1 POL 200Y1 L0101 - Lecture of Oct. 6, 2003 Chapters 16-18 apply the teaching of chapter 15 to specific virtues that are critical to political life. Today we will be discussing Chapter 16 in particular. The topic of this chapter is liberality. This is the virtue having to do with giving; it is closest to what we would call generosity. Liberality is well known to Machiavelli s readers through Aristotle s teaching in the Nicomachean Ethics. Now, if you recall, in last week s discussion of chapter 15 Professor Orwin drew our attention to the extent to which Machiavelli understands himself to be responding to earlier writers. In chapter 15, entitled, Of Those Things for Which Men And Especially Princes are Praised or Blamed, Machiavelli writes: And Because I know that many have written of this, I fear that in writing of it again, I may be held presumptuous, especially since in disputing this matter I depart from the orders of others. But since my intent is to write something useful to whoever understands it, it has appeared to me more fitting to go directly to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination of it. (p. 61) Last week we had also noted that in Chapter 15 Machiavelli lists 11 pairs of qualities for which men are praised or blamed. This presentation recalls to our minds Aristotle s discussion of the moral virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics. In the Ethics Aristotle lists 11 pairs of moral virtues. The virtue of liberality is among them. What Machiavelli is up to in chapter 16 becomes very clear when we compare his treatment of liberality with Aristotle s treatment of the same. According to Aristotle, liberality consists in giving the right amount, to the right people, on the right occasions. For Aristotle, liberality is a mean between two extremes, meanness or stinginess, on the one hand, and overspending on the other. The mean or stingy person is not virtuous because they don t give enough they covet money too much, the person who overspends takes his generosity too far giving to any and all comers. Here is a quote from book four of the Ethics worth keeping in mind, Aristotle states: Again, those who give are called liberal, but those who do not take are praised not for their liberality but quite as much for justice; and those who do take are not praised at all. Now let's look at Machiavelli. Machiavelli begins by paying lip service to liberality as intrinsically good, he begins: Beginning then with the first of the above mentioned qualities, I say that it would be good to be held liberal (p.62) But, as we know by now, Machiavelli s first word is never his last. He goes on: Nonetheless, liberality, when used so that you may be held liberal, hurts you. (p. 62-3)
Question: So, looking at just this sentence, what is it that hurts you, according to Machiavelli? Practicing liberality in order to be held liberal, OR to put it differently, spending your money in order to gain a reputation for being liberal that s what hurts you. Machiavelli goes on to say (see the top of p. 63): If liberality is practiced virtuously it may not be recognized, and you will not escape the infamy of its contrary. Question: What does Aristotle mean hear, what does he mean when he says if liberality is practiced virtuously? Note the sense of virtuously as it is used in this sentence. Here and only here in the Prince it appears to be used in the sense recommended by Aristotle. Machiavelli is here saying that if one practices liberality virtuously that is if one gives the right amount, to the right people, on the right occasions this liberality will not be recognized but will go down as its opposite. In attempting to be a generous prince you will only succeed in gaining the reputation for rapacity. Question: But, would Machiavelli s treatment of liberality faze Aristotle? We are not yet experts in Aristotle, but what do you think Machiavelli s presentation would pose a problem for Aristotle? No. For Aristotle what matters is the reality, not the appearance. What matters for Aristotle is whether or not one possesses virtue. And for Aristotle there is a reality to virtue the standard for which is not how big a political splash you make. But let s suppose that you do practice liberality so a to gain a reputation for it. So you give you give indiscriminately and in a big way. Question: How then, according to Machiavelli, does one succeed in gaining the reputation for illiberality? You are forced to take. If you give indiscriminately and in a big way you will quickly exhaust your resources and thereby menace your reputation. Because if you are going to continue to give, you will need to have things to give, and so, soon you will resort to taking. To support your addiction to liberality you'll actually have to practice rapacity: In the end it will be necessary, if he wants to maintain a name for liberality, to burden the people extraordinarily, to be rigorous with taxes, and to do all those things that can be done to get money. This will begin to make him hated by his subjects, and little esteemed by anyone as he becomes poor; so having offended the many and rewarded the few with this liberality of his, he feels every least hardship and runs into risk at every slight danger. When he 2
3 recognizes this, and wants to draw back from it, he immediately incurs the infamy of meanness. (p. 63) Apart from the difficulties that the private person may have in attempting to maintain a reputation for liberality, the prince has the added concern of ensuring that he has the means to be able to wage, at the very least, a defensive war. Think back to chapter 3 and Machiavelli s praise of the prudence of the ancient Romans: For the Romans did in these cases what all wise princes should do: they not only have to have regard for present troubles but also for future ones, and they have to avoid these with all their industry because, when one foresees from afar, one can easily find a remedy for them but when you wait until they come close to you, the medicine is not in time because the disease has become incurable. (p. 12) So, Machiavelli argues that it is better to practice meanness from the beginning so as not to have a reputation for liberality, which can only be maintained by such drastic and counterproductive measures. He even comforts us by suggesting that through the practice of meanness (which let us now call thrift) you can gain a reputation for liberality, because people will be so grateful to you for not taking anything from them. The joke is on Aristotle: not by practicing the mean but only by practicing either one of the extremes either extravagance or stinginess can one gain a reputation for the mean. Let s look at how Machiavelli revises Aristotle: Aristotle says: those who give are called liberal, but those who do not take are praised not for their liberality but for another virtue. Machiavelli says: those who give are come to be called rapacious, and those who do not take are praised for their liberality. Extravagance is risky, stinginess is safe, so better to be stingy or thrifty. Question: Do people in fact gain reputations for thrift merely by refraining from rapacity? That is, do people gain a reputation for giving simply by refraining from taking? No, and at the beginning of the next paragraph, Machiavelli concedes this: "Therefore, so as not to have to rob his subjects, to be able to defend himself, not to become poor and contemptible, nor to be forced to become rapacious, a prince should esteem it little to incur a name for meanness, because this is one of those vices which enable him to rule. (p.64)
So merely refraining from taking does not gain you a reputation for giving, and Machiavelli now must field objections based on great figures of the past who really did enjoy a reputation for giving. And if someone should say Read p. 64. Machiavelli has come full circle. From recommending against concerning yourself with a reputation for liberality because this will drive you to rapacity, he ends up recommending that you practice rapacity to gain a reputation for liberality. The appearance of being a big giver necessarily depends on the reality of being a big taker. The crucial distinction to bear in mind: us and them, domestic and foreign. If you take from the majority of your own people to give to a minority, the majority will hate you. But if you take from as many outsiders as possible to give to all of your own people, then they will love you. And they will even do most of the work for you: you just form them into an army of takers. True liberality is the worst alternative, stinginess is second best, but best of all is rapacity practiced in the biggest possible way, for practiced in that way it no longer incurs a reputation for rapacity, but rather one for liberality. And only the reputation matters. So where as Aristotle says: Again, those who give are called liberal, but those who do not take are praised not for their liberality but quite as much for justice; and those who do take are not praised at all. Machiavelli says: those who give are come to be called rapacious, and those who do not take are praised for their liberality, and those who take on the greatest scale are praised most of all, so long as they take from the foreigner and give to their own. What Machiavelli is recommending here is really a policy of steady economic growth. In the circumstances of his day, it is endless imperialism, with all of the risks and inconveniences. Conquer, Conquer, Conquer, and exploit, exploit, exploit. But substitute, as Locke will do, nature for man as the enemy to be exploited, and substitute armies of entrepreneurs, workers, scientists, and economists for armies of the old fashioned kind, and you have what remains a cornerstone of modern politics: liberality not as the distribution of existing wealth, but as the creation of new wealth through an expanding economy, an ongoing and endless project. This is Machiavelli's chapter on economics, which clearly foreshadows the modern economic project. Herein lies an important distinction between the modern and the pre-modern position: As moderns our reservations concerning acquisition consist in the justice and feasibility of acquisition. That is we are concerned about whether 4
acquisition is equitably distributed and whether it is non-exploitative. We are concerned about whether acquisition is sustainable, for example, whether it is ecologically sound. What we as moderns do not question is whether acquisition is good. Aristotle, in contrast, does ask this question. He doesn't JUST question the justice of a city or an individual enriching itself through trade: he questions the goodness of it, as measured by the standard of virtue. (Aristotle, if you will, takes it one step further) Modernity accepts the ongoing and endless project of the creation of new wealth, the pre-modern position raises questions the goodness of the project itself. On Wednesday we will be doing chapters 18-21. 5