1 Some methodological points It is ok if your thesis is long and complicated. Just make sure you explain it clearly early on in your paper. And make sure that the antecedents of the two conditionals match each other. When thinking about these topics, start with what you are most confident about: Think about the easy cases: e.g. those where you can confidently say who is identical to whom, or who has what mental states. o The easiest cases probably are the ones you are most familiar with: cases involving your self, your own mental states, and the justification of every-day beliefs. o These should typically be the starting point for any thinking you do. When you are thinking about weirder, more difficult things (e.g. corporate mental states, the justification of group beliefs, or corporate identity): o It can be helpful to develop a view that explains the easy cases, and see what that view says about the weird/hard cases. o Think about how what you want to say about the weird/hard cases makes can be reconciled with what you say about the easy cases. E.g. if you have a theory about the justification of group beliefs that makes this justification very hard to come by, do you also want to say that it is hard for individual humans to have justified beliefs? If you say different things about the easy and hard cases, you have to show that there are differences between the cases that explain this. When thinking about x, think about other issues that x is related to. We are interested in justification (probably) because we are interested in pursuing the truth. o So, whatever justifies beliefs should probably be something that is relevant to this pursuit. Mental states are (probably) relevant to understanding and rationality (and maybe to responsibility). o Tollefson thinks that we ascribe mental states to being in order to understand their behavior (where that understanding requires seeing the being as rational). She also thinks we can t hold a being responsible unless it has the right mental states. Is this because beings can t be held responsible unless they are somewhat rational (or capable of being rational)? o Paul thinks that what is rational for a person to do depends on what they understand, or what they know/believe. And that understanding to some extent requires having had certain experiences (e.g. we can t understand parenthood until we ve experienced it). o Internalists think that what we are justified in believing has to do with our mental states: What our experience tells us, what we remember, what common sense tells us, etc.
2 o So, what we say about mental states has implications for what we say about understanding, rationality, and responsibility (and vice versa). As you develop your view about mental states, ask yourself about its implications for these other issues, and if these implications are plausible. Identity is relevant to blame/responsibility, and to rationality. o Look at examples 3 and 4 on the Personal identity handout. Roughly, A should only be held responsible for what B does if A and B are identical. Roughly, it typically seems rational for people to somewhat prioritize their own interests when making decisions ( own interests meaning the interests of the person who is identical to them ). o So, if you are considering saying that A and B are identical: Ask, Does it make sense to blame B for what A has done? Would it make sense for to A to worry about what will happen to B (in the same way that A worries about what will happen to A)? o So, if you are considering saying that A and B are non-identical: Ask, Does it not make sense to blame B for what A has done? Would it be weird for A to worry about what will happen to B (in the way that A worries about what will happen to A)? When you disagree with someone, address the evidence they give for their view. Can you show that this actually fits your view just as well, or better? Can you give more (or stronger) evidence against their view than they give for it? Can you defeat the justification their evidence gives (e.g. by showing that the evidence is unreliable in some way)? Look for connections between topics, but don t mix things up. For example, most people think there is a clear connection between what we say about mental states and what we say about identity. o E.g. what it means to be psychologically continuous might depend on what mental states are. The evidence for views about mental states might be connected to evidence for views about identity: o E.g. some of what makes Brison s view plausible also seems to make interpretationism plausible (see 1c,2c,3c on Tollefson handout). o E.g. some of what Brison says about the physical nature of memory might be relevant to thinking about mental states. Some of what we talked about when talking about Paul is relevant to thinking about rationality, and thus to Tollefson: o See iii and iv on handout from Feb 13. But don t mix up the theories: o Interpretationism and functionalism are not views about identity. o Psychological continuity, or Olson s view, are not theories about mental states.
3 Identity Make sure you have considered examples 1-8a on the handout from March 27. If your view does not fit any of these, that is an obvious objection. Consider what your view says about transformative experiences: is it ever the case that the person before the experience is not quantitatively identical to the person after? If so, that is surprising and should be supported/defended. Many of you are appealing to memory as part of your theory of personal identity. While that s a good idea, be careful: people forget things quite often. If you say that identity requires full recollection of past you, then almost no one is identical to any past person. Think about false memories (there might be a connection to Joan-simulator, see below). Some views you might agree or disagree with: Psychological continuity: o There are different versions of this; see the section on Psychological Continuity Views in the optional reading on Personal Identity. The animal view (Olson): A is identical to B iff A and B are the same animal. o There s a related view which is about having the same body. o Both animal and body views have to say something about what counts as being the same animal or body. Brison s view: A is identical to B iff: (here is just one version; see your notes for others) o B can construct a narrative that makes A s experiences part of B s life + there is a receptive audience o Does this allow very young people, or people with severe cognitive limitations, to be identical to their past selves? If you disagree with these views, they are obvious objections to your thesis. o If you agree, you have to answer the questions mentioned here. If you are writing about group identity (e.g. identity of corporations), consider the parallel versions of the above views: o E.g. if corporations have mental states, then there is a corporate version of the psychological continuity view. o If you disagree w/ the parallel version of one of these views, that will be an obvious objection to your thesis. o Note that Tollefson thinks that an important aspect of why corporations can have mental states has to do with their structure e.g. that they have rules and procedures they consistently follow. Think about how this might connect to corporate identity. Mental states Tollefsen: Mental states of groups (seemingly) need not be the states of the individuals: The members of a corporation might think that some policy is bad for the corporation, but vote for it out of self interest, and this vote might mean that the corporation wants to do that thing, or believes that this is a good policy.
4 The members of a corporation might be opposed to some policy but the corporation believes in it because it s in the rules or policy put in place by previous members. The corporation knows x and y, but no one person knows both x and y (e.g. board members know the financial stuff, tech people know the tech stuff, no one knows both, but the corporation knows both). Data points (if these don t fit your thesis, then that is an obvious objection): We talk like we ascribe certain mental states to certain non-humans (corporations, animals, etc.). We ascribe moral responsibility to some non-humans in ways that make sense if they have mental states. Brison claims that: o Our memory and experience is partly dependent on our interaction with other people (which is consistent with contemporary psychological findings). o Our body can be a very significant part of our mental states. The Joan-simulator: o Most of the class did not think this could feel empathy/sympathy. Because it did not know what it was like to feel pain (it lacked qualia). o Most of the class thought that it did not understand the conversation o Most of the class thought that it did not remember the past events that it claimed to remember. Does remembering x require having actually experienced x? o Consider what this suggests about corporate/group mental states more generally. o Arguably, the functionalist will say that the Joan-simulator has all the mental states Joan has. Because (arguably) it has parts that do everything Joan s brain parts do. Could one argue that these don t have the same function as Joan s brain parts do? o Arguably, the interpretationist will say that the Joan-simulator has the same mental states that Joan would have had in the same conversation. This is because predicting and explaining its behavior in the conversation would be done in just the same way we would predict or explain Joan s behavior in the same conversation. Connections to the first half of the semester What beings can experience admiration? o To answer this, functionalists will first ask: What is the function of admiration? o Interpretationists will ask: How does attributing admiration to others help us to understand them? o Is admiration a qualitative mental state? Can the Joan-simulator feel it? o Zagzebski: If some beings cannot admire, then maybe certain kinds of beliefs cannot be justified for them? Zagzebski thinks that our religious beliefs can be a central part of who we are (in some cases) o Does this mean that changing these beliefs might end personal identity? o Is it the beliefs themselves that are a central part of who we are, or some other psychological thing which relates to these beliefs (e.g. values/goals)?
5 Review of how to respond to counterexamples My view is that, if A s core values change, then A ceases to exist.... Part 2 Jill has a hundred core values. Some of these have to do with her family and friends welfare. That is, for each member of her family, and each friend, one of her core values has to do with that person being better off. But she also has core values which involve being a good friend/family member to these people. This is not just the core value of promoting their welfare, since in some cases being a respectful friend involves saying true but hurtful things. Jill also has the core value of loving certain animals, and the core value of loving the environment, core values having to do with art, sports, and so forth. You might think that these are mostly just expression of just a few core values, but they are not: they really are all core values. If two values are both expressions of a single, core value, then whenever these values come into conflict, there is a choice which properly satisfies the fundamental value, and so is not really bad (according to your values). For Jill, however, any two of these 100 values can come into conflict in ways such that, no matter what she does, she will do something clearly bad to her. One of Jill s values changes. E.g. her hamster dies, so her core value of loving this hamster goes away. Because Jill has so many core values, it is not plausible that Jill stops persisting just because this one value changes. Part 3 response: deny that this contradicts the consequent of the thesis Jill really does cease to exist in this case. This may seem surprising, since the person who exists in Jill s body is so similar to Jill. But it is true. Because these are all core values to Jill, they are each extremely important to Jill on their own. This is what makes them core: the counterexample relies on claiming that, when any of these values conflict, Jill knows that whatever she does is bad to her. If Jill could say, Well, I can t do both x and y, but I ll do x and that s not a big deal that I can t do y, then y wouldn t be one of Jill s core values. But, if that s right, then a change to any of these values is a change in what is extremely valuable to Jill, not a change in something superficial or unimportant. So, even though the person in Jill s body after the hamster dies is still very similar to Jill, that person is different in a way that was extremely important to Jill response: deny that this fits the antecedent of the thesis I agree that Jill persists after her hamster dies. However, this is because none of her core values have changed. The death of a loved one does not stop you from loving that person. To love a being is to feel about that being s reasons as you do about your own reasons, to feel about that being s welfare exactly as you feel about your own. When the hamster dies, it has no more reasons or welfare. So loving the hamster is very easy: there are no hamster-reasons to have feelings about. Jill has no feelings about her hamster s reasons, because he is dead, but she still loves him. So her core values have not changed response: defeat the justification for believing the counterexample I share the feeling that Jill persists, but we should not trust our reactions here. Our reactions are based on the fact that we can t really imagine that this is one of Jill s core values, and so they don t really tell us about this example. It is very hard to imagine that Jill cares about this hamster as much as she cares about other things. To see why I say that, imagine that Jill has 100 core values, and one of them is her love for herself. This value changes, but the others stay the same. Here we would feel that Jill no longer persists; that s why the objection involves a loss of a hamster, and not something more clearly fundamental. If the value of loving your self and of loving a hamster are both core values, then we should have the same reactions to these two cases [the author needs to argue here that there is not some other difference between these core values that is relevant to identity] If we have different reactions to this case, it is because we don t really think Jill has changed in her core values. Since the case is only relevant if she did, then we should not trust our judgments about this case.