The Big Schema of Things:

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The Big Schema of Things: Two Philosophical Visions of The Relationship Between Language and Reality and Their Implications for The Semantic Web Allen Ginsberg Lead Artificial Intelligence Engineer The MITRE Corporation McLean, Virginia A National Resource Working in the Public Interest

The Semantic Web vis-a-vis Natural Language SW Requirement: machines to use formal language in ways that humans use Natural Language (NL) SW term can refer to same thing as human using a NL term mean the same as human using a NL term be used to state same truth as human uttering NL statement Page 2

Overview of the Argument Received View of SW reference/meaning Correspondence Vision for Natural Language (NL) semantics Holistic Vision & Critique of Correspondence NL semantic notions not explained by correspondence Holistic meaning-as-use account better for NL But implies NL terms typically not definable Dilemma for SW development If formal methods used to define SW terms, result not likely to coincide with NL counterparts. If such methods not used, how can machines interpret terms? Resolution of Dilemma via meaning-as-use insight Page 3

R-URIs & The URI-Identity Crisis URIs give reference/meaning of SW terms (R-URI) How can URIs identify things outside the web? Why is this an issue? Ambiguity problem: URI-Identity crisis Refers to real world object? Is a web address for a file? - This problem resolvable by developing syntax to mark distinction Deeper epistemological worry When a machine uses a URI referentially how do we know what the intended referent is? Page 4

The Received View of SW Reference A R-URI provides the web address of a representation (of an information object). This representation can be processed to provide unambiguous (in principle) reference to an information object that exists independently of the web. http://www.example.org/employment.owl#employee Information object Referent R-URI Employee concept Referent Computable Process employment.owl Representation <!-- This file represents the concept of an employee and related concepts --> <! Employees are Persons --> <owl:class rdf:id="employee"> <rdfs:subclassof> <owl:class rdf:id="person"/> </rdfs:subclassof> </owl:class> employee of the month employee record <owl:class "> </owl:class> Page 5

The Correspondence Vision (1) Mapping language to a fully determinate reality Reality exists independently of thought/belief/language Statement is meaningful because its constituent non-logical terms correspond to pieces of reality its logical structure portrays a possible arrangement of those pieces. Statement is true if it pictures an arrangement in sync with the structure of reality Page 6

The Correspondence Vision (2) - The Three Tiers Language ball is round is smaller than Mapping of expressions to reality is mediated by concepts Concepts Representations of Fully Determinate Non-Linguistic Reality Concrete Objects Properties Relations + + Simple Properties Composite Properties (Logical constructions out of simples) Simple Relations Composite Relations Page 7

The Correspondence Vision (3) Analytic Truth Consider language L L has standard logical machinery L s terms mapped to concepts representing fully determinate objects, etc. Let C be a term in L mapped to a concept representing a composite property Then L has statements using C that are analytically true Concept has a shape subsumes concept is spherical because the properties they represent are accordingly composed. Statement Anything that is spherical has a shape must be true. Page 8

Correspondence & The Received View How to represent concepts for SW? Select concept representing fully determinate piece of reality Create term in chosen formal language to stand for concept State analytic and significant empirical facts Statements guaranteed to include real world as a model More statements formulated, fewer models Eventually set of statements hones in on real world singling out real world as only model (modulo isomorphisms) But watch out for the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem! Page 9

The Holistic Vision (1) Meaning of expression determined by its use in community of competent rational speakers. web of inferential and behavioral connections to other statements, beliefs, dispositions to act Language & belief interwoven in a total system used to structure the world we experience. No clear-cut distinction between language, belief, and reality. Truth holistic too. Page 10

The Holistic Vision (2) - Contra Fully Determinate Language-Independent Reality Holist Gedanken Experiment: Consider two communities of rational speakers one accepts Object O has property P other accepts Object O does not have property P Suppose two communities have accounted for all relevant evidence in systems of belief systems resilient to all future evidence Holist Conclusions: there is no truth to the matter (ontological indeterminate) as to whether O has P is true/false as to whether the disagreement is about reality or language Page 11

Ontological Indeterminacy When two or more incompatible conceptual systems model a domain of interest with equal empirical adequacy Examples Philosophical example Descartes Evil Genius Scientific example Poincare s Conventionalism of Geometry argument Everyday life example U.S. Constitution has/has-no right to privacy Page 12

Critique of Correspondence & Received View (1) Attack on Analytic Truth Dogma of correspondence view (holism a la Quine) Very few examples in NL that hold up Specification of meaning of NL terms an empirical pursuit Evidence for meaning-hypotheses gathered by observing what people say and do Postulate rules for use governing community of speakers But rules of use typically not fully determinate Maintaining there is a truth to the matter in such cases goes beyond the linguistic evidence Page 13

Critique of Correspondence & Received View (2) Consider rational competent speakers assent/dissent to whether a dog can be an employee Bomb-sniffing dog newest member of U. of I. Public Safety Department whether Pluto is a planet (details coming up) whether a same-sex marriage is really a marriage Should SW technology require certain responses in order to use SW versions of those terms? Unfortunately that is exactly what the received view entails. Crux of the problem: received view cannot distinguish between intention to use term according to certain NL community rules of use and precisely defining term. Page 14

Is Pluto a Planet? (1) Imagine two conflicting theories/ontologies http://www.ontologies.net/astro-1.owl (a1) (pro Pluto) http://www.ontologies.net/astro-2.owl (a2) (anti Pluto) a1:planet a2:planet R-URI for planet in first theory R-URI for planet in the second Now consider the following statements: Pluto is a1:planet (P1) Comes out true Pluto is not a a2:planet (P2) Comes out true Problem for received view: a1:planet & a2:planet cannot represent the same concept each ontology defines certain concepts for fully determinate objects, etc. If a1:planet, a2:planet defined the same concept then something (Pluto) would both be and not be an instance. P1 and P2 don t represent a substantive disagreement at all! Page 15

Forced Ontological Commitment Let astro-1.owl, astro-2.owl be authoritative ontologies. Astronomer A3 wants SW site with assertions about planets but does not take sides on Pluto case. A3 links occurrences of planet to one ontology or the other, thereby taking a position on the issue. A3 could decide to develop a neutral ontology. Problem: 3 rd planet would be totally different concept Page 16

Meaning-as-Use Accept meaning-as-use point of view Grant that NL terms cannot be precisely defined at all Therefore not definable using formal methods. We are then faced with the second horn of the dilemma If not by using formal definitions, how can machine-useable versions of these terms be constructed? The way out of the dilemma Not necessary for NL terms to be precisely definable in order for people to know when they are using terms in the same way. How to do that for machines? Machine version of a meaning-as-use approach Record intended use of a SW term using recognized NL dictionary of usages Use formal methods to explicate the intended usage, not define Page 17

Intended Usage Records R-URI http://www.example.org/employment/employee.iur Usage-ID: 101.1 Language-Term: ENGLISH EMPLOYEE SPANISH EMPLEADO Explicated-By: http://www.ontologies.net/myontology.owl Usage-ID field and Language-Term field indissolubly linked Dictionary of linked Usage-IDs and Language-term fields would be maintained and made accessible by a standards body. Explicated-By field is optional, machine-useable theory, of what this intended usage amounts to. R-URIs with same Usage-ID are ipso-facto the same SW term even if explications differ Page 18

Avoiding Ontological Commitment R-URI http://www.firstschool.astro/planet.iur Usage-ID: 503.1 Mars is a planet[503.1] Language-Term: ENGLISH Planet Pluto is a planet[503.1] Explicated-By: http://www.ontologies.net/astro-1.owl R-URI http://www.secondschool.astro/planet.iur Usage-ID: 503.1 Mars is a planet[503.1] Language-Term: ENGLISH Planet Pluto is not a planet[503.1] Explicated-By: http://www.ontologies.net/astro-2.owl R-URI http://www.undecidedschool.astro/planet.iur Usage-ID: 503.1 Language-Term: ENGLISH Planet Mars is a planet[503.1] Partially-Explicating-Competitors: http://www.ontologies.net/astro-1.owl http://www.ontologies.net/astro-2.owl Page 19

What is Explication? Use theory in explicated-by field for truth-value of SW statements Same as current practice But separation of intended-usage from definition allows alternatives Partially-Explicating-Competitors field illustrates this point Use notion of supervaluation for truth value (after Bas van Fraassen) Any statement assigned true/false by all competing theories is assigned same Otherwise statement is not assigned a truth value by supervaluation - Note that this means that any logical truth, such as, Either Pluto is a planet or Pluto is not a planet is assigned true by the supervaluation. Otherwise, beyond the scope of this discussion, i.e., future work Page 20

Conclusion Discussion of semantic notions for NL a primary concern of modern philosophy Not surprising nor unwelcome for SW to raise such discussions Holistic vision, and meaning-as-use, has had little influence in computational knowledge representation thus far. Hopefully this work shows how some of those insights can be employed Page 21