The Chinese-Jesuit metaphysical debate about Ultimacy Feng-Chuan Pan Department of East Asian Studies National Taiwan Normal University This paper will examine one of the main themes in the Rites Controversy: the Chinese name for Deus and the Chinese views on Ultimacy. A profound disagreement between Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) and Niccolò Longobardo (1565-1655) had led to the Jiading( 嘉定 ) conference of 1628 that forbade the use of the ancient terms of Tian and Shangdi for God. But how did the Chinese react to it? Did the Jiading interdict on Tian and Shangdi resolve the problem, or rather create new ones? Supervised by Longobardo, Giulio Aleni (1582-1649) reformulated the argument on the existence of God in his influential book Wanwu zhenyuan ( 萬物真原, The True Origin of the Ten-Thousands Things ) in the same year of 1628. Starting from the dispute between Ricci and Longobardo, 1 and Aleni's attempt to mediate between them, I want to bring in the Chinese reactions to the proposals of the Jesuits, as their views should be taken into account, wherever the archival data and related research are available. For that purpose, I juxtapose the refutations by anti-jesuit literati, as well as their main source of reference, the Xingli daquan ( 性理大全, The Complete Collections of the Doctrines on Nature and Principle, 1415), 2 a collection of Confucian texts, used in imperial examinations during the Ming Dynasty, and also serving as the main reference for Longobardo. 1. Controversy over the terms for the Ultimate As early as 1603, in his Tianzhu shiyi ( 天主實義, The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven ), Ricci referred to the ancient Confucian Classics as he claimed that * 1 Given the numerous publications on Ricci and his Tianzhu shiyi, I will mainly focus on the disagreement between Ricci and Longobardo. For details of Ricci s arguments, see Ricci, Tianzhu shiyi, translated, with introduction and notes by Douglas Lancashire and Peter Hu Kuo-chen, The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven. (Henceforth: Lancashire) 2 Hu Guang 胡廣, Xingli daquan, vol. 34, p.18. (Henceforth: Xingli daquan ). This book was one of the three textbooks promulgated by Emperor Yongle of the Ming Dynasty. The other two were Sishu daquan 四書大全, The Complete Collections of the Four Books ) and Wujing daquan ( 五經大全, The Complete Collections of the Five Classics ), which will not be used here. 1
The one we call Tianzhu is the one called Shangdi in Chinese. ( 吾天主即華言上帝 ). 3 He valued the terms Shangdi ( 上帝, Governor or Emperor on High ) and Di ( 帝, Governor or Emperor ) as found in Classics such as the Book of Changes, the Book of Rites and the Book of Odes 4 by stressing that this Shangdi of the ancient Classics was not to be equated to the Daoist Jade emperor, Buddhist Kong ( 空, emptiness ) and Wu ( 無, non-being ), or to Taiji ( 太極, Great Ultimacy ) and Li ( 理, the Principle ) in Song-Ming Commentaries. 5 Rather he listed this Shangdi as Tianzhu ( 天主, Lord of Heaven ), the Christian God. The term Shangdi was commonly used in the Shang dynasty (1766-1123 BCE), and Tian was a new term introduced in the Zhou dynasty (1122-221 BCE). 6 In the Song dynasty (960-1279 CE), there were two major Commentaries on these two terms, which dominated later scholarship and became the orthodoxy of the state. One was by Master Zhu Xi ( 朱熹, 1130-1200), who argued that the word Di was to be understood as signifying Tian ( 朱註解帝為天 ) and that the word Tian was to be understood as the Li (the Principle, 解天為理 ). The other influential masters were the two brothers Cheng. Cheng Yi ( 程頤, 1033-1107) said: when we think in terms of form we speak of Tian; when we think in terms of exercising control over things we speak of Di, and when we think in terms of nature we speak of Qian ( 以形體謂天, 以主宰謂帝, 以性情謂乾 ). 7 In 1594, long before his Tianzhu shiyi was published, Ricci had translated the Four Books from Chinese into Latin. He believed that many terms and phrases in the ancient Classics were in harmony with Christian notions such as the unity of God and the immortality of the soul. 8 Ricci considered the Song-Ming Commentaries of the ancient terms as corrupted by Buddhism and Daoism. He traced the origin of the 3 Ricci, Tianzhu shiyi, vol. I, p. 20. 4 Ricci, Tianzhu shiyi, vol. I, pp. 20-21. 5 Ricci, Tianzhu shiyi, vol. I, pp. 14-19. Feng Yingjing 馮應京, Preface to Tianzhu shiyi (1601), pp. 1-3. 6 For the statistics of the usages of Tian, Di and Shangdi in ancient Classics, see Nicolas Standaert, The Fascinating God (Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1995), pp. 85-90, 103-107, 117, 123. 7 Ricci, Tianzhu shiyi, vol. I, pp. 20b-21, see the English translation in Lancashire, p. 126-127. The word Qian means the first the origin literally. It was often used with connection to Kun ( 坤 ) to denote Heaven and Earth, namely the world. 8 Lancashire and Hu, Translators Introduction to The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, pp. 14-15. 2
terms to the ancient Classics and provided a new interpretation of them. Thus, the ancients terms were distinguished from the Song-Ming commentators. On the basis of this distinction between the ancient and the Song-Ming Confucian traditions, Ricci argued that Taiji was not identical to Shangdi because the former term did not appear in the ancient Classics. He distinguished the teaching of Shangdi in ancient times from the discussions of Taiji among his contemporary Confucians. He accepted the former and rejected the latter, regarding it as a later invention. In the view of Ricci, the theory of Taiji was based on symbols representing yang and yin, as well as on the five elements offering the interpretation of how the world was made. He regarded this theory as being influenced by Buddhism and Daoism, and as empty symbols without any ground which were veiled by concepts such as Li, qi and Taiji of the Song-Ming Commentaries. 9 Taiji could not be the true reality and was not able to produce heaven and earth. In his view, only Shangdi could be seen as the origin of the world, and this was what he called Tianzhu, the Christian God. Different from Ricci, who equated Shangdi in ancient Chinese classics to the Christian God, and who made a distinction between the ancient Confucians and his contemporary ones, Longobardo argued that both the ancient and the contemporary Confucians were "atheists" 10 who believed in "only one material substance in different degrees", 11 rather than any spiritual substance. After having examined the Commentaries in Xingli daquan and having consulted various Chinese scholars, he concluded that the Song-Ming Commentaries were atheistic because of their materialistic theories. The ancients were also atheistic since the true meaning of the ancient texts was revealed by the commentators. The different attitudes towards the Song-Ming Commentaries between Ricci and Longobardo resulted in their conflict of interpretations of Chinese traditions, especially the ancient one. These different hermeneutics in the Jesuits understandings of various traditions of Chinese thought had been at work from the beginning of their mission in China. In later sections, we 9 Ricci, Tianzhu shiyi, vol. I, pp.14b-15a, Lancashire, p. 107. 10 Longobardo, Traité, p. 84. Gernet has also compared part of the discussions between Longobardo and Leibniz, see Jacques Gernet, "Leibniz on a Seminal Chinese Concept versus the Missionary Longobardo," in Wenchao Li and Hans Poser (eds.), Das Neueste Ü ber China: G. W. Leibnizens Novissima Sinica von 1697 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2000), pp. 203-209. However, I will use the French text in this dissertation. 11 Longobardo, Traité, section 10 under the heading "Que les Chinois n'ont point connu de Substance Spirituelle, distincte de la materelle, mais une seule substance materielle en differens degrez", in Traité, p. 47. 3
shall see the complexity in more detail when Aleni tried to balance Ricci s and Longobardo s approaches through his exchanges with Fujian literati. In line with his understanding of the Song-Ming Confucian doctrines, Longobardo argued that the Chinese knew nothing of an infinite force that had the power to pull all things from nothingness, 12 or a spiritual substance distinct from the material, such as there are God, Angels and the rational soul. 13 What the Chinese knew, he claimed, was only a universal, immense and infinite Substance from which has emanated the Tai-Kie, or the primordial air, that contains in itself this same universal substance and that, by taking different qualities or accidents once by moving, then by resting, becomes the immediate matter of all things. 14 Longobardo s interpretation of the Confucian Li was: They call it Li, by which they mean the Being, Substance, and Entity of things; as they figure that there exists one infinite, eternal, uncreated, incorruptible Substance, without origin and without end. This Substance, according to them, is not only the physical principle of Heaven, Earth, and other bodily things; but also the moral source of the virtues, habits and other spiritual things; from this sprung that famous Latin axiom, Omnia sunt unum. 15 After consultations with a Chinese scholar, he concluded that the Chinese follow all the absurdities our Europeans deduce from the principle, Toutes choses sont un (all things are one) until they come to downright atheism in the end. 16 He fiercely attacked the Confucian axiom Wanwu yiti ( 萬物一體, all things are one ), which was identified with the Latin axiom of Omnia sunt unum. But 12 Longobardo, Traité, p. 32:...une puissance infinie, qui eût le pouvoir de tirer toutes choses de rien.... 13 Longobardo, Traité, p. 47: [ ] il est constant que les Chinois n'ont point connu de substance spirituelle distincte de la materielle, comme sont Dieu, les Anges, & l'ame raisonnable [ ]. 14 Ibid. 15 Longobardo, Traité, p. 74: Cette Substance, selon eux, n'est pas seulement le principe physique du Ciel, de la Terre, & des autres choses corporelles; mais encore le principe moral des vertus, des habitudes & des autres choses spirituelles, d'où a pris naissance ce fameux axiome Latin, Omnia sunt unum. 16 Longobardo, Traité, p. 96: Il dit dans la Préface, que toutes choses sont tellement une même substance, qui est la Li, qu il n y a nulle autre difference entre elles, que la figure exterieure & les qualities accidentelles; d où s ensuivent toutes le absurditez que le Européens ont fait voir, en consequence du principle, Toutes choses sont un; principle qui conduit à l atheïsme. 4
Longobardo s reading of Li as an entity was incorrect because his understanding of the Ultimate as a substance whereas the Confucians did not share the same understanding of it. I will explain this later. Longobardo suspected that some Europeans might equate this Li to the Christian God because of the attributes quoted above, such as infinite, eternal, uncreated, incorruptible Substance, without origin and without end which the Chinese applied to Li since these are the qualities and perfections which can only belong to God. 17 But he saw this as hidden poison, because he understood Li as nothing but the primary matter ( 元質 ), which was regarded as the first creation of God s work. 18 Different from Ricci s interpretation of Li as accident, he materialized Taiji, Li and qi by relating them to the scholastic concept of prime matter. On the basis of this equation of Taiji as prime matter, he concluded that the Chinese tradition as a whole was atheist. The other issue raised by Longobardo was the non-personal aspect of the Chinese Shangdi. Descriptions of the Lord of Heaven, as introduced by the Jesuits, spoke of a living, intelligent substance, without beginning, without end, which had created all things and which governed from Heaven like the King in his Palace governs his entire Kingdom. 19 Since this differed from the descriptions of Shangdi in the ancient Classics, he consulted a scholar who told him that this Shangdi was [ ] not truly like a living man, seated in Heaven, but is only the power that rules, which governs Heaven, that is in all things and in ourselves; so that we can say that our heart is a same thing as Tien-Cheu and Xangti. 20 On the basis of this non-personal understanding of Shangdi provided by a Chinese scholar, Longobardo refuted Ricci s equation of Shangdi to God, arguing that, if, according to the Song-Ming Commentaries, Shangdi was the same as Taiji, Tian and Li, it could be only material, not spiritual, because the latter concepts were merely 17 Longobardo, Traité, p. 78. 18 Ibid. 19 Underline Leibniz s (Henceforth: Underline his). See Longobardo, Traité, p. 86: Nous répondîmes, que nous entendions une substance vivante, intelligente, sans principe, sans fin, qui avoit crée toutes choses, & qui du Ciel les gouvernoit, comme le Roi dans son Palais gouverne tout son Roïaume. 20 Ibid.: n'est pas veritablement comme un homme vivant, assis dans le Ciel; mais qu'il est seulement la vertu qui domine, qui gouverne le ciel, qui est en toutes choses, & en nous-mêmes; & qu'ainsi nous pouvons dire que nôtre coeur est une même chose que Tien-Cheu & Xangti, Italics and underlines his. The spelling of the two terms are different in his text: Tien-Cheu is Tianzhu and Xangti is Shangdi. 5
material. Consequently, the Christian doctrine of the Triune God, with three persons and one substance should be transliterated by Latin terms and be transliterated as follows: Deus as Dousi ( 陡斯 ) and the three persons of Trinity as Badele ( 罷德肋, Pater), Feilue ( 費略, Filius) and Sibiliduosanduo ( 斯彼利多三多, Spiritus Santus), respectively. He introduced the doctrine of Trinity in his Chinese book, Linghun daoti shuo ( 靈魂道體說, 1636), in which he explained that the three persons ( 位 ) of Deus were of one substance ( 三位共是一體 ). 21 With the same logic, he argued that the human soul also possessed three abilities: memory, intelligence, and desire. These newly invented terms transliterated from Latin, actually meant nothing and were alien to Chinese. This issue of presenting Deus/Tian as a person was one of the main themes of debate between the Jesuits and Chinese scholars. I will come back to it in the next section when dealing with their debate on the Incarnation. At the time of the Jiading conference, Aleni worked under Longobardo s supervision and got in an awkward situation, as the major Jesuit in Fujian, the province where the debates on Chinese rites started shortly after the conference. His book Wanwu zhenyuan eventually became as influential as Ricci Tianzhu shiyi. It was published in the year of the Jiading conference, when the Jesuits agreed to abandon Ricci s equation of Shangdi to God. Wanwu zhenyuan was a cautious composition. Following Longobardo s opposition to Ricci s approach Aleni avoided the ancient terms of Tian and Shangdi and was quite straightforward in introducing the Thomist proofs of God to the Chinese audience. His book was highly praised by Longobardo and Rui de Figueiredo (1594-1642). Jean-François Foucquet (1665-1741) called it the next most influential book for the China mission after Ricci Tianzhu shiyi. 22 It was often reprinted even after the prohibition of Chinese Rites and terminology had been promulgated by Maigrot in 1693 in Fujian, at least in 1694, 1791, 1906, and 1924. 23 Wanwu zhenyuan was also the book that Aleni submitted to the prime minister Ye Xianggao before their conversation at Sanshan in 1627. 21 Longobardo, Linghun daoti shuo, pp. 7b-10. 22 See Jean-François Foucquet s letter to the Duc of de la Force, November 26, 1702, quoted in John W. Witek, S. J., Principles of Scholasticism in China: A Comparison of Giulio Aleni s Wanwu zhenyuan with Matteo Ricci s Tianzhu shiyi, in Scholar from the West, pp. 276, 286-288. Thanks C. von Collani s correction in her books review of my PhD dissertation, published in Exchange 36 (2007), pp. 220-221. 23 Claudia von Collani, Franciso Luján s Annotations in Guilio Aleni s Wanwu zhenyuan, in Scholar from the West, pp. 292. 6
2. A threefold antithesis about Ultimacy facing Aleni and southern Chinese literati The following questions are of interest. As the ancient terms of Shangdi and Tian had been forbidden in the Jiading conference of 1628, how did Aleni reformulate his argument? Did his reformulation resolve the tension or create new problems? Given Longobardo s judgement that the whole Chinese tradition was materialistic and atheistic, how would Aleni approach the policy of accommodation in Fujian? How did the Chinese receive his arguments? In studying how Aleni reformulated the issues and how the Chinese reacted to his arguments in particular and to the Jesuits views in general, I propose three sets of concepts opposing the Jesuits and the Chinese that can be treated as a basic antithesis in a cluster of three arguments, the one evoking the other. The basic question behind the three sets of concepts is: Whether to speak of an outside God who produces the world and reveals himself in words OR of the inside Tian that gives birth to the world and reveals itself in deeds? The question marks in each of the following sections imply a hint that these two concepts need not be considered mutually exclusive. On both sides when the Jesuits and the Chinese literati, especially the anti-jesuit literati, were debating, there were two extremes. However, I would like to consider a possible integration of the two traditions.. 2.1. Ultimacy outside or inside? The question of outside or inside undergirded the debates on the origins of the world between the Jesuits and the Chinese. The Jesuits insisted on a Lord of Heaven standing outside the Heaven, whereas the Confucian spoke of an immanent but transcendent origin of all beings. Although both Christianity and Confucianism consist of discussions on the tension between the immanent and the transcendent, in the Jesuit-Chinese debate, the difference on this point between the two traditions was greatly stressed. The character of God s transcendence was one-sidedly portrayed as outside, whereas the Confucian idea of the immanent and transcendent origin was understood as inside. The Jesuits used the analogy of the Architect to oppose their Confucian interlocutors who believed the transcendent origin to be immanent in the world and united with the world. The question, thus, became a conflict between outside or inside. In his preface to Wanwu zhenyuan Aleni notes: 7
When one finds contradicting interpretations of the same thing, there must be a Principle ( 理, Li) for us to determine which one is true since not all interpretations can be true. This is just as what is required to weigh the weight of a thing by a scale, or to measure the purity of gold by the purest gold standard. Similarly, there must be a principle for determining the truth of the world. [ ] In your tradition, there are different interpretations of the origin of Heaven and Earth, such as Li, qi ( 氣, material force ) and zhuzai ( 主宰, Governor ). As for the meaning of governor, there are even more different theories, which are really confusing. [ ] This question of the origin of the world is crucial. [...] It needs to be investigated by reason ( 理, li). For reason is the universal master ( 公師, gongshi) of all human beings. The people from the East and the West share the same reason although their cultures and customs are different. 24 In this passage, Aleni stressed the existence of a scale or criterion outside the world before advancing the basic argument of his book and arriving at his conclusion of the existence of a creator outside the world. Because the Christian doctrine about the origin of the world was so different from that of Confucianism, Aleni pressed for a criterion to determine the true one. In his view, this criterion was reason or li, regarded as the common possession of all human beings, which enabled him to apply scholastic theology, especially Thomas Aquinas the Five Ways of rationally demonstrating the existence of God. His key presupposition was: All things in the world have a beginning. 25 This concept, which was new to the Chinese and was later extended to the debate about the idea of time, resulted in refutation of the five main 26 concepts of 24 Aleni, Preface to Wanwu zhenyuan, in Xu Zongze, MingQingjian yesuhuishi yizhu tiyao, pp. 173-174. The Chinese original of the quotation is as follows: 凡論一事而有相反之說, 既不能具真, 必有一確法以決之, 如論物之輕重, 必須定以權衡, 如辨金之真偽, 必須定以鏐石, 論道亦然 所謂天地有所以生者, 又或曰理 曰氣 曰主宰 窮究主宰之說又各議論不一, 以至人心茫然 此天地間一大事 必須逐端以理論之 理者, 人類之公師, 東海西海之人, 異地同天, 異文同理, 莫能脫於公師之教焉 25 This is the title of Wanwu zhenyuan s first chapter: 論萬物皆有始. 26 Aleni composed four refutations with the following chapter titles: 人物不能自生 ( human beings and things in the world are not able to emerge themselves ), 天地不能自生人物 ( Heaven and Earth are not able to give birth of human beings and things ), 元氣不能自分天地 ( The prime material 8
Song-Ming Confucianism. These are human and things ( 人物, Renwu), Heaven and Earth ( 天地, Tiandi), Material force ( 氣, qi ), Principle ( 理, Li) and Great Ultimacy ( 太極, Taiji) and they are rejected one after the other in order to highlight the Christian God alone as the true origin and governor of the world. Aleni s reason for refuting them was that the reality they signified all had a beginning. Therefore, in Aleni s view, they could not be the true origin of all things which should have no beginning. After this rejection of the main concepts of the Confucian tradition, Aleni argued for the existence of a producer and governor, stating that the Tianzhu he preached was the true origin of the world, of both Heaven and Earth, and that all things in the world came from the origin without origin or the beginner without beginning ( 無原之原 ). He insisted that the teaching of this Lord of Heaven is the only true teaching. In his last chapter entitled: Tianzhu is the beginner without beginning of all things in the world, Aleni echoed the starting point of the book: all things have a beginning. He started his argument from the phenomena of the world, he thus projected the book to the beginner outside the world. This approach went a step further beyond the Song-Ming Confucian s gewu qiongli ( 格物窮理, to investigate all things in order to understand the Li thoroughly ), by pointing out that after gewu qiongli, one should go on to discover this Lord of Heaven who was outside all things and set up this Li in all things. At this point, it is important to recall the scholastic background of Aleni and most Jesuits, and to compare to the Chinese views, both pro and anti Jesuit. The Jesuit application of Aquinas and of Aristotelian theories The Jesuit s central idea was that the world has a beginning and an end. On the basis of this linear thinking, Aleni s argument progressed from the beginning of the world in chapter one to the theory in his final chapter about the origin without origin. In his attempt to keep alive the policy of accommodation he worked out an application of Aquinas proofs of God, especially the Five Ways. 27 The dominance of Aquinas approach was clearly visible in the following statement stated by Aleni: force is not possible to be divided into Heaven and Earth ), 理不能造物 ( Principle can not create things of the world ). 27 The Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas appears in the Part I, Question 2, Article 3 of Aquinas' Summa 9
When one wants to trace the origin of the world, it is not possible to go back infinitely. Rather, there must be a final ultimate. The first, earliest, the most prior who is not born by any thing else ( 無所從生者 ) is precisely the one who I say to you is the Lord of Heaven, the Producer ( 造物者 ) of the world. 28 In this key passage, Aleni words it is not possible to go back infinitely reflect the Thomist proofs of God, of which this book frequently applies the first, the second and the fifth ways, whereas the third and fourth ways seem less clear in this book. 29 Let us start our investigation from Aleni s arguments in this book. The first way of Aquinas Proof from Motion and Change clearly states that the chain of motion can not go on to infinity and thus presupposes God as the first mover, appears clearly in the title of this book s first chapter: All things in the world have a beginning. Aleni explained: In the very beginning of the creation of heaven, its movement was from the East to the West, one circle per day, the same as we can observe today. The next day, the circle finished and started a new circle, which was the beginning of another day. Therefore, if we trace the very first day of the movement by following this same logic, we will find a moment when there was no Heaven, Earth, or movement---a moment when nothing was born. Can we not say then that was the beginning of Heaven and Earth? 30 Theologiae. See T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Christian Classics, 1948), vol. I, pp. 13-14. Aquinas Summa Theologica had been partially translated into Chinese in late Ming China under the title of Chaoxing xueyao ( 超性學要, A Summary of the Study of the Supernatural ) by L. Buglio ( 利類思, 1606-1682) and Gabriel de Magalhàes ( 安文思, 1609-1677) during 1654-1678 in Bibliothèque Nationale Paris, Chinese Archives, Courant, 6906-6907. These five ways can be found in Chaoxing xueyao, vol. 1, pp. 16-19: 萬物有一無元之有, 所謂天主 據理推證, 約有五端 : 一 以物動證 二 以物之作所以然證 三 以固然與非固然之物證 四 以物之不等證 五 凡宇內無知之物, 形有所向, 向有所得, 終古如此是豈偶然?. 28 Aleni, Wanwu zhenyuan, p. 24a: 遞推原本, 既不可至無窮, 必有所止極, 則最先 最初 無所從生者, 乃吾所謂天主造物者也. 29 The third is the Proof from the Contingency of Beings and the fourth is Proof from the Degrees of Perfection of Beings. The reason why Aleni did not use the two ways needs further investigation. 30 Aleni, Wanwu zhenyuan, p. 2: 蓋天一開闢就能運動, 既運動, 必如今日自東而西, 一日一週, 明日復還本方, 既還本方即一日之始也, 即此推之, 一日之前直至于無天可動, 無地可載, 無物可生, 豈不為天地之所始乎? 10
This proof implies that the world had a beginning when nothing existed and that, before the momentum initiated by the first mover, no movement was possible. Only when the first mover activated it, could all movement of the world be started. Aquinas second way of Proof by Efficient Cause is applied in the following way: The bearer ( 生, sheng) must be prior to the things which were born. In Aleni s view, as nothing was born by itself, every thing could be given birth only by someone else that had been existing earlier than the thing itself. Therefore, he continued, since Heaven is not able to bear itself, neither Earth, any human being or anything in the world from the chain of generating relationship, can be deduced a first bearer who initiated this chain. 31 We can see that the efficient cause of Aquinas is accommodated to Confucian term of generating (sheng, giving birth ), a term that was applied to the Christian concept of creation. As the third and fourth ways are not found in this book, let us proceed to the fifth way Proof from the Final Cause. We read Aleni s statement as follows: When we see those unconscious beings which always follow their nature or principle, we can conclude that there must be someone who is conscious and most intelligent, ordering and directing them. [ ] Now we see Heaven, which is unconscious [ ] but always moves in circles. It marks for us the time day after day, year after year. Since Heaven and Earth take care of the whole evolution of things ( 生化, shenghua) in the world, but are not conscious of their working, how can we deny that the most intelligent one exists who makes all these unconscious beings work in order? [ ] Therefore, we must say that there is someone who sets up the nature and principle in all things thereby enabling them to work in order. 32 In this Thomist line, Aleni reworded the concepts Li, Qi and Taiji in the Confucian tradition. The Li in all things, so he argued, was neither conscious nor intelligent, but at most the principle installed by the producer of the world. Following Ricci s view, Aleni interpreted Li as an accident ( 依賴者 ), on the same level as the scale of law ( 法 31 Aleni, Wanwu zhenyuan, p. 5. 32 Aleni, Wanwu zhenyuan, p. 17: 凡無心之物, 自不知舉動, 設若一舉一動悉中其法, 必有有心而最靈名者以運動之 今天地無心而時時運行 遞報時刻, 日日如此, 歲歲如此, 又照臨生化而自不知其動, 不知其生化, 豈無有靈明者運旋而使之然? 必先有定其性之所以然, 然後能各因其性而為自然也 11
度 ) and the Five Virtues and Seven Sentiments ( 五德七情 ), which come into existence only by combining with a substance. 33 Aleni explained that the term shenghua ( 生化, to bear and transform ) may refer to the evolution of all things in the world, while another term huasheng ( 化生, literally: to transform and to bear ) is to be used to denote the concept of creation. Aleni argued that only the one who had consciousness and was perfect and most intelligence was able to huasheng all things in the world. Thus, the Confucians intelligent Li was reduced to a simply principle or a natural rule. While Aleni s argument on Li as an accident came from Ricci, his view of Taiji as the prime matter or primordial air came from Longobardo s treatise of Chinese religion. Although Ricci s Tianzhu shiyi described such concepts as ti and Taiji as accidents which depended on other things for their existence, it made no direct equation to prime matter. Aleni, however, followed Longobardo s interpretation of Li as prime matter in scholastic philosophy and his materialization of the Confucian tradition. Here we should recall that the Aristotelian theory of four causes had first been applied by Ricci in his pivotal book Tianzhu shiyi. On this point Aleni followed Ricci, who had written: When we attempt to discuss why things are as they are, we find that there are four causes. [ ] They are the active cause, the formal cause, the material cause and the final cause. The active cause is that which makes a thing to be. The formal cause gives form to a thing and places it in its own class, thereby distinguishing it from other classes of things. The material cause is the original material of a thing which is given form. The final cause determines the end and the purpose of a thing. These causes can been seen in every event and in every piece of work. [ ] There is nothing in the world which does not combine within itself these four causes. Of these four, the formal cause and the material cause, as found in phenomena, are internal principles of phenomena or, if one wishes to state it in that way, are the yin (negative) and yang (positive) principles. The active cause and final cause lie outside phenomena and exist prior to phenomena, and therefore cannot be said to be internal principles of phenomena. The Lord of Heaven we speak of is the reason for things 33 Aleni, Wanwu zhenyuan, pp. 12-15. 12
being as they are, and we refer to Him only as the active and final cause. Therefore, it is clear that there must exist Someone who creates the world. 34 Ricci s four causes: material cause ( 質 ), formal cause ( 模 ), active cause ( 造 ) and final cause ( 為 ), were the common translation of Aristotle s theory of four causes. He also attempted to distinguish all things into two categories: substance ( 自立者 ) and accident ( 倚賴物 ), 35 but he refuted the concept of Li, because it was spoken of in two ways: either as residing in the minds of men, or as found in things. Given these two ways of speaking about this principle, Ricci argued that it was an accident and could not be the origin of all things. He concluded that Li did not exist before the beginning of the world, precisely because it could be found only together with the things in the world and the minds of human beings. Before the beginning of the world, there was nothing for Li to rely or depend on. If Li was only an accident, it could not stand on its own; and if there were no substances, such as things or human beings for them to rely on, all accidents were void and non-existent. Thus he concluded that Li could not be the origin of the world. 36 But Aleni, following Longobardo, went further by stressing the material side of Li, which became the form of a thing. Similarly, besides the Li, another Confucian concept qi was also refuted as material, and thus removed from the list of candidates for the origin of the world. Aleni stated, All producers must be outside the thing they produce. For instance, a carpenter first has to take other material as components for the device he plans to make. This carpenter is outside of these devices. Now the prime qi ( 元氣, yuanqi) in your tradition, you say, is fully inside rather than outside the myriad things of the world. Thus it can be either the material or formal cause, but not the active and the final cause of the world. 37 34 Lancashire, pp. 85-86. See also Aleni, Wanwu zhenyuan, pp. 9b-10a. 35 Aleni also pointed out these two categories, see Wanwu zhenyuan, p. 9b. 36 Ricci, Tianzhu shiyi, vol. I, p. 16. 37 Italics mine, see Aleni, Wanwu zhenyuan, p. 10b: 又凡造物者必在物體之外, 如工匠造物必不分其體為器皿, 須以他物造之, 其工匠固在他物之外也, 今元氣渾在物物之中以成萬物, 是元氣為物體而不在外, 僅可為質者 模者而不可為造者 為者也 13
The qi (material force) Aleni interpreted as the prime air that filled everything inside of the world and he contrasted the inside and the outside so as to highlight the Lord of Heaven as distinct from the world. The Aristotelian theory of four causes was also applied in his statement that qi was at most the material or the formal cause, which was as raw material for the outside Creator, Lord of Heaven. Applying this theory of four causes, he argued that the active cause must be outside. Since the prime qi is inside, it is not the Creator of all things. But this argument was not without deficiencies. Along similar lines also a third Confucian concept was refuted in Wanwu zhenyuan, namely Taiji. Aleni saw this as no different from Li and/or qi, neither of them being conscious or intelligent. In his view, Taiji was simply part of the material world, and thus incapable of governing the changes and the evolution of the world. 38 On the basis of Aristotle s hylomorphism, implied in Longobardo s approach, Aleni too interpreted Taiji as prime matter ( 原質, yuanzhi), and therefore, as of the same substance as the material things ( 與物同體 ). 39 Thus, neither Taiji, nor Li or qi could be the Creator of the world. His four reasons for this conclusion were: (1) prime matter had a beginning whereas the Creator had not; (2) prime matter was an accident which could not subsist on its own; (3) prime matter was not omnipresent; (4) prime matter was the foundation only for the material not for the spiritual. 40 As stated, Aleni was working under the supervision of Longobardo and his Wanwu zhengyuan was written after Longobardo voiced his opposition to Ricci s equation of Tian and Shangdi with God and his positive attitude toward the Chinese ancient Classics. This clearly directed Aleni s arguments away from the ancients toward the Song-Ming Confucian tradition. He followed Longobardo s interpretation which identified Taiji and Li as the prime matter of the West and applied the Five 38 Aleni, Sanshan lunxueji ( 三山論學記, The Learned Conversation at Sanshan, 1627), p. 5, reprinted in Wu, Xianxain (ed.) Tianzhujiao dongchuanwenxianxubian 天主教東傳文獻續編 (Taipei: Xueshenshuju, 1966), vol. one. 39 Aleni, Sanshan lunxueji, p. 5. His understanding of ti ( 體, substance) and xing ( 性, nature) was a big issue. Longobardo s criticism to the Daoti ( 道體, the substance of Dao) might have had an impact on him. 40 We find also the same argument in his conversation with Fujian literati. See Li Jiubiao, Kouduorichao (1630-1630), vol. 4, p.3. He states, 儒者之解太極, 不出理氣二字 則貴邦所謂太極似敝邦所謂元質也 元質不過造物主化成天地之材料, 不過天地四所以然之一端, 安得為主, 又安得而祭之事之也哉? 14
Ways of Aquinas. No mention of the ancients was made in his book on the concept of the Lord of Heaven as the origin of the myriad things. The Chinese reaction to the Jesuits metaphysics The Jesuits attempts to relate to the Chinese view of Ultimacy was bound to provoke hostile reactions, which were mainly based on Song-Ming Confucianism. One of the main sources of their thought is Xingli daquan. Concerning the origin of the world, the following passage from the chapter Taiji tushuo ( 太極圖說, An illustration and explanation of Taiji ) 41 in Xingli daquan, we read the following description: Without ultimate, therefore Great Ultimacy ( 無極而太極, Wuji er Taiji, without end, therefore, great end). Great Ultimacy generates yang (male) through movement. When its activity reaches its limit, it becomes tranquility. Through tranquility Great Ultimacy generates Yin (female). When tranquility reaches its limit, activity begins again. So movement and tranquility alternate and become the root of each other, giving rise to the distinction of yin and yang, and the two modes are thus established. [ ] By the transformation of yang and its union with yin, the Five Agents of Water, Fire, Wood, Metal, and Earth arise. When these five material forces (qi) are distributed in harmonious order, the four seasons run their course. [ ] When the reality of Non-ultimate ( 無極之真 ) and the essence of yin, yang and the Five Agents ( 二五之精 ) come into mysterious union, integration ensues. Qian (Heaven) constitutes the male element, and kun (Earth) the female element. The interaction of these two material forces engenders and transforms the myriad things. The myriad things born and reborn (sheng-sheng, 生生 ), give rise to an unending transformation. 42 From this follows that the transcendent Taiji was understood as immanent in the world. There was no discussion in the Confucian texts concerning a timeless 41 This contains one chapter of Xingli daquan. 42 Different from most of philosophers who translate the Chinese term 太極 as the Great Ultimate, I rather translate it as Great Ultimacy, as it can not be seen as a substance according to Confucian thought. Hu Guang, Xingli daquan, vol. 1, pp. 13-33: 無極而太極 太極動而生陽, 動極而靜, 靜而生陰, 靜極復動, 互為其根 陽變陰合而生水火木金土, 五氣順佈, 四時行焉 無極之真, 二五之精, 妙合而凝, 乾道成男, 坤道成女, 二氣交感, 化生萬物, 萬物生生而變化無窮 15
world before the beginning of the world. The power of generation and transformation was innate in everything of the world. The process of transformation moved automatically. The potential of all movement and evolution was already rooted in Taiji. There was no need for an outside beginner and mover to activate this process. The operation of the two polars of yin and yang, i.e., female and male, activated the movement of the generation circularly. To refute the Jesuits criticism of Taiji, the anti-jesuit Confucian Zhong Shicheng ( 鍾始聲 ), who was also a Buddhist master, wrote his twofold critique called Pixieji ( 闢邪集, Two Essays for Countering Heterodoxy, 1643). His statement runs as follows, Did Confucius not say that change (yi, 易 ) itself was the Great Ultimacy which gave birth to liangyi ( 兩儀 the two appearances, viz. yin and yang)? It is because of this that change is the nature of intelligence and consciousness. It is motionless and extremely quiet. Simply through its inner sense ( 感而遂通, gan er sui tong), it activates and governs all changes and evolution ( 萬化, wanhua) in the world without thoughts and actions ( 無思無為, wu si wu wei). 43 The phrase through its inner sense indicated that the work of evolution was not initiated by an outsider, but rather by the innate nature or spontaneity of the myriad things in the world. According to the words of Cheng Hao ( 程顥, 1032-1085), this through its inner sense meant that it possessed the whole inherent Li (principle, reason). And because it was motionless, it was called extremely quiet. Although it could be stimulated through the senses, This stimulation was not from outside. 44 This Taiji was the Li, which was transcendent, but also immanent in each and every thing of the world. The axiom of Li yi feng shu ( 理一分殊, the principle is one but manifested in the myriad things) of Cheng Yi ( 程頤, 1033-1107) described the 43 Zhong Shisheng, "Tianxue zaizheng ( 天學再徵, The Second Inquiry into the Jesuits preaching of the study of Heaven ), in his Pixieji, p. 8a: 孔子不言 易 有太極, 是生兩儀乎? 夫 易 即靈明知覺之本性也, 故無思無為, 寂然不動, 感而遂通, 正不必以此主宰萬化 44 Xingli daquan, vol. 34, p.18 : 因不動, 故言寂然, 雖不動, 感便通, 感非自外也. 16
relationship of the immanent ultimate with the world. 45 Zhu Xi ( 朱熹, 1130-1200) used the metaphor of moon-shadows in the myriad rivers and lakes to explain that the principle was immanent in each and every thing as the inner senses. In conclusion, according to Zhong, change (Yi, 易 ) was intelligent consciousness, which itself is capable of enabling the whole evolution of the world. The Jesuit idea of a Tianzhu who produced the world from outside was inconceivable for the Confucians. Zhong pointed out that the Jesuits did not fully understand the different meanings of Tian in Chinese tradition. He stated: What we Confucians say about Tian has three levels of meaning: firstly, it means the blue sky ( 蒼蒼之天 ), the variety of heavens, of which we are unable to see the limits. Secondly, it denotes the one who governs the world and metes out the reward and punishment. To this we can apply to the term Shangdi ( 上帝, the governor on high ) in our classics such as The Book of Odes, The Book of Changes and The Book of the Mean. They [the Jesuits] know only these two meanings. This governor Tian is simply governing but does not bear ( 生, sheng, giving birth to ) the world. [ ] The third meaning of Tian is the one who is intelligent, without beginning or end, who is not born by anyone else and will never be extinguished. We call it Tian, because it is the origin of all things in the world. We also call it ming ( 命, destiny ), because it is the nature ( 性, xing) conferred by Tian as recorded in The Book of the Mean. 46 The three levels of the meaning of Tian quoted by Zhong described different attributes of Tian. If the third meaning of Tian accorded with Zhong s understanding, the Jesuits refutation of Confucian thought, by either regarding Tian and Li as materialistic or as an accident, would be a great mistake. Zhong explained that the Chinese terms such as Heaven ( 天, tian), destiny ( 命, ming), unexpressed Mean ( 未發 45 Xingli daquan, vol. 26, p. 1 : 朱子曰 : 伊川說得好, 曰理一分殊 合含天地萬物而言, 只是一箇理, 即在人則又各自有一箇理 46 Zhong Shisheng, "Tianxue zaizheng," pp. 3b-4a: 吾儒所謂天者有三 : 一者望而蒼蒼之天, 所謂昭昭之多, 及其無窮者是也 ; 二者統御世間, 主善罰惡之天, 即 詩 易 中庸 所稱上帝是也 彼惟知此而已, 此之天帝, 但治世而非生世也 三者本有靈明之性, 無始無終, 不生不滅 ; 名之為天, 此乃天地萬物本原 ; 名之為命, 故 中庸 云 : 天命之謂性 17
之中, weifa zhizhong), changes ( 易, yi), inherent intelligence ( 良知, liangzi), mind ( 心, xin), sincerity ( 誠, cheng) all referred to the same one, viz. the origin of all things in the world. The origin is without mood, neither creating nor producing ( 無造作 ), without reward nor punishment ( 無賞罰 ), sound nor smell ( 無聲臭 ). 47 Reflecting on these three levels of meaning, Zhong criticized the Jesuits idea of an outside producer of the world and concluded: Then this Tianzhu is limited to a certain border ( 方隅 ) and boundary ( 分劑 ), and is not able to extend everywhere, being divided ( 分段 ) and changing ( 變遷 ). How can one name this limited Lord of Heaven as the one who has no beginning or end and will be governing the world forever? 48 Zhong wondered how, if this Tianzhu were outside of the world and no connection were possible between Tianzhu and the world, could the former govern the latter? The Jesuits preached a Lord of Heaven who was so supreme, and standing totally outside the world, that this Lord was not inside. The Jesuits Lord of Heaven was therefore unable to fill in all spaces ( 盈充, yingchong) and penetrate into all things. By contrast, if this Lord could fill the world, it could not possibly for it be the Highest ( 至尊, zhizun). 49 In Zhong s view, these two concepts of yingchong and zhizun contradicted each other; and he insisted the Jesuits fundamental defect to be their idea of an outside Lord of Heaven. The Jesuits argument about the highest Lord (zhizun) as an outsider could not be reconciled with the attribute of residing everywhere inside the world (yingchong). And, since the Jesuits highest Lord of Heaven could not be the insider of the world, it would be unable to govern the world. Zhong went a step further. From an ethical perspective, he claimed that if the Jesuits upheld both attributes of the Lord of Heaven: high beyond the world and fully within in the world, it would be a blasphemy against the authority of Heaven to 47 Zhong Shisheng, "Tianxue zaizheng, p. 4b. 48 Zhong Shisheng, "Tianxue zaizheng," p. 7b: 然則天主有方隅也, 有分劑也, 原非遍一切也, 則必有分段也, 有變遷也, 何以無始無終能為萬世主乎?. 49 Zhong Shisheng, "Tianxue zaizheng," p. 3b : 既無所不盈充, 則不但在天堂, 亦遍在地獄 若謂高居天堂, 至尊無上, 則盈充之義不成, 若謂遍一切處, 則至尊之體不立 18
consider the body of this Tianzhu as the Heaven and Earth. 50 The Jesuits argument of an outside producer, which resulted in God-world dichotomy, was the vital weakness of their argument. Clearly, the key conflict between the Jesuits and the anti-jesuit literati lay in the third meaning of Tian. The Jesuits were criticized for not knowing the deepest meaning of this origin of all things in the world. Ricci took the second meaning of Tian as a governor into account when he identified God as Shangdi. But Longobardo and the later Jesuits rejected this identification and emphasized excessively the first level, namely, the material character of Tian and thus materialized the whole Confucian tradition. The Jesuits emphasized the concept of transcendence to such an extent that God became spatially outside and chronologically prior to the world. The presupposition of the Jesuits was the Creator-world dichotomy. God s transcendence was interpreted as someone outside the world on the basis of Aristotelian theory of four causes. God, as a producer or an Architect, must be standing outside the things. The difference of God and Tian was pushed to the limit during the debates between the Jesuits and the late Ming Chinese. The Jesuit idea of an outside Lord of Heaven created a gap between this Lord and the world, and restricted this Lord to a place other than this world. This restriction in a Chinese understanding meant that this Lord was limited and finite rather than omnipresent. 2.2. Producing or generating? In this section, I will discuss how the Jesuits presented the doctrine of creation and how the Confucians responded to their arguments. As I have pointed out, they described God as an outside Architect. In this section, we will see that this action of producing ( 造, zao) was portrayed as opposed to the Confucians view of the Heaven-Human relationship which was one of giving birth. In spite of this difference, the Jesuits used Chinese terms that contained both ideas, so that we need first to clarify the issue of terminology. 50 Zhong Shisheng, "Tianxue zaizheng," pp. 10-11. I agree with Zürcher s conclusion that the Jesuits 以其外之 ( because they exteriorize it ) as the greatest difference between the Jesuits and Late Ming Chinese. See E. Zürcher, In the Beginning, 17 th Century Chinese Reaction to Christian Creationism, in Chun-Chieh Huang and Erik Zürcher (eds.), Time and Space in Chinese Culture, (Leiden: Brill, 1995). 19
The Jesuits presentation of the concept of creation One of the terms used by the Jesuits for the idea of creation was huasheng ( 化生 ). The word sheng ( 生, birth, bear, born ) can be a verb, noun or an adjective. The word hua ( 化 ) means change or transformation, depending on how it is used in the context. The original meaning of the Chinese term huasheng is close to transforming birth, and far renewed from the idea of creation out of nothing. Nonetheless, the Jesuits inserted the Christian concept of creation into this term. According to Hanyu dacidian ( 漢語大詞典, the Great Dictionary of Chinese ), in Yijing ( 易經, the Book of Changes ), the term huasheng refers to the fact that things are being nourished and transformed in Heaven and on Earth. In the philosophy of Song-Ming Confucianism, this term meant that all things in the world are transformed by the material force (qi), and were all present in one single moment ( 因氣 一時具有, 忽然而生 ). In Buddhism, the term was understood in two ways. Firstly, it could be seen as one of the four types of birth: oviparity ( 卵生, luansheng), viviparity ( 胎生, taisheng), wet birth ( 濕生, shisheng) and transforming birth ( 化生, huasheng). In this context, huasheng meant the sudden appearance without any foundation ( 無所依託, 無而忽起 ). 51 This Buddhist interpretation was closer to the concept of creation from nothing. But the Jesuit indeed refused all Buddhist ideas ever since Ricci had criticised the Buddhist influence on Chinese traditions that had ever affected the language. Secondly, a similar idea of huasheng could be found in the doctrine of Buddha s three bodies. There huashen ( 化身 ) meant the visible and touchable physical body of Buddha. 52 This idea was close to the Christian Incarnation. For instance, a Buddhist monk in late Ming, Xingji 行璣, considered Jesus as the visible body of the Lord of Heaven. 53 As this would pose a challenge to the uniqueness of the Incarnation, it was controversial when the Jesuit selected the cluster of sheng and huasheng to translate creation. 51 Cf. Dasheng yizhang, ( 大乘義章, The Meaning of Mahayana Doctrine ), vols. 8, 19, quoted in Hanyu dacidian ( 漢語大辭典, Great Dictionary of Chinese Language ). Cf. also Shiyongfoxue cidian ( 實用佛學辭典, Practical Dictionary of Buddhism ) (Taipei: Mile Press, 1984) pp. 212-213 529. 52 Ibid. 53 Xingji, Chaili ouyan ( 拆利偶言, Some Words to Expose the Fraud of Ricci ), in Fanke pixieji ( 翻刻闢邪集, New Carved Edition of the Collection of Essays for Refuting Heresy ), (Kyoto: Chinese Press, 1984), vol. II, p. 24a. 20
Another term for creation chosen by the Jesuits was zao ( 造, produce ). Aleni distinguished two viewpoints on creation. From the perspective of the Creator, he used various terms such as huacheng ( 化成, finish by transformation ), zaocheng ( 造成, finish by producing ), and zao ( 造 ) to describe the act of creating. 54 From the perspective of the creature, he used shousheng ( 受生, to receive life ). 55 When he spoke of the natural development of creatures, he used terms like shenghua ( 生化, birth and transformation ), zisheng ( 滋生, propagation ), and disheng wanhua ( 遞生萬化, gradual birth, rebirth, and transformation ). 56 The word zao corresponded to the idea of an outside producer. The various usages of the terminology resulted from the different interpretations within Chinese philosophy concerning the development and evolution in and of the world. Having clarified the terminology, we may now examine how the process of creation was presented in Wanwu zhenyuan. The way Aleni described Genesis was clearly conditioned by his knowledge of astronomy at the time. He introduced the six-days of creation day by day. The cosmos was viewed as a nine-levels concentric celestial system in which the Earth was in the center. The Heaven of heavens ( 天堂之天, tiantang zhitian) where the Lord of Heaven, stood outside the celestial system which He produced. There were three hells in the center of the earth. 57 The Lord of Heaven was both outside the celestial system and penetrating into these hells inside the earth, as well as everywhere on earth. Before the material world was created, Heaven, earth, hells and nine degrees of heavenly spirits had been created. 58 Apart from the Lord of Heaven, all had a beginning. Aleni distinguished all that had a beginning into two categories: one would have an end, whereas the other would not. Yet, all were finite. For instance, the birds and beasts, grass and trees were regarded as things with a beginning and an end. The ghosts and spirits as well as the souls of human beings had a beginning but had no end. The Lord of Heaven had neither beginning nor end, and was seen as therefore the beginning and the origin of all 54 Aleni, Wanwu zhenyuan, pp. 7-24. 55 Aleni, Wanwu zhenyuan, pp. 4, 9. 56 Aleni, Wanwu zhenyuan, pp. 4-17. 57 Aleni, Wanwu zhenyuan, p. 22. 58 Aleni, Wanwu zhenyuan, p. 21. 21