TWO TREATISES OF PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR; the former consisting of ten doubts concerning providence, nd solution of those doubts; nd the ltter contining development of the nture of evil. TRANSLATED FROM THE EDITION OF THESE WORKS BY VICTOR COUSIN, professor of philosophy in the university of pris, BY THOMAS TAYLOR, TRANSLATOR OF PLATO, ARISTOTLE, ETC. ETC. " Who finds not Providence ll-good nd wise, Alike in wht it gives, nd wht denies?" " All prtil ill is universl good." " One truth is cler; whtever is, is right" Pope's Essy on Mn. LONDON: printed for the trnsltor; AND SOLD BY WILLIAM PICKERING, CHANCERY LANE.
PRINTED BY RICHARD TAYLOR, RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET. 23762X TO CHARLES ATTWOOD, Esq., THIS WORK IS INSCRIBED, AS A TESTIMONY OF VERY GREAT ESTEEM FOR HIS TALENTS AND WORTH, AND PARTICULARLY FOR HIS ADMIRATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO ; AND AS A MOST GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE KINDNESS WHICH HE HAS SO MUNIFICENTLY AND SO DISINTERESTEDLY SHOWN TO THE TRANSLATOR.
PREFACE. NO subjects of discussion re perhps more interesting or more importnt thn those of which the present volume consists. For wht cn more demnd our most serious ttention, or wht cn be more essentil to the well-being of our immortl prt, thn scientific elucidtion nd defense of the mysterious wys of Providence, nd development of the nture of Evil? For s Divinity is goodness itself, it is requisite tht ll the dispenstions of his providence should be beneficent, nd tht perfect evil should hve no rel existence in the nture of things. Tht this is necessry, is demonstrted by Proclus in the following Tretises with his usul cuteness nd eloquence, by rguments which re no less dmirble for their perspicuity, thn invincible from their strength. In prise of Proclus, I hve sid so much in most of my other numerous works, tht I shll only summrily observe t present respecting this coryphen philosopher, tht his disciple Mrinus sys in his Life of him, "tht he ws wise in most trnscendent degree"; nd tht Ammonius Hermis clls him his divine preceptor, nd sys " tht he vi PREFACE, possessed the power of unfolding the opinions of the ncients, nd scientific judgement of the nture of things, in the highest perfection possible to mn". And with respect to his eloquence, his before-mentioned disciple Mrinus sys, " tht he did not pper to be without divine inspirtion, for he produced from his wise mouth words similr to
the most thick-flling snow b ; so tht his eyes emitted bright rdince, nd the rest of his countennce prticipted of divine illumintion" c. Among the moderns lso, the sgcious Kepler, fter hving mde long extrct from the first book of the Commentries of Proclus on Euclid, sys of him, " His lnguge flows like torrent, inundting its bnks, nd hiding the drk fords nd whirlpools of doubts, while his mind, full of the mjesty of things of such mgnitude, struggles in the strits of lnguge, nd the conclusion never stisfying him, exceeds by the copi of words, the simplicity of the propositions" d. Dr. Brrow lso, Amnion, in Aristot. De Interprettione. b Alluding to wht Homer sys of the eloquence of Ulysses, in the third book of the Ilid, v. 222. c Mrini Proclus, cp. 23. d " Ortio fluit ipsi torrentis instr, rips inundns, et cec dubittionum vd gurgitesque occultns, dum mens, plen mjesttis tntrum rerum, lucttur in ugustiis lingue, et conclusio nun-qum sibi ipsi verborum copi stisfciens, propositionum simplicittem excedit." Vid. Hrmonices Mundi, lib. iv. p. 118. PREFACE. Vll in his Mthemticl Lectures (p. 8.), quotes Proclus's eulogy of point, nd sys tht it is mgnificently written. And lstly, the uthor of the Pursuits of Literture clls Proclus, lluding to his diction, " the nimted rivl of Plto." With respect to Morbek, the uthor of the Ltin version from which the following trnsltion ws mde, the Greek originl being unfortuntely lost, nothing more is known of him thn tht he ws Archbishop of Corinth in the thirteenth century, nd tht the version of the former of these tretises ws completed by him in the yer 1280, on the 4th dy of
Februry. His version lso of the very dmirble tretise of Proclus on Providence nd Fte, ws first published entire by Fbricius in the eighth volume of his Bibliothec Grec, nd fterwrds, together with his Ltin version of the two following tretises, by Victor Cousin, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Pris, 8vo, 1820. To this gentlemn, who, s well s myself, is n rdent dmirer of the philosophy of Plto, the public re indebted for excellent editions of the Commentries of Proclus on the First Alcibides, nd on the Prmenides of Plto b. I shll only further observe, tht in the following Of this tretise I hve given trnsltion, which the reder will find ner the end of my trnsltion of Proclus on the Theology of Plto. b This justly celebrted mn hs done me the honour to correspond with me, nd hs spoken in the most hndsome mnner of my Pltonic publictions. viii PREFACE. trnsltion I hve endevoured to give the ccurte mening of Proclus, nd to preserve s much of his mnner s is possible, from n originl which, s Fbricius justly observes, is " ll but brbrous " ; nd tht the reder will find in these Tretises demonstrtion of those gret Pltonic dogms which Pope hs so elegntly celebrted in his Essy on Mn, but without ttempting to prove tht they re true. The dogms I llude to re the following: Tht " there must be somewhere, such rnk s Mn " b ; tht " ll prtil evil is universl good"; nd tht " whtever is, is right." Hence Proclus proves by incontrovertible rguments, tht evil hs no rel existence, but hs only shdowy subsistence, nd tht Divinity
conceled it in the utility of good. " Versio incult fteor, et tnlum non brbr, sed ex qu Grece lingue et Philosophis Pltonice peritis pulchrs sententis uctoris perspicere, nec difficile ut confido erit, nec injucundum." b Pope lso sys of mn, in the bove-mentioned philosophicl poem, with no less ccurcy thn elegnce, tht he is, " Plc'd on this isthmus of middle stte, A being drkly wise nd rudely gret." Epist, II. For mn is situted between beings tht eternlly bide in- the possession of rel good, such s divine ntures, nd those tht perpetully prticipte only of pprent good, such s brutes. Hence, rnking in the lst order of rtionl essences, his wisdom my justly be sid to be drk, nd his gretness rude. [1] TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE, &c. The gret Plto, in the tenth book of his Lws, compels us, by dmntine rguments, s it were, to confess tht Providence hs n existence; nd lso elsewhere in mny plces, s in the Timeus, he shows tht the Demiurgus hs elborted the fbriction of things, by his providentil energies, s fr s to the lst portion of intelligence, nd this he likewise clerly sserts. But it is requisite tht we should be persuded by wht Plto hs demonstrted, nd by the most efficcious ttesttions given by the [Chlden] orcles to the demonstrtions of Plto. For I conceive tht this trdition of the orcles to the worthy
uditors of the Gods, is most mnifest demonstrtion of the existence of Providence, in nswer to whtever In the version of Morbek ostendes; for which it is necessry to red ostendens. [2] opposes it ccording to the conceptions of the multitude, nd is sufficient to repel the phntsms which prevent them from believing tht ll things subsist conformbly to the will of Providence, nd to led them from bse grrulity on this subject, to the truth of things. And we sy this, not s if we thought tht wht hs been written on this subject by those prior to us is not worthy of gret ttention, but becuse the soul, though these things hve been the occsion of doubt, nd hve been distinctly considered thousnd times, yet desires to her nd spek concerning them, to revolve them, nd, s it were, discuss them in herself, nd is not willing to receive informtion lone bout them from others. Let us, therefore, interrogte ourselves, nd doubting, in the secret recesses of the soul, endevour to exercise ourselves in the solution of doubts, considering it s of no consequence whether we discuss, or whether we do not, wht hs been sid by those prior to us; since s long s we deliver wht we re persuded is truth, we shll pper to ssert nd to write our own conceptions on this subject. To which my be dded, tht we shll hve Hermes for our common leder, who is sid to insert nticiptions of common conceptions in every soul. 1. And prior to everything else, let us investigte whether Providence extends to ll things, to The ltter prt of this sentence in the version of Morbek is, " et non solum de foris recipere de his sermories nolente." But for nolente I red volente.
[3] wholes nd prts, nd to the most individul things in the hevens, nd under the hevens, to eternl nd corruptible ntures. But it is requisite tht Providence should either know the desert of the things for which it provides, or tht it should not led ll things ccording to their desert, in consequence of being ignornt of their worth. We must lso investigte the mnner in which Providence knows ll things, both wholes nd prts, nd corruptible nd eternl ntures, nd wht the chrcteristic is of its knowledge. And if we re ble to pprehend this, fterwrds something else, nd gin nother thing will become the subject of doubt. Considering therefore this in the first plce, nd invoking the common leder, Hermes, we must sy tht with respect to knowledge, one kind is con-nscent with irrtionlity, nd is clled sense or phntsy; it lso pertins to things of prtil nture, nd which re not externl to body, nd therefore mnifests tht the cognitions themselves re directed to prtil essences. But nother kind of knowledge is essentilly inherent in the rtionl life, nd is clled opinion nd science; differing indeed from irrtionl cognitions in this, tht it knows universls, they, s we hve sid, hving perception of prtil qulities lone. These two kinds of rtionl knowledge likewise differ from ech other, becuse the one, viz. opinion, is the knowledge of mutble ntures; but the other, viz. science, is the knowledge of things permnently [4] immutble. Prior to these, however, there is nother knowledge, which is denominted intellectul ; of which one kind pprehends ll things t once nd simply, but the other is knowledge, not of ll things t once, but of one thing t time*. And in this they differ, one being the knowledge of n intellect in every
respect perfect, but the other being the knowledge of prtil intellects; ll intellectul essences indeed understnding ll things, nd in this trnscending rtionl cognitions; but one intellect hving totl subsistence, nd intellectully perceiving ll things totlly; but nother pprehending ll things prtilly, becuse being itself prtil, its intellections re lso of prtil nture. Beyond ll these, however, is the knowledge of Providence, which is bove intellect, nd exists in the one lone, ccording to which every God is es-sentilized, nd is sid to ttend providentilly to ll things, estblishing himself in n energy prior to intellectul perception. By this one, therefore, ccording to which lso he subsists, he knows ll things. For if we dmit tht other cognitions necessrily remin connscent with the essences to which they pertin, s, for instnce, phntsy nd sense, which, being irrtionl, belong to the irrtionl life, nd likewise the cognitions prior to these, which re rtionl, s pertining to rtionl souls, nd the intellectul to intellectul essences, it would be bsurd not to dmit, tht the cogni And such is the knowledge of our intellect. [5] tions of the Gods, so fr s they re Gods, re defined ccording to n hyprxis which is trnscendency one, since from common conceptions we think tht divinity is something better thn intellect, nd tht the knowledge of everything is conformble to wht the thing is. If, therefore, Providence subsists ccording to the one, nd is tht which imprts good to ll things, nd the good is the sme with the one b, through being which it provides for ll things, in this one it likewise knows the things which
re the subjects of its providentil energies. By the one, therefore, it possesses the power of knowing ll things. To this one, however, there is no greter knowledge of wholes thn of prts; of things which re ccording to nture, thn of such s re preternturl; of species, thn of things which re without species. For s of ll sensible things, it is necessry tht there should be some imprtible orgn which forms judgement of them, nd likewise of the forms prior to sensibles, tht there should be nother judiciry orgn by which they re perceived; since if the judiciry orgn ws divisible, nd by one prt of itself perceived one thing, nd by nother prt of itself nother thing, it would be just the sme s if I should perceive this thing, but you tht; thus Hyprxis signifies the summit of the essence of thing, nd is tht ccording to which tht thing principlly subsists. b The good, ccording to Plto, is the sme with the one. For in his Republic, he celebrtes the principle of ll things by the former of these ppelltions, nd in the Prmenides by the ltter. [6] lso it is requisite tht there should be something prior to forms, which hs one knowledge both of universls nd individuls; or fter wht mnner could it rrnge them, these indeed s" prticipnts, but those s things prticipted? To these, however, there is nothing else common thn unity. Prior therefore to forms, there is something gnostic, which knows ll things so fr s they re one. But it is evident tht this which knows ccording to the one, knows so fr s the similr is known by the similr, I men so fr s tht which proceeds from cuse is known by its cuse. For every where, nd in ll these, there is the one. And, indeed, every being, of whtever kind it my be, does not subsist universlly; since tht which exists ccording
to prt, is different from tht which exists s whole. Nor is everything species [or form], since there is something else which is not species; nor is everything ccording to nture, since there is lso tht which is preternturl. But every- thing which cn be conceived, whtever it my be, is one, in consequence of the one existing bove ll things. If, however, there is nything which does not prticipte of the one, neither will it wholly prticipte of being, nor will it be ble to prticipte of Providence. If, therefore, nothing escpes the one, tht which knows ll things from itself, will possess this knowledge through trnscendency i. e. Whole does not subsist universlly, becuse some things re prts; or in other words, everything is not whole, becuse prt, so fr s it is prt, is not whole. [7] of union ; since it will know ll things either by the one, or by tht which is not the one. This ltter mode of knowledge, however, is of subordinte nture, nd foreign from tht of the one. By the one, therefore, Providence knows everything which is in ny respect whtever one. For unity is common to ll things, both to beings, nd to non-beings. [Hence Providence, s we hve sid, being defined ccording to the one nd the good, nd the good being prior to intellect (for intellect spires fter the good, since this is the object of desire to ll beings, but the good does not spire fter intellect,) this being the cse, it is necessry tht providentil should be superior to intellectul knowledge ; nd in consequence of this, tht Providence should know ll things by its own one, through which it benefits ll things, the intellectul nd the non-intellectul, the vitl nd the non-vitl, beings nd non-beings, inserting in ll things, the one, s representtion of its own one b.] For the
In Morbek's version " uniliter". But this in the originl ws doubtless eniios, ((Greek deleted, ed.)), ccording to trnscendency of union. b The originl of the prt within the brckets is to be found in Philoponus contr Procl. de Mundi ieternitte, nd. is s follows : (Greek deleted, ed.) * This ddition, which is obviously necessry, is corroborted by the version of Morbek, which hs in this plce " et non intelligenti et viventi," &c. one of it is not like n individul one. For this is the lst of beings, nd is inferior to tht which is universl, through the prticiption of which it is tht which it is. The one of Providence, however, is more excellent thn tht which is universl: for the universl is certin one, but is not the one itself; becuse it is mny things, nd not one lone, in consequence of possessing the differences of the things which it contins. But neither is the one ccording to which Providence exists such s whole; for this indeed is prtible; but tht s being truly one, is lso truly imprtible. [In short, therefore, since we ssert tht this one of Providence is productive of ll things, we must lso cknowledge tht it is the sviour of ll things; hving n hyprxis more true thn ll essence, nd more mnifest thn ll knowledge; not being distributed into prts together with things which re the objects of its knowledge, nor moved bout them, since these re the peculirities of psychicl nd intellectul knowledge. For every intellect is one mny, both in its being nd its intellectul perception; nd every soul, since it is essentilized in motion, perceives intellectully in conjunction with motion. But the one of Providence biding in the one, is t the sme time immutble nd indivisible, nd knows ll things in wy which is eternlly the sme. Nor does it know mn lone, nd sun, nd everything else of this
kind, but lso every prticulr thing. For nothing escpes tht one, whether you spek of the being of thing, or [9] i. e. Pertining to soul. consider it s n object of knowledge.] And it is sid indeed, nd is rightly sid, tht the whole circle exists centrlly in the centre, since the centre is the cuse, but the circle the thing cused; nd for the sme reson every number subsists mondiclly in the mond. All things, however, exist in the one of Providence in fr superior mnner, since it is in much more trnscendent degree one thn centre nd the mond. As, therefore, if the centre hd knowledge of the circle, it would hve centrl knowledge of it, s it likewise hs centrl hypostsis, nd would not distribute itself into prts with the prts of the circle; [thus lso the trnscendently united knowledge of Providence, is knowledge of ll divisible essences in the sme imprtible nture, nd of ech of the most individul nd most totl things; nd s it gve subsistence to everything ccording to the one, so like The following is the originl of the prt within the brckets, nd is to be lone found in the before-cited work of Philoponus : (Greek deleted, ed.) [10] wise by the one it knows everything ]. And neither is its knowledge divided with the things known; nor re the things tht re known confounded on ccount of the profound union of knowledge. This knowledge, however, being one, comprehends indeed ll the infinity of the objects of knowledge, but is trnscendently united bove ll the union tht is in them. Such, therefore, is the nswer to the first of the doubts concerning Providence. 2. If you re willing, however, we will direct
our ttention to second object of inquiry. We sy, then, tht Providence knows things of contingent nture; nd by the ncients the profundity of this doubt hs been sufficiently estblished: for on ccount of this profundity, some of them, dmitting the existence of Providence, hve tken wy from beings the nture of wht is contingent; but others, not t ll contrdicting the evidence which presents itself for the subsistence of contingent events, hve denied tht Providence extends s fr s to these. Both these, however, pre-ssume rightly tht Providence exists, tht the thing known is definite to the gnostic nture, nd tht the indefiniteness of tht which is known rises This prt lso within the brckets, is to be found in the before-cited work of Philoponus, nd the originl of it is s follows : (Greek deleted, ed.) [11] from its own nture. We however sy, tht Providence knows the whole of this, in consequence of possessing definite knowledge of the indefinite, the indefiniteness being bout to be, but not ctully existing, nd knowledge ntecedently comprehending the cuse of tht which is indefinite. For Providence knows tht something indefinite will tke plce, nd looking to the cuse of this, it knows the indefinite thing; nd s it gve subsistence to, so likewise it knows the indefinite, not by the indefinite, but s it produced the indefinite by the definite: in like mnner it knows the indefinite definitely, just s it knows incorporelly nd without intervl, tht which is distended into bulk nd is corporel. And if, indeed, the reson [or productive principle] which is in seed, being one nd wholly in ech prt of the seed, nd possessing the cuse of the seed, should know tht there would be seprtion of its productive power from itself, existing indeed s the cuse of distribution into prts to tht
which is posterior to itself, but being itself imprtible; in this cse, it would sy, I possess the whole of this prtibility imprtibly; not existing seprtely from either, but contining tht which is subordinte in tht which is more excellent; so tht neither is the distribution without cuse, nor does it preexist in the cuse [distri It ppers to me tht in this plce, immeditely fter the. words in Morbek's version, "et to indetermintum esse propter illius nturm," it is requisite to dd, Dicimus tmen ut Providenti, &c. For in wht follows, Proclus gives his own opinion, nd not tht of the ncients. [12] butedly], but it subsists there ccording to cuse, nd in its prticipnts, ccording to hyprxis. And if, indeed, it should investigte the cuse of tht prtition, it would find it in itself, becuse in itself it is imprtible; but when it becomes situted in nother subject, nd not in itself, it is the source to them of distribution into prts, in consequence of which ech of the prts is not everywhere. After this mnner therefore we sy, tht Providence being the cuse of ll things, knows the things of which it is the cuse, hs definite knowledge both of tht which is definite nd of tht which is indefinite, nd gives genertion to things which will hve n indefinite subsistence. Nor does nything impossible hppen on ccount of this, [the indefiniteness existing in things posterior to Providence,] in whose knowledge they re ntecedently comprehended, nd in such wy s is dpted to cuses. But this is now mnifest. 3. In the third plce, the doubt consequent to this deserves to be considered, since it likewise requires much ttention; viz. if Providence is the cuse both of things definite nd indefinite, whether it is the cuse of both these ccording to one nd the sme thing, or ccording to
different things. For if ccording to the sme thing, how cn it perceive in its knowledge, tht this thing which is pro This prt within the brckets is in the version of Morbek, " in determintione in iis que post ipsm existente." But for in determintione, it is necessry to red indetermintione, conformbly to the bove trnsltion. [13] duced by it will be definite,: but tht indefinite? But if ccording to different things, how will it ny longer remin one in hyprxis, if this thing which pertins to it is one thing, but tht nother? Invoking, therefore, Divinity to illuminte the reson which perfects our conceptions on this subject, we must sy to ourselves, tht Providence is estblished in the one [nd this is the sme with the good]. For everything which is of providentil nture, if we believe in common conceptions, lwys procures some rel or some pprent good for the objects of its providentil cre; nor is providentil nything else thn beneficent energy. But we hve before observed, tht to imprt good is the sme thing s to imprt unity, becuse the one is good, nd the good is one; nd this hs been ten thousnd times sserted. We sy, therefore, tht Providence is chrcterized by the one, or, which is the sme thing, by the good. The one of it, however, s we hve before observed, is neither such s mteril one, -for this is inefficcious nd unprolific, becuse fter mtter there is nothing, but the one of Providence is prolific nd most efficcious, becuse ll things re posterior to Providence. Nor is it one s tht which is n individul; for this presents itself to the view in the lst division of things, nd is one in such wy s to be none of other things. But Providence is one s contining ll things, s present to ll things of which it is the cuse,
nd s the slvtion of ll things; [not fter the sme mnner s the universl which subsists in opinion, nd [14] which some ssert to be the one ;] for this, indeed, though it comprehends the things which re under it, nd imprts essence to ech of them, in consequence of contining their differences cuslly, yet it is essentilly one mny. The one of Providence, however, is exempt from ll the beings of which it is the productive nd perfective cuse, nd is unreceptive of vrition of every kind. Providence, therefore, being no one of these, but estblished bove every specific essence b, nd nevertheless producing ll things ccording to the most profound union, possesses power uncircumscribed, nd incomprehensible by ll things; so tht neither cn ny one of the ntures which subsist from it, nor ll of them tken collectively, unfold the power which preexists in it, or receive nd comprehend the immensity of it in its bosom. But ll things being s it were bsorbed by Providence, they prticipte of it in some wy or other, ccording to the nturl dpttion of ech to this prticiption. Hence the one of Providence, being more profoundly one thn every incorporel nd corporel union, nd being infinitely powerful, possesses this power in n infinitely greter degree thn every infinite nd finite power. For it is not t ll wonderful The prt within the brckets is in the version of Morbek s follows : " non quod inopinbile dicere, ut universle quidm iunt unum;" insted of which I red, conformbly to the bove trnsltion, non ut universle quod in opinione subsistit, et quod quidm iunt unum esse. b Wht I hve rendered specific essence, is in Morbek specionlem essentim, which doubtless ws in the Greek eidiken ousin
[15] tht in infinite powers one should be more infinite thn nother. For the infinite ccording to quntity must not be considered s existing in the one of Providence; since in quntity there is not [in energy] the infinitely more thn the infinite. Nevertheless, everything infinite will be such to the ntures which re under it, ccording to infinite power; but to the ntures which re prior to it it will be finite, in consequence of being bounded by them. For if it were not comprehended by the ntures prior to it, neither could it be under the dominion of things more excellent thn itself, nd therefore would not be contined by them. If, therefore, it is contined by them though it is infinite, they predominte over it; nd if they predominte over it, nd it is comprehended by them, it is not infinite [with reference to them]. Neither, likewise, is it infinite to itself. For tht which is infinite to itself, is incomprehensible to itself; nd hence it is not ble to contin, nd be the sviour of itself. But every being is ccording to power preservtive of itself. It remins, therefore, tht ech of the things tht re infinite, is lone infinite to the ntures posterior to itself. Hence the infinite power of Providence, being comprehensive of ll the powers of the ntures which re the subjects of its providentil energy, genertes s well s contins them ccording to the most profound union in the infinite depths of itself; just s it imprts to ll things union commensurte to ech. For neither is the [16] one everywhere the sme, for instnce, in incorporel ntures nd in bodies; nor in perpetul bodies, nd in such s re corruptible. For the union of perpetul is greter thn tht of corruptible bodies ; or how could the former remin indissoluble, but unity perish in the other? To which lso it my be dded, tht n incorporel nture is more proximte to the
one; but body, on ccount of the infinite seprtion of its prts, flls very fr short of the one. Nor must it be doubted whether one thing is in greter degree one thn nother; since we see tht everything by diminution lwys becomes something different from tht which is prior to itself, till it proceeds to the extremity of the order to which it belongs. Providence, therefore, existing ccording to trnscendent union, nd possessing infinite power, some of the ntures which re produced by it nd prtke of its beneficent energy, (though ll things proceed from, nd prticipte of Providence,) subsist ccording to the one, by which they re connscently bounded; but others subsist ccording to the infinite, indefiniteness being connscent with their essence. For imittions of the infinite which is with Providence subsist here through indefiniteness ; but the imittions of its unity, through bound. On this ccount, the first of the ntures in the universe, nd which re unchngeble, subsist ccording to one bound; but the ntures tht succeed these tend to indefiniteness, in consequence of possessing [17] second rnk. But every infinity subsists ccording to the infinity of Providence, nd everything definite subsists ccording to union. The infinity likewise which is in primry ntures is vnquished by unity, nd lrgely prtkes of the one. Here too [i. e. in the sublunry region] things nturlly indefinite, re subservient to such s re definite; nd definite ntures give n orderly rrngement to such s re borne long indefinitely ccording to n ll-vrious trnsmuttion. As primry ntures likewise re to ech other ccording to their mutul order, thus lso such of their recipients s possess hbitude nlogous to them, give completion to the world; less excellent being suspended from more excellent beings.
Wht hs been sid, however, will become more [ evident by ssuming tht intellect produces both body nd tht which is incorporel, but ech of these incorporelly, nd tht it knows nd produces them conformbly to its own nture. And s the productive principle of incorporel ntures is in intellect incorporel, so likewise the cuse of body in it is incorporel; the former ssimilting to itself the things which re produced, but the ltter, on ccount of diminution with respect to intellect, producing things more foreign to the incorporel species. Soul itself likewise genertes those vitl nd motive productive powers or forms which re in other souls ; but of those forms which fll into mt The words in itlics re in Morbek's version "propter submissionem"; but the originl ws, I hve no doubt, di huphesin. [18] ter, some it produces of gnostic, but others of fbrictive nture. And it produces indeed ll these vitlly, some proceeding through life into life, but others proceeding through life into the privtion of vitlity. And, in short, everything which genertes, nd t the sme time knows tht which it genertes from different cuses, genertes nd knows the thing produced by it, by knowledge superior to the object of its knowledge. Of the ntures, however, which re produced by this cuse, some re produced conformbly to it, but others ccording to diminution. Hence, you my sy tht Providence, possessing through the one of itself the cuse of definite ntures, but through infinity the cuse of such s re indefinite, knows nd genertes both of them definitely; just s intellect knows nd produces incorporelly, both tht which subsists ccording
to the form of the incorporel essence, nd tht which subsists ccording to the form of body. But you will spek rightly if you sy, tht of the things produced, these indeed re definite on ccount of the one, but those re indefinite on ccount of infinity. For neither re beings which hve necessry existence without infinity, nor such s re contingent without bound. For the ltter re entirely terminted in the bound of necessity, nd the former, being eternl essences from necessity of nture, Morbek's version of this sentence is, " Nm necessriis entibus expertibus infinitte, neque contingentibus termino." But for " Nm necessriis," it is necessry to red, conformbly to the bove trnsltion, Nm neque necessriis. [19] prticipte of infinite power. Or whence do they derive this perpetuity, nd n invrible smeness of subsistence? Here, indeed, the one predominting, nd, on ccount of this, cusing tht which is generted to be necessry, nd being the cuse of the colligtion of the infinite; but there the infinite predominting, nd cusing the one to be diminished, through flying from the infinite, which runs bove it, nd comprehends it in its embrce. Providence, however, possesses knowledge of both these, though, s we hve lredy sid, its knowledge is ccording to tht which is more excellent thn the things which it knows b, nd ntecedently comprehending in its knowledge power productive of the peculirity of ech, nd cusing this thing to be chrcterized by bound, but tht by infinity. Every bound, therefore, is from thence, nd every infinity, whether in incorporel ntures, or in bodies; nd, in like mnner, tht which consists of both these is from thence derived. Hence lso the knowledge both of simple nd
of composite ntures is there, just s the genertions of things simple nd of things composite proceed from thence. This sentence in the version of Morbek is, "Etenim hec penitus in eum qui necessrii terminum terminte, et ill propter ipsm necessrim nturm etern enti prticipre infinit virtute." But for terminte, it is necessry to red terminri. b For knowledge subsists ccording to the nture of tht which knows, nd not ccording to the nture of tht which is known. This is dmirbly illustrted by Proclus in his Commentry on the Prmenides of Plto. See vol. iii. of my trnsltion of Plto, p.82. [20] Becuse, likewise, the one of Providence produces every kind of bound, nd every kind of infinity, nd lso every whole, which consists of both these; hence, either from the one previling, tht which is produced is necessry, or from infinity running before bound, tht which is contingent is effected. Becuse, however, neither here ws it lwful for the infinite to be deserted by the one, hence the contingent, s we hve sid, termintes in the nture of tht which is necessry: nd this is either in greter degree detined by the one, nd, pssing into necessry event, becomes for longer time definite; or, in consequence of prticipting of the one in more debile degree, becomes necessry in less time, but suffers the sme thing, nd becomes definite. The contingent likewise imittes the infinite power of the one, but not the power of itself. For every power is the power of nother thing which possesses it, but not of itself; since everything, of whtever kind it my be, which is indefinite, in consequence of not yet hving definite existence, possesses wht is sid to be contingent, but necessrily termintes in either being or not being; nd this either prior to greter, or prior to less time. And this is mnifested by conjecturl divintions. For they re more verified in less
thn in greter time, s if the indefiniteness hd now pssed wy. Tht it is requisite, however, tht there should be knowledge of the indefinite in beings superior to us, if this lso ought to hve n llotted order, nd not to be, s it were, dventitious to the universe, [21] must be dmitted t present, s being elsewhere demonstrted; but we now lone investigte fter wht mnner it is effected. And this likewise will become mnifest. For the universe would not be one, nor the government of it ccording to intellect, if this government ws not definite; nd of those things of which there is the sme order, there is certin colligtion. It is necessry, however, to ttribute this knowledge either to demons lone, for s they re proximte to things in the sublunry region, they pper to hve knowledge of, nd to preside over them, or this knowledge must be ttributed to the Gods prior to demons, to whom the Gods commit the providentil inspection of ll mundne ffirs. But if we leve to demons lone the knowledge nd providentil inspection of things indefinite, we must sy either tht they know them prt from ech other, nd lso the subjects of their providentil ttention, nd the ntures prior to themselves, s we do, or tht they hve simultneous knowledge of both. And if, indeed, they hve knowledge of these seprte from ech other, in wht do they differ from our souls? For these re incpble of pying ttention to themselves nd their own concerns, nd of surveying t the sme time the ntures which re bove them. But so fr s they do not extend themselves to externl objects, nd yet possess knowledge of these, we must confess tht they tend to definite knowledge of things indefinite. If, however, t
the sme time it is necessry [22] to dmit tht their knowledge of the ntures over which they preside is derived from resoning process, we must lso grnt tht they contin the forms nd exemplrs of things indefinite. For dinoi (i. e. the discursive energy of reson) is the knowledge of these. Or if we ssert tht this knowledge pertins to beings who energise prior to rtiocintion, much more must we refer it to the Gods, from whom demons lso possess the power of divintion, nd the definite foreknowledge of things indefinite. For if indeed, they perceive definite things indefinitely, we must not scribe to them n impssivity which is dpted to immutble gener. For everything of this kind requires phntsy nd sense, so tht in consequence of not remembering present circumstnces, the soul my conjoin the ssimiltion of future events to the present nd the pst. But if they perceive indefinite things definitely, why, if we scribe this power to demons, should we not dmit tht this in much greter degree is possible to the Gods, so s to grnt tht they know temporl concerns untemporlly, indefinite things definitely, nd tht they provide for indefinite ntures ccording to definite b mode of knowledge? For if, indeed, they re unble to know things indefinite, definitely, but this is possible to demons, then the In the version of Morbek in this plce, " Si utem determinte," fter utem it is necessry to dd indetermint. b The word determintum is evidently wnting in this plce in the version of Morbek; for he hs only in the ltter prt of this sentence, "et providere indetermintis secundum cognitionis modum," insted of secundum determintum cognitionis modum. [23] Gods will be deprived of knowledge of this kind through wnt of power, which is bsurd.
And if it should be sid, tht they do not wish to possess this knowledge," this would be ttended with much greter bsurdity thn to ssert tht they re not ble to possess it; since, though they give subsistence to things of this kind, they would be unwilling to py providentil ttention to their own productions. Or on this hypothesis it must likewise be grnted, tht not ll mortl ntures nd prticulrs, nd everything which the world contins, were produced by the Gods. And some things, indeed, were [immeditely] fbricted by the one fther of the universe, but others by the mundne gods, yet through the commnd of their fther, who t the sme time through them produced these. But it is not lwful for those beings who produce other things either immeditely or meditely to neglect the Gods. If, however, the Gods wish to provide for things indefinite definitely, nd re ble to effect this, they will entirely both provide for them, nd t the sme time tht they providentilly ttend to, will know the desert of the subjects of their providentil cre. And the Gods, indeed, will possess this knowledge exemptly b, extending to ll things their providentil ttention: but demons, distributing into prts The version of Morbek hs here " nolunt," but the true reding is obviously volunt. b This word, used here by Morbek in his version, is "exlttim;" but the word used by Proclus ws, I hve no doubt, conformbly to my version, exērēmenōs. [24] the superessentil illumintions which they receive from them, re llotted different prefecture over different herds of nimls, s fr s to the lst prtition, s Plto sys; so tht some of them preside over men, others over
lions, nd others over other nimls, or hve dominion over plnts. And still more prtilly, some re the inspective gurdins of the eye, others of the liver, nd others of the hert. But ll things re full of Gods; some providing for certin things, immeditely, but others, s we hve sid, for other things through demons s medi: not tht the Gods re incpble of being present with ll things, but ultimte ntures re not ble of themselves to prticipte such s re primry. The inptitude of prticipnts likewise, by insinuting itself becomes sometimes n obstcle to the enjoyment of the beneficent influence of the Gods, nd to the conscious perception of the providentil interference of demons. Tht, however, which possesses proper dpttion, hs the Gods immeditely present with it, nd hence knows when it is known by them; nd begins to see Providence descending into it, the gurdin cre of which it ws ignornt of prior to its dpttion, nd which it hd prticipted immnifestly. But if some one sleeping in the light of the sun, nd being illuminted by it, should be ignornt during his sleep tht he ws thus illuminted, nd on wking should see himself surrounded by the solr splen It ppers to me to be necessry to dd in this prt of Morbek's version, videre. [25] dour, he might then think tht this light ws not present with him before, becuse he, on ccount of his ignornce, ws not present with the light. Then, therefore, [i.e.. when thing becomes dpted to the prticiption of the Gods,] the indefinite lso becomes definite, nd is converted to divinity, with whom the indefinite subsisted definitely, nd from thence derives, through prticiption, bound. For prior to its conversion to divinity, it ws indeed with reference to itself indefinite, but not such to
divinity; but conformbly to his nture, hd with him definite subsistence, nd ws known to him s thing seprted from him through its own in definiteness, yet not so seprted s to escpe ll bound; for in this cse, filing into the byss of nonentity, it would become ltent; but it is cut off from him in such wy, s neither to be without bound, nor yet to be perfectly estblished in it. After its conversion, however, it both hs knowledge of its own indefiniteness, nd of the pre-existing bound by which indefiniteness is dorned. This will likewise follow, if we dmit tht good ccedes to ll things from Providence lone, in the sme mnner s intelligence proceeds from intellect, nd life nd vitl motion from soul. But if everything which lives, in ny wy whtever, lives on ccount of soul, nd everything intelligent intellectully perceives on ccount of intellect, it is evident tht whtever prticiptes of the good of Providence, possesses this good on ccount of Providence, though the prticipnt should rnk mong [26] prtil ntures, nd things which prticipte of it only t times, nd not lwys. For it is requisite to led everything to its fountin, from which the whole series of it is derived. If nything, therefore, which the world contins is benefited, it is benefited on ccount of Providence; nd this is not only the cse with eternl, but likewise with corruptible ntures; nd not only with definite, but lso with such s re indefinite, whether ech of these receives its proper good from Providence immeditely, or through medi is first benefited by it. For intermedite beings do not subvert the gifts of the cuses prior to themselves, but render the inptitude of ultimte ntures dpted to the prticiption of such s re primry, corroborting them by their own forerunning illumintions. Hence things which re more
proximte to Providence enjoy nd re dorned by it in greter degree; just s we must dmit from common conceptions, tht the ntures which re nerer to the sun re more illuminted by it thn those which re more remote from it; tht the beings which re more proximte to soul, re more vitl; nd those tht re nerer to intellect, re more perfect in intellectul perception. For proximity is sid to be tht which it is, on ccount of the llince of its essence to the things to which it is ner, nd remoteness is entirely so denominted on ccount of its essentil elongtion from something else. It be In Morbek's version, for " bonifict" in this plce, it is necessry to red bonifictur. [27] ing dmitted, therefore, tht Providence is nothing else thn tht which imprts good to ll things, those ntures which more lrgely prticipte of it, re in greter degree benefited nd dorned, Hence it is not requisite tht everything should be proximtely suspended from Providence, but it is proper tht intermedite ntures should be suspended from those tht re proximte to Providence ; for this cuses the ltter to enjoy the good of Providence by themselves, nd the former to be in wnt, s it were, of other colligtions, in order to receive the good which it imprts. For if there ws not co-ordintion of ll things with reference to the one, neither would the world be one; or if ll things prticipted of their dorning cuse fter the sme mnner, there would not be n order of things dorned. If, therefore, there re both order nd coordintion, the former giving distinction to ll things, nd cusing some things to be prior nd others to be posterior, but the ltter converting divided ntures to one good, if this be the cse, it is necessry tht ll things should prticipte of Providence, but tht the
prticiptions should not be the sme; tht ll should prticipte, indeed, on ccount of coordintion; but not of the sme things, on ccount of order, which cuses some things to be first, others to be second, nd others to be successive to these. For, s Plto sys, every power which is motive of greter, is much more motive of less things, nd obtining dominion over stronger, it will much more predominte over more [28] debile ntures. There, however, will concurring with power, it is necessry tht Providence should extend its beneficent cre to things of less excellent nture. For it must not be sid, tht Providence is ble indeed, but unwilling, to effect wht it is ble to effect; since whtever good men re ble to ccomplish, they lso wish to ccomplish. Nor is the power of Providence without will, nor its will without power; since the ltter would render ppetition vin b, nd the former would cuse power to be imperfect. If, however, it is requisite tht Providence should extend itself to secondry, it is much more necessry tht it should extend itself to primry ntures. For it does not pertin to Providence to profit nd dorn less excellent beings, but leve such s re more excellent destitute of itself. For if more excellent beings re not in wnt of nything, they derive this superiority to ny kind of indigence from Providence, which imprts to primry beings the power of being sufficient to themselves. Our common conceptions, therefore, s we hve before sid, necessrily proclim, tht we should ssert Providence to be the cuse of ll good, nd tht we should confess tht the power by which ny being is sufficient to itself is thence derived, nd subsists for its ske. Whether, therefore, beings re indigent, they i. e. with Providence.
b The version of Morbek in this plce is, " Hoc quidem enim ppetitum fcit verum, hoc utem virtutem imperfectm;" but for verum I red vnum. [29] re llotted plenitude from Providence in wy conformble to their nture; or whether they re not indigent, they re lwys filled, nd hve sufficiency from themselves (to utrches) prior to the ntures which re lwys indigent; but t the sme time they lwys receive from Providence n pproprite plenitude. All things, therefore, s I hve sid, ccording to the order which they possess, derive their subsistence from Providence; nd of the beings which re generted, nd re not lwys, some re essentilly produced from it, nd from eternl beings; but others hve their genertion through eternl beings, not becuse Providence is indigent of things posterior to itself for the production of these, but these, in consequence of being much distnt from it, requiring to the prticiption of it the influence of the beings which it proximtely produced. If, however, though Providence is present everywhere nd in ll things, yet the sme good is not in ll things, we ought not to be surprised. For this is the work of the most excellent Providence, to imprt good indeed to ll things, but to mesure the prticiption of it by the desert of the recipients; nd for everything to receive only s much s it is ble to receive, whether essence cuses difference, s in souls nd bodies, (for the good of ech of these is not the sme, becuse the essence is not the sme,) or whether their desert rises from energy lone, s we sy, tht souls differently energising, lwys receive from Providence different llotments. And ll souls, indeed, [30] hve llotments from Providence; but some submit to their llotment with fcility, nd others with difficulty; becuse they cnnot be converted to Providence without obstcle. This, therefore,
must be dmitted. For tht it is most true tht there is lso prticulr Providence, my be ssumed by directing our ttention to sublunry ffirs, becuse ll these contribute something to the universe, nd no one of the things which it contins is superdventitious, though we re not ble to perceive the cuses from which it is derived. To which it my be dded, tht in certin souls lso the power of Providence is displyed. But it would be ridiculous to dmit tht these things thus subsist, nd others do not, if ll things existed fter similr mnner. On this subject, however, enough hs been sid. 4. Respiring however, s it were, from the discussion of this hed, let us consider in the fourth plce, from nother principle, fter wht mnner we sy the prticiptions of the Gods re effected : which lso those who engge in the specultion of ides re ccustomed to investigte. For if the Gods lwys energising, the ntures which re here do not lwys prticipte of them, must it not follow tht the Gods would energise in vin? Or if we do not dmit tht they possess n eternl energy, still greter bsurdity will follow: if it is proper to cll tht which is impossible bsurd. For whtever exists with the Gods, lwys exists with them, nd prior to ll time. Hence their energy does not [31] tke plce in prt only of infinite time: for time nd tht which is infinite re externl to the Gods. Tht these things, therefore, my lso be ppropritely discussed, it must be observed, in the first plce, tht every prticiption, whether it is of eternl or of corruptible ntures, is lwys llotted middle order between prticipnts nd the things prticipted.. And s communiction with the extremes is requisite to ll medi, it is necessry tht the medi should be united both with the prticipnts nd the things prticipted; for if the medi pertined to one of these only, they would not