151 Dodd Hall jcarpenter@fsu.edu Department of Philosophy Office: 850-644-1483 Tallahassee, FL 32306-1500 Education 2008-2012 Ph.D. (obtained Dec. 2012), Philosophy, Florida State University (FSU) Dissertation: Remedying Some Defects in the History of Analyticity Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, Carnap, Descartes, Frege, Kant, Quine, Williamson, Wittgenstein. See Dissertation Abstract, below. Russell (Chair), Michael, J. Piers 2006-2008 M.A., Philosophy, FSU 1998-2002 B.S. (with Honors), Philosophy and Mathematics, University of Wisconsin-Madison Specialization Competence Areas of Specialization and Competence Philosophy of Language, History of Analytic Philosophy Ethics, Logic Awards, Honors, and Nominations Hilldale Fellowship University of Wisconsin-Madison 2001-2002 Honors Apprenticeship University of Wisconsin-Madison 2000 Outstanding TA Award FSU, nomination 2008 Publications Carpenter, John, Investigating Intentions: A Philosophical Assessment of Wegner s Work on Mental Causation, 6 th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Arts and Humanities: Conference Proceedings (ISSN#: 1541-5899, 2008). Arp, Robert, and Carpenter, John, 24 and the Ethics of Objectification, in 24 and Philosophy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2008). Under Review and In Progress Descartes and Analyticity Carnap and Quine Throw Light on the Interesting Word Analytic Under Review In Progress Conference Presentations Descartes s Antithetical Role in the History of Epistemology FSU-UF Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, Gainesville, 2008. Even Einstein was Irrational: Comments on Sosa and Galloway 12 th Annual NE Florida Student Philosophy Conference, Jacksonville, 2009. Investigating Intentions: A Philosophical Assessment of Work on Mental Causation 6 th Annual Hawaii Int. Conference on Arts and Humanities, Honolulu, 2008. 1
Teaching Experience Adjunct Professor/Instructor (full responsibilities) Introduction to Philosophy FSU 95 students Critical Thinking (w/ McFarlane) FSU 180 students [Pending] Ethical Issues (Twice) FSU 75 & 111 students Symbolic Logic FSU 48 students American Philosophers Barry University 30 students Ethical Theory FSU 20 students Philosophy of Language FSU 48 students [Pending] Teaching Assistance Introduction to Philosophy (Twice) Critical Thinking (Twice) Ethical Issues Plato and His Predecessors Political Thought, Contemporary Symbolic Logic Existentialism Philosophy of Mind Modern Philosophy Ethical Theory Philosophy of Language Graduate Coursework History of Philosophy Aristotle s Essentialism Frege and Early Russell Kant Plato s Theaetetus Wittgenstein Carnap, Directed Study on Justus Noam Chomsky s Philosophy, Directed Study on Leiber Modern Philosophy, History of Roberts Philosophy of Language, Mathematics, and Logic Ostensive Definitions, Directed Study on Philosophy of Mathematics, Directed Study on Gödel s Theorems, Directed Study on Modern Logic I Modern Logic II Modal Logic, Directed Study on 2
Graduate Coursework (Continued) Epistemology and Metaphysics Epistemology, Topics in Naturalized Rationality, Theoretical Metaphilosophy, Directed Study on Metaphysics and Epistemology Core Course Ethics and Philosophy of Mind Well-being Well-being, Directed Study on Moral Responsibility, The Nature of Metaethics, Topics in Free Will Compatibilist Style Ethics Core Course Korsgaard s The Sources of Normativity, Dir. Study on Intentions, Decisions, and Mental Actions Dalton McKenna Clarke Gert McKenna McNaughton McNaughton Mele Research and Development Positions Research Assistant Department of Astronomy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999. Applied Calculus Tutorial Designer Department of Plant Pathology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2001. Volunteer Web Page Designer Department of Philosophy, FSU, 2007-2010. Professional Services and Other Activities Organizing Committee (full responsibilities), The Society for Women s Advancement in Philosophy (S.W.A.P.) Conference, 2009. Ethics Bowl Coach (FSU), 2007. Session Chair and Conference Assistant, S.W.A.P. Conference, 2007. Session Chair, FSU Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, 2007. Conference Assistant, S.W.A.P. Conference, 2008. Conference Assistant, Florida Philosophical Association, 2007. Reviewer, FSU Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, 2006. Promotional Assistance, Sects and Sexuality Conference, put on jointly by the Religion Department and S.W.A.P., 2010. 3
Organizational Affiliation Vice President S.W.A.P. 2008-2009 Member S.W.A.P. 2006-2010 Member The American Philosophical Association 2011-2013 Member FSU Philosophy Graduate Student Organization 2006-2012 References Dr. Michael Dr. Russell Dr. J. Piers Teaching: Dr. Michael McKenna Teaching: Dr. John Roberts Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, FSU Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona Letters of recommendation are on file in the FSU Philosophy Department main office. Contact Karen Foulke at kfoulke@fsu.edu or 850-644-1483 to request copies. Dissertation Abstract One explanation of why No song will ever go supernova is true, or capable of being known, is solely based on the meanings of the words no, song, etc. The legitimacy and philosophical importance of such an explanation has been hotly debated since the time of Kant, but its role in the works of various philosophers has been insufficiently investigated thus far. The bulk of my dissertation is an exploration into how analyticity the ostensible concept associated with this kind of explanation relates to the philosophical works of Descartes, Kant, Frege, Carnap, Quine, and Williamson. I examine how analyticity is related to Descartes s philosophy by offering a critical appraisal of the three most pertinent discussions in the literature. Erde suggests that Descartes took cogito ergo sum to be analytically true on the basis of conceptual containment. I argue that Erde s thesis is false for several reasons, one of which is that if Erde s interpretation were correct, cogito ergo sum would have no more import than I am walking, therefore I exist, but clearly Descartes thought that it does. Katz argued that though Descartes had a sense of the fact that cogito ergo sum is analytic, since Descartes did not have access to the true linguistic theory in which its justification can be formulated, Descartes s epistemology was provided as an ersatz alternative. I argue that Descartes s epistemology leaves no room for any amendments from linguistics. In short, Descartes held that cogito ergo sum is (1) true solely because it was made true by God, and (2) can be known to be true solely because God gave us the ability to intuit truths; however, Descartes did not appreciate that this account could not convince a skeptic. Finally, for the same reasons that undermined Katz view, Díaz failed to show that Descartes s ontological argument involves analyticity. Nevertheless, I argue that since 4
Descartes held that (1) the idea of God contains necessary existence and that (2) the understanding of words commits us to having the ideas signified by those words, we can know that God exists is true simply based on understanding those words. Though Kant s subject-predicate containment account of analyticity is superficially different from Frege s account involving only logic and definitions, I argue that the two are relevantly similar for the following reasons: Kant held a liberal view on what counts as subject-predicate sentences, maintained that analytic judgments ought to increase our knowledge, and advocated logical analysis as the way to determine which judgments are analytic. The substantive difference between Kant and Frege is whether analyticity is grounded in logical analysis based on concepts or definitions. Unlike Kant, who seems to have assumed that none of our concepts are vague, Frege called attention to the vagueness in ordinary language, and recommended that in formal contexts, vagueness be removed by fruitful stipulative definitions. In contrast with the later work of Wittgenstein, Frege thought that ordinary language was flawed for various reasons, the major one of which is that ordinary words, with their vague senses, rarely have perspicuous referents, and hence fail to be capable of capturing the definiteness of truth. Stipulations can ensure perspicuous referents, but such definitions must not invalidate any propositions already commonly accepted or affirm any that are already commonly not accepted, on pain of changing the legitimate subject associated with those words. Carnap and Quine initially agreed on the characterization of analyticity as only involving rule-governed symbol manipulation, but even this characterization tacitly imported the semantics of logical terms, and Carnap subsequently was convinced that widespread toleration of semantics could generate fruitful results. Quine argued that accepting semantics in this fashion leads to an incorrect account of ontology. Carnap s view on ontology was pluralistic in the sense that ontology varied by language, and languages varied by which sentences were taken to be analytic by the language formulators. Quine s famous case against analyticity amounts to the insistence that (1) analytic is in need of a scientifically respectable explanation, since it is a term of art, and that (2) there is no antecedently clear sense of analytic on the basis of which Carnap could use the word, or provide an explication for it. However, I demonstrate that Quine eventually gave this objection up and provided an explication of his own. The lasting disagreement between Carnap and Quine was over the usefulness of analyticity. Williamson s two main arguments against analytic and synthetic ( not analytic ) truths being true in substantively different senses are reductios. According to him, if true were ambiguous, then the standard disquotational principles for true and false sentences, and the truth-tables for sentential logical connectives, would have to incorporate these distinct senses, but it is not possible to do so while keeping the alleged senses of true distinct. I argue that in the case of the disquotational principles, Williamson offers an inadequate disambiguation, and when appropriately disambiguated, the correct statuses of the disquotational principles can be demonstrated. In the case of compositional semantics, while Williamson is correct that characteristic truth-tables cannot be generally disambiguated, what is important is that the same problem does not apply to particular applications of truth-tables. 5