Contents Translator's Introduction / xv PART I THE CRISIS OF THE SCmNCES AS EXPRESSION OF THE RADICAL LIFE-CRISIS OF EUROPEAN HUMANITY I. Is there, in view of their constant successes, really a crisis of the sciences? / 3 2. The positivistic reduction of the idea of science to mere factual science. The "crisis" of science as the loss of its meaning for life. / 5 3. The founding of the autonomy of European humanity through the new formulation of the idea of philosophy in the Renaissance. / 7 4. The failure of the new science after its initial success; the unclarified motive for this failure. / 10 5. The ideal of universal philosophy and the process of its inner dissolution. / I I 6. The history of modern philosophy as a struggle for the meaning of man. / 14 7. The project of the investigations of this work. / 16 PART II CLARIFICATION OF THE ORIGIN OF THE MODERN OPPOSITION BETWEEN PHYSICALISTIC OBJECTIVISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVISM 8. The origin of the new idea of the universality of science in the reshaping of mathematics. / 21 9. GalileD's mathematization of nature. / 23 a. "Pure geometry." / 24 b. The basic notion of Galilean physics: nature as a mathematical universe. / 28 c. The problem of the mathematizability of the "plena." / 34 d. The motivation of Galileo's conception of nature. / 37 [ix]
x / CONTENTS e. The verificational character of natural science's fundamental hypothesis. I 41 f. The problem of the sense of natural-scientific "formulae." I 43 g. The emptying of the meaning of mathematical natural science through "technization." I 46 h. The life-world as the forgotten meaning-fundament of natural science. I 48 i. Portentous misunderstandings resulting from lack of clarity about the meaning of mathematization. I 53 k. Fundamental significance of the problem of the origin of mathematical natural science. I 56 1. Characterization of the method of our exposition. I 57 10. The origin of dualism in the prevailing exemplary role of natural science. The rationality of the world more geometrico. I 60 I I. Dualism as the reason for the incomprehensibility of the problems of reason; as presupposition for the specialization of the sciences; as the foundation of naturalistic psychology. I 61 12. Over-all characterization of modern physicalistic rationalism. I 65 13. The first difficulties of physicalistic naturalism in psychology: the incomprehensibility of functioning subjectivity. I 67 14. Precursory characterization of objectivism and transcendentalism. The struggle between these two ideas as the sense of modern spiritual history. I 68 15. Reflection on the method of our historical manner of investigation. I 70 16. Descartes as the primal founder not only of the modern idea of objectivistic rationalism but also of the transcendental motif which explodes it. I 73 17. Descartes's return to the ego cogito. Exposition of the sense of the Cartesian epoche. I 75 lb. Descartes's misinterpretation of himself. The psychologistic falsification of the pure ego attained through the epoche. I 78 19. Descartes's obtrusive interest in objectivism as the reason for his self-misinterpretation. I 81 20. "Intentionality" in Descartes. I 82 21. Descartes as the starting point of two lines of development, rationalism and empiricism. I 83 22. Locke's naturalistic-epistemological psychology. I 84 23. Berkeley. David Hume's psychology as fi,ctionalistic theory of knowledge: the "bankruptcy" of philosophy and science. I 86 24. The genuine philosophical motif hidden in the absurdity of Hume's skepticism: the shaking of objectivism. I 88 25. The "transcendental" motif in rationalism: Kant's conception of a transcendental philosophy. I 9I
Contents / xi 26. Preliminary discussion of the concept of the "transcendental" which guides us here. / 97 27. The philosophy of Kant and his followers seen from the perspective of our guiding concept of the "transcendental." The task of taking a critical position. / 98 PART III THE CLARIFICATION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM AND THE RELATED FUNCTION OF PSYCHOLOGY A. The Way into Phenomenological Transcendental Philosophy by Inquiring back from the Pre given Life World 28. Kant's unexpressed "presupposition": the surrounding world of life, taken for granted as valid. / 103 29. The life-world can be disclosed as a realm of subjective phenomena which have remained "anonymous." / 111 30. The lack of an intuitive exhibiting method as the reason for Kant's mythical constructions. / 114 3I. Kant and the inadequacy of the psychology of his day. The opaqueness of the distinction between transcendental subjectivity and soul. / 1 16 32. The possibility of a hidden truth in Kant's transcendental philosophy: the problem of a "new dimension." The antagonism between the "life of the plane" and the "life of depth." / 118 33. The problem of the "life-world" as a partial problem within the general problem of objective science. / 121 34. Exposition of the problem of a science of the life-world. / 123 a. The difference between objective science and science in general. / 123 b. The use of subjective-relative experiences for the objective sciences, and the science of them. / 125 c. Is the subjective-relative an object for psychology? / 126 d. The life-world as universe of what is intuitable in principle; the "objective-true" world as in principle nonintuitable "logical" substruction. / 127 e. The objective sciences as subjective constructs-those of a particular praxis, namely, the theoretical-logical, which itself belongs to the full concreteness of the life-world. / 129 f. The problem of the life-world not as a partial problem but rather as a universal problem for philosophy. / 132 35. Analysis of the transcendental epoche. First step: The epoche of objective science. / 135 36. How can the life-world, after the epoche of the objective sciences, become the subject matter of a science? The distinction in principle between the objective-logical a priori and the a priori of the life-world. / 137 37. The fonnal and most general structures of the life-world: thing
xii / CONTENTS and world on the one side, thing-consciousness on the other. / 142 38. The two possible fundamental ways of making the life-world thematic: the naive and natural straightforward attitude and the idea of a consistently reflective attitude toward the "houl' of the subjective manner of givenness of life-world and lifeworld objects. / 143 39. The peculiar character of the transcendental epoche as a total change of the natural attitude of life. / 148 40. The difficulties surrounding the genuine sense of performing the total epoche. The temptation to misconstrue it as a withholding of all individual validities, carried out step by step. / 148 41. The genuine transcendental epoche makes possible the "transcendental reduction" -the discovery and investigation of the transcendental correlation between world and world-consciousness. / 151 42. The task of concretely plotting ways in which the transcendental reduction can actually be carried out. / 152 43. Characterization of a new way to the reduction, as contrasted with the "Cartesian way." / 154 44. The life-world as subject matter for a theoretical interest determined by a universal epoche in respect to the actuality of the things of the life-world. / ISS 45. Beginnings of a concrete exposition of what is given in senseintuition purely as such. / 157 46. The universal a priori of correlation. / 159 47. Indication of further directions of inquiry: the basic subjective phenomena of kinesthesis, alteration of validity, horizon-consciousness, and the communalization of experience. / 161 48. Anything that is-whatever its meaning and to whatever region it belongs-is an index of a subjective system of correlations. / 165 49. Preliminary concept of transcendental constitution as "original formation of meaning." The restricted character of the exemplary analyses carried out so far; an indication of further horizons of exposition. / 167 50. First ordering of all working problems under the headings ego-cogito-cogitatum. / 170 51. The task of an "ontology of the life-world." / 173 52. The emergence of paradoxical enigmas. The necessity of new radical reflections. / 174 53. The paradox of human subjectivity: being a subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world. / 178
Contents / xiii 54. The resolution of the paradox: / 182 a. We as human beings, and we as ultimately functioningaccomplishing subjects. / 182 b. As primal ego, I constitute my horizon of transcendental others as cosubjects within the transcendental intersubjectivity which constitutes the world. / 184 55. The correction in principle of our first application of the epoche by reducing it to the absolutely unique, ultimately functioning ego. / 186 PART III B. The Way into Phenomenological Transcendental Philosophy from Psychology 56. Characterization of the philosophical development after Kant from the perspective of the struggle between physicalistic objectivism and the constantly reemerging "transcendental motif." / 191 57. The fateful separation of transcendental philosophy and psychology. / 198 58. The alliance and the difference between psychology and transcendental philosophy. Psychology as the decisive field. / 203 59. Analysis of the reorientation from the psychological attitude into the transcendental attitude. Psychology "before" and "after" the phenomenological reduction. (The problem of "flowing in.") / 208 60. The reason for the failure of psychology: dualistic and physicalistic presuppositions. / 2II 6x. Psychology in the tension between the (objectivistic-philosophical) idea of science and empirical procedure: the incompatibility of the two directions of psychological inquiry (the psychophysical and that of "psychology based on inner experience"). / 213 62. Preliminary discussion of the absurdity of giving equal status in principle to souls and bodies as realities; indication of the difference in principle between the temporality, the causality, and the individuation of natural things and those of souls. / 215 63. The questionable character of the concepts of "outer" and "inner" experience. Why has the experience of the bodily thing in the life-world, as the experience of something "merely subjective," not previously been included in the subject matter of psychology? / 219 64. Cartesian dualism as the reason for the parallelization. Only the formal and most general features of the schema "descriptive vs. explanatory science" are justified. / 221 65. Testing the legitimacy of an empirically grounded dualism by familiarizing oneself with the factual procedure of the psychologist and the physiologist. / 224 66. The world of common experience: its set of regional types and
xiv / CONTENTS the possible universal abstractions within it: "nature" as correlate of a universal abstraction; the problem of "complementary abstractions." / 226 67. The dualism of the abstractions grounded in experience. The continuing historical influence of the empiricist approach (from Hobbes to Wundt). Critique of data-empiricism. / 230 68. The task of a pure explication of consciousness as such: the universal problem of intentionality. (Brentano's attempt at a reform of psychology.) / 233 69. The basic psychological method of "phenomenological-psychological reduction" (first characterization: [r] intentional relatedness and the epoche; [2] levels of descriptive psychology; [3] establishing the "disinterested spectator"). / 235 70. The difficulties of psychological "abstraction." (The paradox of the "intentional object"; the intentional primal phenomenon of "sense." / 241 7r. The danger of misunderstanding the "universality" of the phenomenological-psychological epocm. The decisive significance of the correct understanding. / 244 72. The relation of transcendental psychology to transcendental phenomenology as the proper access to pure self-knowledge. Definitive removal of the objectivistic ideal from the science of the soul. / 257 APPENDIXES A. The Vienna Lecture I. Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity / 269 B. Supplementary Texts II. Idealization and the Science of Reality-The Mathematization III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. of Nature / 301 The Attitude of Natural Science and the Attitude of Humanistic Science. Naturalism, Dualism, and Psychophysical Psychology / 315 Philosophy as Mankind's Self-Reflection; the Self-Realization of Reason / 335 [Objectivity and the World of Experience] / 343 [The Origin of Geometry] / 353 [The Life-World and the World of Science] / 379 Fink's Appendix on the Problem of the "Unconscious" / 385 Denial of Scientific Philosophy. Necessity of Reflection. The Reflection [Must Be] Historical. How Is History Required? / 389 X. Fink's Outline for the Continuation of the Crisis / 397 Index / 401