The copyright laws of the United States (Title 17, U.S. Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. If a user makes a request for, or later uses a photocopy or reproduction (including handwritten copies) for purposes in excess of fair use, that user may be liable for copyright infringement. Users are advised to obtain permission from the copyright owner before any re-use of this material. Use of this material is for private, non-commercial, and educational purposes; additional reprints and further distribution is prohibited. Copies are not for resale. All other rights reserved. For further information, contact Director, Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6010 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. FIRlnGLlne HOST: WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR. GUEST: SUBJECT: MORRIS ABRAM 0 "FORGIVENESS FOR WAR CRIMINALS?" FIRING LINE is produced and directed by WARREN STEIBEL. This is a transcript of FIRING LINE program #2725/1154, taped at HBO Studios in New York City on January 19, 1998, and telecast later on public television stations. Copyright l997fjrjng LINE Transcripts and videocassettes are available through Producers Incorporated for Television, 2700 Cypress Street, Columbia, SC 29205 &o3n99-3449
MR. BUCKLEY: The decision of the Clinton administration is not to instruct NATO troops in Bosnia to round up indicted war criminals and dispatch them to trial by the special court set up by the United Nations. Several reasons have been advanced for this drastic change in national policy. It is said that to single out the criminals, confine and deport them will merely prolong the agony of the area. There is even talk to the effect that the only way to cope with the mess of Croatian, Serb, and Muslim war criminals is to grant amnesty. In heated opposition to interrupting, let alone suspending, the pursuit of large-scale criminals is Morris Abram. He is currently the chairman of the United Nations Watch. This organization was founded in 1993 in Geneva with a breathtaking mandate; namely, to remind the United Nations of what it is supposed to do and contracted by its charter to do and by subsequent treaties. One of these is to try to punish war criminals of the kind that were identified in Nuremberg in 1945 and in some cases hanged. A young prosecutor at Nuremberg at the time was Morris Abram. Since then, Mr. Abram engaged in the practice of law in Atlanta. He is a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School, began a career of service in various capacities for four presidents, beginning with John F. Kennedy. He served as president of Brandeis University for two years, was president of the American Jewish Committee, and then permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations in Geneva, which continues to be his headquarters. Let me begin by asking Ambassador Abram if he would catch us up. At this moment are any war criminals being rounded up? If not, are they at least being identified? MR. ABRAM: Some have been identified, some have been indicted, some have even surrendered. But the principal war criminals who have been indicted and for whom warrants have been issued by the court in the Hague, which was set up by the United Nations under charter seven, chapter seven of the charter, Karadzik and Mladic who are the principal war criminals, who are responsible for the most heinous crimes, have not been arrested, though ample authority exists to arrest them and ample force exists, and I suppose on the theory that somebody might be killed in trying to arrest them. As many as 60,000 NATO troops have been in that territory. And you know, Bill, if you said that policemen shouldn't arrest criminals here because some of them might be killed, you would have an understanding, I think, of how I feel about the failure to arrest these really terrible people. 1
MR. BUCKLEY: Well, are you telling me, Mr. Abram, that if orders went out to arrest them, it could be done? MR. ABRAM: Oh yes, there is no question it could be done. MR. BUCKLEY: They follow an absolutely overt schedule and are identifiable? MR. ABRAM: They've been identified, they have even been, some of them, on ski slopes in the presence of some of these forces. The truth is that the NATO commanders--and I would say principally because of the United States' failure to lead--have taken the position that they will capture them if they come across them, but they will not exercise any military authority to arrest them or use any force to arrest them. And of course that means they're not arrested. MR. BUCKLEY: Okay, now, could you tell us what were the pressures that built up into making that decision? It must have been something other than simply the concern for a possible casualty by the arresting mandate. MR. ABRAM: Well, first of all, the president of the United States has said that we would do everything in our power to assist this tribunal which lives in the Hague, operates from the Hague, the War Crimes Tribunal, which has done, I think, a splendid job. It started under the prosecutor Justice Goldstone of South Africa. We would help them in every conceivable way. But I think, first of all, we've not wanted any of our troops sent home in body bags, though I'm sure it's perfectly true that the mayor of New York doesn't want any policemen sent home to their respective churches or synagogues in body bags. But that's the number one reason. And the second reason, I think, is that there's a feeling that if you do this, it may conceivably unwind the Dayton accords. And three, I think they just don't want any division in the NATO forces; some of the NATO forces may feel differently about it than others. MR. BUCKLEY: Well, how do you handle critics who say that the war criminal approach is something that tends to make the situation more volatile? Charles Krauthammer, for instance, says that in his column. Do you take that seriously? MR. ABRAM: What do you mean, more volatile? 2
MR. BUCKLEY: Well, I think the assumption is that if you let things sleep a little bit, tensions diminish. That doesn't seem to have happened in the last six centuries in Bosnia. MR. ABRAM: It sure hasn't. MR. ABRAM: And I think I can make another argument, and that is that if you don't want to identify all Croatians as bad or all Serbians as bad or all Muslims as bad--there are elements of all these societies, as all societies, that are bad--then you should, as we did in the case of the Nuremberg trials, identify those who are the most responsible, and therefore you exculpate to a large extent the generality of Germans. And I think it would compose the situation and move the situation more towards peace rather than conflict. That's my view. But now I'm-- MR. BUCKLEY: You mean by isolating symbols. MR. ABRAM: Yes, symbols. You take the symbols, exactly as you do in the case of the Truth Commission in South Africa. You can't prosecute all those who are guilty, but if you take the symbols, you relieve, it seems to me, the blanket indictment of a whole people, which shouldn't be done, and which, as you suggest, has been characteristic of the way the Croatians and the Serbs have treated each other-- MR. BUCKLEY: So this is sort of-- MR. ABRAM: --for the last 600 years. MR. BUCKLEY: --a non-genocidal approach-- MR. ABRAM: Yes. MR. BUCKLEY: --to justice. MR. ABRAM: But you know, Bill, you mentioned Nuremberg. When I left Nuremberg, as a very, very young man, I felt that maybe the way to deal with the pacification of the world was to deter war by prosecuting war criminals. I felt we made a major stab in that direction at Nuremberg, but you know, as time goes on, one's mind, as 3
you know in my case, changes from time to time, and I don't believe that trial of war criminals has really deterred any kind of conflicts. I don't think so. And I also realize that there are problems in trying war criminals because you have to select--the question of who the judges are, the question of the fairness of the tribunals, and as you may know, the succession after Nuremberg to try to produce an international criminal court has gone on for 50 years and we haven't got one yet, and maybe such persons who have opposed this kind of process may have something on their side. So I am not an absolutist on the same question. MR. BUCKLEY: As I understand it, what you have now is the international criminal tribunal; what you don't have is the international war crimes tribunal. MR. ABRAM: We don't have an international criminal tribunal. That would have to be a treaty-- MR. ABRAM: --and we've been 50 years and we still don't have a treaty. MR. BUCKLEY: And what's holding that up? MR. ABRAM: Holding it up is the fact that they can't agree on the terms of the treaty: What are the crimes? How far down you will go in the application of criminal justice, and the feeling--my own feeling- is that if you got the treaty, you would find that the bastards of the world wouldn't sign and therefore wouldn't be responsible, and the decent countries, such as ourselves and England and France and others would, and we would be responsible. That's one of the problems. It's a very difficult process. And I must say that the tribunal that exists in the Hague is a real advance because it doesn't have to depend on the ratification of the process. MR. BUCKLEY: It's ad hoc. MR. ABRAM: It's ad hoc. Why? Because all the nations of the world are part of the United Nations treaty and charter, and that gave the security council the right, in the interest of international peace and security, to establish this tribunal, which I think was a master stroke. 4
MR. BUCKLEY: As a lawyer, you probably found difficulty in attempting any generic attempts at justice when the Soviet Union was a co-sponsor. It made the thing implausible, right? So the ad hoc approach is probably better, isn't it? MR. ABRAM: I think it's better. MR. ABRAM: But the ad hoc approach has certain drawbacks, because any one of the five powers can veto. MR. BUCKLEY: Veto, yes. MR. ABRAM: But that's not the drawback in some cases, because- May I make this suggestion to you? MR. ABRAM: If there were an international criminal tribunal, having lived in the United Nations long enough, I know, and maybe--you were there for a short period of time--you would know, that there would be a strong tendency in the international community to hold the United States as one of the first war criminals, because didn't we invade Panama? Didn't we invade Grenada? There's a tendency. It wouldn't get very far, but there would be a tendency. And at the present time, just to give you an illustration. You know the Hague conventions--i'm sorry, the Geneva conventions against occupation--and these are very serious crimes, drawn up as a result of Hitler's occupation of Europe- the only country that has ever been held accountable, or being sought to be held accountable, is Israel, for three-and-a-half acres of land outside Jerusalem. Tibet, which has been occupied, and all the monks have been driven out of the country since 1950 has never been so censured, nor East Timor nor Afghanistan. So there's a tendency-- MR. BUCKLEY: So we're really talking about the difficulties of universalizing-- MR. ABRAM: Exactly. MR. BUCKLEY: --justice in a world in which perspectives are simply not held in common. But that's one argument that's been held against an attempt to make justice out of the Bosnian situation. Mr. Ignatieff 5
is very eloquent on the subject, where he writes that-- Let me quote him. He says, "If a Serb is someone who believes that Croats have a historical tendency towards fascism, and a Croat is someone who believes that Serbs have a penchant for genocide, then to discard these myths is to give up a defining element of Serbian and Croatian identity." Now that, of course, doesn't translate into a mandate for war crimes. But the auspices under which prosecution goes forward have to be universally acknowledged, don't they? What does Article VII tell us a bout that? MR. ABRAM: Article VII says that the Security Council has the responsibility of restoring and preserving peace and security and dealing with threats to international peace and security. I think it's a stretch to say that it had the power to set up this court, but no one has the power to challenge it anyway. I would say that Chapter VII had used it for our going into Haiti under the United Nations flag, and I don't think that was a threat to international peace an~ security. But I still support a Chapter VII court, because my question to you is: What is a world to do which knows that about 8,000 people were assembled in a night in a safe haven around Srebrenica and were executed? Now we know that and we know who gave the orders, and they have been indicted. So I say to the author you quote, What are you going to do with it? It's the same question that was put to the Allied powers after World War II. What are you going to do if you catch Hitler, Caldonbruner, Himmler, and Ribbentrop and Goering? What are you going to do with them? Churchill said let's shoot them. Now that didn't go over with many people. MR. BUCKLEY: He wanted summary justice. MR. ABRAM: Yes, sir. Right in the field. Others said, Well, we let the Kaiser get away with it, maybe we should let him get away with it. The decision of the Allied powers, then called United Nations, was to hold trials under the rubric of law and the rule of law. MR. BUCKLEY: Who was the moving spirit in that decision? MR. ABRAM: The United States. And I think it was the correct move. But as I said, I thought it would have an enduring effect and a transcendent effect; it didn't. But we were all, I think, rather naive. At least I was. Do you remember Cordell Hull, that crusty old Tennessean? 6
MR. ABRAM: He said now that we've got the United Nations we won't need regional alliances, we don't need power politics, we don't even really, I suppose, need armies. MR. BUCKLEY: The hillbilly Polonius, he was called. MR. ABRAM: Yes, exactly. MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, there was that sort of floating optimism that seemed to say we can identify injustice on a massive scale and we should crank up the machinery to make this a going proposition. But it collapsed pretty fast, didn't it? MR. ABRAM: Very. And not only make it a going proposition, but make it a deterrence. MR. BUCKLEY: Right. Yes, yes. MR. ABRAM: Now I must say to you, I would hate to live in a New York or a Los Angeles without a police force and a criminal justice system. But we are living in a world in which the weapons are much more dangerous and the enmities are much more serious without a criminal justice system. And I think this is extremely dangerous. But on the other hand, I recognize there are certain grave dangers in setting up a criminal justice system, and certain great obstacles. MR. BUCKLEY: Well, tell us a little bit more about what the United Nations Watch sets out to do and how it bears on the situation. MR. ABRAM: Well, the United Nations Watch was established to judge the United Nations, using the yardstick of its own charter. Now we can't do it in all areas, and there never has been an independent watch of the United Nations. There's a Congress watch, an EPA watch, there's even a Hillary watch, but no United Nations watch, which is a vast area of unexamined conduct. MR. ABRAM: Now you may say--you wouldn't, because you know- that the states themselves watch it, but they watch it for their own self-interest. Our state does too. I hope it does. I hope it does. And 7
take the United Nations Association, it exists, as it should, to be sort of a-- MR. BUCKLEY: Enthusiast. MR. ABRAM: --supporter of the United Nations. No one watched it. So we proceeded to watch it in only three areas, because we don't have the resources. Does it abide by the cardinal principle of equal treatment of all nations, large and small? Does it grant equality to men and women, as it says it does, the charter says. And third--this is really laughable--does it appoint and promote according to the principles of efficiency, competence, and integrity, with only due regard to geographical diversity, or has it been turned around so that the quota system is the basic system by which one gains promotion and appointment? And we found that in all of these areas the UN is extremely-- Well, I'm not knocking the UN, because I think it's a very important institution and I think we ought to pay our debts. But I'm saying that it ought to comply with its charter. If it did, it wouldn't need any of these reforms. The reforms are already there. It just won't comply with them. It's like the financing laws in the United States with respect to elections. What we do need is to comply with the laws that exist. MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, right. But to the extent that the UN Watch focuses on the war criminal issue-- MR. ABRAM: All right. MR. BUCKLEY: --it then seeks to energize that whole machinery? MR. ABRAM: Yes. We have not focused on that particularly, but I have made repeated statements as chairman of the UN Watch that we should prosecute those war criminals who have been identified by the Hague tribunal, and for whom arrest warrants have been issued, and they should be arrested. And there is no reason why they shouldn't be arrested. MR. BUCKLEY: To what extent do you consider yourself licensed to make public political points and to mobilize pressure? For instance, do you target the Clinton administration as responsible for this la test tergiversation, and if so, what does United Nations Watch seek to do to ginger up public pressure? 8
MR. ABRAM: I think we will continue to press the president of the United States to give leadership to the NATO forces and the S-4 forces in the field, to give the orders, to arrest the criminals as he's promised he would support the Dayton accords. And the Dayton accords are going to come apart, because if these criminals are not arrested, just as soon as those troops pull out, God knows what is going to happen there. The arrest and trial of these war criminals will take out of circulation the principal figures, the political figures, who have stirred up much of this trouble. I don't happen to believe--! don't know enough about it to be certain, of course, but I don't happen to believe that the things would have happened in Yugoslavia that did without the power-hungry people who have committed enormous crimes to stay in power. But you know, I don't want to be understood as having condemned all kind of international cooperation, because I think in this interdependent world we need it desperately. For example, you are a writer, and you might well have asked me how would you be protected in your-- MR. BUCKLEY: My profession. MR. ABRAM: -- copyright if it weren't for international conventions. And I know you are a sailor, and I hope no one ever will seize you by an act of piracy. But I hope you would be protected by the international conventions about this. And I know that these are important. But I think if they are important they ought to be used. MR. BUCKLEY: Well, do we isolate the United States as, primarily responsible, yes, but is it unique in objecting to the forwarding of these purposes? What kind of backing are you getting in Great Britain, Germany, Italy, France? MR. ABRAM: I would say that the United States backs us extremely well, across the board. MR. BUCKLEY: Up to the point of actually arresting the figure? MR. ABRAM: Up to this-- They're not cooperative on this matter. MR. ABRAM: Arresting. But the United States, I say, far from being a country which is governed by the charter extremely well, it deals with charter principles better than any other state. And I know that I have 9
my suspicions about the abuse of human rights as an international tool to improve society, though I certainly support it. But I'll say this, the United States is again the best of countries, and I think the United States does a fairly good job in the international field, and I'm proud of it. I'm not proud of certain allies that we have and their reticence to do anything at all without the backing of the United States, even in their own backyard. I think it was a terrible mistake for Europe not to have dealt with Yugoslavia long before we had to come in and deal with it. MR. BUCKLEY: To what extent are you informed by historical precedence? For instance, in the Civil War, there was no action taken by either side, or even threatened by the losing side. The idea then was general amnesty, was it not? That would not be applicable in this situation, would it? MR. ABRAM: I think it would be applicable with respect to most of the people, if you identified the chief criminals, and that's all you will ever be able to identify. I think if you pick them out, as we did in the case of Germany--we did a pretty good job in Germany. After all, what Hitler did was a devastating attack on civilization. And yet, I don't think people hold Germans and Germany today in contempt. And I think partially it's because-- MR. BUCKLEY: Goldhagen does. MR. ABRAM: Who? MR. BUCKLEY: Goldhagen. MR. ABRAM: Yes. He does. And have you read the new book? MR. BUCKLEY: I have. MR. ABRAM: Hitler's-- MR. ABRAM: Yes, great. But on the other hand, I think the generality of people is not to hold this generation of Germans responsible. And I think it would not have been so had it not been for the Nuremberg trials and the subsequent trials that took place. 10
MR. BUCKLEY: They had the effect of a distillation-- MR. ABRAM: Exactly. The Japanese too. Right, right, right. MR. ABRAM: These are two of our allies and we are trying to get both of them into the Security Council. Who would have thought we would have in 1945? MR. BUCKLEY: Right. Now they have indicted 75 people and they have got three of them. MR. ABRAM: Yes. MR. BUCKLEY: What happens to them? MR. ABRAM: They're going to be tried. None of them can be executed. MR. BUCKLEY: Why not? MR. ABRAM: Because the charter of the tribunal, the Hague tribunal, the ad hoc tribunal, makes the death sentence--it prohibits the death sentence. And that's interesting, because there is a concurrent jurisdiction, you see. Rwanda can try its criminals-- MR. ABRAM: --and Yugoslavia can try its criminals. MR. ABRAM: In Rwanda they have the death sentence. And so many of the people in Rwanda do not want to surrender to the Hague because they want to give the death sentence. MR. BUCKLEY: Oh, right, right, right. Yes, yes. I do think that the Eichmann trial stressed the dramatic potency of a death sentence. And you may very well be against death sentences, but let me simply make that point. Since we are talking about symbols, an execution tends to drive your point home in the sense that isolation from life 11
plus life does not. You probably do not want to commit yourself on that particular point. MR. ABRAM: Oh, I'll commit myself, yes. MR. BUCKLEY: You will? MR. ABRAM: Oh, yes. I mean, the question is, Do I favor the death sentence? Oh, yes. MR. BUCKLEY: But that's res judicata, right? That's not a change. MR. ABRAM: No. MR. BUCKLEY: So whatever happens at the Hague, that's not going to happen. MR. ABRAM: Will not happen. It cannot happen under the Hague charter. But you know, one of the things that's pleased me about the Hague. I mentioned the fact that an international tribunal could be a difficult thing because of the differences in the jurisprudence of the countries that compose it. But I have been very happy with the work of the Hague tribunal. Those judges have gotten along well, it seems to be a very responsible court, and it gives, I think, a good name to international justice. MR. BUCKLEY: Thank you, Ambassador Morris Abram; thank you, ladies and gentlemen. 12