Elena Paducheva (Moscow)

Similar documents
Presuppositions (Ch. 6, pp )

10. Presuppositions Introduction The Phenomenon Tests for presuppositions

Ling 98a: The Meaning of Negation (Week 1)

Mandy Simons Carnegie Mellon University June 2010

Presupposition Projection and At-issueness

The main plank of Professor Simons thoroughly pragmatic account of presupposition

Russell: On Denoting

Lecture 9: Presuppositions

Lexical Alternatives as a Source of Pragmatic Presuppositions

The projection problem of presuppositions

Lecture 1. Yasutada Sudo 12 January 2018

Presupposition and Rules for Anaphora

Factivity and Presuppositions David Schueler University of Minnesota, Twin Cities LSA Annual Meeting 2013

A Linguistic Interlude

A presupposition is a precondition of a sentence such that the sentences cannot be

Presupposition: An (un)common attitude?

Topics in Linguistic Theory: Propositional Attitudes

Class #9 - The Attributive/Referential Distinction

Exhaustification over Questions in Japanese

ROBERT STALNAKER PRESUPPOSITIONS

91. Presupposition. Denial, projection, cancellation, satisfaction, accommodation: the five stages of presupposition theory.

Pronominal, temporal and descriptive anaphora

Some proposals for understanding narrow content

Presupposition projection: Global accommodation, local accommodation, and scope ambiguities

ILLOCUTIONARY ORIGINS OF FAMILIAR LOGICAL OPERATORS

Towards a Solution to the Proviso Problem

Pragmatic Presupposition

Affirmation-Negation: New Perspective

Presupposition: Introduction

From Necessary Truth to Necessary Existence

Satisfied or Exhaustified An Ambiguity Account of the Proviso Problem

Strawson On Referring. By: Jake McDougall and Siri Cosper

ZHANG Yan-qiu, CHEN Qiang. Changchun University, Changchun, China

Linguistic Society of America

Phil 435: Philosophy of Language. P. F. Strawson: On Referring

Experimental Investigations of the Typology of Presupposition Triggers

The Semantics and Pragmatics of Presupposition

Presupposed ignorance and exhaustification: how scalar implicatures and presuppositions interact

Conditions on Propositional Anaphora

On Conceivability and Existence in Linguistic Interpretation

Comments on Lasersohn

Particles: presupposition triggers or context markers

Negation And The Strength Of Presuppositions Or There Is More To Speaking Than Words

Russell on Denoting. G. J. Mattey. Fall, 2005 / Philosophy 156. The concept any finite number is not odd, nor is it even.

The Myth of Factive Verbs

ROB VAN DER SANDT R V D S A N D H I L.K U N.N L

What would count as Ibn Sīnā (11th century Persia) having first order logic?

The Whys and How Comes of Presupposition and NPI Licensing in Questions

Propositions as Cognitive Event Types

Theories of propositions

Kai von Fintel (MIT)

PART III - Symbolic Logic Chapter 7 - Sentential Propositions

Slides: Notes:

3. Negations Not: contradicting content Contradictory propositions Overview Connectives

Logic: A Brief Introduction

Quantifiers: Their Semantic Type (Part 3) Heim and Kratzer Chapter 6

Subjective Logic: Logic as Rational Belief Dynamics. Richard Johns Department of Philosophy, UBC

'ONLY' IN IMPERATIVES

Expressing Credences. Daniel Rothschild All Souls College, Oxford OX1 4AL

Why the Traditional Conceptions of Propositions can t be Correct

URI: from the 2013 edition of the FCT Project PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010. Edited by João Branquinho and Ricardo Santos

Uli Sauerland (Berlin) Implicated Presuppositions. 1 Introduction

The Unexpected Projection of Some Presupposition Triggers

On Truth At Jeffrey C. King Rutgers University

Superlative quantifiers and meta-speech acts

part one MACROSTRUCTURE Cambridge University Press X - A Theory of Argument Mark Vorobej Excerpt More information

HAVING FALSE REASONS

Module 5. Knowledge Representation and Logic (Propositional Logic) Version 2 CSE IIT, Kharagpur

Modal disagreements. Justin Khoo. Forthcoming in Inquiry

Comments on Truth at A World for Modal Propositions

Clearly, it must be : An analysis of theories surrounding clarity and epistemic must. Teal Patterson. Swarthmore College, Department of Linguistics

Interactions with Context. Eric Swanson. B.A., Bard College (1997) M.A., Yale University (1999) M.A., Tufts University (2001)

Identity and Plurals

Chapter 2 Truth Predicates in Natural Language

Bertrand Russell Proper Names, Adjectives and Verbs 1

Understanding Belief Reports. David Braun. In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection.

CHAPTER 1 A PROPOSITIONAL THEORY OF ASSERTIVE ILLOCUTIONARY ARGUMENTS OCTOBER 2017

LGCS 199DR: Independent Study in Pragmatics

Verificationism. PHIL September 27, 2011

Exercises Introduction to morphosyntax

Empty Names and Two-Valued Positive Free Logic

Ayer on the criterion of verifiability

Backgrounding and accommodation of presuppositions: an experimental approach

A Scopal Theory of Presupposition I

A set of puzzles about names in belief reports

Slovenian (Rivero, 2001) a.janez se oblaci.

Entailment as Plural Modal Anaphora

An alternative understanding of interpretations: Incompatibility Semantics

Presupposition and Accommodation: Understanding the Stalnakerian picture *

CHAPTER 2 THE LARGER LOGICAL LANDSCAPE NOVEMBER 2017

Scott Soames: Understanding Truth

Can logical consequence be deflated?

Brainstorming exercise

Semantic Entailment and Natural Deduction

Day 3. Wednesday May 23, Learn the basic building blocks of proofs (specifically, direct proofs)

15. Russell on definite descriptions

Draft January 19, 2010 Draft January 19, True at. Scott Soames School of Philosophy USC. To Appear In a Symposium on

In Reference and Definite Descriptions, Keith Donnellan makes a

1. Introduction Formal deductive logic Overview

17. Tying it up: thoughts and intentionality

Transcription:

PRESUPPOSITIONS AND SEMANTIC TYPOLOGY OF PROJECTIVE MEANINGS * Elena Paducheva (Moscow) elena.paducheva@yandex.ru The notion of presupposition is the most important notion that came into linguistics from logic. Common Ground approach to presuppositions is not-at-issue The history of presuppositions begins with Strawson 1950 (which refers to Frege 1892), where it is said: P is a PRESUPPOSITION of S, if P must be true for S to be either true or false; i.e., if S has a false presupposition it is semantically deviant. R.Stalnaker (1974) paved the way from the truth of presuppositions to PROJECTION UNDER NEGATION, and then linguists themselves found many other projection diagnostics for presuppositions: conditionals, question, modals, etc. In Karttunen 1974, Heim 1983 a PRAGMATIC DEFINITION of presupposition was put forward, based on the so called Common Ground condition. This approach is duly criticized in Roberts e.a. 2009. * I am grateful to Barbara Partee for immeasurable help. 1

Back to Frege-Strawson approach to presuppositions Thus, we return to the definition of presupposition based on projection tests. However, it was noticed by several authors (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990; Beaver 1997; Potts 2007; Roberts 2006; Roberts e.a. 2010) that some words and constructions successfully pass the projection tests but are not comfortably categorized as presupposition-triggers: non-restrictive relative clauses (Bob, who was in Baku, missed our last seminar); nominal appositives (John, as a conscientious colleague, came in time); parenthetical sentences and parenthetical adverbials (By chance, John was at home) and some others. In a breakthrough paper Potts 2007 these meanings were called CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURES (CIs). The term is misleading. In Roberts e.a. 2009 they are called BACKGROUND IMPLICATIONS, which is also infelicitous. I suggest the term SECONDARY ASSERTION: in Russian grammatical tradition the corresponding syntactic constructions are called SECONDARY PREDICATIONS. Two other types of projective meanings which are also not readily identified as presuppositions were discussed in Roberts e.a. 2009, one triggered, e.g., by the word discover, another connected with only. Semantic typology of projective meanings is, in fact, an intriguing field of exploration. In Roberts e.a. 2009, 2010 projection was related to the notion of BEING (NOT)-AT ISSUE. And this is a useful path to pursue. 2

Projection and being not-at-issue < > projection is a consequence of the scope of sentential operators such as negation, conditionals and modals typically being limited roughly to what is understood as the main point, or, in the terminology we will use, the at-issue content of the utterance. Whatever does not belong to the main point the not-at-issue content is left out of the scope of the operator, and hence projects. (Roberts e.a. 2009) Our hypothesis claims that material projects if and only if it is actually not-at-issue (Roberts e.a. 2010). The relationship between not-at-issue-ness (no matter how defined) and projection is not strait forward. First of all, negation, though being at the heart of the very idea of projection, is a special kind of sentential operators: a sentence with a presupposition-trigger may have no natural negation as, e.g., (A) Even Lucy came. In fact, even is the highest operator in the semantic structure of this sentence, i.e. it introduces the contents at issue. But the meaning of even consists of nothing but presupposition, and it is natural to define negation in natural language as presupposition-preserving operation. Thus, (A) has no negation. According to other projection tests, even-proposition projects: in (B) Even Lucy came? the fact that all the rest came is not questioned. And semantically, evenproposition remains at issue. So, an even-proposition projects (if not under negation), being semantically at issue and thus contradicting the claim that material projects < > only if it is actually not-at-issue. 3

In (A) projection under negation test gives a result different from other types of projection tests because its highest semantic operator doesn t constitute an assertion syntactically, and the sentence has no negation. On the other hand, a sentence may also have no natural negation if there is more than one assertion in its semantic structure. Take Russian sentences (1a) and (1b). (1) a. Soldaty gromko pazgovarivali The soldiers loudly spoke ; b. Soldaty pazgovarivali gromko The soldiers spoke loudly. Sentence (1b) has a negative counterpart Soldaty pazgovarivali ne gromko, with a negative particle before the asserted gromko, while sentence (1a) has no natural negation. The explanation is that sentence (1a), because of its word order and syntactic structure, has two assertions: the soldiers spoke (ordinary component) and the conversation was loud (MODIFYING component). Sentences with conjunctions as and or but also have no natural negation exactly because they contain more than one assertion; the negated meaning (containing a lot of disjunctions) is too indeterminate (cf. Horn 1989): (2) IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT (Mary is nasty and wise) either Mary is not nasty, or not wise, or both. 4

But in example (2) negation test agrees with other projection tests: general question is not felicitous for Mary is nasty and wise and even for (1a) Soldaty gromko pazgovarivali, as opposed to (1b) Soldaty pazgovarivali gromko. Thus, in (2), as well as in (1a), the sentence as a whole is at issue, but it cannot constitute the scope of a sentential operator such as negation. The relationships between being not-at-issue and being able to project are now as follows. For a proposition it is necessary to be semantically at-issue in order to constitute the scope of negation or other operators. But it is not sufficient. This was demonstrated both by example (A) Even Lucy came and (1), (2). For a proposition in order to project it is necessary to be not-at-issue. But it is not sufficient, see example (3): (3) Ivan, k sožaleniju, otkazalsja ot priglašenija Ivan, unfortunately, refused the invitation. In fact, in (3) the component sožalenije is in parenthesis and, thus, syntactically, not-at-issue, but it doesn t project under negation; in fact, negation doesn t apply to (3). Neither does general question or conditional. The same is true about other parentheticals expressing propositional attitudes. 5

They express a secondary, and, thus, syntactically not-at-issue proposition, but do not project either under negation or in other contexts. Potts 2007 on semantic difference between secondary assertions (CIs) and genuine presuppositions In Potts 2007 it is maintained that SEMANTIC INDEPENDENCE is a feature that differentiates CIs (= secondary assertions) from presuppositions. CIs are logically independent of what is asserted, i.e., of the at-issue entailments, see example (4). (4) Lance Armstrong, an Arkansan, has won the 2002 Tour de France! Potts 2007: I know that Armstrong is a Texan; the CI is false. But I can still recover from (4) the information that Lance won this year s Tour. I need not accommodate the CI proposition to do this. While sentence (5) is undefined if the presupposition her coat is on fire is false: (5) Ali doesn t realize her coat is on fire. Presuppositions can be arguments of operators that constitute assertive components, CIs cannot. In example (3) there is a predicate-argument connection between its two propositional components; and this is why k sožaleniju unfortunately does not project as other 6

secondary predications do (NRRCs, NAs, parentheticals of by chance type). Semantically, k sožaleniju remains at-issue (= assertive), in spite of its syntax. Potts 2007 on different kinds of deixis in presuppositions and secondary assertions Stalnaker s definition of presupposition mentions the speaker who believes that Q both in her assertion or denial that P. Sentence (A) Even Lucy came asserts that Lucy came and presupposes Lucy is among the least likely to have come. But the meaning of likely is egocentric: likely requires the subject of the opinion. And in the semantic representation of a sentence I have to make it clear that it is the speaker s presupposition otherwise I won t be able to give an account of the fact that in the embedded position the presupposition changes its bearer. In fact, in sentence (C) Mother is happy that even Lucy came it is the presupposition of the Mother. (Perhaps, the speaker should agree with the Mother, otherwise some kind of quotation marks around even would have been inserted.) Thus, in the case of a genuine presupposition the presupposing subject undergoes HYPOTACTIC PROJECTION (Paducheva 2011). It is observed in Potts 2007 that in the context of CI the speaker remains the subject of the projected proposition, and this is the second distinction between CIs and genuine presuppositions. 7

A proposition can project being neither presupposition nor Potts CI An implication can projects under negation being neither a presupposition nor a CI of the sentence in question. For sentence (6а), in its neutral reading, the most natural negation is (6b): (6) а. Ivan priedet v Moskvu / dlja učastija v konkurse Čajkovskogo \ Ivan will come to Moscow to take part in Čajkovskij competition ; b. Ivan ne priedet \ v Moskvu dlja učastija v konkurse Čajkovskogo Ivan won t come to Moscow to take part in Čajkovskij competition. The meaning of sentence (6а) includes two propositions (Paducheva 2004: 126). (i) Ivan will come to Moscow ; (ii) the purpose of Ivan s <expected> arrival in Moscow is taking part in Čajkovskij contest. Proposition (i) is an assertion of (6b); in fact, it constitutes the scope of negation in (6b). But (ii) definitely is not a presupposition of (6b) in Frege-Strawson sense. At the same time it is a component of the meaning of (6b), which is the negation of (6а), i.e. it projects under negation. Syntactically, it is a modifying component, the same as in (1a). If the TR-structure were different, namely, if the finite verb had no stress, (i) would have been a presupposition and (ii) an assertion. But with the given TRstructure, i.e. with the stressed verb, component (ii) is not at issue, and this is why it projects under negation. Note that (1a) cannot be negated in the same way. In Boguslavskij 1997 not-at-issue-ness of (ii) in (6) was explained by SEMANTICS OF EXPECTATION it is only with this aim that Ivan s arrival in Moscow is considered. 8

Presupposition cancellation The notion of presupposition is sometimes reproached of being non-well-defined because presuppositions can be cancelled. This reproach isn t substantial, for cancellation can always be accounted for as a well defined phenomenon. A non-factive interpretation may become possible, e.g., for verbs of inner state causation as the result of a specific assumption arising in the context of discourse. Look at example (7). (7) Ivan ne poradoval nas svoim vozvraščeniem Ivan didn t make us happy by returning. Sentence (7) has an interpretation (i) corresponding to its lexico-syntactic structure; in other words, it allows an ordinary factual reading of its subordinate proposition Ivan returned. On the other hand, a non-factive reading (ii) may also become possible due to the contextual assumption for Ivan to return IS to make us happy. In the context of this assumption the only way for Ivan not to make us happy is not to return (i.e. not to commit the action of returning): (i) that Ivan returned didn t make us happy ; (ii) Ivan didn t return and, thus, didn t make us happy. It is only in this context that the factive presupposition can be canceled the presupposition that is triggered by lexical semantics of the verb poradovat make happy. The meaning of the verb повезло was lucky in sentences (8a) and (8b) differs in that in (8a) the component the event Y happened to Х is a presupposition, while in (8b) it is an assertion (example discussed in V.Apresjan 2010). (8) a. Emu povezlo, čto on vstretil molčalivuju ženščinu he was happy to meet a silent woman ; ne povezlo = event Y happened to Х Y was bad ; b. Emu povezlo rodit sja bogatym he was happy to be born rich ; ne povezlo = event Y didn t happen to Х. The explanation is that in (8b) the verb doesn t denote any separate event: its semantics is that of an adverb, cf. On pospešil vyjti he hurried to go away = On vyšel pospešno he went away in a hurry. To resume, projection is the unique method for detecting presuppositions, though not all that projects is presupposed. Presuppositions are a privileged kind of projective meanings and semantic typology of projective meanings remains an intriguing field of exploration. References Paducheva 2004 Падучева Е.В. Динамические модели в семантике лексики. М.: Языки славянской культуры, 2004. Paducheva 2011 Падучева Е.В. Эгоцентрические валентности и деконструкция говорящего. Вопросы языкознания, 2011, 3, 3-18, http://lexicograph.ruslang.ru/textpdf1/egocentricals.pdf. Boguslavskij 1996 Богуславский И. М. Сфера действия лексических единиц. М.: Языки рус. культуры, 1996. Apresjan V. 2010 Апресян В.Ю. Семантическая структура слова и его взаимодействие с отрицанием // Компьютерная лингвистика и интеллектуальные технологии. Вып. 9 (16). По материалам международной конференции Диалог 2010. М.: РГГУ, 2010. 9