UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA Manuel de Jesus Ortega Melendres, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. CV 0--PHX-GMS Phoenix, Arizona November, 0 : p.m. 0 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW (Motion Hearing) 0 Court Reporter: Gary Moll 0 W. Washington Street, SPC # Phoenix, Arizona 00 (0) - Proceedings taken by stenographic court reporter Transcript prepared by computer-aided transcription

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing A P P E A R A N C E S 0 0 For the Plaintiffs: American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants' Rights Project By: Cecillia D. Wang, Esq. Drumm Street San Francisco, California American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona By: Daniel J. Pochoda, Esq. P.O. Box Phoenix, Arizona 0 Covington & Burling, LLP By: Stanley Young, Esq. By: Michelle L. Morin, Esq. Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 00 Redwood Shores, California 0 For the Defendant Maricopa County: Walker & Peskind, PLLC By: Richard K. Walker, Esq. SGA Corporate Center 00 N. th Street, Suite 0 Phoenix, Arizona For the Defendant Joseph M. Arpaio and Maricopa County Sheriff's Office: Iafrate & Associates By: Michele M. Iafrate, Esq. N. nd Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 00 Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC By: A. Melvin McDonald, Jr., Esq. By: John T. Masterson, Esq. By: Joseph T. Popolizio, Esq. 0 N. Central Avenue, Suite 00 Phoenix, Arizona 0 For the Movants Christine Stutz and Thomas P. Liddy: Broening, Oberg, Woods & Wilson, PC By: Terrence P. Woods, Esq. P.O. Box 0 Phoenix, Arizona 0

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing A P P E A R A N C E S 0 For the Intervenor United States of America: U.S. Department of Justice - Civil Rights Division By: Maureen Johnston, Esq. 0 D. Street NW, #0 Washington, D.C. 000 For Executive Chief Brian Sands: Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP By: M. Craig Murdy, Esq. N. Central Avenue, Suite 00 Phoenix, Arizona 0 Also present: Mr. Michael Zullo 0

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing P R O C E E D I N G S 0 0 THE COURT: Please be seated. THE CLERK: This is CV 0-, Melendres, et al., v. Arpaio, et al., on for oral argument. Counsel, please announce your appearances. MR. YOUNG: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Stanley Young, Covington & Burling, for plaintiffs. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. POCHODA: Dan Pochoda, ACLU of Arizona, for plaintiffs. MR. ZULLO: Michael Zullo representing Michael Zullo. THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Zullo. MS. IAFRATE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Michele Iafrate on behalf of Sheriff Arpaio and the alleged nonparty contemnors. MR. WOODS: Your Honor, I'm Terry Woods. I'm representing nonparties Stutz and Liddy. MR. MURDY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Craig Murdy on behalf of retired Chief Sands. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MS. JOHNSTON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Maureen Johnston on behalf of the United States. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. WALKER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is ::0 :: :: :: ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 Richard Walker on behalf of Maricopa County. THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Walker. Do we have anybody else on the line? MS. WANG: Yes, Your Honor. It's Cecillia Wang from the ACLU for plaintiffs. Good afternoon. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. McDONALD: Your Honor, Mel McDonald making a special appearance for Sheriff Joe Arpaio. MR. MASTERSON: Good afternoon, Judge. John Masterson, Joe Popolizio for Sheriff Arpaio and the individual contemnors. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MS. MORIN: Good afternoon. This is Michelle Morin with Covington for plaintiffs. THE COURT: Good afternoon. Do we have everybody who's on the phone? All right. Mr. Zullo, you've been in court before? MR. ZULLO: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay. I usually have folks come up right here to this podium to address me. And as I said, this is your motion for protective order, so you get the first and the last chance to address me, so please -- please do so. MR. ZULLO: This it? This one? THE COURT: It is. Thank you. MR. ZULLO: Your Honor, obviously, I'm not an ::0 :: ::0 :: ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 attorney. Obviously, there is probably little chance that I'm going to win against arguing those guys. And also, at the risk of at this juncture having to represent myself, I don't want to venture off into that gray area of testifying and not knowing I'm testifying, so what I'd like to do is just read a statement -- THE COURT: You may do so. MR. ZULLO: -- to the Court. Thank you. Your Honor, this Court has said a number of times on the record that the Court is considering referencing this matter to the U.S. Attorney, and even has gone as far as inviting them into the courtroom. The Court has invited Raphael Gomez into this courtroom, someone intimately familiar with Mr. Montgomery. Couple that with the ACLU's threatening claims; the U.S. Attorney, to my understanding, not interested in giving me even a hint of immunity, even though I didn't make that request; you, yourself, Your Honor, stating on the record that you're not inclined to grant me any type of immunity, I believe I have some serious, legitimate Fifth Amendment and due-process concerns. In accordance with the ruling by the Supreme Court in U.S. versus Hubbell, even turning over a list that identifies, even with reasonable particularity, which is what I would testify to if I was compelled to testify, if forced to :: ::0 :: ::0 ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 testify, would be a violation of my Fifth Amendment rights. Just the production of a list has already violated my constitutional rights under Hubbell. The Court has already violated U.S. v. Hubbell by instructing lawyers who do not represent me, and knowing they do not represent me, as the record will show, instructing them to compile and turn over a list of documents that, in effect, may be used against me. In light of this fact, I am asking the Court to please stay my portion of this proceeding until I can secure competent counsel to address this very complex matter before any other violations of my due process rights may occur. I met with counsel, Your Honor, within hours of finding out I didn't have counsel. I have been forced to take a pro se position because I've learned I have no representation. It should also be noted that Mr. Tim Casey has submitted a bill to Maricopa County in the sum of $,000 for legal expense reimbursement for the cost incurred by him as merely being a witness and merely testifying in this case. Mr. Casey is a lawyer, one who I'm sure is able to defend himself; I'm not. I simply cannot afford the cost of this type of complex representation. I have asked the County to provide me counsel, to their defense yesterday at around noon, informal, written form, and I had not heard back from them with :: :: :: ::0 ::0

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 their decision. The situation has been created by the hands of the ACLU and their attorneys. Your Honor, I would also like to point out that the measure set for me and others contained in the ACLU's threatening footnote that's at the issue of this, they have in fact ensnared themselves and every other lawyer in the courtroom. They, too, along with every other lawyer in this courtroom, would have to be held to the same standard of violation that the ACLU wishes to affix to me and the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office. Your Honor, I see no harm in proceeding with your case and at least holding my testimony in abeyance until I'm allowed ample time to get this matter under control. I have just not been afforded adequate time. Your Honor, the least you can do is grant me more days to secure counsel and please stay your decision, and not require me to be deposed or testify until I could secure adequate representation and get a full understanding of the circumstances. Should you decide today, Your Honor, to rule against me, I'm going to find myself thrust again into a situation that I don't want to be in and one not of my making where I'm going to have no other option but to appeal pro se, pro se to the Ninth Circuit asking for an emergency stay on the matter, something I don't want to do. :0:0 :0: :0:0 :0: ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 I have due process rights, and I think I have grave concerns, and I think my rights need to be recognized and abided by. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Zullo. Does anybody from plaintiffs wish to respond? MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I think we've said everything we want or need to say in our previous papers, which I did e-mail to Mr. Zullo on Tuesday. We think that the Court needs to proceed. Mr. Zullo is a witness, not a party in this action, and in order to complete the proceeding that the Court is in the middle of, I think we need to proceed. THE COURT: Thank you. Does any other party have anything they wish to say? MR. WALKER: Your Honor, this is Richard Walker. I just wanted to advise the Court that Mr. Zullo is correct: He sent a letter requesting that the County provide counsel to me yesterday. I responded to that letter -- it was probably around o'clock or :0, so Mr. Zullo had probably left his computer -- and tried to explain in some considerable detail why the County does not believe he is entitled to be provided counsel at taxpayer expense. THE COURT: Do you want to summarize that for us here today, Mr. Walker, please. MR. WALKER: Certainly, Your Honor. :: :: ::0 :: ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 0 I think that the key issues are, first of all, as things presently stand, Mr. Zullo is not -- has no civil claim asserted against him, and that also distinguishes him from the named contemnors, who have been threatened with the possibility of civil contempt. And the institutional representation that Jones, Skelton provides, from the County's perspective, provides representation of employees, and under certain circumstances, including ones applicable to Mr. Zullo, agents of MCSO, for purposes of the institutional interest, but not as individuals. And my letter also explains that he may have been led to a misconception by the fact that the alleged contemnors have individual counsel. To the extent that those attorneys have been retained to provide advice on potential criminal issues, however, they have not been provided by the County; those attorneys have been retained by the individuals themselves at their expense. And that is a standard policy of the County: not to provide counsel for purposes of advice on potential criminal matters. With respect to Mr. Zullo's comments about Mr. Casey's bill, it is true, I learned, I think it was either yesterday or maybe even this morning, that Mr. Casey had submitted a bill seeking reimbursement for the ethics counsel he retained in connection with his appearance as a witness in this case. I can inform the Court that this was in the wake of :: :: :: :: ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 his having been informed by the Maricopa County Attorney's Office that his request for reimbursement was being denied, and my understanding of his letter is essentially that he's appealing that decision to the Board of Supervisors. THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Walker. Does anybody else, any other party or specially appearing nonparty, have anything they wish to say? I take it by the silence the answer is no. Now, Mr. Zullo, it's your motion, so as I explained at the start, you get the opportunity first to speak and you get the opportunity last to speak, and so I'll hear from you again if you wish to say something. MR. ZULLO: Thank you, Your Honor. I am -- I'm not a naive guy. I was a sworn police officer at one time in my life. I've testified in courts; I've testified before grand juries; I've put people in prison. I'm not stupid. I didn't get anything wrong in representations made to me. I understand the splitting hairs. Before I turned over what's at issue today, I made it emphatically clear I needed to know who was representing me and what was going to be done with it, and I was told. It wasn't followed through. I find myself in a position where I don't want to hold your court up. It's not that I don't want to cooperate; I just have some very serious, serious concerns. And I don't believe that footnote should have ever been entered into this :: :: :: :: ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 proceeding, but it has been, and I'm very concerned about it; personally, I am very concerned about it. I'm concerned about it for my family. And Your Honor, I want to make sure that I'm not wandering off here, so if I am I'm going to ask you to please corral me. But I don't want to mislead this Court. My testimony will not support the Court's hypothesis. It just will not. So there's no delaying tactic here. I just want my rights protected. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Zullo, I am going to deny your motion for protective order. Let me explain why. And I'm also going to deny your motion for a stay. You've kind of mixed the two, it's completely understandable. I'm going to explain why in both cases. I've already denied your motion for a stay once, but I'll explain it again why I'm doing that. First, as it pertains to your motion for protective order, you did cite some good law, and let me just say that you've done a very fine job in terms -- I mean, I'm not saying that you shouldn't get a lawyer, lawyers are always better, but you've done a fine job in putting forth your legal argument and you even, I think, put forth the appropriate case to make the best claim. And the case is the Hubbell case. And what the Hubbell case says is that even the act of producing documents, :: :: :: ::0 ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 to the extent that you're acknowledging that you had the documents, to the extent that that suggests that you had the documents and you created them, there is at least some aspect of that that could be incriminating. And that is what the case says, and you were right to cite it in terms of the facts of this case. There are a couple of exceptions to Hubbell, though, and I think that they both apply here, and I'll give you a brief explanation and then I'm going to file a written order today that will explain my explanation, and that will assist you to the extent that you may seek emergency relief. You indicated you don't want to do that. I understand you don't want to do it. But to the extent that a written explanation of my order is set forth, that may help you in doing it. The first is even if Mr. Masterson and Mr. Popolizio were your lawyers, even if they were your lawyers, when you turn the documents over to them and they are subpoenaed, and they are the ones who have to produce them, you lose any sort of testimonial aspect because you're not the ones that's producing them, and that's set forth in the Fisher case. So even if they were your lawyers when you turned the documents over to them, because they're being subpoenaed for them, there is no criminal aspect -- or no self-incriminating aspect to it because they're the ones that's producing them, not you. The second reason you'll see that I'm going to deny :: :: :: ::0 ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 your order is even though persons have a right to say, My mere production of these documents incriminates me, they don't when they are people who are working for a recognized organization. And it is my ruling, and I'm basing it on some responses that you gave to document production requests, that I think the term you used was that you were individually activated, not as a member of the Cold -- you know, not the whole Cold Case -- MR. ZULLO: Um-hum. THE COURT: -- Posse was individually activated, but that you personally were individually activated by the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office when you went to Seattle. And so the things that you have done and the documents you've created in pursuit of the Seattle investigation are documents that are created for the MCSO, and that doesn't give you a personal right to claim self-incrimination as a result of them, at least those are going to be my two rulings, and I'm going to -- as I said, I'm going to set that forth in writing so that you can have it in pursuing whatever emergency relief you feel like you need to pursue. I hope that will assist you. I'm also going to deny your request for a stay. And even though I understand, and, to some extent, have sympathy for the situation you're in, it looks to me like you became aware even -- and I realize that there may be a factual dispute between you and Mr. Masterson and Mr. Popolizio about what you may have been told or what your understanding was, but even :0: :0:0 :0: ::0 ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 accepting your version of events, you were told unequivocally that you weren't represented by them on October 0th or st, so I've already kind of postponed the proceeding to allow you to seek to obtain an attorney. We're now, what? It's the th of November. You are not a party to this case, meaning that I haven't indicated that I have any civil contempt contentions against you, let alone any criminal contempt assertions against you. Now, that does not mean -- and you're perfectly correct -- that doesn't mean that the United States Government may not choose to prosecute you. I can't say that; I don't know that. But I also feel, after looking at the statutes at issue, that I don't just have free-form ability to go around granting immunity to people. There has to be a motion from the United States Government; they have to go through a whole process to do that; they've indicated they're not going to do that. You indicated you wanted counsel from Maricopa County. But Maricopa County has indicated now for some time, and they've just reiterated, that they are not going to pay for you to have counsel because you're not -- I haven't noticed you as somebody who I'm interested in any sort of criminal referral and you're not a subject of the civil contempt motion, and so you're really not a party to this case. You suggested that I have a hypothesis, and I :: ::0 ::0 :: ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 understand that you may feel that way. But what I'm really trying to do is hold a hearing where I can have all the facts and from those facts determine what happened, and sometimes maybe what happened isn't even really relevant to what I'm really looking at, which is remedies -- which is whether or not there's a contempt, and what the remedies need to be. Again, it seems to me that you have relevant information that may cut one way or the other, and if it doesn't cut the way that you perceive that I want it to cut, that doesn't matter. It is relevant information and I'm going to listen to it; I'm going to give it as much credence as I give everybody else's. That being said, that does not mean that you still don't have your Fifth Amendment rights, and whether or not you have an attorney you can invoke those rights, and I'm not trying to suggest that you can't invoke those rights, and it's up to you and/or your counsel to determine whether or not you should invoke those rights in any given circumstance, and so I'm going to leave that to you. I do believe that we've already -- and so I'm going to order -- Mr. Masterson, Mr. Popolizio, are you there? MR. MASTERSON: This is John Masterson, Judge. We're here. THE COURT: All right. I am going to order you to turn over the documents that you've been holding today, as you :: :: :: ::0 ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 indicated you would, to all other parties in this action. Mr. Zullo, I think you've already indicated that you had Monday free to be deposed. Is that the date that we've set for the deposition? MR. YOUNG: We have noticed that date, Your Honor, and we do intend to take it starting at :00 a.m. on Monday. THE COURT: All right. That doesn't present you, Mr. Zullo, if you want, from having an attorney to represent you there. It doesn't prevent you from having an attorney to represent you here. As I've indicated, whether or not you feel like you're able to hire an attorney, that also does not prevent your invocation, in appropriate circumstances, of your Fifth Amendment rights. Fifth Amendment rights do have to implicate -- do have to be related to some sort of legitimate concern of criminal prosecution. But you've already set forth the footnote which you've indicated causes you concern, and I understand that it does cause you concern. I am aware that the United States has not -- has indicated that it has no intention of granting you any immunity, so I understand that concern. But beyond that, you need do make that decision yourself or you need to make it in conjunction with an attorney. Do you understand what I'm -- MR. ZULLO: Yes, sir. THE COURT: -- saying? :: :: :: ::0 ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 MR. ZULLO: I do understand. THE COURT: All right. Do you have any other questions that other counsel here might assist you in answering? MR. ZULLO: It's very difficult, Your Honor, for me to communicate anywhere, because I don't have an attorney. So I'm going to ask you a question and if you can't answer it, I understand. THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to prevent you from asking me a question, but I am going to tell you that as a judge I'm prohibited from practicing law, meaning that I won't be able to give you legal advice. MR. ZULLO: Okay. THE COURT: But, you know, I will try to make things as clear to you as I can within the realm of that limitation. MR. ZULLO: As far as my deposition is concerned, is there a process or a negotiation that could take place that would streamline that deposition to the relevant matters that are before you and not a broad-based fishing expedition? THE COURT: Well, I think what you can do is raise your concerns with the parties and/or your objections with the parties. If I have to rule on objections, I have sentencings all day on Monday but I can try to take any objections or concerns and rule on them either at the end of the day or at noon; or, if we need to, first thing on Tuesday morning, to ::0 :: :: :: ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 resume the deposition. But my suggestion to you, Mr. Zullo, would be if you have concerns of that nature, and if you're comfortable doing so, you can explain them to the parties who are at your deposition and see if they will agree to streamline their questions in a way that you anticipate; and if they won't, then you can take appropriate action based on the individual questions that you're asked. But even though it's always better to have an attorney -- and I'm not trying to suggest that it isn't, for reasons that I think you already know -- simply because you don't have an attorney does not mean that you don't have constitutional rights. MR. ZULLO: Oh, I understand that, sir. THE COURT: All right. And you do have the right to assert those in appropriate circumstances. MR. ZULLO: Yes, sir. THE COURT: All right. Anything else that anybody would like to bring up? MR. WOODS: Briefly, Your Honor. Your Honor, the parties have indicated that they're not going to call either of my clients as witnesses in this hearing, and so while I want to remain on the mailing list, you won't be seeing me any more, for that reason. THE COURT: All right. Thank you for letting me know :: ::0 :: :: ::

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 0 that, Mr. Woods. MR. WOODS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Young? MR. YOUNG: Yes, Your Honor. We do have a scheduling issue, and it relates to the discussion we've had as to the sequence of witnesses. We have three witnesses left, to my knowledge: Captain Skinner, Chief Sheridan, and Mr. Zullo. Because we are planning to take Mr. Zullo's deposition on Monday and his deposition transcript, which hopefully would speed things along, I don't think is going to be ready on Tuesday morning, it would be our proposal that Captain Skinner and Chief Sheridan, in whatever order defendants want, testify, and then we have Mr. Zullo after them. We did ask Ms. Iafrate earlier this afternoon about Chief Sheridan's condition, and I'm not sure about that at this point, so I think I would perhaps ask counsel for defendants whether that would be acceptable to them and ask the Court whether it would be acceptable for the Court to proceed in that sequence. THE COURT: All right. I'll indicate that it is acceptable to the Court to proceed in that sequence -- I believe I raised it as a possibility -- recognizing that there may be other obstacles to it that the parties might work out. Mr. Masterson, Mr. Popolizio, do you have any concerns? :: :: :: :: ::0

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 MR. MASTERSON: Well, Judge, I do have a concern. We're going to be prepared to have Captain Skinner testify as early as Tuesday, but I think that the plaintiffs are going to have the transcript of that deposition. We've been getting them the same day, as I recall, that the depositions are taken, we get them late in the day, and certainly no later than the following morning. So I don't want to have another gap, but I want to give as much time for Chief Sheridan to testify as possible. So we were looking at Chief Sheridan late Thursday or possibly on Friday, so I think Mr. Zullo ought to be able to testify between Captain Skinner and Chief Sheridan. THE COURT: Well, it doesn't seem to me to be -- Mr. Young's request that they have an ability to get the deposition back and look at it doesn't seem to me to be unreasonable. Of course, to the extent that there are issues pertaining to the availability of Chief Sheridan, those don't seem to me to be unreasonable, either, at least on their face, if you're representing to me that they in fact do exist. So maybe what we better do is plan to proceed with Captain Skinner first thing Tuesday morning and then see where we're at when Captain Skinner's testimony is over. You indicated that you thought he might take up to three hours, Mr. Masterson? MR. MASTERSON: I think that's right, Judge. Probably :: :: :00:0 :00: :00:

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 not more than that. We're still going over outlines and such, and I think we've -- we're probably somewhere in the vicinity of between two and three right now. THE COURT: All right. Well, I would ask you to do this, then. I'm going to ask you to do something; I'm going to ask Mr. Young to do something. I'm going to ask you, Mr. Masterson, to check with Chief Deputy Sheridan, see if there is any possibility that he would be able to proceed Tuesday afternoon if we're available and then reconvene Thursday morning. If that is possible, that's what I would like to do. If it's not possible, I'm going to ask you, Mr. Young, to check and see if Mr. Zullo would be available to come in Tuesday afternoon, and if that's going to at all be possible for you, if you can make arrangements to do that. So the first order of business is Mr. Masterson, you check with Chief Deputy Sheridan to ascertain his availability for Tuesday afternoon. If he's not available, Mr. Young, check with Mr. Zullo and with the court reporter to see if it's available physically and otherwise for you to proceed with Mr. Zullo Tuesday afternoon. If that's not available, then we'll just have to proceed with one or the other on Thursday morning and proceed as that goes on Friday. And if we have to go on Saturday, I'll see if I can make arrangements to go on Saturday, so that we :00: :0:0 :0: :0: :0:

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 can be as efficient as possible. Any concerns about that proceeding? MS. WANG: No, Your Honor. We'll try our best. THE COURT: Mr. Masterson? MR. MASTERSON: No concerns, Judge. THE COURT: All right. MR. YOUNG: We have another issue, which is exhibits. We have inquired repeatedly of defendants whether there are any exhibits that they plan to introduce as part of their case, since I think we would be entitled to get a list and to get copies of them. We have not received a response. Our assumption based on that is that there are no exhibits that defendants intend to produce and we would seek the Court's guidance on that, and obviously an answer from defendants as well. THE COURT: Mr. Masterson. MR. MASTERSON: Judge, I'm just sitting here looking across the room, and I thought we had sent them but we're poised to send exhibits out right now, so we're going to be sending some their way here as soon as we get off the phone. MR. WALKER: Your Honor, this -- MR. MASTERSON: And I'll tell you, there's not a whole bunch of them. MR. WALKER: Your Honor, this is Richard Walker. I anticipate having two exhibits on behalf of the :0:0 :0: :0: :0: :0:0

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 County, and I should be able to send those out by tomorrow. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Walker, you indicated that you may or may not call witnesses. Have you been able to arrive at any determination with the plaintiffs as to whether or not that's going to be necessary? MR. WALKER: No, I haven't, Your Honor, and I wouldn't expect that. I'm sure they -- they will want to see these exhibits first. And once they see them, I'm hopeful that they will give me the stipulations I need so that I don't have to call the witnesses. THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm really going to be very pinched, as I've indicated, on Monday; you're going to be in deposition, anyway. But if there are matters that need to be raised, I should be available around noon and after :00, so we can take up matters then, or, if need be, Tuesday morning. But otherwise, I'm going to expect that in any event, we are going to be begin with Captain Skinner first thing on Tuesday morning. Anything else? MR. YOUNG: Yes, Your Honor. MS. WANG: Your Honor, this is -- MR. YOUNG: Ms. Wang has a point that she will raise. THE COURT: All right. Ms. Wang? MS. WANG: Thank you, Your Honor. On October th during court we raised a few issues about the proposed subject :0: :0: :0: :0: :0:

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 matters for Chief Sheridan's testimony in defendants' case in chief, and specifically we discussed first the relevance of any testimony by Chief Deputy Sheridan on training provided by the United States Government to MCSO deputies back when they were certified under the (g) program. And secondly, Your Honor, we also raised an objection to defendants putting on any duplicative testimony by Chief Sheridan. Many of the topics that they described in the joint pretrial statement are matters on which there was already comprehensive testimony by Chief Sheridan during our case in chief. So Your Honor, I've written to defendants to try to seek clarification on whether they have revised their intentions on Chief Sheridan's testimony, I have not heard back from them, and so I would seek the Court's guidance as to whether Your Honor would entertain a motion in limine or whether you would prefer that we raise objections as we go along during the direct examination of Chief Sheridan. THE COURT: Well, I think we have killed a lot of trees in this case; we'll probably kill more. I don't think we need a new motion in limine. I think I indicated that I don't see the relevance of Chief Deputy Sheridan's attempts to testify that the United States Government instructed them concerning the ability to use race as one factor among others in their (g) training. :0:0 :0: :0: :0: :0:0

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 That being said, I have always said, and so found in my original findings of fact and conclusions of law -- about which, by the way, I already have entered the findings of fact and conclusions of law, which have been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit -- that such training was provided by Immigration and Customs Enforcement to the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, and that they followed and promulgated such training in their subsequent instructions to their own patrol deputies personnel. So Mr. Masterson, I'm not really going to be willing to entertain a lot on this. If you feel like fairness requires that it be brought out, it can be brought out about to the extent I've just bought it out. But this matter has already been litigated; there have already been findings of fact; those findings of fact have been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Do you intend to dwell on it very long, Mr. Masterson? MR. MASTERSON: Judge, I don't intend to dwell on it very long, and in fact, I'm really happy right now this is kind of the first time that anybody's said that out loud for everyone to hear. And so I do not intend to dwell on it, and I think we can -- and we're certainly not going to try to duplicate testimony that we've already brought forward through Chief Sheridan or other witnesses. THE COURT: All right. So I guess in answer to your question, Ms. Wang: Why don't we save trees? If you have objections, you can make them during Chief Deputy Sheridan's :0: :0: :0: :0: :0:

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing 0 0 testimony. MS. WANG: Thank you, Your Honor. We'll go forward that way. THE COURT: Anything else that anybody needs to raise? All right. I'll see you Tuesday morning. (Proceedings concluded at :0 p.m.) :0:

Melendres v. Arpaio, // Motion Hearing C E R T I F I C A T E 0 I, GARY MOLL, do hereby certify that I am duly appointed and qualified to act as Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. I FURTHER CERTIFY that the foregoing pages constitute a full, true, and accurate transcript of all of that portion of the proceedings contained herein, had in the above-entitled cause on the date specified therein, and that said transcript was prepared under my direction and control. DATED at Phoenix, Arizona, this th day of November, 0. 0 s/gary Moll