SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS Michaelmas 2018 Dr Michael Biggs 0. Introduction http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfos0060/ SociologicalAnalysis.shtml!
We want to explain 1. Variation across cases why in UK do 3/4 of ethnic Chinese attend university but only 1/3 of white British? why do American workers work 20% longer than French? 2. Change over time why has unionization declined in the past 50 years? 3. Anomalous phenomenon why do people commit suicide? why do university prestige rankings remain stable? anomalous with respect to commonsense or theory requires analysis of variation/change
Names and abstractions Like magicians in all times and places, the theorist thinks he controls phenomena if he is able to give them names, particularly names of his own invention. (Homans 1974) biopower, liquid modernity, neoliberalism, necro-politics, homohysteria, habitus, patriarchy Rather than talking about people, sociologists often seem to be more at ease talking about abstract things especially abstract things which supposedly can only be described in their own invented terminology. (Billig 2013)
Explanatory tools Generalizable across domains of social life and subfields of sociology Different tools, not single grand theory failure of grand theories like Marxism and Functionalism grand theories tend to create disciples Marx is on our side; we are not on the side of Marx. (Thompson 1978) social phenomena are complex, multilayered Explanatory theory should focus on the actions of people
Example: immigration and conflict (Dancygier 2010) Dissects conflict into two distinct types Assumes ethnic groups compete for scarce resources Assumes politicians respond to votes instrumental rationality Treats as given variation in cohesion of ethnic groups Ignores religion
Outline 1. Instrumental rationality 2. Interaction and emotions 3. Altruism and values 4. Social integration 5. Social networks 6. Diffusion 7. Cultural evolution 8. Explanation and evidence
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS Michaelmas 2018 Dr Michael Biggs 1. Instrumental rationality http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfos0060/ SociologicalAnalysis.shtml!
Explaining individual action To explain social phenomena, explain why individuals act the way they do: methodological individualism Weber (1920): Sociology is the interpretive understanding of social action, and thereby causal explanation of its course and consequences collectivities must be treated as solely the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable action (rearticulated by Goldthorpe 2016)
Explaining action Folk pyschology: desire + belief => action Opportunities / constraints / costs & benefits / payoffs Beliefs/expectations Desires/preferences
Instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität) Choose the best means to achieve your ends; choose action that maximizes utility Desires/preferences: stable, consistent continuous: you can always trade off between preferences contrast value-rationality (lecture 3) To use instrumental rationality as explanation, preferences are the fulcrum never invoke changing preferences to explain behavioural change, or invoke varying preferences to explain behavioural variation
Self-interest Instrumental rationality also assumes that preferences are self-interested, with some exceptions (e.g. parent s utility depends on child s utility) Hobbes (1651): the greatest part of mankind are pursuers of wealth, command, or sensual pleasure Smith (1776): the desire of bettering our condition comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go to the grave An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of mankind propose and wish to better their condition.
Explanation Specify the individuals opportunities, to demonstrate that their actual choice was the best means to their ends Smith (1776): why was teaching so much worse in Oxford than Scottish universities? utility = (+ leisure, + income) It is the interest of every man to live as much at his ease as he can incentives (i.e. opportunities): fixed stipend vs. student fees in Scotland, teacher had to sacrifice some leisure in order to gain income; in Oxford, teacher gained nothing by sacrificing leisure not a difference in preferences: if an Oxford fellow moved to Scotland, he would spend more time on teaching Note: desires are postulated; do not ask!
Elaborations: (1) Strategic interaction My incentives depend on what you do: game theory You left right left good, good bad, bad Me right bad, bad good, good
(2) Belief formation Really we act on the basis of beliefs about incentives Distinguish incorrect-albeit-rational from irrational beliefs (Popper 1994) Bayesian learning: prior + evidence => posterior (Breen 1999) Some beliefs are impossible to empirically test: religion (cf. lecture 3)! Combine with strategic interaction: how can private knowledge e.g. trustworthiness be communicated? (lecture 2)
(3) Broader preferences Smith (1759): How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him Preference for approval, akin to money (Homans 1974) Experiments prove importance of other-regarding / social preferences (Fehr & Gintis 2007) more cooperative willing to punish unfairness
Limitations 0. Psychically ------------ ------------ unrealistic (Pettit 1995) 1. Problems with rationality is maximizing possible especially under conditions of uncertainty? (Simon 1978) experiments reveal inconsistent preferences and irrational beliefs (Kahneman 2011) inconsistency over time, myopia (Ainslie 2001) 2. What explains the incentives? can they in turn be derived from instrumentally rational action? e.g. income is predicated on property rights, how enforced?
Instrumental rationality as peculiarly modern? Values Institutions capitalism: private property and money democracy emancipation from patriarchal family
Summary Instrumental rationality as working hypothesis (Goldthorpe 1998) rather than microfoundations e.g. Dancygier s (2010) explanation for conflict over immigration: assume politicians maximize vote share and groups compete for resources, but does not fully explain variation in group s collective mobilization Explanation by instrumental rationality: assumes invariant desires, primarily self-interested people act differently because they face different incentives or because they have different (albeit rationally derived) beliefs
References Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (1920), part I George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, American Economic Review (1977) Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011) George Ainslie, Breakdown of Will (2001) Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, American Economic Review 68 (1978) George C. Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, rev. ed. (1974) Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis, Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Analytical and Experimental Foundations, Annual Review of Sociology 33 (2007) Philip Pettit, The Virtual Reality of Homo Economicus, Monist 78 (1995) John H. Goldthorpe, Rational Action Theory for Sociology, British Journal of Sociology 49 (1998) John H. Goldthorpe, Sociology as a Population Science (2016) Richard Breen, Beliefs, Rational Choice and Bayesian Learning, Rationality and Society 11 (1999) Michael Billig, Learn to Write Badly: How to Succeed in the Social Sciences (2013) E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory: Or an Orrery of Errors (1978) Rafaela M. Dancygier, Immigration and Conflict in Europe (2010)