FRANK JACKSON AND ROBERT PARGETTER A MODIFIED DUTCH BOOK ARGUMENT. (Received 14 May, 1975)

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FRANK JACKSON AND ROBERT PARGETTER A MODIFIED DUTCH BOOK ARGUMENT (Received 14 May, 1975) A unifying strand in the debate between objectivists and subjectivists is the thesis that a man's degrees of belief ought to obey the axioms of the probability calculus. This paper is concerned to reconstruct the argument most widely employed in support of this thesis - the Dutch Book Argument (DBA). We first note a critical shortcoming in the usual presentation of the DBA; we then introduce a general principle of rationality as the basis for a modification that overcomes this shortcoming; and, finally, we argue that the modified DBA is immune from certain further objections that might be or have been advanced to the DBA. I. THE STANDARD DBA As standardly presented, the DBA has three parts: a part relating degree of belief and betting behaviour, a part concerned with the rationality and coherence of sets of bets, and a formal part giving mathematical demonstrations that certain sets of bets have certain properties. The formal part is not in dispute, and will be presupposed in our discussion. We take it that there is such a thing as partial belief, and that it is conceptually related to betting behaviour, and describe the latter more or less standardly thus: A bet with respect to p is specified by (i) a (positive) sum of money, S, the stake, (ii) a number between 0 and 1, Qp, the betting quotient, and (iii) whether the bet is on p or against p (the direction of the bet). A bet on p at quotient Qp involves an outlay (=possible loss) of S" Qp and a win, ifp turns out true, of S- S. Qp. A bet against p involves outlay of S-S. Qp and a win, if p turns out false, of S. Qp. For concreteness, the bets discussed below are treated in the usual way as money bets. We assume that it is desirable to win money and undesirable to lose money. (The justification of the assumption is discussed later.) Finally, we take it that the betting quotient to be identified with a Philosophical Studies 29 (1976) 403-407. All Rights Reserved Copyright 9 1976 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

404 FRANK JACKSON AND ROBERT PARGETTER person's degree of belief in p is his forced quotient (Fore Qp).l The person is compelled to nominate a quotient prior to being informed whether he will be betting on or against p at that rate. Now for the critical shortcoming. 2 How might a dutch book style argument justify the forced betting quotient correlate of, say, the Negation Axiom, namely Fore Qp + Fore Q ~p = 1 (1) The essential insight about rationality that underlies the DBA is that a course of action that must lead to nett loss is irrational. But how does violating (1) lead to a certain loss? There are two cases: the sum is greater than one, the sum is less than one. Now if ForcQp+ForcQ,~p> 1, bets on p and,~p with equal stake lead to a certain loss; but bets against p and ~p with equal stake lead to a certain gain. If Fore Qp + Fore Qp < 1, bets againstp and ~p lead to a certain loss; but bets on p and ~p lead to a certain gain. 3 It is hard to connect this with the essential insight about rationality. True, violating (1) and betting in a certain way leads to a loss come what may; but this, following the insight, only shows the conjunction irrational. And this surely is insufficient in itself to show that it is irrational to violate (1). After all, violating (1) and betting in a different way lead s to a certain gain. The fact is that the connection between irrationality and betting quotients which do not obey the probability axioms, has not been made sufficiently clear to sustain the DBA. As a first step towards a repair we state a general principle governing rationality. II. RATIONALITY AND UNIVERSALIZABILITY If act A is (morally) right and B is like A in all relevant respects, then B is right. This principle, where 'right' may be replaced by 'good', 'bad', 'ought to be done', and so on, is the so-called universalizability principle in Ethics. A similar principle applies to rational belief. If it is rational to believe proposition p in situation $1, and situation $2 is, in all respects relevant to the truth of p, like $1, then it is rational to believe p in $2. We take this principle to be an evident truth - one such that the best argument for it is to state it. The corresponding principle for degrees of rational belief is: If it is

A MODIFIED DUTCH BOOK ARGUMENT 405 rational to believe p in $1 to degree R and $2 is identical to $1 in all respects relevant to the truth of p, then it is rational to believe p in Sz to degree R. III. A RECONSTRUCTED DBA Consider a person, X, who is forced to bet concerning propositions, Pl,..., P,, under the following conditions: (i) the direction of his bet regarding each p~ is determined by a person, Y, who knows his betting quotient, Q~, for each p~, (ii) X specifies these betting quotients in ignorance of the direction of his bets, (iii) Y wants X to lose, and (iv) Y knows the formal part of the DBA. The quotients here will be forced quotients, and so Q~ may be identified with X's degree of belief in p~ for each i. We will call a situation satisfying (i)-(iv), a competitive betting situation; and quotients in such situations, competitive quotients. Now it will be paradigmatically irrational for X to have a set of competitive betting quotients which do not obey the probability calculus. Because Y wants X to lose and, as he knows the formal part of the DBA, Y can ensure that X does lose. Therefore, a set of competitive betting quotients which violate the probability axioms are irrational. But these betting quotients are degrees of belief: they are determined by degrees of belief, 4 so if the former are irrational, so are the latter. Hence, it is irrational to have a set of degrees of belief which violate the probability axioms in a competitive situation (as defined in (i)-(iv), above). We now eliminate this italicized proviso by reference to the universalizability principle for rational belief. Consider the normal situation where someone believes pl,..., p. to degrees r~..., r,, respectively, but is not going to be betting about them. Call this situation S,. Now consider So, a situation exactly like S, in every respect relevant to the truth ofp~,..., p., and differing just in that clauses (i)-(iv) of the competitive betting situation apply. Therefore, r 1... I", in Sc should be identical to r 1... r, ins,, by universalizability. But, as shown, the former ought to obey the probability axioms; so if the latter should be identical with the former, then so ought the latter. Clearly, this kind of universalizability argument is always possible. For any situation in which one believes a set of propositions to varying degrees, there is a situation identical in all truth-relevant respects, which

406 FRANK JACKSON AND ROBERT PARGETTER fulfils the conditions defining a competitive betting situation. In the latter, the DBA shows that a necessary condition of one's degrees of belief being rational is concordance with the probability axioms. And, by universalizability, one's degrees of belief ought to be the same in both situations. Hence, our modified DBA enables us to extend this necessary condition to any belief-situation whatever. IV. ON TWO OBJECTIONS We now show how two serious objections, further to the 'critical shortcoming' of w 1, to the standard DBA can be handled within the framework of our reconstruction. (i) The Person Without Desire The equation of money with the desirable in the DBA is standardly alleged to be a harmless assumption of convenience. But it conceals a substantive assumption - that the person in question has desires. And surely a person might have beliefs without desires. For such a person, the standard DBA cannot even get started. In our approach, we imagine such a person endowed (perhaps miraculously) with desires in a manner irrelevant to the truth of the propositions in question; show that such an endowed person's degrees of belief ought to obey the axioms; and thert extend the result to the original person by reference to universalizability. (ii) Unsettled Bets In real life some bets can only be settled one way - for instance, a bet on there being three successive sevens in the decimal expansion of n can only be settled affirmatively; and other bets cannot be settled either way - for instance, one on Julius Caesar having winked ten times crossing the Rubicon. This gives the standard DBA difficulty, for in such cases rational betting quotients need not obey the axioms. 5 In our approach, we imagine that God settles all such bets, and this is known to both parties. And then argue in the manner of two paragraphs back using universalizability. La Trobe University

A MODIFIED DUTCH BOOK ARGUMENT 407 NOTES 1 This assumption is not crucial in what follows, and readers who favour some other quotient, e.g., the maximum quotient on p, may insert their favourite throughout what follows. We put it briefly as it is well put in Patricia Baillie, 'Confirmation and The Dutch Book Argument', British Journal for The Philosophy of Science 24 (1973), 393-397. It was, indeed, her paper that convinced us of the need to modify the DBA. 8 In accord with the policy of omitting the formal part of the DBA, we leave out the arithmetic here. 4 This is not, of course, true in non-competitive situations where Y wants X to win. 5 For details see Ian Hacking, 'On Falling Short of Strict Coherence', Philosophy of Science 35 (1968), 284--286; and B. D. Ellis, 'The Logic of Subjective Probability', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (1973), 125-152.