Sketch of argument 1 (cf TR 8) Claim: absurdism about human purposes is contradictory. Absurdism 1 : there are no jusbfied human purposes. Suppose someone acts on the mobve that absurdism 1 is true. That acbon asserts some value. Thus, absurdism 1 is false.
Sketch of argument 2 (cf TR 8) Claim: there is an emerging universalist ethics arising from rebellion. Absurdism 2 : neither history nor the universe have a purpose. Absurdism 2 entails that any value must arise from human beings. Now, limit our argument to those who accept absurdism 2. Human beings have a nature (cf TR 16). Cultural progress can result in us becoming more aware of our human nature (cf TR 20 and also cf TR25). When we recognize a harm to human nature (against ourselves or others), we might rebel. To rebel is to assert a value that respects some aspect of that human nature; since this nature is universal, the rebel s acbon asserts a universal value (cf TR 16).
Answering an objecbon (that is, rejecbng an alternabve explanabon) Claim (from Scheler and Nietzsche): human beings rebel because they feel ressenbment against the powerful. (cf TR 17ff) Camus s reply is a mustering of contrary evidence: One envies what one doesn t have. The rebel demands respect for what she has or is. The resenvul (secretly) want to be something different; the rebel wants to assert what she is. The resenvul take delight in harming those that they resent. The rebel wants to stop her own humiliabon; she is not mobvated to humiliate others.
Some senses of nihilism Basic nihilism: There are no jusbfied values or purposes. NC-nihilism (Nietzschean nihilism, according to Camus) (cf TR 69): the state in which all of one s values and purposes are based upon a false jusbficabon. R-nihilism (Russian historical nihilism): a belief system that rejects contemporary values as failed or false, but offers no explicit alternabve values. C-nihilism (Camus s implicit definibon): denial of, or acbon contrary to, all human values (and remember that these are the only values for Camus). N-nihilism (Nietzsche s descripbon in Will to Power s36): the belief that there is some problem that arises because basic nihilism is true. ( The philosophical nihilist is convinced that all that happens is meaningless and in vain; and that there ought not to be anything meaningless and in vain. )
What is the relabonship between absurdism and nihilism? That depends on the definibon of nihilism and of absurdism. But most significantly: The conjuncbon of Absurdism 1 and Absurdism 2 is equivalent to basic nihilism. Absurdism 2 is independent of basic nihilism (because absurdism 2 allows that there could be purposes to human lives, even jusbfied purposes for human lives).
Some essenbal features of rebellion The rebel is self-consciously aware of (some relevant aspect of) human nature. The rebel asserts a value arising from human nature. The acbon itself asserts the value, right now, during the acbon. This asserbon is implicitly universal, since the value arising from human nature must be a value for all human beings (since all human beings share the relevant features of human nature). The rebel implicitly demands some kind of equality, since the rebel acts against oppressors who deny the rebel exercise of a capability that the oppressors exercise (or at least that they could exercise).
Our problem: how to strike a balance Claim: rebellion o_en goes too far, and as a result collapses back into an asserbon of nihilism. Too li8le: To not rebel in the face of acbon that you know harm human beings is to tacitly endorse basic nihilism by asserbng no values. Just right: To rebel (to some degree) against such acbons is to assert a universal value. Too much: - Rebellion without restraint can lead to acbons that deny human values, and thus tacitly endorse basic nihilism or C-nihilism. - Rebellion on extreme consequenbalist grounds can collapse into a tacit endorsement of basic nihilism or C-nihilism because the value that the acbon asserts now is contrary to human values.