June 2010 The Security Trends Analysis is provided by NCCI as an informational and advisory report to NGOs on possible trends, threats and incidents based on information received from NGOs, the media, international organisations and official sources. Every reasonable effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this trends analysis; by collating information from reliable sources or where a source is in doubt, corroborating that information. There will be occasions where information is included and accuracy cannot be guaranteed, typically in emerging or developing situations where it is considered in the best interests of organisations to be made aware of what information there is available. This trends analysis is only an overview and is targeted at NCCI Members HoMs and security specialists as an addendum to their own information and analysis. Technical and general information is available to members at the NCCI Website: www.ncciraq.org We welcome comments and contributions from the NGO community to make this tool as useful as possible. Please do not hesitate to get in touch with us at: communication@ncci.org We thank you in advance for NOT disseminating this document and for making sure that it is kept within your organisation. 1
Map of the governorates of Iraq 2
Security Trends Analysis June 2010 The security and political context in the post-election period: continued uncertainty A lack of transparency continues to be the most salient feature of the ongoing negotiations to form a government. The election results have still not been certified by the Supreme Court, making it possible that parliament will not elect a president before mid-july. This would leave precious little time for a prime minister-elect to ratify a government before the onset of Ramadan on or around August 11th. It could be mid-september before a government sits and a sense of apprehension obtains. In early 2006, during the months of uncertainty following the December 2005 elections, Al Qaeda in Iraq executed an attack on the shrine of Imam al-askari in Samarra, a site venerated by Shia Muslims. This prompted revenge attacks on Sunni mosques and clerics and was followed by more Sunni violence against Shias. This marked the beginning of the sectarian civil war which left tens of thousands dead and injured and millions displaced. The Iraqi state is now stronger, the US occupation is no longer such a serious factor in violence and there is little mention of a possible return to the darkness of 2006-7. At the same time, insurgents attack checkpoints regularly and Al Qaeda in Iraq is still executing mass-casualty terrorist attacks which aim at re-igniting sectarian violence. In the political arena, the most major development in recent weeks is the union between the State of Law (SOL) and the Iraqi National Alliance (INA). The two lists have failed to nominate a prime minister due to their conflicting opinions however. There are currently 5 candidates for the PM position from the coalition; Nouri al-maliki and Ja afar al-sadr from SOL (Ja far al-sadr nominated as an alternative if Maliki is rejected) and former PM Ibrahim al- Ja afari, Vice president Adil Abdul-Mahdi and Minister of Finance Baqer al-zubaidi from INA. Both lists wish to dominate the process of nominating a new PM. Neither list is free of internal rifts. The INA has a top-heavy structure which favours the Islamic Supreme Council despite their declining popularity, allowing them to sideline contenders from the popular Sadrist bloc within the alliance. Within the SOL, Maliki who is head of the alliance and the Da wa party, is using every possible means to cling to his position. If he is forced to give up in favour of Ja far al-sadr or another candidate from within the alliance, he may try to control the new PM to a large extent. The dominant culture in Iraqi politics, whereby relationships between individuals and hierarchies within parties far outweigh the importance of ideology and policies militates against the possibility of alliances being formed on the basis of common political ground. This partly explains why the Iraqiyya alliance, which shares SOL s centralist ideals, will not be a big part of the new government. Iraqiyya won a simple majority of 91 seats in the March elections but allianceleader Ayyad Allawi will not become Prime Minister because his secular approach is rejected by the main players and Iran, never far from the negotiating table, has effectively rejected his candidacy. Allawi does not seem to want to let go of the hope of being PM, though it is a virtual impossibility as ten weeks have 3
now passed since the elections were held and there has been no meeting between him and al-maliki. On top of this the Kurdish parties, which continue in their role as kingmakers with their important 40-seat constituency, refused to ally with Allawi and his alliance because of differences with some of the Arab figures in his alliance. The Kurds are also pushing for Kurdish President of Iraq Jalal Talabani to remain in his post. Like the Kurds, the Sadrist bloc is also playing an important role in determining who will be PM this year, having effectively taking the seats that the other Shia parties in the INA (particularly the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq) lost. The Sadrists, who reject Maliki s nomination for another term, and the Kurdish alliance are playing a pivotal role in determining who will be the new PM. The Kurds welcomed the integration of SoL and INA, announcing that they have no reservations over any one nominated by the new coalition as long as they support their demand for the presidency. This will be a more powerful position in this parliamentary term, since there will no longer be a requirement for two vicepresidents. In conclusion, the most likely scenario is that the newly announced coalition of SOL and INA will eventually agree on an alternative nominee for the PM (as was the case with the previous government when Maliki was nominated the best possible alternative to Ibrahim Ja afari). The Sadrist position will be a decisive factor in this matter. Candidates from Iraqiyya may accept the position of speaker of the house and several other important positions whilst the Kurds may well retain the president s position. The nature of the new government The controversial de-baathification moves, ostensibly aimed at sympathizers with the old regime but by all informed accounts a campaign to sideline nationalist politicians that threatened the hegemony of the ruling elite, has continued after the election. The prominent Sunni politician Saleh al-mutlak from the Iraqiyya alliance was excluded from the March elections and his brother Ibrahim took his place only to be banned himself in early May. On the 27 th of May, another move by the State of Law list against Iraqiyya became apparent; a specific request from the list was announced for the votes of the three candidates, two from Iraqiyya (Najm al-harbi and Abdallah Hasan Rashid) and one from INA, to be annulled, on the basis of two legal convictions and membership in the Iraqi armed forces respectively. The clear attempts to marginalize Iraqiyya as a political force have been noted by Iraqis, internationals and observers of all stripes, though the international community has not yet addressed the problem. Perhaps the most alarming aspect of this phenomenon is the fact that, despite the fact that Iraqiyya won a simple majority in the elections, it is largely excluded from the process of forming a government. Voters did not anticipate the current scenario when they went to the polls; the post-elections super-alliance between the SOL and the UIA was only forged on the basis of a controversial Supreme Court ruling which was made after the elections and which allowed a bloc created after the polls to form government. Those that voted for the SOL or UIA selected them as independent entities and those that were happy to see Iraqiyya win a plurality must find it hard to understand how the winning party can be largely excluded from government. 4
These politically motivated exclusions set a dangerous precedent and ultimately raise serious questions about how much Iraqis can and indeed should trust the new state. Power-sharing The only thing that really binds the members of the new super alliance together is that they are Shia Muslims. To Iraq expert Professor Reidar Visser this is an extremely negative development as it means that the focus of politics continues to be the sectarian element of identity. This, in his opinion, means politicians form alliances in such a way as to support their own sect and guarantees Iraq s Shia a strength in government that will exclude Sunnis, secularists and minorities. To many analysts, the marginalization of Iraq s Sunnis (often cited as the primary factor driving the insurgency in Iraq), will continue under the new government. Even if one prefers to emphasize Iraq s nationalist tradition rather than its sectarian divisions it is impossible to ignore certain facts about the elections; Sunnis and secular nationalists voted for Iraqiyya, Kurds voted for the Kurdish Alliance or Goran (another Kurdish list that has since joined the Kurdish Alliance) and Shias voted for the United Iraqi Alliance. Iraqiyya continues to be targeted. The De-Baathification committee which was the centre of controversy before the elections for its politicized campaign against the list has now disqualified Ibrahim al-mutlaq, a prominent Sunni figure who replaced his brother Saleh al-mutlaq when the committee disqualified him before the elections in February. A new MP for the Iraqiyya list, Bashir Ahmed, was assassinated by unidentified assailants believed to be from Al Qaeda in Mosul on May 24 th. Quite apart from voting habits and the fate of Iraqiyya, another central issue militates against an efficient government emerging in the near future. Ironically, the continuingly popular notion of a government of national unity (hukuma tawaafuqiya in Arabic) actually works to create divisions. It is an artificial arrangement that claims to be the most inclusive possible system for multicultural Iraq but is actually dominated by Shia politicians (many of whom are closely-aligned with Iran) and their Kurdish allies to the exclusion of other major groups, most notably the Sunni Arabs, the nationalists and the secularists. External stakeholders are not pushing for a more inclusive system and thus it is very unlikely to change in the near future. Iran does not wish to see the system change because its influence is guaranteed through the major political parties which, broadly speaking, are made up of Shia Muslims sympathetic to an Islamic political programme. As for the United States, it does not exhibit the will or capacity to become involved in reforming the flawed system it introduced. US policy in Iraq has been informed by discredited theories of an Iraq of its nations. The Obama administration is not really interested in the nuances of the political system. The ethno-sectarian logic of the political system has a place and a momentum that Sunnis and secularists are either unwilling or unable to resist. Ultimately this leaves them with little say in national governance. Iraqiyya, by far the most popular choice for precisely these two groups, will not take any meaningful positions in the new government which will perpetuate the disaffection and alienation of Sunnis and nationalists. Thus, to those that read post-2003 politics 5
as a gradual Shia-Kurd takeover and, more dangerously, to those who espouse extremist anti-shia ideologies, the status quo is a significant threat to their interests. This could incite them to violence and this is not only the case with the groups known as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq but with former members of the US-sponsored Sahwa movement. Terrorism and militia activity Al Qaeda/the Islamic State in Iraq: status quo These are the most common names heard in relation to terrorist violence in Iraq. It is difficult to discern the difference between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq. A Stratfor Global intelligence report describes the Islamic State of Iraq as: 'a coalition of groups that includes Al-Qaeda's Iraq franchise. This coalition was formed as a result of a conscious decision to put an Iraqi face on jihadist efforts in the country rather than have the movement characterized by foreign leaders such as Abu Musab al-zarqawi. This transformation was illustrated by the fact that an Iraqi named Abu Omar al-baghdadi was named to lead the ISI...'. On April 18th 2010 Abu Omar al-baghdadi and Abu Ayuub al-masri, said to be the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, were killed by Iraqi security forces in a raid in Baghdad. Despite the triumphant tone with which this was announced, the loose coalition of like-minded groups that these men headed executed a set of coordinated bombings described by many as revenge attacks on Friday 23rd April. These targeted Shia areas of Baghdad and killed at least 56 people. Less than two weeks later on Monday 10th May a string of coordinated incidents killed over 100 and injured many more. Coordinated dawn ambushes on checkpoints across Baghdad killed 7 members of the Iraqi security forces, a double bomb attack which occurred in a mixed Sunni-Shia area of Suwayrah 60 kilometres south east of Baghdad killed 11, bomb attacks on houses in and around the former Sunni insurgent bastion of Fallujah in Anbar, killed???. The most deadly attack targeted a factory belonging to the State Company for Textile Industries which killed 36 and wounded 140 others. These attacks could be interpreted either as revenge attacks, or as a show of force mounted to demonstrate that the killing of the two most influential individuals in the ISI did not weaken the movement or as a combination of the two. Although it could seem like a simple task to find a leader for a militant group, effective militant leaders can be hard to come by. Such an individual must be ruthless, aggressive and fearless as well as intelligent and charismatic, especially given that this organization seeks to recruit suicide bombers. The ISI has since announced the appointment of a new leader (Abu Bakr al-qureishi) but it remains to be seen what this means for the group. Will the ISI sustain a loss of capacity after the death of two key figures or will a change of leadership work to the group s advantage? The answer to this question rests partly on a measurement of the spread of extremist ideas. Poverty, deprivation, poor education and unemployment help create a permissive environment for terrorism and these are realities that many Iraqis face, often in rural areas and poor urban areas. A Guardian article published on the 23 rd May suggests that detainees in US prisons use their time in custody to appoint new leaders and plot mayhem after their release. 6
In a recent interview with The Independent, the foreign Minister Hoshyan Zebari claimed that Al Qaeda is struggling because of a shortage of would-be suicide bombers from abroad and is also finding it more difficult to find safe havens in Sunni Arab areas as it did in the past. Despite claiming that their capacity is decreasing, Zebari warned that al-qa'ida would pool its remaining resources and make another spectacular attack in Baghdad very soon. The organization also stands to gain from the polarization of politicians and gain ground as long as the government remains weak and divided. Though foreign support has dropped off, it could find new avenues of domestic support from a Sunni population that is vastly disappointed in the government. It could even enjoy renewed support from abroad if the new government neglects to work on its relations with regional powers, particularly Saudi Arabia and Syria which stand accused of turning a blind eye to the movement of foreign fighters and weapons through their territory and into Iraq in the past. Frustration, a loss of for better representation for Sunnis in politics, detentions of Sunnis perceived as arbitrary or unjust, human rights abuses in prisons, slow economic development and growing unemployment amongst young Iraqi males are all factors that can strengthen extremism and all of these continue to be serious issues in Iraq today. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) The ISF is much stronger and greater in number than it was in 2006 but members of the security forces are frequently injured or killed in attacks on checkpoints and patrols. Analysis of the security context often tends to ignore the high number of these incidents. Targeted assassinations involving silenced weapons or improvised explosives that are stuck to cars or left outside homes are a regular occurrence in Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Anbar. On May 24th in Anbar, where Sunni insurgents are still able to operate quite freely, four bombs exploded outside the homes of three police officers. Infiltration News reports on May 25th emerged to the effect that U.S. and Iraqi forces arrested 30 policemen, including two police commanders, at the al-walid police station west of Baghdad during a joint raid. According to the report, the officers were suspected of collaborating with insurgents in the area near Abu Ghraib and police seized unlicensed weapons during the raid. The source cited in the report claimed that most of the police working at the al-walid station were originally members of a local Awakening Council militia before joining the police station more than a year ago. This incident highlights a serious dilemma which is that, in many areas, security forces cannot be trusted. Their involvement in crime is another major issue. On May 24 th in what was merely the latest news of such an incident, a number of senior police officers in Baghdad's Bayaa district were arrested in connection with a brazen gold heist in an otherwise heavily-guarded shopping street in which 14 people died. On the same day, a police officer in Samarra in Salaheldin was sentenced to 15 years in prison for leaking information about fellow officers to al Qaeda. On May 31 st 2010 Al Jazeera reported on infiltration of the security forces in multisectarian Diyala, where explosions are still a regular occurrence despite the 7
presence of US and Iraqi forces. The article quoted the chief of Diyala police as saying: "We have made a number of arrests including officers we are now checking the background of each policeman... the problem was they were hired by security agencies without any security checks because we needed a force in place as soon as possible." This is an indication of the challenges the Diyala police face. Structural weaknesses: multiplicity, division and susceptibility to manipulation In the large-scale attacks against high-profile targets in Baghdad over the last few months, ISI has demonstrated an ability to gather intelligence, plan, acquire materials, build reliable IEDs and execute attacks. The polarization prior to the election provided them with an opportunity to exploit and this has continued since then. The absence of clear authority and the uncertainties of the near future have an impact on both the rank-and-file and the senior members of the security services..in the words of Wafiq al-samaraa i, ex-security chief for President Talabani, when he was interviewed by al-jazeera: "When security forces do not believe in the political agenda of their government, you end up with disloyal forces that perform sloppy security work, which could include accepting bribes to look the other way." Samaraa i asserts in the same interview that one of the major problems is that Iraq has no effective intelligence apparatus to speak of partly because experienced officials connected to the former regime were dismissed. Though the recent killing of two Al Qaeda leaders was executed on the basis of Iraqi intelligence, the Iraqis are still heavily dependent on the US in this field. Current PM Nouri al-maliki is criticised for intervening in the management and command of the security and intelligence services, despite his lack of military experience. He has even been accused of using the anti-terrorist squad against his own political opponents. Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East policy says the Maliki government has developed "a culture of direct control" and says the people in charge of the ISOF are "personally chosen loyalists or relatives of Maliki." According to Knights, Maliki is only supposed to accept or reject missions that come to him but will occasionally assert his prerogative as commander in chief and tell the ISOF to do something or not to do something. At the same time, US Special Forces advisors are involved at every level of the ISOF chain of command and will remain in Iraq after the US withdraws its troops, which will potentially allow the US to use this unit (which Congress intends to double in size) for its own purposes i. It is important also to underline the multiplicity of the security forces. Samaraa i claims there are 9 different security departments, each with a different political agenda. It is hoped that neutral candidates who are loyal to Iraq more than any given political faction will be found to fill senior army and police posts in the coming weeks and months but this is not guaranteed. Even if such people can be found, the current uncertainty likely has an impact on the performance of the rank-and-file. Many cannot be sure of keeping their jobs if a commander with political allegiances that differ from theirs is put in charge of their branch of the security forces. Such uncertainty could have a negative impact on their performance by, for example, encouraging corruption and negligence. 8
Technological capacity is another factor. Whilst security units such as the antiterror forces are equipped with the latest American weaponry and night vision goggles, police on checkpoints have (at least until very recently) been equipped with the infamous bogus bomb-detection wands imported from the UK and now banned by the UK government. The US withdrawal The US will pull out a substantial number of its combat troops by August and leave approximately 50,000 in place for training, support and advice. A number of these will be part of anti-terrorism operations of the kind seen against ISI recently which have involved close cooperation with Iraqi security forces. The US withdrawal, which is already underway and is scheduled to continue until August, is not a primary factor in analysis of security despite what some media sources suggest. This is for various reasons. Firstly, the US has actually been scaling back its involvement since the invasion began through empowering indigenous security forces, both conventional state forces and non-state actors such as the local Sahwa militias. Secondly, the US will likely remain heavily involved in important and powerful branches of the security services such as the anti-terrorism unit. Thirdly, the US will leave a significant number of troops in place to support Iraqi security forces in sensitive areas (most importantly in Kirkuk and in the buffer zone between the Kurdish Regional Government areas and Iraq itself). The Obama administration is in a difficult position in Afghanistan and Pakistan and wants to concentrate its efforts there. Iran s presumed successful enrichment of uranium and the lack of options for challenging it mean the US is keen to avoid any extra pressure that Iran could apply in Iraq. Statements by US commanders on the possibility of slowing down the withdrawal could reflect a level of anxiety over recent violence or aim at putting pressure on extremist groups, but commentators hold that they mean no more than this. Conclusion Though it is clear that there is little popular appetite for a return to major violence, the strength of the Sunni insurgency and the Islamic State in Iraq is unknowable at the current stage. Though many would like to believe that it is diminishing, low-profile violence in the form of assassinations of police and army personnel using silenced weapons and IEDs is continuous. High-profile attacks are sporadic but targeted, effective and spectacular. As indicated above, in certain areas (particularly Diyala and Anbar) the security forces are known to have been heavily infiltrated by Sunni extremists. The election results are still not certified nearly 3 months after the polls were held. It seems very unlikely that Sunnis will be given fair representation given the politicized disqualifications campaign that has targeted Iraqiyya. The perceived slow pace of reconstruction and lack of interest in investment in services in Sunni areas are factors that can make it more likely that Iraqis will join extremist groups. Such perceptions are likely to grow stronger under a Shia-dominated government. Extremist religious ideologies do not have a long history in Iraq and do not have a broad base but desperation has inspired interest in them in the past and can do again in the future. 9
i The Nation 3/6/09; Iraq s new death squad http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090622/bauer/4 10