Levinas and Asian Thought ed. by Leah Kalmanson, Frank Garrett, and Sarah Mattice (review) David Chai Philosophy East and West, Volume 65, Number 2, April 2015, pp. 639-643 (Review) Published by University of Hawai'i Press DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2015.0028 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/584832 Access provided by National Taiwan University (12 Sep 2018 07:10 GMT)
Nonetheless, Müller s study is a decidedly fruitful reading for anyone concerned with medieval Japanese Buddhism and/or comparative philosophy. While it is by no means an easy book, it provides multifaceted and original insights into both the Zen pragmatics of language and the possibilities of the theory of symbols when applied to concrete historical phenomena. It not only goes a long way in demystifying Dōgen and his writings no small feat by itself but will also provide a point of reference for future studies both philosophical and philological on the structure of symbols, the use of language, and the representation of experience in Buddhism. Levinas and Asian Thought. Edited by Leah Kalmanson, Frank Garrett, and Sarah Mattice. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2013. Pp. ix + 295. Paper $28.00, isbn 978-0-820-70468-5. Reviewed by David Chai Chinese University of Hong Kong davidchai@cuhk.edu.hk Levinas and Asian Thought, edited by Leah Kalmanson, Frank Garrett, and Sarah Mattice, is one in a long series of works on Levinas coming out of Duquesne University Press. Structurally, the editors have divided the work into three units: Selves and Others (4 chapters); Responsibility and its Limits (4 chapters); and Practices, Norms, and Institutions (5 chapters). Of these thirteen chapters, seven are on Buddhism while the remaining six comprise an eclectic selection of topics dealing with, for example, the samurai code of bushidō, Islamic ethics, the tea ceremony, and the war crimes trials in Cambodia. Of the Introduction s nine pages, only four are devoted to explicating the need for this book. It is here that the editors pointedly note a theme found in each of its subsequent chapters: that any comparison between Levinas and Asian philosophy must not only overcome the double bind of philosophy (p. 3), it must furthermore come to terms with Levinas disparaging views of non-western cultures. The editors disown this shortsightedness of Levinas (p. 2) by directing our attention to the many fruitful applications of the concept of alterity in postcolonial studies (p. 2). What this has to do with the philosophical traditions of Asia is unclear, but it goes some way to explaining the preponderance of chapters on India. Another stated challenge for a comparison between Levinas and Asian thought stems from the deep conceptual divides that separate the cosmological, ontological, and metaphysical underpinnings of his work from much of Asian philosophy (p. 3). This issue is also conveniently avoided in that two thirds of the chapters are on ethics. A third stated challenge is the consideration of Levinas deep indebtedness to Jewish theology (p. 3), an indebtedness that is nowhere to be seen in this book. The fourth and final challenge pertains to conceptions of subjectivity [that] reveal a divide between Levinas s philosophical premises and mainstream Asian worldviews (p. 3.) This is Philosophy East & West Volume 65, Number 2 April 2015 639 643 639 2015 by University of Hawai i Press
without question the most relevant of the four issues and one that ultimately shapes the book s methodology. In light of the above-stated challenges, it would have been informative to know why the Japanese tea ceremony, for example, is taken as emblematic of Asian art and aesthetics and not, say, Chinese landscape painting. The same holds true for the chapters on Sima Qian (how is the historical narrative of Sima Qian able to stand in for the writings of Confucius or Mencius?), on Watsuji Tetsurō (how is an obscure Japanese thinker more qualified to represent an Asian theory of mind than the Neo- Confucian Wang Yangming or the Sufi Al-Ghazali?), on the war crimes trials of the Khmer Rouge, or on the honor code of the samurai (again, why is Japanese bushidō more appropriate than the Confucian ren or Sufi futuwwah?). What is more, topics one would expect to be included in a work of this nature are surprisingly absent: temporality, hermeneutics, altruism, and gender. Another factor that contributes to the book s unevenness stems from its many weak chapters. For example, the chapter by Frank Garrett on Levinas and Buddhist no-self uses the work of Nishida Kitarō, the founder of the Kyoto School of Zen Buddhism, to reveal Levinas ethics in that the lexicon of Buddhist philosophy provides a fitting language with which to express Levinas own decoupling of the subjective I from the metaphysics of identity (p. 13). In order to do this, Garrett uses three kōan to put into question the totalization of subjectivism (p. 13). Leaving aside the question of why Garrett feels the need for such questioning, the major issue is that he uses kōan from Linji (ninth century c.e.), a monk belonging to the Southern School of Chan Buddhism, to interpret Kitarō, while his reading of Kitarō is limited to but a single chapter of Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview (University of Hawai i Press, 1993). Instead of using Linji to read Kitarō, and Kitarō to read Levinas, Garrett would have been better served by using Nishitani s Religion and Nothingness (University of California Press, 1983), a work more in line with the goal of this chapter. This question must be asked because the kōan quoted by Garrett do not appear in Kitarō s text; indeed, their sole function is to problematize the notion of exteriority in ethics (p. 15). Indeed, it would appear they were chosen simply because they contain the word face. Although we learn that the other is exterior and empty, we learn little else about either Kitarō or Levinas. Drew Dalton s chapter on desire in Levinas and Theravada Buddhism opens by noting Levinas Western chauvinism and his knowing nothing about Buddhism (p. 27). After a rather lengthy overview of the Levinasian and Theravadin views on desire, Dalton concludes that ultimately Levinas and the Theravadin Buddhist differ profoundly on the value of desire (p. 40), such that we must recognize an insurmountable rift between these teachings [the Buddhist] on the nature and function of desire and Levinas s thought (p. 40). Dalton then proclaims his task a success insofar as it has plotted a path worth endeavoring, and yet it will require other scholars in the future (p. 40) to attain a more satisfactory interpretation. This transference of responsibility also appears in the chapter by Steven Shankman on the Han dynasty historian Sima Qian. After raising the issue of Levinas as the great theorist of the other [who] showed little curiosity about foundational cultures 640 Philosophy East & West
other than those that produced Greek philosophy and the Hebrew Bible (p. 41), Shankman initiates a quest for other others (p. 43) in Asia, finding indications of alterity in the Analects of Confucius and violations of it in Sima Qian s condemnation of the first Qin emperor (pp. 44 45). Referring to Levinas theory that any mystical holism will prevent us from experiencing the transcendental other, Shankman applies this idea to ancient China, writing: Sima appears to be considering the relation between transgressions of alterity, on the one hand, and the experience of mystic participation in a cosmic whole, on the other (p. 47). What he neglects to say is that Sima Qian s role as court historian was to strengthen the perception of a Confucian Han empire by vilifying the Legalist policies of the Qin. This holds true for Shankman s example of the Qin terracotta figures; the names inscribed on their backs were not an act of alterity but simply a means of ensuring high production quality. Joel Krueger s paper deals with the contemporary Japanese thinker Watsuji Tetsurō and Levinas on social cognition and Theory of Mind. Laden with technical jargon, it provides no biographical information on Tetsurō other than that Max Scheler heavily influenced him. As for why Tetsurō should be compared to Levinas, Krueger s answer is that they share several common interests and orientations that come together in mutually illuminating ways, which might offer a fresh critical perspective to the dominant Theory of Mind paradigm informing many social cognitive discussions (p. 76). But this is precisely the issue many readers will have this chapter; it is targeting an audience keen on Theory of Mind discourse, not one interested in establishing connections between Levinas and Asian thought. Andy Amato utilizes the Japanese code of bushidō to engage Levinas views on honor and self-sacrifice. He relies on popular literature and puppet shows for evidence of bushidō (pp. 135 136) even though the samurai code of honor was orally transmitted, not a formally written philosophy. Furthermore, bushidō is not exclusively about the otherness of one s master, as Amato claims, but conjoining with him in both life and death. Thus, in Amato s claim that if we were to read the Levinasian other as lord or master we find a graspable relation to this ethic: while still possessing many difficulties, we quite simply read ourselves as warriors obliged to a liege, as subjects tied to an other (p. 139), he appears to be stretching bushidō s intent so as to conform to Levinas. A final example is Matthew Coate s chapter on Levinas notion of absolute otherness and the art of the Japanese tea ceremony. In his contention that the latter can save Levinas s account [of art] without either simply denying that anything like ethical art-works exist or else resorting to some ad hoc move (p. 182), Coate draws upon the Book of Tea by Okakura Kakuzō (1862 1913), reaching the following conclusion: The tea ceremony is self-contradictory art as it both slackens and heightens vigilance of encountering the other (pp. 191 192). What Coate neglects to discuss is his justification for choosing this work over the much older Chinese version (the Classic of Tea, written by Lu Yu in the late eighth century c.e.), or why the tea ceremony holds precedence over other art forms, be they literal (music, painting, sculpture) or metaphoric (prayer, dance, singing). Book Reviews 641
What ultimately makes Levinas and Asian Thought worth purchasing, however, are the chapters by Eric Nelson, Dan Lusthaus, M. Ashraf Adeel, Bradley Douglas Park, and Mitchell Verter. Not only are these exemplary examples of comparative philosophy, but they each provide penetrating insights into their respective topics. To illustrate, Eric Nelson responds to the critique of Levinas by new materialists such as Gillian Rose and Slavoj Zizek as offering a phenomenological monadology of the other, a theological noumenology of the invisible (p. 103) by noting that Levinas and Buddhism not only serve as sources of fixation and domination... but that they can place these including their own self-reification into question (p. 105). Drawing upon a variety of Buddhist traditions, Nelson argues that although self-reflection must be transcended to give rise to a greater awakening, it is within our skepticism of such conceptual and linguistic frameworks that barriers between self and other can be forgotten (p. 107). This self-forgetting is significant for understanding Levinas phenomenologically insofar as it allows us to view his ethics of the other as one of interpersonal blossoming, a natural and effortless receptiveness to things (p. 113) such that in the facticity of suffering... there continue to be possibilities for transformation and transcendence toward the good beyond being within being (p. 114). By framing Levinas theory of the other in such terms, Nelson successfully avoids being drawn into the debate over Levinas views of non-western traditions and lets his philosophy speak for itself. M. Ashraf Adeel also touches upon the theme of invisibility, albeit in the context of the Qur an. Whereas Buddhism holds that freedom arises through a process of selfunfolding, in Islam the ever-higher unseen can add an ever-escaping dimension to the meaning of my existence provided I have faith (p. 172). This idea is also seen in Levinas eschatology and his notion of the Infinite, the result of which is that in any face-to-face encounter with the other, there is always a third person (p. 178); hence, any finite judgments made of the other become impossible. The solution to this dilemma, Adeel argues, reflects the natural receptiveness to things seen in Nelson s paper: [an] Islamic position of living a life of moral striving based on continuously revisable ethical or legal judgments, in which all others are approached as my moral superiors (p. 180). Finally, Bradley Douglas Park and Mitchell Verter bring the phenomenological discussion of Levinas to its rightful conclusion by locating their examination to the realm of bodily experience. Both Park s chapter on Daoism (pp. 195 223) and Verter s on Buddhism (pp. 225 239) focus on questions of consciousness and the breathing-self as modes of otherness. They point the way to overcoming selfishness and our desire to dominate others via themes of interconnectedness, mutual dependency, forgetting, and, most importantly, the praxis of self-nourishment. As was seen in the chapters by Nelson and Adeel, Levinasian ethics need not be one of pessimism and conflict; rather, seen in the light of Asian thought, when done properly, the notion of alterity can indeed be one of promissory hope and self-betterment. Overall Levinas and Asian Thought is a work with much promise but falls short in its execution. This is truly unfortunate as comparative philosophical studies involving Asian thinkers are few and far between. Still, Duquesne University Press 642 Philosophy East & West
is to be commended for supporting this work if only for the discussion it will surely invite. Gandhi: A Spiritual Biography. By Arvind Sharma. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013. Pp. vii + 252. isbn 978-0-300-18596-6. Reviewed by Sushumna Kannan San Diego State University sushumnaa@gmail.com As is evident from the title of his new book, Gandhi: A Spiritual Biography, Arvind Sharma aims at tracing Gandhi s life from the perspective of spirituality. The introduction begins by suggesting that some aspects of Gandhi s life find explanation when viewed through prisms that qualify human beings as spiritual beings having a human experience (p. 4). It is then argued that the thesis that the source of Gandhi s strength and leadership was spiritual is a strong one and worth investigating. The context for such a project is well-prompted in the face of many understandings of Gandhi as an individual accessing Hinduism in unique and intuitive ways as well as evolving spiritual principles in a specifically religion-neutral manner. Structurally, the book is divided into two parts. The first part describes and discusses all that could be considered spiritual in Gandhi s life in his own words, mostly through his autobiography. This part acts as a typical biography, providing details of the significant events in Gandhi s life. The second part is analytical and, through various sources, picks specific themes that prompt understandings of Gandhi as a spiritual person and the kind of spirituality he could be seen as upholding. The first part uses questions at pertinent points, enriching the content and defying what could otherwise have been a monotonous narrative. Most of these questions have to do with Gandhi s ideas, the nature of their formation, and his influences. In his autobiography, Gandhi views his actions in retrospect and interjects his storytelling with thoughts such as God in his infinite mercy protected me from myself, which Sharma, as the spiritual biographer, duly notes and contextualizes (p. 19). Here, the analysis could have explored the nature of spirituality as something that gains greater relevance in later life in keeping with similar insights from the Indian spiritual traditions. But Sharma draws on other ideas from, say, the Islamic tradition to suggest that God turning his face toward us could be a significant occurrence (p. 20). Though such analyses are a matter of authorial choice, a theory of the uniqueness of the Indian spiritual traditions from times prior to Gandhi, if proposed right at the beginning of the book, might have offered a richer view. Sharma does offer many small clarifications in a general manner that shed light on Hinduism and at times locate its uniqueness in contrast to both practical wisdom and also the enlightenment logic that re-defined the ideal place of God and man. Some comparisons and contrasts with other religious and spiritual traditions help cull Philosophy East & West Volume 65, Number 2 April 2015 643 646 643 2015 by University of Hawai i Press