The Rise of ISIS Colonel (Ret.) Peter R. Mansoor, PhD Gen. Raymond E. Mason, Jr. Chair of Military History The Ohio State University
What went wrong? Key assumptions going into the war: War of liberation Government/infrastructure will remain intact Iraqis would freely support the transition to a liberal democracy Critical errors in the first months: Extensive de-ba athification Disbanding the Iraqi army Empowering sectarian politics Lack of strategy and coherent operational approach to the occupation "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive." Carl von Clausewitz, Military Theorist
2006 - Iraq Explodes Bombing of the Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra Sectarian cleansing/terrorism in Baghdad By Dec 2006, more than 3,500 Iraqis killed each month to ethno-sectarian violence Multi-National Force-Iraq failed to adjust strategic approach Focused on killing and capturing insurgent and terrorist operatives Rapid transition of security responsibilities to Iraqi security forces Al-Askari Shrine after the bombing
Violent Civilian Deaths in Iraq Surge Begins Does not include civilian deaths due to accidents unrelated to friendly or enemy actions. Sources: SIGACTS III Coalition and Iraqi reports as 09AUG08.
A New Strategy The Surge By late-summer 2006, clear that United States is headed for defeat Parallel strategic reviews by the National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department President Bush made final decision to surge additional forces into Iraq U.S. forces deployed differently, in accordance with new counterinsurgency doctrine The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads. U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Doctrine
Border Ports of Entry Improvements Kinetics Counter-Terrorist Force Ops Conventional Force Ops Iraqi Conventional & Special Force Ops Sons of Iraq Counter Ethno-Sectarian Pressures Politics Tribal Awakenings Political Reconciliation (Laws/policies) Weapons Foreign Fighters Engagement with Source Countries AQI NEEDS Ansar al Sunna Safe Havens AQ Senior Leader Guidance Other Groups AQI Popular Support Squeezing Al Qaeda Strategic Communications Money Command and Control Ideology Information Operations Religious Engagement Jobs Programs Services Detainee Intel Fusion Intel, Surveillance Releases and Recce Platforms Armed Unmanned Intelligence Aerial Vehicles Interagency Internet Education Non-kinetics Counterinsurgency in Detention Facilities Detainee Ops
Security Incidents Ramadan 16OCT-14NOV04 5OCT-4NOV05 24SEP-23OCT06 13SEP-13OCT07 Baghdad Security Plan, 15 February 2007 Surge of Offensives Battle of Najaf Iraqi elections, 30 January 2005 Second Fallujah Parliamentary elections, 15 December 2005 Constitutional referendum, 15 October 2005 Samarra mosque bombing, 22 February 2006 Basrah and Sadr City Operations, 25 March 2008 First Militia Uprising and Fallujah Chart includes potential attacks (IEDs/mines found and cleared) and executed attacks. Sources: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 9AUG08; weekly beginning 3JAN04.
Ethno-Sectarian Violence in Baghdad DEC 06 APR 07 SEP 07 Baghdad Baghdad Density plots depict incidents of ethno-sectarian deaths. Ethno-Sectarian Deaths JUL 08 Baghdad Baghdad Density Least Most Neighborhood Sect Legend 75% Shi a 75% Sunni 51% Shi a / 25% Sunni 51% Sunni / 25% Shi a Unknown Mixed - No majority. Source: CIOC Trends (CF and Iraqi reports) as of 09AUG08; weekly beginning 1 May 06.
Differing Perspectives President George W. Bush: Iraq as South Korea President Barack Obama: Iraq as Vietnam
Winning the War, Losing the Peace Election of 2010 Ayad Allawi wins, but U.S. and Iran both back Nouri al- Maliki as prime minister U.S. forces depart from Iraq in 2011; U.S. loses leverage Maliki governs in a highly sectarian and devise manner: jails opponents, tortures Sunni political prisoners, attacks protest camps Sunnis once again alienated from the political system Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-maliki
The Rise of ISIS ISIS is the successor to al-qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Group metastasized in Syria ISIS allied with Ba athists of Saddam Hussein s defeated army Tacit alliance with many Iraqi Sunni Arabs Collapse of Iraqi Army in Mosul due to Maliki s political interference with its leadership
Turkish Military Action Against PKK AQI s Main Effort Security Challenges (2006) AQI in Control Sectarian Violence Shi ite Militias in Control Kurdish Influence AQI & Sunni Insurgents Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) Special Groups (SG) Shia Extremists (Jund al Sama, al Yamani, Mahdawiyah)
The Danger ISIS the largest, most heavily armed, most combat experienced, and best financed terrorist group in the world today Regional instability impact on oil markets Global terrorism Western security Religious Conflict in the Middle East
Strategy to Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIS Sunni Arab tribes are key, as they were during the surge Political accommodation (regional autonomy) necessary to bring the tribes into a coalition against ISIS Wage a hybrid war against a hybrid force: Iraqi Army and Kurdish Peshmerga Sunni tribal irregulars Syrian moderates (problematic) U.S. advisors Ramp up the air campaign Fight the information war Islamic world must denounce ISIS Pressure (or accommodate) Turkey: stop oil smuggling, inhibit transit of jihadists, allow use of Incirlik air base