Traditional Morality and Utilitarianism Chapter 16, Kai Nielsen Introduction to Ethics Professor Douglas Olena
Conservatism or Absolutism Utilitarianism is accused of having monstrous implications. Opposed to this is conservatism or absolutism which maintains there is a set of privileged moral principles that are not questionable. 143 One of these principles is that It is always wrong to kill an innocent human, whatever the consequences of not doing so.
Consequentialism 143 I will argue that such moral conservatism is itself unjustified and, indeed, has morally unacceptable consequences, while consequentialism does not have implications which are morally monstrous and does not contain evident moral mistakes.
Argument 143 Kai Nielsen argues that in the case of a just war the possibility that one must kill innocents to save lives is justifiable. The case of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan proves this. When considered that 1,000,000 American lives were not destroyed in a plausibly estimated ground campaign in Japan, the use of the bombs saved lives, though at the cost of innocent Japanese lives.
Argument 144 Dropping the charge of moral corruption but sticking with the moral issue about what actions are right, is it not the case that my consequentialist position logically forces me to conclude that under some circumstances I must not only countenance but actually advocate violence toward the innocent? In the face of this proposal moral conservatism would retreat to an absolutist position. Nielsen asks the question whether one must never allow the possibility to raise a question about such privileged pronouncements.
Case 1: The Innocent Fat Man 145 My first exemplary tale was designed to show that our normal, immediate, rather absolutist moral reactions need to be questioned along with such principles as The direct intention of the death of an innocent person is never justifiable. His argument suggests that an absolutist position is not justifiable and consequentialism can not be rejected out of hand.
Case 2: The Magistrate and the Mob 145 Nielsen will show in the case of the threatening mob that the consequentialist should stick with commonsense moral convictions for such cases.
Case 2: The Magistrate and the Mob 145, 146 The morally conscientious utilitarian will opt for letting the mob do what it wants to do and not murder the innocent man to allay the mob reaction. This is the answer conservatism would give, but for different reasons.
Case 2: The Magistrate and the Mob 146 The consequentialist could argue consistently that murdering the innocent man would be the right thing to do in each case of its kind, but the negative effect on the judicial system when the truth about this judicial killing came out would prove to be a more lasting damage to justice and community peace than letting the mob do what it will in the case at hand.
Case 2: The Magistrate and the Mob Consequentialism can come to the same conclusion as the moral absolutist in cases like this. What a consequentialist can not do is admit that in every case the innocent life must be preserved.
Case 1: The Innocent Fat Man 148 This case brings up the issue of whether commonsense moral rules can in every case function as moral facts or a kind of moral ground to test the adequacy of normative ethical theories or positions. Nielsen answers negatively in this case. Commonsense moral rules can not act as moral facts or a moral ground for testing theories.
Case 1: The Innocent Fat Man 149 Nielsen agrees that blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is still more monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here. And if commonsense moral convictions cannot agree to this, then commonsense moral convictions are evading the issue at hand.
Wrap it Up 149, 150 It is the utmost social utility that such bans against killing the innocent not be called into question in any practical manner by consequentialist reasoning. My point was to specify the situations in which we ought to override out commonsense moral convictions about those matters, and the contexts in which we are not so justified or at least in which it is not clear which course of action is justified.