Hefazat-e-Islam: An Ambiguity in Sheikh Hasina's Rule?

Hefazat-e-Islam: An Ambiguity in Sheikh Hasina's Rule?

TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary 1 Hefazat-e-Islam: A Background 2 Hefazat and Education 4 13-point Charter and Agitation 6 Recent activities of the Hefazat-e-Islam Secularism Lawsuit Idols: A Blasphemy? Support for the Rohingya 8 9 10 Funding for the Islamist movement 11 Relationship with Bangladeshi administrations Hefazat s departure from its support for the opposition Sheikh Hasina and her indirect support for Hefazat 12 13 Hefazat-e-Islam, links to homegrown terrorism 15

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On September 15, 2017, Hefazat-e-Islam held nationwide programs against the alleged state-sanctioned persecution of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. Leaders of the Hefazat-e-Islam called for arming the Rohingyas against the continued oppression of the religious minority by the Tatmadaw and the Myanmarese government. At a rally organized at the Anderkillah Shahi Jame Mosque in Chittagong, leaders of the radical Islamist organization warned of launching Jihad against Myanmar, in the case the country did not cease its Army s excesses on the Rohingya. As an organization, the Hefazat-e-Islam is known to highlight issues pertaining to the Islamic Shariah law and has continued to take up issues that have a direct relation to the Muslim-majority in Bangladesh. Previously, Hefazat-e-Islam was in the news with regards to the organization s stringent opposition to an UnIslamic Statue of Justice in the premises of the Bangladeshi Supreme Court in Dhaka. Following a congregation of thousands of conservative Muslims in Dhaka s city center, and after receiving the backing of the Prime Minister (PM), the statue was removed from its location. Following the decision of the government, Hefazat called for the destruction of all statues across Bangladesh citing their Islamundermining nature. The incident provides a prime example of Hefazat s status as an Islamist pressure group that wields considerable influence over the conservative masses that are in a sizable majority in Bangladesh. This report emphasizes the importance of Hefazat-e-Islam in Bangladesh s current political system, its organizational hierarchy and the background of its leadership. Further, the report sheds light on the controversial the 13-point Charter that Islamist groups in Bangladesh led by Hefazat have put forth and the April 2013 Islamist movement demanding an expedited implementation of the charter. Furthermore, the report gives a brief understanding of Hefazat s relationships with successive Bangladeshi governments, under the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The report also elucidates the alleged ambiguity in the current Sheikh Hasina administration s stance with respect to Hefazat and its activities. Moreover, alleged links between the Islamist organization and domestic terror outfits are discussed in this report. 1

HEFAZAT-E-ISLAM: A BACKGROUND Bangladesh s Liberation War of 1971 was won on the ideals of secularism, humanism, and democracy. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the father of the nation, was a known secularist and the current Awami League government under his daughter PM Sheikh Hasina has been hailed on numerous occasions for upholding the secular credentials of Bangladesh as opposed to her nemesis, BNP Chairperson and former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia as well as military dispensations that ruled the South Asian country. Hefazat-e-Islam burst into prominence following its staging of mass demonstrations and sit-ins across Dhaka in 2013, demanding that Bangladesh adhere to a strict Islamic doctrine and in opposition to the Shahbagh movement that called for death penalty for members of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and BNP (the principle opposition) who were allegedly involved in war crimes during the 1971 Liberation War. The Hefazat demonstrations paralyzed Dhaka, as thousands of followers of the radical organization clogged six main entrances to the city. The Hefazat-e-Islam can be viewed as an Islamic umbrella to most Madrassas and other related organizations in Bangladesh and has considerable support in major cities of the country such as Chittagong and Dhaka. Hefazat itself houses around 12,000 Quranic students and is headed by the 97-year-old Maulana Shah Ahmed Shafi, who operates from the Hathazari Madrassa in Chittagong. Hefazat-e-Islam was formed in 2010 in opposition to the incumbent government decision to ensure that women get equal rights to inheritance. Massive Hefazat-e-Islam rally in Dhaka 2

While Hefazat, as most Islamic educational organizations, is viewed as a charitable front for the impoverished and destitute, the organization due to its more than a million followers has continued to indulge in political activities in association with its vision of establishing Islamic rule in the country. Although Hefazat has been linked to political outfits such as the JeI, its leaders have continued to maintain that they were supporters of the Liberation War and the ensuing formation of the Bengali state under Mujibur Rahman. On several occasions Hefazat has also condemned domestic and international terrorist attacks, claiming that the organization adhered to peaceful policies and resisted any radicalization attempts. Hefazat-e-Islam is known to have taken advantage of the vacuum left in the Islamist space of Bangladesh following the arrest and execution of several leaders belonging to JeI and other political entities, to form a coalition of Islamist organizations and Madrassas. Women activists protesting against a Hefazat-e-Islam demonstration in Dhaka 3

HEFAZAT AND EDUCATION Hefazat started out as an organization promoting Islamic education in Bangladesh. Hefazat exerts substantial control over most Quranic schools in Bangladesh and thus has garnered the support of millions of Muslims in the country with a population of 160 million (86 percent Muslim population). The Islamist organization has a track record of training Imams, who are then funded to propagate their ideals in the Middle-east, the United Kingdom, United States and other parts of the world. Image of a young boy studying in a Hefazat-run Madrassa In recent times, Hefazat-e-Islam was successful in pressuring the government to omit educational content that was deemed Un-Islamic. Further, the ultra-conservative organization was able to force the hand of the government with regards to exclusion of content related to non-muslim authors from primary and secondary educational textbooks. The advocacy of Shariah to be imposed across Bangladesh has dominated the discourse of Hefazat-e-Islam and its leaders across Bangladesh. Recently a change in textbooks that shifted the blame of sexual harassment onto the victims and suggesting the choice of attire worn by women, one of the major reasons for sexual crimes has been allegedly linked to Hefazat and the control it enjoys over the incumbent government s educational policy. In April 2017, the Sheikh Hasina government ceded to the demands of the Hefazat calling for degrees issued by Madrassas to be equivalent to a Master s degree from a state-backed institution. 4

As of June 2017, 300, 000 privately-funded mosques have been erected in Bangladesh and community Madrassas have seen an exponential rise with 1.4 million students enrolling in them in addition to the 5 million students studying in state-funded Madrassas. Surveys conducted by the government have stated growing Islamism in the Bangladeshi society and rising faith in Islamist practices such as caning for people consuming alcohol, Islamic banking, non-inheritance for women and universal Islamic practices such as women covering their heads. Organizations such as Hefazat have played a pivotal role in the growing piety of Bangladeshis. The ever-increasing number of Bangladeshi citizens employed in the Middle-east and the Hefazat s Imam exports to various regions across the globe are known to be some of the major causes for this trend. Police action on a Hefazat-led violent protest 5

13-POINT CHARTER AND AGITATION On February 5, 2013, large-scale protests were witnessed in Shahbagh, Dhaka following demands for capital punishment for Abdul Quader Mollah (senior JeI leader) who had been sentenced to life imprisonment and others who were convicted of war crimes committed during the 1971 Liberation War under the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh. The movement was led by young online activists and bloggers who had amassed thousands of followers in relation to their writings supporting the secular credentials of the Bangladeshi constitution as well as demanding more stricter punishment for the war criminals. The protests were vehemently met by counter-protests by JeI, leading to social unrest and the killings of several politicians and civilians. The Shahbagh movement directly benefited Hefazat-e-Islam, that had a contrasting stance with respect to the movement s motto of banning politics based on religion. At the instigation of Ameer Shah Ahmed Shafi, leader of Hefazat-e-Islam, approximately 500,000 demonstrators descended over Dhaka, bringing the national capital to a standstill. Their primary demand was the implementation of a 13 point Islamist Charter. The organization organized a similar rally in May 2013 and indulged in arson and violence demanding maximum punishment for the atheist bloggers and activists who had spearheaded the Shahbagh movement. Hefazat's central leadership taking part in a protest 6

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RECENT ACTIVITIES OF HEFAZAT SECULARISM LAWSUIT Hefazat organized multiple protests across Bangladesh and specifically in Dhaka, with the demand of dismissing a legal writ challenging Islam as the state-religion in April 2016. According to the Bangladeshi Constitution, adopted in 1972, Article 8 and its preamble clearly states nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism as its fundamental principles. However, following the rise of General Ziaur Rahman, the Bangladeshi Parliament passed an amendment to the constitution in 1979. The amendment added the text In the name of Allah, the beneficent, the merciful before even the Preamble and replaced the word secularism with absolute faith and trust in Almighty Allah. Furthermore, during General Muhammad Ershad s rule, the Parliament passed the eighth amendment, introducing Section 2A, that stated: The state-religion of the republic is Islam, but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony. The JeI and Hefazat were successful in quashing this writ as the judges of the High Court presiding over the matter dismissed it on technical grounds. Importantly, the Awami League had supported Islam as the state-religion in this particular matter. Maulana Shah Ahmed Shafi, leader of the Hefazat-e-Islam 8

The statue that formerly was located in the premises of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, before being removed by the government IDOLS: A BLASPHEMY? A court commissioned stainless-steel sculpture that was erected in the premises of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in Dhaka became a flashpoint between supporters of Hefazat-e-Islam and left-leaning activists in May 2017. Hefazat had organized several demonstrations with their usual Islamist-flavor, condemning the erection of the statue that cost the government around 22,000 USD, and criticizing the government of being soft on elements who were a threat to Islam. Depicting living beings as statues or other forms of art is proscribed by Islam. In a swift move, seen by many as an attempt to appease the Islamic-hardliners in the country, the government decided to remove the statue, with Sheikh Hasina herself stating that the statue was inspired by Greek Goddess Themis and the government saw no sense in retaining it in Bangladesh. Following the judgment, the Hefazat called for a blanket-ban on statues or idols that are deemed Un- Islamic. A sermon was issued by its leaders demanding that the government refrain from erecting statues on the street or in government buildings, excluding inside the premises of temples. As seen in this case, Hefazat-e-Islam is known to pressure the government into making decisions that might be in opposition to the fundamental principles of the Awami League and the Sheikh Hasina government. 9

Hefazat members at a rally supporting Rohingya refugees and condemning the Myanmar government's alleged persecution SUPPORT FOR THE ROHINGYA The Rohingya Crisis and the influx of thousands of Bengali-speaking people from Rakhine state in Myanmar to refugee camps in Bangladesh led to several infrastructural and security issues for the government. In tandem, Hefazat-e-Islam launched several protests across the country in support of the Rohingyas who were allegedly persecuted by the Tatmadaw (Myanmarese Army) and the Aung San Suu Kyi-led government leading to the mass exodus. On September 18, 2017, approximately 20,000 Islamist hardliners belonging to Hefazat-e-Islam marched in Dhaka with plans to lay siege to the Myanmarese Embassy. While the protesters were stopped by security personnel before they could reach the Embassy, a rally was held at the iconic Baitul Mukarram National Mosque in Dhaka as memorandums were submitted to the United Nations Offices and the Embassy, demanding an immediate halt to atrocities against the Rohingya. Similarly on September 15, 2017, around 15, 000 demonstrators gathered demanding the Bangladeshi government go to war with Myanmar and liberate Rakhine from the Tatmadaw. Such instances can be looked at from the prism of the intention of Hefazat-e-Islam to direct Muslims in Bangladesh to fight for Muslims abroad as well as in the country. Aggressive tactics such as declaring Jihad against Myanmar to plans to surround the Myanmarese Embassy, though not leading to any effect on government policies can be intended at keeping the pressure on the incumbent government for further leverage in the short term. 10

FUNDING FOR THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT A study conducted by Dr.Abul Barkat, with the Department of Economics (Dhaka University) and the President of the Bangladesh Economic Association, revealed the structure of the funding received by Islamist organizations in Bangladesh. Funding is received by such organizations through means such as large financial institutions, household micro-level credit systems, mosques, madrassas, news media, trading enterprises, NGO s and overseas remittances. Dr.Barkat estimated the annual net profit of such organizations to amount to approximately 250 million USD of which 10 percent is used to finance political activities. Further, around 27 percent comes from financial institutions including banks, insurance companies, and leasing companies. The annual profit earned by such organizations is equivalent to six percent of the government s annual development budget while the annual growth rate of the profits earned is 7.5-9 percent which is much higher than that of the Bangladeshi economy. In recent times several Non-Profit Organizations (NGO s) specifically from the Middle-East have supposedly been funding Hefazat s activities in Bangladesh. Taking into account, that Saudi Arabia houses approximately 2 million Bangladeshi migrant workers, both countries have shared cordial relations for decades. Further, the fact that Saudi Arabia is home to the holiest Muslim religious sites (Mecca, Madina), and the origin of the Wahhabi-Salafist doctrine, has made the predominantly Sunni-Muslim population in Bangladesh to have a positive opinion of the Middle-eastern giant. The Saudis are known to have patronized activities of the JeI and its associated NGOs in the past and have funded the political ambitions of the Islamist party and its programs in the country. Unconfirmed reports have even indicated an investment of 1.07 billion being funneled into Bangladesh through Saudi Arabia for the purpose of building approximately 560 Wahhabi mosques in the country. Moreover, by the joining the coalition of Muslim countries against terrorism targeting the holy Muslim sites of Mecca and Madina, Bangladesh has maintained its relations with its Sunni-Islam sister nations. Bangladeshi blue-collared workers in the Middle East 11

RELATIONSHIP WITH SUCCESSIVE BANGLADESHI DISPENSATIONS While Hefazat-e-Islam has always maintained its non-political nature, since its formation in 2010, the Islamist group has continued to pressure the government in power by either highlighting the threats to Islam due to the alleged rise of a negligible population of allegedly left-leaning activists or by accusing the government of complicity in demeaning the role, religion plays in society and politics. Given that in the recent past, Bangladesh has either been governed by the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League or Khaleda Zia s BNP, understanding the relationship of Hefazat with regards to these political entities remains crucial. HEFAZAT S DEPARTURE FROM ITS SUPPORT FOR THE OPPOSITION The BNP and its Chairperson Khaleda Zia, are regarded as being conservatives in Bangladesh s political spectrum. The Shahbagh movement is known to have divided Bangladesh's polity in the center, primarily on the basis of their support or opposition to war crimes trials in which several JeI and BNP leaders were indicted. As mentioned in the previous sections of this report, the Hefazat-e-Islam while being for the Liberation War and the following trials, opposed the Shahbagh protests by launching a series of unrest generating demonstrations in 2013. Their primary opposition was to the fact that bloggers and activists who had amassed for the movement demanded a society and political system devoid of religion. Notably, the BNP after several consultations had politically supported the movement, even though the Shahbagh protests demanded a stricter punishment for the war crimes tribunal that incriminated several BNP leaders as well. Groups such as Hefazat, Islami Okiyo Jote and Khelafat Majlis have remained the focus of attention with respect to the propagation of Islamic values in Bangladesh, however, their context has been largely local. During the BNP s rule, Islamist groups and Madrassas are known to have flourished and in turn delivered political dividends for the BNP, with their tacit support during polls. While the Hefazat did not exist as a legitimate organization during Khaleda Zia s rule, due to its influence on most Madrassas in Bangladesh, the Islamist group and its associates might have received backing from the BNP in its nascent stages. Ideologically, the BNP suits Hefazat s policies more than the Awami League. Having said that, given Hefazat s opposition to women in the seat of power, its support for the war crime trials and its stress on the imposition of Shariah in the country, it can be assumed that these tenants are liable to negate any affinity developed for the BNP and its ideology of utilization of Islamism for consolidation of power. Recently, the BNP has accused the Awami League of using the Hefazat-e-Islam politically to counter the opposition in the country. 12

SHEIKH HASINA AND HER INDIRECT SUPPORT FOR HEFAZAT With the failing health of Hefazat Ameer, Shah Ahmed Shafi, and growing factional feuds within the Islamist organization, Hefazat seems to be crumbling from within. Several Hefazat leaders have either been expelled over have been sidelined by relatives of Shafi. Rumours of a rebellion are also doing the rounds specifically after the dismissal of Dhaka-centric leaders. Many in Bangladesh believe that in the aftermath of the crackdown by the government on rampaging Hefazat leaders in 2013, the government has either managed to infiltrate the organization or has been able to manage the Hefazat from the sidelines. Following the crackdown, several Hefazat leaders, including senior Hefazat leader and General Secretary Junayed Babungari, intended on continuing their movement and the implementation of their aforementioned charter. However, Shafi and his son Anas Madani are known to have been averse to any further confrontation with the Sheikh Hasina government. 13

In Dhaka, Hefazat s high command is believed to have shifted from the Lalbagh Madrassa to the Baridhara Madrassa with associates of Anas Madani ruling the roost. Sources indicate that at the time of writing, Anas Madani s leadership remains ineffective due to the directions he receives from the government. Certain Awami League leaders are known to have personally met Shafi and Anas Madani paying him visits at the Hathazari Madrassa. Incidentally, Awami League leader, Sirajul Jabbar Chowdhury, as well as MP Shamim Osman, attended a program organized by Hefazat recently. PM Sheikh Hasina herself met with Shafi, drawing domestic and international criticism for negotiating with the Islamist Maulana. That said, Awami League denied any linkages between Hefazat and the Hasina adminsitration. The departure of Hefazat s pro-bnp, JeI stance is said to have helped build bridges between the radical group and the ruling dispensation. Sheikh Hasina with Hefazat-e-Islam Chief Shafi 14

HEFAZAT-E-ISLAM, LINKS TO HOMEGROWN TERRORISM Hefazat s alleged links to domestic terrorist organizations have been a matter of contention for successive governments. Given that Hefazat-e-Islam has proposed Taliban-like policies to be imposed across the country with a stress on medieval practices such as segregation of genders, capital punishment for derogatory statements against Islam and exclusion of Ahmadiyyas from the religious ambit of Muslims, accusations have been levelled against Hefazat for having links with domestic militant outfits such as Harkat-ul-Jihad al-islami, Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) as well as transnational militant outfits such as Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). While homegrown terrorism can be assumed to be comparatively stamped out of Bangladesh in the aftermath of raids conducted by the Bangladeshi security forces after the Dhaka attacks of 2016, ideologues of the extremist-faction of the Islamist movement still persist in Bangladesh, many of them being embedded in Hefazat-e-Islam. Support for the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) (Rohingya militant outfit) and calls for arming the refugees has given credence to the argument that Hefazat might play a more extremist political role in the coming years. Further, Maulana Habibur Rahman and Ameer of Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis and an active member of Hefazat-e-Islam in Sylhet was caught on record celebrating the victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990's. Members of the ARSA with leader Ataullah in the center 15

Keeping in mind the aforementioned factors, while the Hefazat-e-Islam has not been charged directly by Bangladesh s security agencies for being involved anti-national and militant activities, in the future, if the organization is sidelined or is not provided timely political dividends or is curtailed, it might be the largest conservative force to reckon with for the Sheikh Hasina government. It also remains likely that Hefazat might get an entry into active politics in the upcoming general elections, slated to be held in 2019. Taking into consideration Hefazat s clout, specifically among the conservative sections of the Bangladeshi society, it might be able to bag tickets for around 50 seats in the 350 seat-jatiya Sangsad (Bangladeshi Parliament). It would be an apt opportunity for Hefazat to forward its agenda in the political scheme of things in Bangladesh. The royal treatment provided to Shafi when he returned to Chittagong from India after medical treatment, involving an 80-car convoy indicates the growing proximity between the ruling dispensation and Hefazat-e-Islam. 16

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