On Slippery Ground: The British Position in Punjab in 1857

Article On Slippery Ground: The British Position in Punjab in 1857 Indian Historical Review 44(1) 92 105 2017 ICHR SAGE Publications sagepub.in/home.nav DOI: 10.1177/0376983617694718 http://ihr.sagepub.com Bir Good Gill 1 Abstract The article attempts to look at some of the aspects of 1857 in the Punjab and in particular at the British position in the Punjab during 1857. It explains why Punjab was such an important province for the British to hold on to India and why they could not let it go up in flames. Contrary to the general perception, the British position in the Punjab was not secure. In spite of the pre-emptive steps taken to prevent the uprising in Punjab, the situation was very grim. The article looks at the situation prevailing in different cities of Punjab such as Peshawar, Multan, Lahore, Amritsar, Ludhiana and others. It illustrates the manipulations, intrigues and cruelty resorted to by the British in order to keep the situation under control, and how despite all this, they failed to prevent the people and the infantry from expressing their discontent and disaffection for the British rule. The article also exposes the precariousness of the British position in the Punjab as expressed in the words of its own officers. Keywords Native Infantry, Sikhs, Gobindgarh Fort, Nicholson and Movable Column, John Lawrence, Situation in Lahore, Peshawar, Multan, Ferozepur, Amritsar, Ludhiana, Hill Rajputs, Delhi The empire that the genius of Maharaja Ranjit Singh created had one great strength the Khalsa Army. The army was brave, disciplined, well-trained and ambitious. It engaged itself with the British in two Anglo-Sikh wars. Lord Henry Hardinge managed to win the First Anglo-Sikh War only with additional help from Delhi. By the terms of the Treaty of Lahore, the Khalsa Army was reduced from an impressive 85,000 to 20,000. 2 The treaty did not last for long. Two years later, it was the revolt of the Sikhs in Multan that sparked off the Second Anglo-Sikh War. The consequent defeat of the Sikh army resulted in sealing the fate of the kingdom of Punjab. Punjab was annexed by the British by the Proclamation of 29 March 1849. 1 Professor, Department of History, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, Punjab, India. 2 Smith, Life of John Lawrence, Vol. I, p. 234. Corresponding author: Bir Good Gill, Professor, Department of History, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, Punjab, India. E-mail: birgoodgill@gmail.com

Gill 93 Six weeks after annexation, another proclamation was issued and pasted everywhere through which general orders were issued for the disarming of the Punjab population. In addition to surrender of the arms, the people were made to demolish all private fortifications and strongholds. 3 Both the Khalsa Army and the population were in low morale. They had been defeated and rendered helpless, yet annexation was a bigger challenge to the British might than the Anglo-Sikh wars. It was necessary to win over the people. The only way to do this was to pamper them. Thus the Board of Administration, the first of its kind, was set up. It offered lavish concessions to the rural people with ample benefits to the agricultural classes. The land revenue was marked at the lowest in India. The irrigation system was improved, canals were dug and public works were started with great fervour. To gain the goodwill of the people, land deeds were granted. It was hoped by the British that this would bring peace and win the loyalty of the people in Punjab. Having said that, did the events of 1857 prove them wrong? This article seeks to challenge some of the commonly held assumptions about the situation in Punjab during 1857. One of these is that Punjab remained quiet during 1857, and the other is that its martial races played an active role in suppression of 1857 elsewhere. The article focuses on the position of the Native Infantry (NI) in Punjab and people s participation in anti-british activities and support to the rebel cause. It also deals with the British attempts to keep the situation under control. It exposes the manipulations, intrigues and cruelty resorted to by the British in Punjab in order to control the situation during 1857. Finally, it attempts to illustrate the precariousness of the British position as shown by their own admission of their weak position in Punjab. Sir John Lawrence, the then Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, was en route to a sanatorium at Murree and was halted at Rawalpindi when the telegram carrying the shocking news of sepoy mutiny from Major Waterfield, Deputy Adjutant General at Meerut, reached him on 11 May. 4 Another followed from Delhi the next day. Hectic activity by the administration started instantaneously in the province all through the day and the night. Pressing messages were wired to all the stations, cantonments, and civil and military lines. Armed men took to the saddle and the process of disbanding the Native Army started everywhere. The situation in Punjab was delicate. The NI had to go, and recruitment of Sikhs was neither feasible nor advisable. Sir John Lawrence voiced a common fear in British circles: I do not like to raise large bodies of old Sikhs. I recollect their strong nationality, how completely they were demoralised for some twelve years before annexation, and how much they have to gain by our ruin. 5 The dilemma was that the Punjab which was taken at gunpoint could not be retained without soldiers. The Punjab contained seventy-four NI regiments, mostly Bengal sepoys. This army had the capacity to place the frontier province in jeopardy in no time. The British authorities realised that in Punjab not a single army station was safe. The forts, the 3 One hundred and twenty thousand weapons of every size and every species ranging from the quoits or the bows and arrows of the times of Porus and Alexander to the cannon or rifle of the nineteenth century were collected. vide Bosworth,, p. 291. 4 Mutiny Records Reports, Part II, p. 134 (hereafter MRR). 5 Bosworth Smith, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 46.

94 Indian Historical Review 44(1) arsenal and the public treasury all were kept under the control of native soldiers, and all had to be wrung from them. In the given circumstances, this was a Herculean task. The urgency of the situation demanded that the Punjab had to be saved at all cost. The Punjab had been won with the help of Bengal Army, and the Khalsa Army was disbanded instantly thereafter. The fate had brought the British to a juncture where the former allies, the Bengal Army, was the principal foe while their counterpart, the Khalsa Army was 8 years old. This time the wisdom lay in disbanding the Bengal Army. The Judicial Commissioner of Punjab, Robert Montgomery, sensed the gravity of the situation. The assessment in the British circles was that the NI in Punjab was not to be relied on anymore. Lahore, Amritsar, Ferozepur, Jalandhar, Phillaur, Kangra, Multan and Peshawar all were possible points of an eruption. Lahore, the political capital of Punjab with its countryside studded with seats of native nobility and hereditary soldiers-sikhs and Mohammedans, was considered to be the weakest link in the chain. 6 This city, with its 90,000 inhabitants, could at a word give forth hundreds of people who would be only too ready to emulate the atrocities of Meerut and Delhi. 7 At the military cantonment of Mian Meer, only 6 miles away from the main city of Lahore, the native regiments gave first hint of what they were capable of. They planned to overpower European soldiers, seize the gates, take possession of Lahore Fort, the treasury therein, and finally, to fire on an empty hospital as a signal of their command at Mian Meer. This was to usher in general rise in the cantonments of Punjab between Sutlej and Ravi. 8 It was believed that the conspiracy was wide spread and deep-laid. The NI along with that of Ferozepur was to seize the magazine and ammunition, and assemble at Phillaur Fort known for its strategic position on the bank of Sutlej. Then on, they could easily march to Delhi. 9 The British, thus, aware of the inherent danger found it risky to disarm Mian Meer regiment straight away. In its stead, a plot was laid. Amidst the enjoyment at the traditional ball given to station officers, the NI comprising 2,500 native soldiers was disbanded in a dramatic way, in the early hours of 13 May. Such was the sense of the magnitude of danger that the NI was withdrawn from the fort as well in no time, and instead three companies of European infantry and one of artillery were placed there. 10 Thirty miles away, a greater challenge was posed by the fort of Gobindgarh at Amritsar. Its worth was not in its commanding position as a storehouse of arsenal like that of Phillaur but in its national religious character. The fort, named after the tenth Guru of Sikhs, was a martial symbol and carried the talismanic pledge of power. It was feared that if the fort was left to the Sikhs at this juncture the Khalsa might rise to make a common cause with the Porobeah. 11 Thus, the natives were subtly withdrawn from Gobindgarh fort, and a garrison of European was left inside it. Both Gurdaspur and Amritsar treasuries were quickly transferred to Gobindgarh Fort. The situation appeared to be so grave that within 3 days provisions for 3 months were secured in 6 MRR Part II, p. 299. 7 Cave-Browne, The Punjab and the Delhi in 1857, (Reprint 1970), Vol. I, p. 92. 8, p. 94. 9, p. 95. 10 For details, see MRR, Part II, pp. 229 34. 11 Cave-Browne, Vol. I, p. 102.

Gill 95 the fort. To avoid the suspicion of the public, different provisions entered the fort at different hours from different gates. To make the security doubly sure, one company of Her Majesty s (HMs) 81st Reserved Company of artillery was moved within the fort walls and Police Horse and Foot were posted outside for constant vigilance. 12 Ferozepur was the largest arsenal in the whole of North India. Brigadier P. Innes, the incharge, was instantly informed to be on the alert when news reached from Delhi on 12 May. This time, before the British officers could make arrangements, the regiments of NI openly rose in rebellion. Some 200 sepoys broke off, loaded their muskets and rushed when they saw European soldiers in the act of filing into the gateway of the entrenchment that had been abandoned. The 45th NI was openly in mutiny and 57th NI followed quickly. The church, mess-houses, hospital and private buildings were all set on fire. In the course, some twenty of the most important buildings were destroyed. Brigadier Innes found it impossible to remove the ammunition to safer place. Helplessly, he ordered it to be blown away. 13 The courage of the soldiers was so high that the disbanded sepoys demanded the liberation of their comrades who were imprisoned. Captain H.R. James, the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, wrote, such a demand after the circumstances which have taken place, appears to the Chief Commissioner to amount to mutiny of an aggravated kind. 14 Multan, on the left bank of the river Chenab, was the rallying point for Mohammedans, in the same way as Amritsar was to the Sikhs. The NI of thousand sepoys was known to be traitors. The people in Multan kept revolting even after the fall at Delhi and it posed immense danger to the authorities. 15 On the extreme northwest, the whole of Peshawar Division was the greatest source of anxiety to the British. It consisted of the restless and the unruly tribes of Afridis, Sinwaris, Arakzais, Mohmunds and the like. The authorities knew if Peshawar was gone, frontier was gone. 16 If Pathans and Sikhs came together, as they did at Multan during the Second Anglo-Sikh War, the British knew, nothing could save them. The city of Peshawar with its 60,000 inhabitants remained a centre of intrigue during the crucial months from May till September. 17 The frontier population, as a policy matter, was never disarmed at the time of annexation unlike that of Punjab proper. The concession was given to them to protect themselves against the tribal raids. 18 This suited the British, without much investment, to keep check on transborder tribes. What suited them then was their biggest worry now. The valley of Peshawar at the beginning of the eventful month of May stood in a ring of repressed hostilities. 19 Eusufzai tribe was the first one to raise the cry of rebellion under Molvi Inayat Ali in May. 20 This was 12 Foreign Department, Secret Branch, Consultation 46, 26 June 1857, National Archives of India, New Delhi (hereafter as Forgn, Sec, Cons and N.A.I.). 13 Cave-Browne, Vol. I, p. 111. 14 Forgn, Sec, Cons. 11, 31 July 1857, N.A.I. 15 For details see Report on events in the Multan Division, vide, MRR, Part II, pp. 1 34. 16 Cave-Browne, Vol. I, p. 138. 17 MRR Part II, p. 153. 18 19, p. 133. 20, p. 130.

96 Indian Historical Review 44(1) followed by that of Khyber tribe under one Syed, hoisting the green flag of Islam to challenge the might of the British. 21 H.R. James, the then Deputy Commissioner (DC) of Peshawar, noted with concern that Syed s presence there could not but excite the hope and agitate the minds of our disaffected but baffled soldiery. 22 Major General Reed, Commander of Peshawar Division, along with Colonel Nicholson foresaw the danger and instantaneously started the formation of Moveable Column to put down mutiny here and wherever, it raised its head in Punjab. 23 Police stations and post offices were threatened by the tribal raids. So much was the threat that levies raised for military service had to be temporarily employed for protection of these. 24 On 12 May itself, stringent orders were given for the examination of sepoy letters that reached the post offices. On 18 May, 51th N.I. at Peshawar dispatched a letter in the handwriting of a Hindu co-soldier to the 64th NI and Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment inviting them to reach Peshawar on 21 May on occasion of Eid. On 20 May, most rancorous and seditious letters had been intercepted from Mohammedans in Patna and Thanesar to one Naik Karimullah, and other soldiers of 64th NI sending them messages from their own mothers that in the struggle if they fell, they would rest in heaven, and their deaths would be pleasant news at home. 25 The British panic at Peshawar was so high that every native regiment was eyed with suspicion. The 5th Light Cavalry, 24th NI, 27th NI and 51th NI were all disbanded. 26 Despite all, arms soon started finding their way into the army lines. Symptoms of an organised uprising began to appear. On 28 August, General Cotton gave orders and made all the army lines of native regiments searched simultaneously. 27 To their utter dismay and shock, it brought forth stocks of swords, muskets, pistols, bayonets, power ball and caps stacked in roofs and floors and beddings and even in drains. 28 This courage to defy all and send messages to all other regiments to rise was a plan that 51th NI had made. Desperate struggle ensued. Colonel Cooper of the 51th NI died in pursuit. 29 Out of 870 sepoys, 660 were killed in various ways. 30 Not only this, the whole of 55th NI at Hoti Mardan revolted on 21 May. 31 They fought bravely and 400 of them safely made their way to Swat where they received a cordial welcome. 32 Colonel Spottiswoode of that regiment could not face the disgrace and committed suicide. 33 In Peshawar valley alone, 810 sepoys embraced martyrdom. Some were blown from guns, some were shot by musketry, while some were hanged 21 22, p. 153. 23, p. 136. 24, p. 131. 25, p. 141. 26, p. 275. 27, p. 286. 28, p. 174. 29, p. 176. 30, p. 175. 31, p. 180. 32 Forgn, Sec, Cons.15, 28 August 1857, N.A.I. 33 MRR, Part II, p. 278.

Gill 97 by civil or military authorities. In addition, an upward of 300 were slain in their pursuit of escape. 34 All the Hindustani regiments had, since the first outbreak at Mian Meer, been disarmed by Brigadier Stuart Corbett. R. Montgomery assessed that it was The stroke which saved the Punjab. 35 Yet Punjab posed a constant threat, and there were fears that Sikhs were ready to join the rebellion. The most significant incident that cemented their dread was the daring act of 26th NI of Mian Meer which was spearheaded by the Sikhs. All the British published accounts have safely omitted this for obvious reasons. However, the 26th NI rose on 30 July. They completed their preparations early in the morning. Major Spencer, the commanding officer, had gone down the lines between 10 and 11 o clock with the Quarter Master Sergeant, shortly after which, the two were attacked by the Sikh sepoys and murdered along with Havildar Major and Subedar. The sepoys did not escape and the account given in the secret letter written from the office of Chief Commissioner to Governor General goes as, Lieutenant White of the Regiment who happened to be riding past the Lines, and being summoned by some of the men, who asked him to come and see their Major who had been nearly killed by some Seikhs was about to dismount from his horse to examine the bodies which he saw lying before him, when he was warned by a sepoy to make his escape if he valued his life. As he put his horse to his speed he with difficulty avoided a blow aimed at his back, which wounded his horse. Lieutenant White then rode off to the Artillery Lines to give the alarm. Yet the sepoys disappeared. 36 The cardinal fear was if the Sikh sepoys were permitted to go scot-free, it could ignite the rebellion of the worst kind in the province. The extremity of the peril compelled the Judicial Commissioner, Commissioner of Lahore and the Chief Commissioner to proceed immediately to Mian Meer, even then when the news reached them it was past midnight. To their utter dismay, they found that There was absolutely no information of the route taken by the mutineers. 37 J. Cave-Browne, otherwise never missing to point out the revolt of sepoys of Bengal Army, holds back that those who rebelled at Mian Meer and who met their ultimate fate among them were also Sikhs. For this very reason, Amritsar, the Sikh religious capital, was avoided for execution. Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner of Punjab, later in defence of Frederic Cooper, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, wrote in April 1859, that in Amritsar there was no jail large enough to hold them; there was a large body of Hindostanee comrades ready to fraternize. 38 Ludhiana was as significant to the British as Amritsar, Lahore or Peshawar. Being a trading city of long standing, it was filled with Kashmiris, Kabulis, besides native Hindus, Sikhs and Mohammedans. G.A.M. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana, received information that all the armourers and furbishers of the city 34, p. 132. 35, p. 299. 36 Forgn, Sec, Cons. 30 32, 25 September 1857, N.A.I. 37 38 R. Montgomery in defence of F. Cooper, in Cave-Browne, Vol. II, pp. 88 89.

98 Indian Historical Review 44(1) were plying a most profitable trade. On 20 June, when Major Coke s corps reached Ludhiana en route to Delhi, they were asked to help search the houses of the city dwellers. So high was the threat involved that operations were conducted at early hours of the morning when people were still sleeping. Major Coke proceeded with the main body through the streets, posting his men at the crosses, roads and on all commanding houses. The search for arms was conducted by batches of policemen, each under a European officer. The yield of eleven two bullock hackery loads of swords and matchlocks 39 speaks for people s intentions to help the rebels. They were not frightened. The very next morning some 400 of them collected at the gate conversing with the mutineers and still supplying their wants. 40 The people s participation in Ludhiana was so high that Government stores were looted and burnt. So were the churches, the houses of Englishmen and the press of English newspapers, indicating the people s pent up anger and hatred for all that symbolised English rule. Twenty-two of the citizens were hanged next day, and the city was fined `55,294. 41 It is interesting to note that the inhabitants soon after petitioned the King of Delhi to have him (Ricketts) disposed of otherwise their lives were in danger. 42 Situation was equally bad in other areas as well Amritsar, Ferozepur, Phillaur, Kangra and Multan. In Amritsar, the vast population comprising of Mohammedans, Sikhs and Hindus was highly conscious politically. There are references of Bhai Maharaj Singh (Jr) going from village to village in the Majha region and inciting people to rebel. He, along with his followers, was a serious threat. On 14 May, at midnight, he was arrested at Attari, 16 miles from Amritsar. 43 A sepoy and a native doctor of 35th NI were also hanged for using seditious language. In June, Radha Kishan, a Brahmin, was hanged for high treason. 44 There were numerous arrests of Sikh sepoys. 45 Feelings in Amritsar were excited and even ready to try the temper of the authority. 46 All the faqirs and beragis were imprisoned. So high was the threat that four new havalats were erected inside the kotwali of Amritsar for the reception of all sorts of suspicious vagabonds. 47 Yet another instance, how much the people detested the British was when the Government in the Punjab faced problem of funds. The financial crunch was such an issue that the mighty British could neither expose the crisis to the people nor do without loans. The disbanded army was already kept in arrears of salary of 3 months. This measure, the Chief Commissioner admitted, would enable us to husband our resources. The Government of Bombay that intended to give a loan of `20 lakhs 39 MRR, Part I, p. 97. 40, p. 98. 41 MRR, Part II, p. 214. 42 Cooper, Crisis in Punjab from the 10th of May Until the Fall of Delhi. 43 MRR, Part II. p. 271. 44, p. 272. 45, p. 275. 46 Mutiny Records Correspondence, Part I, p. 21 (hereafter MRC). 47 Forgn, Sec, Cons. 21, 26 June 1857, N.A.I.

Gill 99 was only able to extend `10 lakhs. 48 Even the Presidency of Bengal had nothing to spare. 49 Within the Punjab, Amritsar and Lahore were two great commercial marts. The rich traders, merchants and wealthy bankers were all settled in these emporia of trade. They showed a close fistedness and distrust during this period. 50 It was noted with regret by the authorities that towards the 6 per cent loan that the Punjab Government wished to raise; the contribution from these two cities was meagre. The administration resented, Men worth half a crore of rupees offered a subscription of `1,000. Their niggard distrust of our government speaks very unfavourably for their loyalty. 51 The news must have been ripe in the bazaars that the Government had no money, therefore, no credibility, otherwise business community normally does not offend the state authority. The British authorities in the Punjab applied every method at their disposal to keep the public in check. They knew fully well that neither public nor the native army was on their side. Not only Native Infantry but the cavalry too was all set to rebel. Colonel Nicholson from Peshawar reported that the 10th Irregular Cavalry at Naushehra and the 7th Irregular Cavalry at Peshawar are not to be relied on. 52 Even the 18th Irregular Cavalry showed discontentment and Nicholson reported that, the sympathies of that branch are with the sepoys. 53 To counter the spirits of the infantry and the people, the British authorities applied the principal of divide et impera. They tried this trick first in the army then with the public. The term Purbeah was adopted in the army of Maharaja Ranjit Singh to designate the Hindustani solider who came from Eastern India and who found his way into the Sikh ranks. During the Anglo-Sikh Wars, the Bengal Army in the Company s service helped the British to emerge victorious against the Khalsa Army. J. Cave-Browne admits that at the time of 1857 there was at least policy in reviving the term (purbeah) at this juncture, for it revived the contempt and hatred with which the class had ever been regarded; it widened the breach between the Punjabee and the Hindostanee, and rendered any coalition the more difficult. 54 The British saw the inherent dangers in any such collaboration. While addressing the Purbeahs, the Chief Commissioner, Sir John Lawrence, made sure to use the term Hindustani soldiers of the Bengal Army. In an appeal to them, dated 1 June 1857, he, after telling them about the benefits of co-operating with the British, warned them against the Sikhs if the Poorbea sepoy neglect the present day, it will never return. The chiefs and people (of Punjab) are loyal and obedient, and the latter only long to take your place in the army. All will unite to crush you. He deliberately uses the word Poorbea stressing that it were the Sikhs who call them so, though for us you are honourable soldiers of the Bengal Army. On the other hand, the British tried to 48 Forgn, Sec, Cons. 24, 28 August 1857, N.A.I. 49 50 MRR, Part II, p. 201. 51, p. 237. 52 Forgn, Sec, Cons. 21, 26 June 1857, N.A.I. 53 Forgn, Sec, Cons. 30, 26 June 1857, N.A.I. 54 Cave-Browne, Vol. I, pp. xv xvi.

100 Indian Historical Review 44(1) win Sikhs against the Purbeahs. Six days later, when on 7 June, three Bengal regiments rose in rebellion at Jalandhar several young Sikh recruits were also involved in the insurrection. But they, taking advantage of a dust storm which came on when the mutineers were a few miles out of cantonments, went back to their homes in Amritsar district. They ran to their homes because their homes were nearby while their Bengali comrades had no option but to hide. The Sikh youth were discovered and were presented to Fredrick Cooper, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar. They having told their plain ingenuous tale were liberated while their companions were captured and executed. 55 It served the British to follow this dual policy for the same crime. The young Sikhs who were spared went home safe. They would, the authorities knew, admire the British for their large-heartedness and their families in villages would spread the message of British magnanimity. Which mother would not like her son to return home safe when the air itself smelled of death? On the other hand, the Hindustani sepoys seeing this, would hate the Sikh soldier on whom the favours were bestowed. Perhaps, they would not invest their faith in Sikh soldiers in the future. This was exactly what the Englishman wanted. It was not to be. A few days later in July, in the camp for Delhi, there are references that in The Guides 56, Purbeahs and Sikhs were hobnobbing. There were emissaries of treason from the King and some of the leading Poorbeahs were systematically tampering with the loyalty of the Sikhs and Punjabees, with the offer of high pay in the King s service. 57 Such seeds could only be sown after making sure that the land was fertile enough. British had the fear that these two would collaborate anytime. When the Sikh rebels were caught near Amritsar, they were not taken to Amritsar for execution because there was every fear that not only Sikhs in Amritsar but even Hindustani comrades would fraternise. 58 The risk of an outbreak at that critical juncture was too high to be taken at the religious capital of the Sikhs. There was similar conspiracy on the part of the British, to create rift between Sikhs and Muslims, once again to use the former to their advantage. The traditional rivalry between the Sikhs and Muslims which had been erased in Second Anglo-Sikh War was attempted to revive. There is an incident mentioned in the diary of Abdul Latif, 1857 Ka Tareekhi Roznamcha. On 27 July, he made an entry saying Few Sikhs after travelling all the way from Lahore appeared in the court of the King (Delhi) and made a representation that in Lahore it was rumoured that the King had decreed the beheading of Sikhs and announced a reward of ten rupees for every head brought. The king responded by saying that he practiced only kindness and nothing else, he treats people of all creeds and religion with equal love and whosoever has spread this rumour is a liar. 55 Cave-Browne, Vol. I, p. 248. 56 The Guide Corps (The Guides) was originally raised at the suggestion of Colonel H.M. Lawrence, Agent Governor General North Western Frontier, by orders of Lord Hardinge, soon after the conclusion of the Sutlej Campaign in March 1846.These special Corps with the best qualities of guides and spies was raised to 810 men from the original 96 following the annexation of the Punjab in 1849.The Guides represented almost all the warlike tribes in its ranks. Good intelligencers, the corps could furnish men conversant with the features of the country and the dialect of the people whenever they were marched in any part of Upper India. 57 Greathed, Letters Written During the Siege of Delhi. 58 Montgomery in defence of Cooper, op. cit.

Gill 101 This is further endorsed by Jeewan Lal, who in his diary of 26 July wrote that A letter was received from one of the chiefs of Lahore in which it was written that Sir John Lawrence had issued a proclamation in the Punjab, which declared that the King of Delhi had offered large rewards to anyone who would kill Sikhs, and bring in their heads. 59 One thing is sure that two diaries maintained by two different people making similar entries almost at the same time at the end of July would have had some truth in it. Sikhs, it seems, were slipping away from the British who possibly were making use of propaganda to incite the Sikh against the Muslims. As far as the Sikh recruitment was concerned, it worried the British the most. Realising the significance of the martial races the Government of India kept pressing the Chief Commissioner right from the beginning to raise bodies of the old Khalsa soldiers. Sir John Lawrence knew the people of Punjab well, and therefore, did not authorise this. He believed, the measure would be a dangerous one, in the Cis-Sutlej states especially where they formed the most turbulent portion of the Sikh Army and were never well disposed towards us. 60 The Sikhs outside the Punjab too had been a constant source of anxiety. An interesting example can be that of Oudh. Oudh was under Sir Henry Lawrence, the brother of Sir John Lawrence. Many of the Sikhs deserted the British during the siege of Oudh, and the rest were in constant correspondence with the other side through their escaped brethren who used to come under the walls of the Sikh Square and converse with the ones still inside, instigating them to shift over. 61 The situation worsened when Sikh cavalry troops too started deserting, and it was felt that the rest could follow them any time. 62 The realisation that some Sikhs were fighting from the side of Bahadur Shah Zafar was most uncomfortable to the British. On 27 July, two Sikhs went on behalf of the chiefs of Lahore over to Bahadur Shah Zafar to deliver 2,00,000 cartridges in the Nimuch camp. While appreciating the act, orders were issued not to waste those cartridges as the supply was running out. 63 Two days later, on 29 July, several Sikhs, retainers of Raja Narinder Singh of Patiala, deserted the English Camp and appeared at the Darbar of the King. 64 On 5 August, the Sikhs in King s army petitioned that their separate regiment be formed, and they be entrusted with two field guns. The argument was that they were in the habit of attacking the English entrenchments. 65 The statement shows that these Sikh soldiers for sure were part of the disarmed Khalsa Army of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. They were encouraged and told not to despair of victory. 66 This regiment of Sikhs 59 Metcalfe, Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi. 60 Forgn, Sec, Cons, 17 18, 26 June 1857, N.A.I. 61 Gubbins, The Mutinies in Oudh. 62, p. 274. 63 Metcalfe, op. cit., p. 168. 64, pp. 171 72. 65, p. 183. 66

102 Indian Historical Review 44(1) and four of cavalry fought at Nimuch. On 28 August, the news reached the King that Nimuch force had beaten the English. 67 The authorities were highly concerned that no such information infiltrates into Punjab. They had created an impression that all was well with them in the rest of India. The measure to check the rebellion came with the declaration of Press Act of June 1857 that subjected all newspapers to rigorous censorship. The Act was strictly implemented in the Punjab. This was especially so in the post offices where it was implemented as, Any objectionable matter and all intelligence calculated to produce excitement in the minds of the people here to affect the prestige of the British Government is carefully excluded. 68 The damage from letters reaching the Punjab was calculated to be so severe that censorship continued even a year later. On 4 September 1858, Richard Temple, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, noted the usefulness of the Act, The necessity for the censorship still exists and its effects are found to be beneficial. 69 No doubt the censorship of letters provided the authorities with leads to sabotage the plans of the sepoys. Brigadier General Nicholson, who was leading the Movable Column from Peshawar under this Act, made himself the self-styled Postmaster General. All the letters that came into the Punjab were intercepted. The Native ones were read and sent on to allay suspicion. There were letters with vital information sent by those who, their regimental commanders in the districts believed, would shed the last drop of their blood for the Sirkar. 70 Everywhere, on his way to Delhi, Nicholson passed strict orders to suppress rebellion the orders were to hang or shoot out or blast from a canon irrespective of the extent of crime, because, to Nicholson, mutiny is like smallpox, it spreads quickly, and must be crushed as soon as possible. 71 The Act XI and Act XIV by which provinces were empowered to try mutineers and other suspected rebels and to give punishment, even capital punishment without appeal had boldened the young General. Sir Lawrence had sent a telegram to the Governor General on 22 June seeking full powers be delegated to me to act on behalf of Governor General and wish for full authority at this crisis it would strengthen my hands and prevent any doubts by vacillation on the part of any body.. 72 Promptly, these powers were delegated to him to act on behalf of Governor General by returning telegram of 22 June. 73 Nicholson abused these powers and executed people often. This Movable Column was a moving terror in Punjab may it be at Phillaur, Amritsar, Jalandhar, Ludhiana or Ferozepur. Lord Canning saw the way the power was misused everywhere. He could see that it would only exasperate the people and stir up feelings of bitterness and animosity. His Clemency Resolution of 31 July 1857 earned him only universal contempt 67, p. 211. 68 Forgn, Political, Cons. 511 15, 11 November 1858, N.A.I. 69 70 Wilberforce, An Untold Chapter of the Indian Mutiny. 71 Trotter, The Life of John Nicholson, Soldier and Administrator. 72 Forgn, Sec, Cons. 299, 31 July 1857, N.A.I. 73

Gill 103 among his countrymen in India. They quickly petitioned the Queen for his recall. British rule in India, the European settlers insisted, could be secured only by policy of vigorous repression and punishment. They believed, in no other way could the Indian people be taught the hopelessness of rebellion. 74 People revolted here and there, and this was betrayed from the cracks of the façade of panic-stricken Government of Punjab. There is not a single account saying that people were with them. Punjab was quiet, but it was the quiet of an agitated mind. The Englishman alone knew how this quiet was maintained. Punjab was taken a hostage and no one outside of its boundaries had any knowledge. What was happening elsewhere was kept away from reaching the public of this province. Censorship and interception of letters was carried on strictly at every point, at every post office. The authorities withheld from Punjab all news about their deteriorating status in other parts of India and made pretension of strength and power that was far from reality. These developments had started filtering back home and caused unrest in Punjab. Sir John Lawrence was a worried man. How far he could rely on the instantly recruited mercenary army of the Rajas of Punjab? The princes themselves could offer no guarantee for the conduct of army provided by them. 75 The Chief Commissioner then knew that he could not hold the people of Punjab anymore. The moment their contact with the outer world developed while going with Movable Column to Delhi, it revealed to them how vulnerable the British position was. The safety of Punjab, all this while, he knew was maintained by sealing the frontiers from any sort of seditious material. The rebellion of NI, plans, virus of revolt spreading into Sikh soldiers, the people s resentment all with each passing day were too much for the British to handle. In the given situation, it was all the more difficult to hold for long a region as vast and as varied in its habitation as Punjab. British fears in Punjab were stung high. They felt immense danger. The more the danger, the more was the terror unleashed in Punjab. Each capital punishment was set as an example for the people to dare not revolt. Each time people did. Many did. The Chief Commissioner had made clear his policy when he ordered Brigadier Innes, to put in force the Act of 14th ultimo, and to try by court martial the mutineers now in their prison and those who have dared to demand their liberation. And any man subsequently acting in a similar manner should be dealt with in the same way. He elaborated further, the Mutiny Act prescribes the punishment of death for such offences, and if such sentence be passed by the court, and confirmed by yourself, it should be carried out on the spot. 76 A. Brandreth, Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Punjab, noted on 11 September 1857, we have destroyed at least 5,000 of the race since mutiny and insurrection broke out. Had our Generals been abler and more active, we should have done more. 77 74 Petition of the Inhabitants of Calcutta for the Recall of Governor General vide Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt in India 1857 1870. 75 MRR, Part II, p. 211. 76 Forgn, Sec, Cons. 11, 31 July 1857, N.A.I. 77 Mutiny Records Correspondence.

104 Indian Historical Review 44(1) The British in Punjab had no martial races, the strength of the province, to fall back on. None of the Pathans, the Sikhs and the hill Rajputs were with them. The Bengal Army had either been disbanded or revolted and what was left was contemplating revolt. The Sikhs of Majha, the main recruiting ground, remained, in lieu of hope, their main fear the fear of disbanded Khalsa Army which was mostly settled in Majha. No recruitment ever came from Majha region. It was noted with regret, As regards the Sikhs of the Majha, they showed during the period of the crisis an unwillingness to enlist. The good recruits of this class were not obtainable until after Delhi had fallen. This fact is significant of the opinion which the Sikhs entertained of our position. 78 On 30 July, John Lawrence sent his last bit to Delhi. He telegraphed to General Cotton, I anticipate that 1,600 Europeans and 1,800 NI will be down by 15th proximo. My policy is to support the army as far as possible. If it fails all will fail. This is the crisis of our fate. 79 Sir John Lawrence s own words best sum up the British position in Punjab: the aspect of things, at first so encouraging, began gradually to be darkened over when, week after week and month after month passed away, and the rebellion was not put down, the Punjabees then began to think that the British power could hardly recover from the repeated shocks it was sustaining. The accumulating odds against us seemed insuperable when detachment after detachment of Europeans went out of the Punjab and none came in; when the success of the mutineers re-echoed through the land; when cantonment after cantonment in Hindustan was destroyed and deserted by its soldiery, who rushed to Delhi; when incendiary letters arrived, figuratively indicating the position of the British in India, and saying that many of the finest trees in the garden have fallen, that white wheat had become very scarce, and country produce very abundant, that hats were hardly to be seen, while turbans were plentiful then the Punjabees began to feel how utterly isolated we were and how desperate was our cause. Their minds passed from confidence to doubt, then to mistrust and then to disaffection. 80 On one side, the British authorities in Punjab were fully aware of their precarious position in Multan Division. Multan could offer them their only escape route in case of ultimate calamity as it possessed the only line of communication that remained open till then. Any help if it could arrive from Bombay it was via this route only. 81 Chief Commissioner, John Lawrence, wrote to Government of India that this point (Multan) we cannot endanger. It is our means of communication with Bombay. 82 On the other, the panic-stricken authorities at Peshawar did their utmost to arrange for the means of defence. In spite of their best efforts, the NI both at Naushehra and Mardan rebelled en masse. 83 In addition to this, John Lawrence expressed his deep concern when he 78 Punjab Administrative Report. 79 Bosworth Smith, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 154. 80 MRR, Part II, pp. 362 63. 81 For details see Gill, Multan in Ferment: Issues and Events in 1857. 82 Forgn, Sec. Cons, 4, 30 July 1858, N.A.I. 83 For details see Gill, 1857: The Crisis at Peshawar.

Gill 105 wrote to Lord Canning that even the native cavalry had all the sympathy with the sepoys at Peshawar. 84 Compelled by the circumstances, Sir John Lawrence was seriously contemplating on abandoning Peshawar to the Amir of Afghanistan in return for support of the latter during the critical time of 1857. This move, he thought, would also spare forces from Peshawar for the assault of Delhi. To John Lawrence, the loss of Peshawar was nothing as compared to that of Delhi. 85 During the first week of September, Sir John Lawrence wrote to General Nicholson, in charge of Moveable Column at Delhi, to take action speedily. He wired, Every day s delay is fraught with danger. Everyday disaffection and mutiny spread. Every day adds to the danger of the native princes taking part against us. In the Punjab we are by no means strong. 86 John Lawrence could see that all was at stake yet all was slipping by. He realised better than his men fighting at the Ridge that in the Punjab, their feet were not grounded on a rock rather it was a slippery ground. The time was running out, so were the chances. The Chief Commissioner needed to be specific. He wired to Nicholson that if Delhi did not fall by 20 September, he could not hold Punjab after that date. 87 Delhi fell on 20 September 1857. References Cave-Browne, J. The Punjab and the Delhi in 1857, 2 vols, London, 1861. Cooper, F. Crisis in Punjab from the 10th of May Until the Fall of Delhi, Chandigarh, 1858 (Reprint, 1977), p. 22. Foreign Department. Secret Branch Consultations, National Archives of India, New Delhi, 1857-58. Gill, B.G. Multan in Ferment: Issues and Events in 1857, in Navtej Singh, ed., The Indian Archives, Vol. LV, National Archives of India, New Delhi, 2007, pp. 35 49.. 1857: The Crisis at Peshawar, in Sanjay Garg, ed., The Punjab Past and Present, Vol. XXXIX, 2008, Patiala, pp. 53 59. Greathed, H.H. Letters Written During the Siege of Delhi, London, 1858, p. 90. Gubbins, M.R. The Mutinies in Oudh, London, 1858, pp. 211 12 and p. 229. Metcalfe, C.T. (Tr.). Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi, Reprint, Delhi, 1974, p.167. Metcalf, T.R. The Aftermath of Revolt in India 1857 1870, London, 1965, p. 294. Mutiny Records Correspondence. Vol. VII, 2 parts, Govt. Publication, Lahore, 1911.. Vol. VII, Part II, p. 26. Mutiny Records Reports. Vol. VIII, 2 parts, Govt. Publication, Lahore, 1911. Punjab Administrative Report. 1856 58, p. 58. Smith, R.B. Life of John Lawrence, 2 Vols, London, 1883. Trotter, L.J. The Life of John Nicholson, Soldier and Administrator, London, 1898, p. 230. Wilberforce, R.G. An Untold Chapter of the Indian Mutiny, London, 1894, pp. 34 35. 84, p. 57. 85 86 Trotter, op. cit., p. 278. 87 Wilberforce, op. cit., p. 201.