (wi e exception of Estonia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and e Eastern part of Germany), people place greater trust in e Church an in oer institutions. This difference is particularly perceptible in Romania, e Ukraine, Croatia, Slovakia, and Russia. Of course, comprised in e sum total of people wi increased religiousness, ere is a percentage of people for whom e change in religious behavior stems from a deep personal change, from spiritual grow, and is closely connected wi a specific religious experience of 5 Tomka, M. Tendances de la religiosité, p. 547. RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 4 (AUGUST 2004) page 6.
e sacred. But such change and grow, which arrange e entire life world of a person around God and e sacred, are usually slow and painful; ey are accessible to only a few. This is what studies of religiousness in Western countries have shown. When mass public changes and trends in e religious sphere are considered--changes at have occurred in a comparatively brief period of time (from a few mons to several years), serious analysis and argumentation is necessary before such phenomena can be defined as specifically religious. This line of reasoning is supported by findings of sociological surveys on religiousness in e 6 post-communist countries. A survey carried out in e spring of 1998 shows at e percentage of deeply religious or definitely religious respondents represents a relatively small share of e total number of people defining emselves as religious. The percentage is smallest in Germany (2.1%), in e Ukraine (3.8%), in Slovenia (5.1%); it is largest in Croatia (33.3%), in Hungary (22.6%), and in Poland (19.5%). Wi its 12% of deeply 7 religious respondents, registered in a 1994 study, Bulgaria is situated around e middle of e scale, togeer wi Romania and Slovakia. Most of e people who identify emselves as religious place emselves in e categories marked by hesitation and vagueness: religious to a certain degree, neier religious, nor non-religious, somewhat non-religious. In Liuania is category amounts to 89.1%, in Slovenia to 83.3%, in Romania 81.6%, in Poland 77%. Past studies at were detailed enough to permit substantial analysis of is type of hesitant fai have usually registered e respondents lack of knowledge of religious doctrine, eir acceptance of only part of e religious fundamentals, lack of interest in or consistent observance of church rituals, lack of correspondence between religious convictions and daily behavior, etc. The highest degrees of such characteristics have been registered in 8 Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Hungary. Actually ese trends are typical for most West European countries; scholars have pointed out as eir major causes e individualization of fai, freedom of belief, e breakup of collective identities supported by traditional religions, etc. 6 Tomka, M. Religion, Church, State and Civil Society in East-Central Europe. In Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe. Krakow, 1999, p. 45. 7 Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria. Sofia, 1994, p. 216. 8 Borowik, I. Between Orodoxy and Eclecticism: On e Religious Transformations of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraina. In Social Compass, vol. 49, N4, 2002, pp. 499-500; Zrinscak, S. Roles, attentes et conflits: la religion et les Eglises dans les sociétés en transition, p. 511, In: Ibid. RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 4 (AUGUST 2004) page 7.
The cited data do not provide sufficient grounds for any categorical division between European countries as regards e processes and trends in religions and churches. Togeer wi is, ere are differences wiin e group itself of e post-communist countries, distinctions at can hardly be accounted for by purely religious or confessional factors. For instance, bo e highest and lowest degrees of religiousness have been registered among some Caolic and some Orodox countries. The same is true for e levels of trust in Churches. The highest degrees of trust has been registered in Caolic Croatia and in Orodox Romania, while e lowest have been indicated in Caolic Slovenia and Czech Republic, and in Orodox Bulgaria. These facts cast doubt on e veracity of analyses at draw dividing lines based on e observed religious changes between countries wi a developed democracy as opposed to post-communist countries, secularized vs. de-secularized cultures, Orodox vs. Caolic countries, etc. Religious-Political Synesis Preserving e monopoly of a predominant religious confession over oer, minority religions in a country represents an important line of interaction between religion and politics in post-communist countries. The more strongly e enic-politic project of e predominant enos is connected wi at group s religious predominance, e more effective and excluding for minority religions is e interaction between religion and politics. Alough 9 religious intolerance is considered typical mostly for Orodox countries, it is also characteristic of Caolicism in ose countries where religion has become interwoven wi e nation-state, e.g. Poland and Croatia. In all ese countries e traditional churches require state political support in order to preserve and enhance eir social positions and restrict e competition of e new religious movements. The latter represent a growing challenge to e conservative aspects of traditional religions: e new movements offer more modern religious ideas and practices, and a more emotional and attractive form of communication. Alough in constitutional and legal terms e freedom of religious belief and religious communities has been declared in post-communist countries, in fact in most of em e religions of e minorities and e new religious movements are in a disadvantaged position. A more 9 Ibid., p. 41. RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 4 (AUGUST 2004) page 8.
complicated procedure for registration and performing activities has been established for em an for e traditional confessions. In e countries where, for various reasons (mostly rooted in e distant or recent past of eir traditional confessions) religion and e church have failed to become a consolidating social force, ey are not attracting strong public interest and trust. Such is e position in e Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In Bulgaria e line of cleavage in society since e start of reforms was not enic-based but political, hence religious differences (especially between Orodoxy and Islam) never became a basis for mutual aggression and contention. The prevalence of political strife over religious-enic differences is evident in e political divisions wiin e Orodox community itself: e formation and opposition between e two synods of e Bulgarian Orodox Church reflected and resulted from e political-party division wiin society at large. Historically e bearer of strong pan-orodox and imperial traditions, after e social changes e Russian Orodox Church proved to be a suitable support for e presidential institution and a reviver of e worn-out foundations of Russian consciousness and selfesteem. Unlike e case of most oer post-communist countries, where e increase of religiousness was usually among e older population, in Russia (1991-57%, 1996-75%) 10 religious feelings extended to a large share of young and educated people. Alough it has no serious impact on e electoral or political behavior of e faiful, affiliation wi Orodoxy is often an indicator of e prevalent auoritarian political preferences. 11 Analyzing e social-political dimensions of contemporary Russian religiousness, e sociologist of religion E. Zweerde points out at e growing interest in religion is largely due to e desire for a more egalitarian, less fragmented society at seeks a basis for 12 consolidation in religion. We are drawn to e same conclusion when analyzing e religious attitudes of some believers, attitudes marked by hesitation, vague expectations, ignorance of and failure to practice some fundamental elements of e doctrinal and ritual aspect of Orodoxy. The expectations at Russian Orodoxy will play a consolidating role for society and e lack of an equally influential rival religion preclude e modern functioning of 10 White, S., I. McAllister. Orodoxy and Political Behavior in Postcommunist Russia. In Review of Religious Research, vol. 41, No. 3, 2000, p. 362. 11 Ibid., p.370. 12 Zweerde, E. Civil Society and Orodox Christianity, p. 37. RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 4 (AUGUST 2004) page 9.
religion in e structuring of Russian political space. The formation on a voluntary basis of various religious communities and eir equal footing in e activities of civil society is part of e modern liberal-democratic project. Russian society, particularly e state and e political sphere in Russia, are still conservative and restrictive in eir attitudes to religious variety, to e religious market in e country (e new Law on Religion demonstrates 13 is). This is still a mono-religious society, insensitive and intolerant to religious variety and, consequently, is still unprepared to become part of e global civil society. The Churches in post-communist countries need e support of e state and legislature and are dependent on e state as regards two oer important issues: e restoration of ecclesiastic property rights and e introduction of religious teaching in school. The teaching of religion in school has been introduced in some countries (Poland, Romania, Croatia), alough it has met wi mixed reactions and reservation on e part of public opinion. In oer countries (e Ukraine, Belarus, Slovenia), in harmony wi e prevalent attitudes, a general discipline religious studies or religion has been introduced as an 14 optional discipline; e situation in Bulgaria is similar. These complicated and contradictory tendencies in e relationship between church and e secular sphere of government and politics, provoke ambivalent public valuations and hopes concerning religious revival. Feelings range from excessive expectations and entrusting religion wi important social functions, to accusations of loss of religious ideals-- more specifically, at religion remains enclosed in conservative clericalism instead of performing its mission of spiritual and moral consolidation of society. On e oer hand, in some extreme forms of e synesis between religion and enos or religion and politics, religion seems to play a role at is alien to it, but which is assigned to it due to e weakness and immaturity of oer social subjects and institutions such as e state, political parties, secular ideologies, civil society. The development and modernization of e latter will probably place religions and e Churches in eir specific place, at of forms of spirituality and social communion which, in eir various social activities, are guided by eir own specific motivation and eos. 13 Elliot, M., S. Corrado. The 1997 Russian Law on Religion e Impact on Protestants. In Religion, State and Society, vol. 27, No. 1, 1999 14 Borowik, I. Religion and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Paradoxes of Transformations. in Church-State Relations, p. 17. RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 4 (AUGUST 2004) page 10.