Identity, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 41 Le temps retrouvéa la recherche du temps perdu, Le temps retrouvé 43 Untimely Meditations, 44 45 Essays and Lectures 46 47 He does not, of course, give reason the same place in our nature as Kant does (he replaces The Gay Science Le temps retrouvé, Le Côté de Guermantes 51 To the Lighthouse A Sketch of the Past, 53 A Sketch of the Past 54 Proust holds that one is for the most part completely closed down by habit: habit hides almost the whole universe from us throughout our lives, Le temps retrouvé, 55 56 Collected Tales, Sketches, Speeches 57 Late Night Thoughts on Listening to Mahler s Ninth Sympthony (London: Routledge, The Myth Makers, EPISTEMOLOGY By Duncan Pritchard M as best I can the actual methodology employed by analytical view there has been a tendency in the recent debate about the is that analytical philosophers do when they do philosophy, and this is especially particular, I claim that once we understand the methodology actually employed by analytical epistemologists properly then we will see that it is not as exposed 1 As we will see below, I think this way of describing the methodology of the philosophical data provided by intuition, I still think we need to recognise Much of the focus when it comes to the role of intuition in epistemology is on our intuitive responses to cases, where we are asked to form an intuitive extensional intuitions Duncan Pritchard joined the University of Edinburgh s philosophy department in 2007 as the new Chair in Epistemology. His work covers a range of questions in epistemology, including epistemic value, testimony, radical skepticism, and virtue epistemology. His books include (Oxford University Press, 2005), (co-authored with Adrian Haddock and Alan Millar, Oxford University Press, 2010), and (Oxford University Press, 2012). He is currently writing a book on radical skepticism, which is due to be published by Princeton University Press. vol.xviii 2012 vol.xviii 2012
that the agent lacks knowledge, and thus that the extension of this term does not There is much more to the role of intuition in epistemology than input to epistemology is that provided by our intuitions regarding the intension intensional intuitions Here are some claims about knowledge which might plausibly be p entails p S s knowledge that p entails that S believes that p S s knowledge that p entails that S is in possession of reasons for thinking that p S s knowledge that p entails that S s belief that p is not true simply as a S s knowledge that p is the result of S s exercise of a relevant cognitive This list is clearly not exhaustive, and nor are all the claims on this list beyond agents lack knowledge in cases where the proposition believed by the agent is between the relevant extensional and intensional intuitions when it comes to particularly since there seem to be cases where our extensional and intensional There is a further type of intuitive data which is relevant here, a kind of intuitive data which is closely related to intensional intuitions but ultimately can also have general intuitions about that term which are neither about its mere true belief is often cited as an important epistemological intuition, but while this intuition is clearly about knowledge, it does not fall into either of the Other intuitions of this sort could be that 3 Call this class of intuitions general intuitions Within any one domain, such as epistemology, there will inevitably be instance, have an intuition about the intension of a term which is called into tension that will need to be resolved, perhaps by highlighting an important ambiguity in the intensional intuition or by showing that the extensional Similarly, one might be led by one s intensional and extensional intuitions might lead one to adopt a particular account of knowledge, but one might then realise that this account is unable to accommodate an important general intuition about knowledge, such as the putative general intuition noted The foregoing reminds us that intuitions are not set in stone but are instead highly defeasible, even when we consider them only in the light of other intuitions (we will consider some non-intuitive data that is part of the think we should regard all of our intuitions as individually defeasible, I also think suggest that some intuitions will be less defeasible than others, and some classes As an illustration of this point, notice that our most deep-seated many of our most fundamental intensional intuitions about this term would be unlikely to count as a theory of knowledge knowledge on which it was not factive, did not entail belief, at here is that our most basic intensional intuitions about a concept play the role of picking out the very thing that we are trying to understand, and hence we Call our most deep-seated intensional intuitions about a concept, intensional platitudes en masse 4
5 6 But other cases might be far less compelling, even though they do still elicit the relevant The extent to which an extensional intuition carries epistemic weight can depend on other factors too, such as the degree to which it trades on a real- which concern far-fetched scenarios (for example, cases that appeal to science in some suitably robust sense of possible (for example, metaphysically 7 Ceteris paribus, the more far-fetched the example is, and particularly the more dubious the example is in terms of its possibility, the less epistemic weight any extensional intuition based on this case will have, for the simple how there is a complex interplay between them, both in terms of determining their relationships to each other, and in determining their respective epistemic We can explore this point by delineating a further kind of category of intuitions which concerns intuitions about the correct linguistic usage of the linguistic intuitions epistemologists might appeal to intuitions we have about the correct usage of the word knows in a particular conversational context as part of the relevant There is, of course, a close relationship between extensional intuitions to distinguish them, for although there will clearly be a great deal of overlap that an agent lacks knowledge even while granting that it would be in some are a case in point here, in that given the rational basis the agent possesses in support of her belief it clearly would be appropriate for her to assert that she has that an agent possesses knowledge and yet nonetheless hold that for independent mind on this score is a case where such an assertion, though true, would in that We have then a subtle distinction between extensional and linguistic intuitions, and now that this distinction is on the table it ought to be clear that part of the skill of the analytical epistemologist will lie in determining which to be an extensional intuition could prove to in fact be a linguistic intuition, and vice versa A badly constructed example could obscure things, and so it may take a very A poorly formulated intensional intuition might gloss over an important about whether an agent in an example has knowledge could muddy the will also be on display when the analytical philosopher adroitly conducts the That it is part of the methodology of analytical epistemology to regard data is clear from considering how analytical epistemologists respond to were able to shock epistemologists into seeing that the received wisdom in the theory of knowledge was wrong demonstrates that great skill can sometimes most naturally understood as a kind of intellectual seeing, it is tempting to reveals that this would be a non-sequitur 11
initial intuitions and intuitional real life, in the sense that once one is in the machine one cannot tell that one s My experience as someone who has often taught this example to intuitively regard the life in the experience machine as at least no worse than they would be happy for their children to live their lives in the experience machine then most opt for the real life outside of the machine, even though makes explicit that entering the machine is a one-way ticket perhaps because one s body becomes unusable thereafter as part of the re-orientation process then again students intuitions tend to shift towards regarding the life outside has explored the example in some detail then the groundswell of opinion tends Here, then, we have a case in which people s initial verdicts about a training apply the relevant intellectual virtues so as to improve her ability to discern An interesting issue regarding this account of the role of intuition in A hard-headed response would be to say nothing at all, on the basis that the Indeed, given that all intuition is defeasible, even when the product of the relevant intellectual virtues, it would be foolhardy to discount the epistemic epistemic credentials of the analytical philosophical enterprise to suppose that those trained in this enterprise have greater skills on this score, one would still have to take into account the possibility that the training had itself introduced be discounted that is, where the agents concerned only come to form their intuitions at all, on account of their being epistemically it is entirely consistent to also hold that this process can sometimes muddle the count as good philosophers by analytical lights, have persuasively argued is widespread disagreement in philosophy should surely give us pause when it comes to supposing that analytical philosophy always enhances one s evidential 13 odd epistemologist who was entirely unconcerned about the fact that her theory not oblige one to empirical non-intuitional input to the
a theory of knowledge, so we also accord some weight to the fact that other empirical data that is relevant to the epistemological enterprise, it follows that epistemologists have an interest in the careful and systematic collection of this the kinds of heuristics and biases that blur human reasoning, and which would undoubtedly play a role in generating some of the intuitive responses given by 14 Knowledge of these heuristics and biases would therefore be essential A second way in which a more informed and systematic collection of lexeme, which means that it is one of the few terms that appears in all known 15 Even so, there might well be widespread divergence in the intuitive their data in this respect from a highly unrepresentative population sample (for 16 To this extent, I think that experimental philosophy which aims to 17 Indeed, given the fact that such data does about experimental philosophy sees it as merely assisting contemporary fundamental problems for the epistemological enterprise, which is what some This is not the only kind of non-intuitional input which is relevant that epistemologists can appeal to takes the form of information about the in fact came about we thereby have information which can potentially play a but as we saw above, that is also the case with the rest of the input to a theory of a priori route to gaining an Here Craig asks us to imagine a state of nature in which creatures with very similar interests and cognitive capacities to our own, and who occupy similar a priori nature, although it does not seem to fall into any of the categories of intuitive There will be other forms of data that epistemologists can appeal to in constructing a theory of knowledge for example, relevant work done by As noted above, even within a single category of intuition-derived data there hand for the epistemologist is to use her critical and logical acumen and, with a above, the only real constraint is that at least some of the intensional platitudes One would also expect there to be a fair degree and ascribing it its due weight will be very tricky, especially since there is a feedback loop in play here, in that the weight one ascribes to one set of evidence reminds us that analytical philosophy is hard One issue that I have glossed over so far is what the epistemologist is which has it as striving for an informative, but still fully reductive, analysis of knowledge, where this involves a decomposition of the target term into
I do not deny that it would be intellectually appealing to be able to practice of epistemologists in this regard indeed, of philosophers more notion, where this involves an informative account of that notion which need such data is nonetheless defeasible, and needs to be considered in the light of we do want our theory of knowledge to give special weight to the intensional way the folk usage of knowledge, so to that extent one would not expect there reasonably expect the theory to depart from the folk usage of knowledge, not least because the folk usage does not itself suggest a consistent theory of this up version of the folk notion, albeit an account which is essentially tied to the The second point is that a mere elucidation of a term can in fact give A good example in this Suppose that it turns out that the best theory of knowledge understands this notion in terms of the further notion of cognitive would surely have learnt something important about the nature of knowledge by recognising the truth of this theory, even if ultimately we were not presented been raised exclusive to him the theory of knowledge as it is understood by contemporary theories of knowledge being proposed are increasingly complex and ad hoc such Even if we grant that contemporary epistemology is indeed focussed and arguably ad hoc modal accounts of knowledge and virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge have been very successful at dealing with a range of problem cases and are In both cases they are also usually very straightforward accounts of knowledge, and so can hardly be charged with Indeed, given the convergence of opinion in epistemology towards views of this sort, one actually has grounds for supposing that if there is a research programme in epistemology which is concerned with turned out to be the optimal account of knowledge available, but it also turned A more serious form of scepticism about the contemporary what has been called the negative programm As we have noted above, experimental philosophy in itself poses no fundamental enhancing the the experimental philosophy programme poses a far more serious challenge, In particular, the thought is that the entire appeal to intuitions that is
at the heart of analytical philosophy is undermined by the data that has been philosophers have in mind here includes, for example, experiments which supposedly irrelevant factors, such as their ethnicity or the order in which 31 The alleged upshot of this data is that analytical philosophers are wrong to rely so much on intuitions, and hence should radically even if we grant the import of these experiments, it still does not follow that analytical epistemology is thereby posed anything like the dramatic indeed, A second issue here is that, as also noted above, analytical epistemology 33 I think Williamson is entirely right on this score, and I would suggest that this made earlier that in responding to the negative programme in experimental philosophy in this way one is not thereby discounting the epistemic weight of to the negative programme that is, to run further experiments which challenge clearly cannot rule-out a priori 34 But for now at least, there is a clear lacuna in the data supporting the challenges to contemporary analytical epistemology besides the two considered 35 Still, I hope to have least shown here that there is far more to the 36 Notes 1 Henceforth, where I talk of epistemology or philosophy, I have in mind analytical b c 3 Such claims are often made by proponents of what is known as locus classicus 4 5 6 7 extensional intuitions which may concern an event which is not even metaphysically possible is Some might feel a very natural aversion to treating mere cognitive skills as virtues, particularly since skills and virtues are often contrasted by key ancient philosophers, such as aba bca this intuitive skill, remarking that I am aware of no intellectual seeming beyond my conscious Indeed, some commentators argue that all intuition should be thought of as a kind of 11 used, was never meant to be an easy enterprise to engage in and the conclusions derived via
methodology in Pritchard 13 Of course, there is one strand in recent philosophical thought which sees philosophy as the cause 14 15 16 17 An example of empirical work from the cognitive sciences that could be relevant to the wide ab Interestingly, this point is often supplemented with the further claim that the analyses of are unable to accommodate a general intuition about knowledge that is, that it is the sort of And note that the claim that a good analysis of knowledge should be straightforward is 31 This is the so-called restrictionist challenge to analytical philosophy made by some 33 34 programme is some of the recent empirical literature regarding the cognitive limitations of philosophical expertise, then this might well pose a challenge to the methodology of analytical 35 epistemological realism 36 Kallestrup, Chris Kelp, Klemens Kappel, Hilary Kornblith, Martin Kusch, Mike Lynch, Ram References Philosophy Compass Philosophical Papers Children Talk About the Mind Philosophical Perspectives A PrioriPhilosophical Studies Philosophical Perspectives Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Epistemology Modalized. In Defence of Pure Reason. Williamson on Knowledge,
. Oxford: Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry Epistemic Value, In Social Epistemology Episteme Midwest Studies In Philosophy Analysis Intuitive Judgment. Grazer Philosophische Studien Rethinking Philosophical Perspectives Philosophical Inquiry. Ethics and Epistemology Philosophical Issues 17, Philosophical Quarterly Achieving Knowledge Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Episteme Journal of Philosophy Biases Psychological Review Social Epistemology, Philosophical Explorations Experimental Philosophy Philosophical Inquiry Grazer Philosophische Studien Episteme Episteme Epistemic Value, Episteme Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Philosophical Studies The Routledge Companion to Epistemology Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Common Knowledge Philosophy Compass Synthese Anarchy, State, and Utopia Philosophical Explanations Epistemic Luck Synthese American Philosophical Quarterly Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy Journal of Philosophy Intuitions Investigations Reason, Truth and History Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Philosophy Compass A Social History of Truth. Cognition The Moral Problem
Duncan Pritchard Role in Philosophical Inquiry Philosophical Studies Grazer Philosophische Studien Experimental Philosophy Stich and His Critics Synthese The Skeptics Oxford: Oxford Knowledge and Skepticism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Science Philosophical Studies The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Philosophical Topics Knowledge and its Limits Dialectica The Philosophy of Philosophy. Williamson on Knowledge Philosophical Investigations Foundations of Knowledge The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology vol.xviii 2012 MORAL RESPONSIBILITY Responsibility Without Identity By David Shoemaker I Platitude Platitude entails what I call Slogan 1 In other words, for someone now to be morally responsible for some past the same person as who accept Slogan presupposes is numerical identity, while others believe that what it presupposes is narrative What they all do agree on, though, is that responsibility presupposes identity of some kind, that some version of SloganSlogan case even granting the truth of Platitude conceptions Because most adherents of Slogan are primarily interested in discussing the metaphysics of personal identity, though, which conception accountability, and this is sometimes taken to mean the following: I cannot appropriately be held to account, that is, punished 3 Slogan: I cannot be each other to account for bad actions that are not crimes (for example, laughing positive another thing, once we admit this last point, we can see that, while considerations no David Shoemaker is Associate Professor in the department of philosophy and Murphy Institute at Tulane University where he has taught since 2009. His areas of specialization are: agency and responsibility (moral and criminal), personal identity and Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction and Knowledge, Nature and Norms: An Introduction to Philosophy, which he wrote and edited with Mark Timmons. vol.xviii 2012