First Treatise <Chapter 1. On the Eternity of Things> 5 10 15 {198} We should first inquire about the eternity of things, and first, in part, under this form: Can our intellect say, as a conclusion known to it, that there are some absolute, permanent things that are not eternal? It is these things that are standardly said to be generated and corrupted, or to possess the alteration or motion that is growth. And it is proved first in the case of things where the passage from non-being to being and from being to non-being seems more manifest for instance, in the case of sensible qualities. It should be known first, however, that to establish that the conclusion Not all things are eternal is not known by us can be done in two ways: either by establishing that the opposite is true, or by establishing that the only means of argument that seem to suffice to establish the proposed conclusion do not suffice. It is thus possible that this is, for someone, an open problem, in which case it could not be established in the first way, but very well could be in the second. 20 25 30 <The Insufficiently of the Argument against the Eternity of Things> First, then, as regards the second way. 1 No intellect to which it is certain and evident that some thing exists for some time can say with certainty at a later time that that thing does not exist, unless it has some argument that effectively (virtualiter) entails the knowledge of that negative proposition with which the intellect says that a thing that existed earlier does not exist. But the intellect is certain, or can be certain, of the existence of the sensible qualities that exist now. Therefore, with regard to some later time, it should not deny that a quality exists unless it has some premise virtually entailing the knowledge of this negative proposition. The major premise is known because the intellect, since it is a rational power, should not change from the side of an affirmative proposition to the negative side unless there exists within it some cause for the change, given that the principle is not known per se. For let us form the following proposition with regard to a thing that existed earlier and that is now being said not to exist: The whiteness does not exist. I ask whether that proposition is known to you from its terms, or through an experience at once, as 1 Autrecourt turns to the first way below.????
35 40 45 50 55 60 something you will experience within yourself. Not the first way, because then it would be known to you always, and so [even] when the opposite claim obtained this negative proposition was known to you in its truth, [and] it was known even in the absence of sensation, from an understanding of its terms. Not in the second way either, because {199} we experience this alone within ourselves: that, before the blackness ensues, the act of appearing that was in us seems to cease, so that we no longer experience within ourselves the act of vision that was in us earlier. Therefore, since this proposition is not known as a principle, it is known as a conclusion, and thus in virtue of some argument. But there is no argument entailing the knowledge of the negative proposition by which it is said that a thing, whiteness, does not exist, because both propositions from that argument are known either from their terms or through experience. I will prove that it is not from their terms, because if they were known from their terms or were dependent on such terms, then such a proposition would always be grasped by intellect, as soon as the terms were grasped, and so even in the absence of that whiteness one would have certainty about it. It must be, then, that it is known through experience from the sensory acts that we experience within ourselves. So the proposition This whiteness does not exist is accepted either from a positive act of sense or from the ceasing of an act of sense that had first been experienced with respect to the whiteness. Not from the first, because from that it would be concluded that the whiteness exists, more than that it does not. Therefore it is accepted from the second, namely from the ceasing of an act that had first been experienced with respect to the whiteness. So, if any argument is to be produced that is suitable to the conclusion that the whiteness that existed earlier does not exist, it seems to be the one just stated. This is apparent for another reason, because what seems to serve as an argument for intellect with regard to some proposition is that to which it resorts, as if naturally, when it is asked about that proposition. But when people are asked Is that water hot?, they immediately resort to the act of touch, and when they are asked Is this wall white?, they resort to the act of sight, and so on in other cases. Now, among some who are young, the argument that might more seem to suffice is this: Because blackness is present, therefore whiteness is not. Yet this cannot be the primary argument for intellect, because the intellect s claim that when blackness comes whiteness is removed holds only because it has seen that when blackness comes the appearance of whiteness ceases within the sense of sight. And so it seems that that argument ought to be called the one into which all the others are finally resolved, and that it seems to suffice. It would, however, be long and pointless to consider thoroughly all the arguments that could be proposed, and by custom it is enough that one accepts 2
65 70 75 80 85 90 the one that is more plausible and more suitable to the question. If there is another argument, then he who states the conclusion as if it is certain to him ought to set that argument out, since otherwise we would be forced to wander as if through infinite arguments. Likewise, it is sufficiently proved that there is no other argument or, if there is, it is reduced to this one as the argument that is fundamental. We now establish that the appearance s ceasing does not suffice as an argument for the conclusion that the thing does not exist. And let us form that argument, so that its force becomes more apparent. It is argued thus: In the case of any thing that appeared to a sense earlier and now, wherever the sense casts its attention, does not appear, that thing does not exist. But so it is for the whiteness that appeared earlier and now does not appear. Therefore etc. That this argument is not conclusive can be established in three ways, the first of which seems to be the more plausible, although I have no evidently demonstrated conclusion. That first way is to let it be said to the major premise that it does not hold true, because natural forms are so divisible into minimal parts that when they are separately divided from the whole they cannot have their action. Thus, although these parts are seen while existing in their whole, they are not seen when dispersed and divided or split up. And this holds true even according to the view of Aristotle, who says that natural entities have a limit at their maximum and minimum. 2 The second way would be to say that a motive power sometimes has its action when it brings about motion [and then] it results in an appearance, and sometimes it is at rest, and then it does not result in an appearance. Nevertheless, it is not on this account said {200} to be corrupted. This would likewise be said about every other power. If not, then, when someone s powers directing his principal operation come to rest, that person is said to be corrupted, and when this occurs in every part of some region, then the world is said to be corrupted with respect to that region. And then let this be so to infinity. In that case, according to natural appearances, the world would be said to be corrupted. The third way would be to say that the fundamental basis (ratio) of the appearance is not removed from anything. For suppose you see whiteness in Socrates s face, blackness in his hair, and 2 See Physics I.4, 187b14. The thought is that if the minimum size of a given form, like a color, is too small to be perceived, then that form could be divided into such minimal parts, and (arguably) could still exist, in the way that water might be dispersed into droplets too small to be perceived. 3
95 100 105 110 115 a scar on his forehead. You will see all these things when he is said to be corrupted not where you saw them earlier, but somewhere else: for instance, whiteness in John, blackness in a horse, and a scar on Peter. But, you will say, I will see similar things, of the same species but not numerically the same. On the contrary, of things that come to the senses and intellect altogether the same, so that the intellect cannot draw a distinction as far as they themselves are concerned, you ought not to deny any degree of identity except on account of a difference among extrinsic things from which that conclusion is established. In the present case, however, these two things come altogether the same to the senses and intellect, like two eggs that are entirely similar, so that the only difference conceived of is a difference in location. Hence, if location were set aside, no difference there would be conceived. Therefore, if there is a difference, it comes from something extrinsic, as in the following way of arguing: Things that are in numerically distinct places are numerically distinct; but these two whitenesses are in numerically distinct places, as is known through sight; therefore they are numerically distinct, since the same thing cannot exist in distinct places. Yet this argument, even if it is plausible, is not conclusive. Although the major premise is denied by some who claim that the same thing can exist in distinct places, let this premise be conceded. For I have no wish to proceed, as some think, from premises so contrary to the senses. Still, the minor premise is denied, because in order to prove that the whiteness that appears in the two eggs exists in distinct places, one cannot argue from sight s casting its attention on the distinct locations where it sees whiteness. Therefore whiteness is in distinct places does not follow. For put before yourself, or around yourself, various mirrors at distinct locations. According to what is standardly maintained, if you cast your attention on one location, you will see yourself and nothing else that formally inheres in the mirror. 3 Similarly, if you attend to another location, you will see yourself. And in this way, in attending to distinct locations, you will see something that does not exist in numerically distinct locations. The same would be said in the present case, by positing that here below only the material exists, and that the actions of things are reduced to separate principles of the sort that Plato postulated for instance, the action of this whiteness would be reduced to a separate whiteness. (The separation I am talking about is the sort that the Commentator attributes to the intelligences and even to the possible 3 Autrecourt is mindful that Peter Auriol had used the case of mirrors to establish that the objects of perception are intentional objects distinct from the real physical object reflected in the mirror. But Autrecourt here allows himself to take for granted the standard view that, when you look into a mirror, you see yourself. 4
120 125 130 135 140 intellect. 4 ) In that case the material to which one attends is nothing but a kind of mirror, so that, in casting one s attention on that location, whiteness is naturally apt to be seen. This is Plato s view. Each of these three ways is plausible, nor do I see that Aristotle has sufficiently refuted any of them. For now, I choose the first. (The argument set out on the first view, the one chosen as more plausible, does not extend to motion supposing motion is a thing distinct from the thing in motion since a motion cannot be split up into atoms (atomalia) whose existence is permanent, as can happen with other natural entities. But as for whether motion is distinct from the thing in motion, and how they are related, we will look into this before the end of the treatise as a whole. 5 For if they are not distinct, then there is no need to take pains over this question. We will also take a look, in its place, at the acts of our soul. 6 ) Therefore, as regards natural things, the only motion is local motion. 7 When there follows from such {201} motion a gathering of natural bodies that are collected to each other and receive the nature of a single supposit, this is called generation. When they are split up, it is called corruption. And when, through local motion, corporeal atoms are conjoined with some supposit in such a way that their occurrence seems to happen neither at the motion of the supposit nor at that which is said to be the supposit s natural operation, then it is called alteration. And perhaps just as a magnet does with iron, so here there is some one thing that connects and retains these indivisibles in such a gathering, and insofar as it is of greater force, so that supposit more endures with its own character. And this, if there were such a thing, would be spoken of as if it were the formal principle of the thing. (But what should be said of light in a medium? What is it at night? It could be said that this light is nothing other than certain bodies that are naturally apt to follow the motion of the sun or of some other luminous body. But if it is here said, in objection, that light is generated in an instant, 8 4 Kennedy cites Averroes, De anima III comm. 4 and 36. 5 See Chapter Five below. 6 See?? As with the case of local motion, the question might arise as to whether, when the soul acts, there is a thing, a change, that is distinct from the soul, and if so whether this change is something that comes into and goes out of existence, contrary to the thesis of this chapter. 7 Compare 1, where it is the denial of eternality that gives rise to the various kinds of motion. 8 This was not the standard view, but it was beginning to get serious attention from Autrecourt s contemporaries. See Peter Marshall, Nicole Oresme on the Nature, Reflection, and Speed of Light, Isis 72 (1981) 357-74. 5
145 150 155 160 165 170 then it should be replied that although it seems to be generated in an instant, because it happens as if suddenly, nevertheless it does take time. Hence sound, as is standardly maintained, multiplies itself in a medium successively, since it occurs with some local motion, and yet it seems to come about as if suddenly. So too, it is not difficult to imagine that there are certain bodies that are very minute and penetrating that seem to spread themselves, as if suddenly, through a whole medium. And this is particularly so when one considers certain features of motion and rest that will be spoken of when we discuss motion.) The end of the first chapter lies in this: that if someone with a good natural aptitude considers [the question], someone not misled by some badly distracting motion, he will say that human beings, at this time, cannot say with certainty that they know (scire) that any thing has passed from existence to non-existence. And it seems from the following that if my intellect has to hold one side, it should hold that things are eternal, especially permanent things. For if, in every case, eternity is better than a thing s corruption, then so it will seem that the universe is more perfect if its parts are held to be eternal, especially its permanent parts, just as its own existence is conceded to be eternal. For if, in accord with the standard understanding, motion is distinguished from that which moves, then one perhaps must say that its perfection lies more in the negation of permanence, just as its existence does. One would then argue as follows: That should be posited in the universe from which a greater perfection appears in the universe, assuming no impossibility follows from its postulation. But so it is that when one posits that natural permanent things, of which we have been speaking above, are eternal, a greater perfection appears in the universe, nor does any impossibility follow from this. Therefore etc. The major that one should not suppose that any possible perfection is lacking in the universe is known, because for whatever reason one [might be lacking], so for the same reason might two or three or infinite infinities, and thus there would be no limit, not even with respect to the measure for measuring the divine truths. The minor also appears true through the aforesaid arguments. A further argument for this conclusion runs as follows. Things should be said to be corrupted in whatever way is most suitable to the thing s nature, if well considered. This claim is known from its terms. But now, if well considered, in the ceasing of natural permanent things there does not occur the total annihilation of any permanent being, but rather the pulling apart or splitting up of small bodies, or else the removal of bodies that had existed within it earlier and the arrival of others. Look at wood that is burned, or at a flaming candle, and you will see that a continuous 6
175 180 185 190 195 200 removal of bodies occurs. And so too death, as Aristotle says in De morte, 9 occurs in one way to someone as a result of the surrounding heat s drawing out the heat that was within. Thus, in things that putrefy, their natural heat is released. And, in short, running through similar cases, it does not appear that corruption in things occurs in any other way {202} than through the removal of bodies. And if this does appear to happen otherwise in a thing, on account of the minuteness of the bodies being removed, it should not on this account be denied. So too, according to Aristotle in Meteorology I, 10 bodies are continuously lifted up from water and earth, and these bodies impress themselves on the air above. Thus, when a lake has become dried out, it should not be supposed that it passes into non-existence, but only that there is a splitting apart and lifting up of the existing bodies. And again, it is argued as follows. Every whole that is most perfect through the inclusion of every perfection and through the exclusion of every imperfection, in which there is no deformity, ought to have all its maximal parts especially where the nature of the thing allows it. The universe is of this sort. Therefore etc. The major is clear, because if the ruin of one house in a city seems to give rise to the deformity of that city, then much more in the case of the whole universe should it be held that a deformity occurring in a part gives rise to the deformity of the whole. The minor seems known namely that, even according to Aristotle, 11 the universe is perfected through the inclusion of every perfection and through the exclusion of every imperfection. Hence, even if something in the universe can be called imperfect in a way by comparing it to something else in the universe that is more perfect, still it is true that there is nothing in the universe that is imperfect absolutely so that it is better for it not to exist. For the good has to be set out as a measure in the universe, since it has the character of an end. Hence you will not assign a reason for why this is this rather than its opposite, except because it is better for it to be this than its opposite, and so in other cases. To this argument, those who delight in seeking out ways of evading what seems more true to natural appearances might respond first by saying that what belongs to the perfection of the universe are species, not individuals, and species do indeed endure perpetually. 12 On the contrary, I ask what you mean by species. Either you mean universal concepts, and then they do not seem to belong to the perfection of the universe more than do the natures of external things, or by species you mean some one thing that, of itself, wholly and really exists in every individual of that species. This second 9 Ch. 6, 470a29-31. 10 I.9, 346b16-347a12. 11 Perhaps On the Heavens II.11, 291b14 (K). 12 See e.g. Aquinas. 7
205 210 215 220 225 meaning would seem more plausible, as those would say who hold that there is a specific nature really in individuals, of itself wholly one, so that it is distinguished within them only through superadded individual differences, so that it is only extrinsically distinguished. 13 But now I ask why you posit, within two whitenesses, some distinctive principle superadded to the nature that, of itself, is wholly one. My seeking this does not seem irrational, because they are wholly as one at the sensory level and in their first comprehension within intellect, so that the intellect would not distinguish them if not for their difference in location. But this argument from location would not be conclusive (that is, the argument that it is impossible for numerically one and the same thing to exist in different places, etc.). 14 It is not conclusive, because according to those who talk this way the specific nature that is of itself wholly one does exist in multiple places. If they can maintain this, then it could equally be maintained against them as regards what is numerically one, since just as this is wholly one in itself, so is the other. Moreover, the argument from generation and corruption 15 would not be conclusive among those saying that when this whiteness is corrupted, whiteness absolutely is not corrupted except extrinsically, but is only discommunicated. And so it would be said, too, if they were wholly indistinguished. To the argument offered above 16 another response could be given that seems plausible. This would be to say that a given thing belongs to the perfection of the universe contingently, meaning that possible perfections are produced in nature, wholly equal to this one, and so when the one is corrupted, another will be substituted. {203} The implausibility of this response emerges first from one consideration, which is that such a substitution seems to suggest some kind of imperfection. This is true, nor do the authorities on the other side deny it, but rather they plainly admit it. The Commentator Averroes, in De anima II, 17 says that the divine solicitude has seen that individuals cannot persist in their numerical identity and, taking pity on them, has bequeathed upon them the power of being able to persist at least in their specific identity. According to this thought, it is argued as follows. A cause that gives rise to its effect by one causal act, to the extent that it suffices for the nature of the whole, is more perfect than a cause that does not give rise to its effect or does so 13 Scotus.. 14 See lines 101ff. 15 There doesn t seem to be a distinct argument from generation and corruption against Autrecourt s view. Perhaps the reference goes all the way back to the first paragraph? 16 This reply targets the argument at lines 154ff, and some of the subsequent arguments as well. 17 II.34 (K).[[quotation??]] 8
230 235 240 245 250 255 through multiple causal acts. But, according to this, God would not give rise to his effect in the genus of final cause through a single causal act, to the extent that would suffice, nor in the genus of efficient cause, except through multiple causal acts. Therefore he would not cause these things most perfectly, neither in the genus of final cause nor in the genus of efficient cause. So it seems better, especially given that it does not seem impossible, to posit one maximal effect rather than to posit so many substitutions. Nor too could you say, according to this, as it seems, that the corruption of this given thing is effected through final causation and, consequently, in no way through efficient causation. For from the fact that, of necessity, in place of this thing another must be substituted that is equal in perfection, it seems that it would be better or at least, it would be good for this thing to endure through subsequent time. <Addendum I> {185} {188} <End of Addendum I> {203} Even if these arguments are not found wholly conclusive, still the position is plausible more plausible than the arguments for the opposite conclusion. For if they have arguments that uphold the opposite conclusions, let them state them, and let the lovers of truth make a comparison with these arguments. I believe that to anyone not partial to one side more than to the other the level of plausibility will appear higher in these arguments. I say this because in the books of others I have seen few arguments for obscure (occultas) conclusions to which I did not know how to give plausible responses. And if they say that I deny principles known per se, it is amazing how they so openly state things that are false, things they could not say except by lying. Was it not sufficiently established above that, when blackness ensues, to say that the whiteness does not exist is neither a principle known from its terms nor is something that we experience at once within ourselves? 18 Also, it is amazing how they hold those to be principles known per se which are the opposite of what is agreed on by nearly all those who preceded Aristotle, or at least the more serious among them. (But to have the occasion to discuss this, let me set out below a chapter on propositions known per se. 19 ) Those who philosophize should no longer allow these men such verbosities, which have served to shield those who do not know how to resist the truth. 18 See lines 18-36 above. 19 O:234-38??? 9