6AANA026 Philosophy of Science Syllabus Academic year 2015/16

6AANA026 Philosophy of Science Syllabus Academic year 2015/16 Basic information Credits: 20 Module Tutor: Sherrilyn Roush Office: 610 Philosophy Building Consultation time: Tuesday 11-12:00, Wednesday 15-16:00 Semester: 2 Lecture time and venue: Tuesday 9-10:00, K 2.40 Seminar time and venue: Tuesday 10-11:00, Strand 306 Module Description This course in general philosophy of science will address questions like: What is required for observations to support scientific hypotheses? What makes something a scientific explanation? Is a computer simulation as good as an experiment? Is the predictive success of science a reason to believe its theories are true about unobservables? Can science be distinguished from metaphysics? Can biology be reduced to physics? Topics covered include the problem of induction, falsificationism, the problem of auxiliary hypotheses, the advantages and disadvantages of Bayesianism, empiricism, the role of natural law and causes, the pessimistic induction. The scientific examples and probability that we use will be taught in class. Objectives -- Textually-referenced knowledge of some of the main problems of general philosophy of science -- Ability to deploy some philosophical techniques and argumentative strategies that can be used to discuss those problems -- Transferable skills of formulating and evaluating arguments both for and against various other kinds of philosophical positions -- Understanding of the place of some of these issues within general philosophy Assessment Formative assessment: 2 x 1,500 word essays Formative essays due: 5pm 26 February 2016 5pm 1 April 2016 Any essays received past the deadline without prior permission or an extremely good excuse will not be given feedback. Summative assessment : 1 two-hour exam in May or June 1

Outline of Lecture Topics and Suggested Readings Week 1 - Logical Positivism Science is all surface. Metaphysics is meaningless. Positivism and Realism, Moritz Schlick, in Ayer 1959, 82-107. Logical Positivism, Christopher Ray, in W.H. Newton-Smith ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001, 243-251. Logical Empiricism, Wesley Salmon, in Newton-Smith 2001, 233-242. Week 2 Induction and Confirmation: from observations to predictions, and back Sceptical Doubts..., Sceptical Solution..., David Hume from: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, T. L. Beauchamp ed., Oxford, 1999, 108-130. Conjectural Knowledge, Karl Popper from: Objective Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 1979, 1-31. Rational Prediction, Wesley C. Salmon from: The Limitations of Deductivism, A. Grünbaum and W. Salmon eds., University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988, 47-60. Week 3 Induction and Confirmation: the role of probability Probability, John Earman and Wesley C. Salmon Part III of Chapter 2 in The Philosophy of Science, Merrilee Salmon et al. eds., Hackett Press, Indianapolis, IN, 1999. Bayesian and Non-Bayesian Approaches, C. Howson & P. Urbach from: Scientific Reasoning, Open Court, Chicago, 1993, 117-131. Week 4 Scientific Explanation: Deductive-Nomological and Statistical Relevance views Selections, from: Aspects of Scientific Explanation. Carl G. Hempel. Free Press, 1965, 333-354, 412-415, 364-376, 376-403. Statistical Explanation, Wesley Salmon from: The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, R. Colodny ed.,university of Pittsburgh Press, 1970, 173-231. Explanation, Jim Woodward, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Peter Machamer and Michael Silberstein eds. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002, 37-54. Week 5 Scientific Explanation: Unification and Causal/Mechanical views Explanatory Unification, Philip Kitcher from: The Philosophy of Science, R. Boyd et al. eds., MIT Press, 1991, 329-348 AND Causal Explanation, David Lewis, in Philosophical Papers Volume II, Oxford University Press, 1986, 214-240. OR The Causal/Mechanical Model of Explanation, Jim Woodward, in Scientific Explanation. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, volume 13, 1989, P. Kitcher and W. Salmon eds., 357 383. READING WEEK 2

Week 6 Reduction and Emergence: Is biology nothing but physics? The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis, Oppenheim and Putnam, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol II, 1958, eds. Feigl, Scriven and Maxwell. The Structure of Science, E. Nagel, 1961, Routledge, Ch. 11 Special Sciences, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis, J. Fodor, Synthese 28 (1974): 97-115. Week 7 Simulation and Experiment: Just as good? Designing a Research Project, Kendall, Emergency Medical Journal 20 (2003), 164-168. doi:10.1136/emj.20.2.164 Does Matter Really Matter? Wendy Parker, Synthese 169 (2009), 483-496. Science in the Age of Computer Simulation, Eric Winsberg, Chapter 3, University of Chicago Press, 2010. The Epistemic Superiority of Experiment to Simulation, Roush ms. Week 8 Rationality, Theory, and Observation: How do we choose theories? The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn AND Rationality and Objectivity in Science or Tom Kuhn meets Tom Bayes, Wesley Salmon. In Scientific Theories. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (1990). Ed. C.W. Savage (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 175-204. OR The Rationality of Science in Relation to its History, Sherri Roush, in Kuhn s Structure: 50 Years On. Springer, 2015. OR Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, Rudolf Carnap, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (1950): 20-40. Reprinted in Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. Week 9 - Realism vs. Anti-realism: Are our theories true? A Cubicle World as a Model of Inference to Unobservable Things, Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction, 1938, 105-134 AND The Scientific Image, Bas van Fraassen, Chs. 1-2. OR The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism, Alan Musgrave from: Relativism and Realism in Science, R. Nola ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988 AND A Confutation of Convergent Realism, Larry Laudan, in The Philosophy of Science, D. Papineau ed. Oxford University Press, 1996, 108-138. Week 10 Realism and Anti-realism: Should past failure worry us? Exceeding our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. P.K. Stanford. Oxford: New York, 2006, Chs. 1,2. Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy, P.D. Magnus and C. Callender, Philosophy of Science (2004) 71: 320 338. 3

The Rationality of Science in Relation to its History, S. Roush, in Kuhn s Structure: 50 Years On. Springer, 2015. Further Reading Week 1: The Turning Point in Philosophy, M. Schlick, in in Logical Positivism, ed. A.J. Ayer. New York: Free Press, 1959, 53-59. The Elimination of Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language, R. Carnap, in Ayer 1959, 60-81. The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning, C.G. Hempel, in Ayer 1959, 108-129. The Old and the New Logic, R. Carnap, in Ayer, 133-146. Logic, Mathematics, and Knowledge of Nature, H. Hahn, in Ayer 1959, 147-161. The Theory of Relativity and A priori Knowledge. Reichenbach, Hans. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965. (Original German: 1920) Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, Rudolf Carnap, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (1950): 20-40. Reprinted in Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. Language, Truth, and Logic, A.J. Ayer. Dover, 1946. Vienna Circle, Thomas Uebel, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/vienna-circle/. Hans Reichenbach, Clark Glymour and Frederick Eberhardt, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/reichenbach/ Week 2 The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Karl R. Popper. New York: Routledge, 1992 (1959). Causality and Explanation, Wesley Salmon, Ch.1. Week 3 Probability Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman-Pearson Philosophy of Induction, Mayo, D.G., and A. Spanos, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (2006) 57: 323 357. Induction and Probability, Alan Hájek and Ned Hall, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002. 149-168. Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic. Fourth Edition. Brian Skyrms. Wadsworth, 2000. An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic. Ian Hacking. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2000. Novel Prediction Selections on consilience, William Whewell, from The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, founded upon their history, Volume II, Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967, 62-68, 74-79. 4

Fresnel, Poisson, and the White Spot : the role of successful prediction in theory acceptance, John Worrall, in The Uses of Experiment 1989 D. Gooding, T. Pinch, and S. Schaffer eds. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 135-57. Prediction vs. Accommodation, Hitchcock and Sober, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2004), 1-34. Simplicity Bayes and Bust: Simplicity as a Problem, 1, 2, 3, 6, Forster The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (Sep., 1995), 399-424. How to Tell When Simpler, Forster and Sober, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (Mar., 1994), 1-35. Why Probability Does Not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification, Kevin T. Kelly and Clark Glymour, from Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, Christopher Hitchcock, ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004, 94-114. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Nelson Goodman. Harvard University Press; 4th Revised edition, 1990, Chs. 3-4. Week 4 Laws of Nature, John W. Carroll, in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition) Edward N. Zalta ed., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/laws-of-nature/. Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws, Nancy Cartwright, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1994) XCIV, pp. 279-292; reprinted in David Papineau (ed.), The Philosophy of Science, pp. 314 26. Humean Supervenience Debugged, Mind (1994) vol 103 no 412, pp. 473-490. Laws of Nature, Fred I. Dretske Philosophy of Science (1977) 44, pp. 248 68. What is a Law of Nature? D.M. Armstrong, Cambridge: CUP, 1983, esp. Part 1. Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman. Fourth edition, 1983. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapter 1. The Structure of Science, E. Nagel, Ch. 4, Routledge, 1961. The Nature of Laws, M. Tooley, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1977) 7, pp. 667 98. New Work for a Theory of Universals, David Lewis, Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1983) vol 61 issue 4 pp. 343-377. A better best system account of lawhood, Jonathan Cohen and Craig Callendar, Philosophical Studies (2009) 145: 1 34. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Nancy Cartwright. Clarendon Press, 1983. Week 5 The Scientific Image. Bas van Fraassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, Ch. 5. Causality and Explanation. Wesley Salmon. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Real Patterns, Daniel Dennett. Journal of Philosophy, LXXXVIII (1991), pp. 27-51. Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XCIV (1994), pp. 279-292; reprinted in David Papineau ed., The Philosophy of Science, pp. 314 26. The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence. R. Batterman, 2002. Oxford University Press, New York. 5

Week 7 Experiment and Observation, Jim Bogen, in Peter Machamer et al. eds., 2002, 128-148. A Climate of Healthy Skepticism, Nate Silver, Chapter 12, The Signal and the Noise, Penguin Press, 2012, 370-411. Week 8 Saving the Phenomena, Jim Bogen and Jim Woodward, Philosophical Review (July 1988), 303-352. Week 9 A Theory s Predictive Success can Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates, Jarrett Leplin, in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, Christopher Hitchcock ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004, 117-132. A Theory s Predictive Success Does not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates, Andre Kukla and Joel Walmsley, in Hitchcock ed. 2004, 133-148. Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds, John Worrall, Dialectica 43 (1989): 99-124. Introductory Textbooks Peter Godfrey-Smith (2003), Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, University of Chicago Press. Excellent contemporary introduction. A relatively cheap paperback, so worth considering if you plan to buy any books for the course. James Ladyman, (2002): Understanding Philosophy of Science, Routledge. - A very readable introduction and excellent for those with less philosophy background. Available reasonably cheaply. Donald Gillies (1993): Philosophy of Science in the 20th Century, Blackwell. - Good resource for philosophy of science in the first half of 20th century. M. H. Salmon et al (1992), Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Prentice-Hall. W. Newton-Smith (1981), The Rationality of Science, Routledge Chalmers, A. F. (1999), What is This Thing Called Science? 4th ed. Open University Press Classic Texts B. Van Fraassen (1980), The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press. T. Kuhn (1998), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd Ed., University of Chicago Press. W.V. Quine (1990), The Pursuit of Truth, Harvard University Press. K. Popper (1959), The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson Press A.J. Ayer (1946), Language Truth and Logic, Dover Collections A.J. Ayer (1966), Logical Positivism, Free Press M. Curd and J. A. Cover (eds.) (1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. Norton J. Leplin (1984), Scientific Realism, University of California Press. D. Papineau (1996), The Philosophy of Science, OUP. R. Boyd et al (1991), The Philosophy of Science, MIT Press. A. Richardson and T. Uebel (2007), The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism, CUP. 6

Sample Essay Questions 1. What can the four main views of explanation say about the following purported explanation? God wants it to be the case that A. What God wants to be the case is the case. ---------- Therefore, A 2. Why does Hume think his skeptical conclusion that we are not rationally justified in believing the future will resemble the past poses no threat to common life? 3. Is Popper successful in arguing that we can make sense of all the epistemic things scientists do without appealing to induction? 4. The legitimacy of drawing conclusions from simulations is always relative to the knowledge we have. But isn t this also true of experiments? So what is the difference? 5. Many realists think that the only or best explanation of the predictive success of science is the approximate truth of its theories. What are some other possible explanations? 6. Why does the picture of the history of science as successive paradigm shifts threaten to make theory choice look irrational? Is there any way to avoid this implication? 7. If we had a complete atomic description of the world, would we still need the science of biology to explain living organisms? 7