Multiculturalism and Social Justice Working Papers Series Social/Political/Psychological Identity Steven Davis Philosophy Department Carleton University Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 steven_davis@carleton.ca MCSJ-02-07
In the last several decades, identity politics has become increasingly important. On this view, it is not a person qua person who is part of the moral/social/political order, but a person with a particular identity. Therefore, it matters politically, socially, culturally and/or morally whether someone is and identifies himself as having certain characteristics or properties, as for example, a Canadian, a member of a First Nation, aged, disabled, an alcoholic, a woman, a Muslim, etc. Most discussions of cultural/social/political identity concentrate on a narrow range of properties, properties connected with nations, states, and religions, but this leaves out a wide range of properties that are important to people and can play a role in their cultural/social/political identity, for example, being a dancer, a butcher, and even an alcoholic. In fact, it is possible for any property of a person to be part of his identity, if it is important to the way that he lives his life. But what makes a property part of a person's cultural/social/political identity? We can answer this question from two points of view, first person and second person. 1 We can ask what it is for an individual from his point of view to have a cultural/social/political identity and what is it for others to assign such an identity to an individual. I shall argue that the first and second person points of view are not 1 We also speak about group identity, for example, the identity of Europeans or Canadians. Group identity is derivative from the identity of the individuals that make up the group. The connection, however, between group and individual identity is complicated. What makes up the identity of a group involves complicated relations between the ordinary members of the group and members of the elite, the political leaders, intellectuals, artists, etcetera, who articulate characteristics that they take to be part of the identity of the group. The non-elite members might well defer to members of the elite about the identity of the group of which they are a part. What complicates the picture is that quite often there are different contested views among the elite about what constitutes the identity of a group, views about which there can be bitter battles and often no agreement. 2
entirely independent. I shall begin with the first person point of view. I shall argue that for a property to be a part of a person s identity it must be a characteristic that the person has, not just one that he thinks that he has; his beliefs about the property must play an important role in his life and for this reason he must believe that he has the properties that constitute his identity. It is clear that we can have multiple identities. We can be a Jew and a Canadian, both of which we take to be part of our identity. In what follows, I shall not discuss issues connected to having multiple identities, but shall concentrate my attention on what it is for someone to have an identity. 2 My goal is to explain what social/cultural/psychological identity is. 3 Moreover, I shall distinguish between a person s identity and his self-conception. A person s identity is what or who he is; a person s self-conception is his belief about what or who he is. I shall claim that some property s belonging to a person s identity entails that he has the property, but someone s believing that some property belongs to his identity does not entail that he has the property. That is, our identities are not constituted by what we believe them to be. A person s identity is his possession of various characteristics or properties, for example, his being a Canadian or a Jew that he regards to be important for his life. What makes it the case that someone possesses these properties? One becomes a 2 I shall make the simplifying assumption that there is only one property that is part of a person s cultural/social/political identity. Amartya Sen (2006) argues that this assumption is morally and politically distorting. I shall not take up the issues that Sen raises in his discussion of multiple identities. My discussion of identity in this section carries over to multiple identities. 3 In what follows I shall speak of identity simpliciter, but it should be understood that I am talking about social/cultural/psychological identity. 3
Canadian citizen by either being born in Canada or to Canadian parents or by being naturalized as a Canadian citizen and one is Jewish by virtue of one's biological mother being Jewish or by converting to Judaism. That a person has these characteristics is a contingent cultural fact about the individual and the world. They depend on there being a Canada and Canadian citizenship and a certain religion, Judaism, with laws that lay out what it is for someone to be Jewish. There are other characteristics, such as being disabled, being an alcoholic or being aged, which might be part of a person s identity, the possession of which do not depend upon cultural facts, but on a person's particular biological makeup. As we shall see, there are important differences between characteristics like being Canadian and being an alcoholic in the way in which they play a role in a person s identity. Let us begin with my contention that a property is part of an individual s identity only if he has the property and not merely that he thinks that he has it. Consider Sally, who identifies herself as a writer, but seldom puts pen to paper. When she does, she writes a paragraph or two and then puts it in her drawer. She has never completed a poem, novel, short story, or any other type of literary work or sent anything that falls into these categories to a publisher. She talks a great deal about her plans to write this or that, but the plans come to nothing. She however thinks of herself as a writer and represents herself to others as being a writer. Being a writer is certainly who she thinks she is. This is not however who she is. 4 To be a writer, she must write, something that Sally does not do. One s identity, I claim, is connected to who or what a person is, not who or what a person thinks that he is. If this is unconvincing, think of someone who takes himself to be part of a First Nation in Canada, the Mohawks, for 4 We might say that she is a would-be writer. 4
example, but is not. As much as he identifies with the Mohawks and thinks of himself as a Mohawk, being a Mohawk is not part of his identity. It is not part of who he is, although it might be who he thinks that he is. Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether someone has a property that is part of his identity. Consider Sam, who is a Canadian, since he was born in Canada to Canadian parents and has not renounced his Canadian citizenship. Imagine that he is taken to France when he is a baby and placed in a French family who tell him nothing about his past, but who does not secure French citizenship for him. He is by Canadian and French law still a Canadian, about which he is unaware. As he grows up, he thinks of himself as being French and identifies with France and French culture. What then is his identity? Is it being French or Canadian? If he tried to vote in a French election, he would be rejected because he was not a French citizen. How about being Canadian, something about which Sam is unaware and which he does not regard to be part of his identity? If he were to apply for a Canadian passport or try to register to vote in a Canadian election, he would be recognized by the relevant authorities as a Canadian. But yet Sam does not think of himself as being Canadian. He knows nothing of its history; does not speak its language; his values are not Canadian, but those of his French friends and adopted family; he abhors sugar pie, poutine, Tim Horton doughnuts, and Niagara Peninsula wine, but loves steak-frites, côtes du Rhône, and boudin noir. Although Sam is not a French citizen, we might say that he is as good as French or for all intents and purposes he is French. There is a distinction to be made between being a French citizen, which Sam is not and being culturally French, which Sam is. This example does not show that Sam is French just because he thinks that he is. He has many characteristics that apply to those who clearly are French. He 5
speaks the language without an accent, knows French history, was raised in a typical French family in France, has values that are typically French, and loves French food and wine. Rather what it illustrates is that it is sometimes difficult to determine the criterion under which someone has a property, in this case the property of being French. 5 A person can believe that a property is part of his identity. Let us call this belief his self-conception. It is his take on himself; it is who or what he believes himself to be. In addition, he might have beliefs about the nature of the properties that make up his self-conception. Let us call these beliefs his conception of his identity properties. It is his take on the nature of the properties that he ascribes to himself. A person can be mistaken about his identity and about the properties that constitute his identity. (Burge, 1979). Let us return to Sam who is a Canadian citizen and suppose that now he knows that he is a Canadian citizen and has reconciled himself with being Canadian. He identifies himself as such and takes it to be part of his identity. Sam also identifies with other Canadians and with Canada. 6 Moreover, he believes that he knows what makes him Canadian and different from, say, Americans. He might think that Canadians give more to charity than Americans and have attitudes that make them kinder and gentler than Americans. He has a mistaken conception of what it is to be Canadian, since 5 Ian Kerr was helpful with this point. 6 It does not follow from Sam s taking his being Canadian to be part of his identity that he identifies with other Canadians or with Canada. He might regard his being Canadian as being a source of selfunderstanding. Despite this, he might be indifferent to other Canadians and to what they achieve or at what they fail. 6
Americans are more charitable than Canadians and in surveys of attitudes that are connected to being kind and general, there is no difference between Canadians and Americans. A person s self-conception about what constitutes his identity can also be mistaken. Someone might think that a property applies to him when it does not. Sally considers herself to be a writer and takes being a writer to be part of her identity. Thus, being a writer is part of her self-conception. However, since she is not a writer, being a writer is not part of her identity and thus, her belief about her identity, her selfconception, is mistaken. That we can be mistaken about our conception of a property that we take to be part of our identity does not mean that in every case there is or even can be a settled account of the nature of these properties. What constitutes being a good teacher, for example, which someone can take to be part of his identity, is something that is open to discussion and about which there can be a good deal of disagreement. Moreover, there might be teaching techniques for which there are no ways to determine whether they are conducive to learning. In addition, there might be disagreements about the goals of education to which teaching is supposed to be conducive. A change in the goals can lead to a change in the views about what constitutes good teaching. It also might be the case that when all the sides have been fully heard, there is no way to choose among the various ends that teaching is supposed to serve. In turn, this would mean that there would not be a settled account of what constitutes being a good teacher, a property that someone might take to be part of his identity. What applies to the property of being a good teacher applies with more force to such properties as being French or Canadian. There is a great deal of disagreement about 7
what constitutes being a Canadian. I have heard some say that it is part of their identity as a Canadian that Canada has socialized medicine or that it has a national railway. Thus, they regard changing the medical system by bringing in elements of private health care or closing down railroad lines as having negative effects on their identities. The point is that there is open endness in the nature of the properties that we regard as constituting identities. Their nature is worked out in social, cultural, and political discussions, about which there can be a great deal of disagreement, disagreements that might never be resolved and that might even be impossible to resolve. The conceptions that we have about the properties that we regard to be part of our identities can be the result of our deferring to others about the natures of these properties. I might not know what constitutes being a good teacher that I take to be part of my identity, but I might defer to someone whom I regard to be a more experienced teacher than I am and whom I take to know more about what constitutes being a good teacher. This also carries over to properties like being a Canadian or French about which people might defer to political or cultural figures to articulate for them what constitutes being Canadian or French. 7 For example, someone, who is Canadian and identifies himself as such, might come to believe that Canadians are kinder, gentler, and more charitable than Americans, because a political leader has articulated that these are characteristics that Canadians have and Americans lack. He might then come to believe that these characteristics are what makes Canadians, Canadian, and what marks them as different from Americans. These characteristics 7 It is notorious that political figures have used people s attachments to certain national identities to manipulate them to their own ends and lead them to act in ways that might not be in their own interest. 8
then becomes part of what the person regards to be part of the nature of being Canadian and thus, become what he believes to be constituents of his identity. Often, we acquire our identities in the way that we acquire a language, at home with our parents. In doing so, we acquire a range of cognitive states, including beliefs, fears, hopes, ambitions, etc. We learn our history and our myths; who are our friends and enemies; what are our values, etc. However, some of what we learn that is part of our identities is non-conceptual. We learn how to eat, how to behave towards others and talk to them in the ways required, how to hold our bodies, etc. We acquire a sense of the distance to keep from others when talking to them; we acquire facial expressions and learn their contextual appropriateness; we learn what are and are not appropriate conversational gestures, etc. I have claimed that for a characteristic to be part of someone s identity, he must think that being that way has a certain kind of importance for his life. It cannot however be any sort of importance. Suppose that Sam is a rock climber, something that he does every couple of months in season, that he enjoys doing, and from which he has a sense of accomplishment when he does it well. It is thus of some importance to him. This, however, is not enough for being a rock climber to part of Sam's identity. For it to play this role, it must be an important part of his life. It must be something he regards as giving a direction or meaning to his life. We can imagine that it is a consuming passion for him, which occupies a great deal of this time. Moreover, it fills his thoughts, conversations, and even his dreams; it gives direction to and values for his life. In addition, it gives value to his life; it makes his life worth living and it might 9
be something for which he is willing to die. If rock climbing had this sort of importance in his life, it would be part of his identity. There are various non-exclusive ways in which a person can believe his identity is important for his life. It can yield what he believes are values for the way he lives his life; it can give him what he regards to be of value for his life and/or it can provide ways that he thinks give him an understanding of his behaviour and attitudes. Suppose that Al is a butcher, but it is not important to him; it is no more than a job to which he has no particular attachment. When he thinks about his job, he wishes he were doing something other than being a butcher. Al identifies himself as a butcher and is aware that he is. His being a butcher even answers for him a question about what he is, but being a butcher is not part of his identity. What must be added for it to become part of his identity is for him to think of his job as being important for his life in that it is part of what informs and provides values for and/or value to his life. That is, being a butcher would be part of Al's identity, if he were to adopt the values and behaviour that would make him a good butcher. In addition, were Al to think that he were a good butcher, it could provide part of what he thinks gives value to his life. He could take pride in his work, which in turn would increase his self-esteem (Copp, 2002). Thus, for Al s being a butcher to be part of his identity it must be something of importance for him, a condition that could be meet if being a butcher provided Al with values that governed his behaviour or with something that he thinks provides value for his life. A person s identity can also yield negative value for his life. Someone can have a property that he takes to be part of his identity, but rather than finding positive value 10
in the property, he might wish that he did not have the property. Suppose that Fred was an alcoholic and that in his society alcoholics were despised. They were thought to be weak and of bad character. Fred, however, takes it to be part of his identity, since it is central to his life; his life is filled with thinking about alcohol and consuming it. Because it is despised in Fred s society, he feels ashamed about being an alcoholic and tries to hide it from others. Rather than provide him with feelings of self-esteem, it yields for him feelings of self-loathing. The characteristic which a person has might not give rise to values, which inform his life or provide something for his life that he regards of value, but might give him what he regards as a way to understand his life. Consider Fred again, who is an alcoholic and identifies himself as such. In doing so, he might regard it as one of his central attributes that he thinks provides him a way to understand himself. His presumed understanding arises through his belief that alcoholics have certain traits that he thinks are causally connected to behaviour and attitudes. Thus, Fred s identity might not give rise to values that direct him in living his life or something that he regards of value, but it might lead him to think that he understands why he lives the sort of life that he does. It might be thought that a person s identity does not just give rise to what he thinks is of value for his life or what he regards to be a way of understanding his life, but gives what is of value for his life and a way of understanding for him to understand it. The reason for the qualifications about values and understanding is that the person might be mistaken about the nature of his identity. Take Fred whose identity is being an alcoholic and whose understanding is presumed. The reason is that Fred might be 11
mistaken about the traits that he connects with alcoholics. He might think that they are more open to expressing their emotions; that they are healthier than non-alcoholics; that they can stop drinking whenever they wish; etc. Or consider Sam who thinks that it is of value for him to be Canadian, because he believes that Canadians are more generous, kinder, and gentler than Americans, about which he is mistaken. Even if the person is mistaken about the nature of the property that constitutes his identity, it can give rise not only to what he thinks are values, but are in fact values for the way he should live his life, although these values will not be well-grounded. There are differences in the roles that a person s identity plays in his life depending on what sort of importance he believes it plays for him. Take Fred s identifying himself as an alcoholic, a characteristic that he thinks explains much of his behaviour and attitudes. It is possible for Fred to take his being an alcoholic as part of his identity without identifying with other alcoholics, 8 without feeling pride or shame in what they do. 9 It is similar with Al who identifies himself as a butcher. He need not identify with other butchers and be concerned about what they do. This contrasts with Sam who identifies himself as a Canadian and identifies with other Canadians. In so identifying with the group, Sam feels pride in the accomplishments of members of the group and shame in their failings. There is also a difference between Fred and Al in the role that their identities play in their lives. In taking being a butcher as part of his identity, Al commits himself to acting in the ways required to fill the role. This does 8 There is a difference between identifying with a group and identifying oneself as being a member of the group. Clearly, I can identify with the oppressed without identifying myself as being part of this group and I can identify myself as being an alcoholic without identifying myself with alcoholics. 9 Alcoholics who join Alcoholics Anonymous can feel pride and shame in what other alcoholics do. But I am not imagining Fred to be a member of AA. 12
not apply to being an alcoholic, since it is not a role and there is no proper way of being an alcoholic. 10 The sorts of characteristics that people identify themselves as having are often characteristics that make them part of a group. In thinking of himself as being a Canadian, Sam would identify himself as being part of a group of people, Canadians. 11 As well, in identifying himself as a Canadian, he might identify himself with Canadians and with Canada. 12 Identifying himself as part of a group can provide Sam with what he thinks is a way of understanding himself. He might offer as an explanation for why he has certain beliefs or attitudes that he is a Canadian and this is what Canadians believe or the way that they behave. 13 In addition, his identification with Canadians and Canada can be connected to values, which he takes to be 10 This might however apply to identifying oneself as being part of group. Identifying with a group might be connected with notions about how someone who belongs to the group ought to behaviour. It is claimed that there is a right way to be French or American. 11 The people who constitute the group with whom one identifies cut across history. One identifies with those who have gone before, those who are currently members of the group, and those who will become members of the group. 12 It is not necessary that if someone identifies with a group, which is connected to a country, he automatically identifies with the country. I might identify myself with Canadians without identifying myself with the country. I might think that of myself as a Canadian, since I think that I share important characteristics with other Canadians, which explains my behaviour, but not identify with the country, since I might not value its culture, institutions, or history. 13 This kind of explanation is supposed to contrast with explanations that are individualistic. Why do you do that, someone might ask. I might say that my reason for doing it is that I enjoy doing it or it is a habit I picked up when I was in grade school. This contrasts with an explanation that appeals to belonging to a group. Why did you say 'bonjour' when you entered the store? I did it, because I am French and saying 'bonjour' on entering a store is what we, French, take to be polite behaviour. I have what I take to be an explanation that I think provides me with an understanding of my behaviour. As with the alcoholic example, the understanding proceeds by the subject s connecting certain traits that he believes applies to members of the group with which he identifies and believes applies to him as well, since he is a member of the group. 13
important for his life. He might think that what are central to Canada are its democratic and liberal values. 14 Hence, in identifying with Canada, he identifies with these values. 15 It thereby gives him ways in which he thinks that he ought to act that flow from what he thinks is intrinsic to Canada. Sam s being part of a group and taking himself to be part of a group can also provide him with something that he finds of value as well as yielding for him values for how he should live his life. He might take pride in being a Canadian because he thinks that some of the things that Canada and its citizens have achieved are praiseworthy. For example, he might believe that its soldiers played heroic roles in the First and Second World Wars and that it is a decent and open society that respects human and civil rights. Since he is a Canadian and identifies with other Canadians and Canada, he can take pride in these sorts of accomplishments. Another source of value for Sam might come from his believing that others accept him as being part of the group, as being one of them. The value for him, then, is his sense that he is not alone in the world, but is part of a group the members of which recognize him as belonging to it. That a person's identifying with a group provides him with something that he regards to be of value does not mean that it is a source of moral value. Someone can take pride in being a member of a certain race and think that this race is superior to others, something that we justifiably regard as not being morally acceptable. 14 Countries do not have essences. It is perfectly possible for Canada to become non-democratic and illiberal. Therefore, it does not follow that if one identifies with Canada that one automatically identifies with democratic and liberal values. 15 Of course, the converse can be true. Sam might have democratic and liberal values that he takes to be universal and because of that, identify with Canada, which is democratic and liberal. He might take his distance from the country, were it to become non-democratic and illiberal. 14
Is it necessary that everyone have an identity? It is obvious that no one escapes having characteristics, since everyone falls under any number of categories. Unless someone is severally handicapped or very young, he would recognize that he has some of the characteristics that apply to him. But what is not necessary is for everyone to take these characteristics to be part of their identities and to provide a meaning for their lives either as a source of values, of something of value and/or of self-understanding. I might well be Canadian, Jewish, and a butcher and think of myself as having these characteristics, but I might be indifferent to them. I might wish that I had been French and think that Canada and things Canadian are of little or no value; I might think that religion is bunk and superstition; and I might regard my being a butcher as a job, something that I would rather not do, but which I do just to make a living. It could be argued that this does not show that I do not have an identity. Someone could claim that no one lives his life without meaning, without values, and without some sort of self-understanding from his point of view. This, however, leaves out of consideration people who are skeptics about values, find little to value in life, and think that all attempts at self-understanding are juvenile narcissism. They would dismiss out of hand any kind of identification with a group, no matter what were the values connected to the group or what was the value of belonging to the group. Thus, it would seem that it is not necessary that everyone have an identity of the sort that is being considered here. Let us turn to the notion of identity from the second person point of view. Others assign to us identities for various purposes, including explanations of our behavior and evaluations of our character. The question is whether the second person point of 15
view can get by with our self-conceptions rather than out identities. Unlike identity, self-conception does not require truth; someone can have a conception of himself in thinking that he has a property, which he takes to be part of his identity without its being the case that he has the property. It might be argued that self-conceptions will do from the second person point of view, since it people s beliefs about themselves that enables us to explain their behavior. We do not need the beliefs to be true. Let us consider Sally again. She believes that she is a writer, but since she is not a writer, being a writer is part of her self-conception, but not her identity. Could then we explain her behavior by appealing to her belief without evaluating the belief as to its truth? Sally s belief would lead us to expect that she writes and publishes or at least attempts to publish what she writes, neither of which she does. Hence, Sally s selfconception cannot explain her behavior, but her identity could explain her behavior. Let us change the story and suppose that she is a writer and identifies herself as such. It is this, the property of being a writer, which enables us to explain her behavior. It enables us to explain why she engages in the activities that she does, writing novels, sending them off to publishers, revising them when they are rejected, having an editor read what she has written, etcetera. We might say that she does these things because she is a writer and these are the sorts of things that writers do. Hence, self-conceptions that do not constitute identities cannot explain why Sally, the would-be writer, does not write. What about the evaluations that we make of people s characters? Can we make do with their self-conceptions rather than their identities? Suppose Fred thinks that he is an alcoholic, but he is not. Suppose further that Sam takes Fred s self-conception at face value and accordingly evaluates Sam as being weak willed. Fred reasons that 16
since Sam identifies himself as an alcoholic and does not do anything to change his condition, he does not have a very strong character. Since Fred s self-conception is mistaken, Sam s evaluation of him is mistaken. Appealing to his identity however does give Sam a way of accurately evaluating Fred s character. If it is part of Fred s identity that he is an alcoholic, then Sam s evaluation of him would not be off the mark. 16 Hence, the second person point of view is parasitic on the first person point of view. Although from the second person point of view, it is necessary that we know what property constitutes a person s identity for us to have an explanation of their behavior or an evaluation of their character, it is not sufficient. The reason is that even though what we might be correct about what property is involved, we might be mistaken about the nature of the property. We might for example correctly identify Fred as having as his identity being an alcoholic, but be mistaken about the nature of the property. Like Fred, we might think that alcoholics are more open to expressing their emotions; that they are healthier than non-alcoholics; that they can stop drinking whenever they wish; etc. For this reason, we might give an incorrect explanation of his behaviour or evaluation of his character, even though we have correctly identified the property that constitutes his identity. 16 I take it that it is a necessary condition for a property to provide an explanation for an event or a grounding for an evaluation for an object it must be true of the object. Consider being the property of being geocentric, a property that places the earth at the centre of the solar system and that the solar system does not have. This property, not possessed by the solar system, cannot explain the movement of the planets, for example. 17
It is a common practice to attribute to others identities and then use those identities in explaining their behavior and evaluating their character. This however does not provide a reason for taking the notion of identity seriously. It might be argued that the notion of identity does not have any standing in the human sciences, since it does not occur in psychological or social scientific explanations of human behavior and for this reason it should not be taken to be a notion that should belong to our understanding and evaluation of humankind. There is one area, normative political theory, in which the notion of identity has standing (Kymlicka, 1995 and Seymour, 1999). People take their identities to be something of great importance to them; it gives for them values for their lives, value to their lives and/or ways they think provide for selfunderstanding. More importantly, it is claimed that since people find their identities of such value, political theory must find a place for them in the political order and bestow on them political value. Such claims make no senses unless the notion of identity is taken seriously. Political theory and morality make use of concepts that have no place in a scientific view of humankind, but this does not show that these concepts are illegitimate. We cannot do without such notions as rights, obligation, duty, responsibility, etc. and perhaps the notion of identity has its place among these notions. This is not to argue that identity has a rightful place within the political or moral sphere. It is only to claim that its not being a notion that has a place within the sciences of humankind does not show that it should not have its place within political and moral theories, theories that we cannot do without. This still leaves open the question whether the notion of identity ought to have a place within our moral and political theories, but this is a subject for another time. 18
References Appiah, K. Anthony (2001). Identity, authenticity, survival: multicultural societies and social reproduction. In A. Guttman and C. Taylor (eds.), Multiculturalism. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Tyler Burge (1979) Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4, 73-121 Copp, David (2002). Social unity and the identity of persons. Journal of Political Philosophy 4: 365-391. Kymlicka, Will (1995). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Seymour, Michel (1999). La nation en question. (Montréal: Hexagone). Tamir, Yael (1993). Liberal Nationalism. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 19