Draft of 12-10- 11 PHIL 202; Fall 2011 Greek Ethics David O. Brink Handout #12: Epicurean Ethics: Hedonism, Death, and Justice Epicurean and Stoic ethical theories are part of more comprehensive philosophical systems that began life as the Hellenistic philosophical schools. The Hellenistic age is a period of Greek intellectual and social history usually dated from the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE (Aristotle died in 322) to Octavian's defeat of Anthony and Cleopatra at Actium in 31 BCE. This period roughly begins with Macedonian rule and ends with the more or less complete incorporation of Greece into the Roman Empire. Philosophy during this period is characterized by three main schools of thought: Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism. Most of the philosophical work done in this period is within one of these three schools. The founders of these schools literally established schools - - educational institutions - - that survived for many years and that perpetuated the doctrines of the school. These schools constructed systematic treatments of logic (e.g. semantics and epistemology), physics (e.g. natural philosophy and metaphysics), and ethics (including politics). These systematic theories were articulated against the background of earlier Greek philosophy - - the Pre- Socratics, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle - - and of the other schools, sometimes borrowing from, sometimes criticizing, this background. Subsequent thinkers in each school developed their views both against this background and against that of the founders of the school. All three schools, but especially Stoicism and Skepticism, outlived the Hellenistic age and received important articulation by Roman intellectuals. It may help to fix the major figures in each Greco- Roman tradition. Among the Epicureans were Epicurus (341-270 BCE), Colotes (4th and 3rd centuries BCE), and Lucretius (1st century BCE). Among the Stoics were Zeno (of Citium) (335-263 BCE), Cleanthes (331-232 BCE), Chrysippus (@280-207 BCE), and Epictetus (@55-135 AD). And among the Skeptics were Pyrrho (@365-270 BCE), Carneades (@214-128 BCE), and Sextus Empiricus (@200 AD). Our evidence about the views of these schools, especially of the founders of these schools, is quite fragmentary. Though many of the figures in these traditions (e.g. Epicurus and Chrysippus) wrote quite a bit, little of that work survives intact. Most of our evidence consists of small quotes (sometimes out of context) and paraphrases by later writers, who often write out of a school opposed to that of the author they're quoting or summarizing. The most complete sources are quite late: the Roman Lucretius (the Epicurean) in his poem De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of the Universe), the Roman philosopher Cicero (106-43 BCE) in many commentaries on the Hellenistic schools, and Sextus Empiricus (the skeptic) with his account of skepticism and his criticisms of opposing schools. EPICUREAN HEDONISM The Epicureans are hedonists (e.g. De Fin i 54), who appeal to what we naturally pursue and shun (De Fin i 30, ii 31; Hellenistic Philosophy 21A2-3, 21B2). Torquatus, Cicero's Epicurean spokesman, describes the commitment this way.
... [A]s soon as every animal is born, it seeks after pleasure and rejoices in it as the greatest good, while it rejects pain as the greatest bad and, as far as possible, avoids it; and it does this while it is not yet corrupted, while the judgment of nature herself is unperverted and sound. Therefore, he says that there is no need of reason or debate about why pleasure is to be pursued and pain avoided. He thinks that these things are perceived, as we perceive that fire is hot..., none of which needs confirmation by elaborate arguments; it is enough to point them out [De Fin. i 30; 21A2-3]. They recognize that some painful things are pursued as good, and some pleasurable things are avoided as bad. However, they follow Socrates in Plato's Protagoras and argue that "bad pleasures" are those that cause greater pain in the long run and that "good pains" are those that prevent greater sufferings in the long run (De Fin i 32-3; 21A5, B3). KATASTEMATIC PLEASURE It might seem obvious what pleasure and pain are (De Fin ii 6, 12-17, 19-20). We would normally identify pleasure with a certain positive or agreeable sensation or feeling and pain with a certain negative or disagreeable sensation or feeling and conclude that there are intermediate, neutral states that involve freedom from both pain and pleasure (De Fin ii 6-7, 16, 19-20). But the Epicureans recognize katastematic pleasure (freedom from pain is a pleasure) in addition to kinetic pleasure (the positive sensation is a pleasure). Indeed, Epicurus seems to think that freedom from pain is the greatest kind of pleasure (De Fin i 37-38, ii 9-11, 17; 21A6-7, 21Q). So Epicurus did not think that there was some intermediate state between pleasure and pain; for that state which some people think is an intermediate state, viz. the absence of all pain, is not only a pleasure but is even the greatest pleasure [De Fin i 38; 21A7]. The doctrine of katastematic pleasure is closely associated with the Epicurean defense of tranquility and freedom from want (ataraxia). But the nature of katastematic pleasure and the value of ataraxia are not entirely clear. Sometimes they seem to think that the removal of pain is itself a source of (kinetic) pleasure (De Fin i 37). 1. Removal of pain causes kinetic pleasure. 2. The cause of pleasure is itself a pleasure. 3. The removal of pain is a katastematic pleasure. 4. The removal of pain causes more kinetic pleasure than other causes of kinetic pleasure. 5. Hence, katastematic pleasures are superior to other pleasures. 6. Hence, katastematic pleasures are superior to kinetic pleasures. But (2) is problematic. Though we commonly refer to activities that tend to cause pleasure as pleasures, as when we call sexual activities pleasures of the body, it is a mistake to think that the causes of pleasure are themselves pleasures. Second, on this picture kinetic pleasure is the only thing having intrinsic value and katastematic pleasures are activities 2
having extrinsic value, because they tend to cause kinetic pleasure. But then there's something very misleading about saying that there are katastematic pleasures alongside kinetic ones and that the former are superior to the latter. Rather, katastematic pleasures, according to this argument, are extrinsically more valuable than other extrinsically valuable things and only to the extent that they produce more kinetic pleasure. So, even if (1)- (4) were sound, the sense in which (5) would then be true would certainly not establish (6). Finally, (4) seems questionable. Not only is removal of pain distinct from kinetic pleasure; I'm not sure that the former causes the latter. Do I feel pleasure when my torture stops or when I stop banging my head against the wall? Moreover, even if removal of pain always produced kinetic pleasure, it must surely be an empirical question whether it always produces more pleasure than other sources. Indeed, it must surely be an implausible empirical claim. I get more pleasure from sex, drugs, or making philosophical progress than I do when I stop beating my head against the wall or slake my thirst. Another possible rationale for the Epicurean claims about katastematic pleasures applies the initial argument for hedonism to katastematic pleasures (cf. De Fin i 56, ii 31). That argument, I said, appeals to our natural judgments and preferences and what we naturally pursue. Because I prefer the intermediate state to pain and pursue the former rather than the latter, it must be a good. But, first, this claim won't support the superiority of katastematic pleasures. As long as I prefer the positive state to the intermediate state, as it is surely natural to do, the katastematic pleasure must be a lesser good than the kinetic pleasure, contrary to the Epicurean view. However, the Epicurean might claim that, all else being equal, we pursue freedom from pain more ardently than we do kinetic pleasure. Perhaps I'm more eager to get rid of intense pains than I am to experience intense pleasures. But surely, this must remain an empirical issue and so is hard to square with their assertion of the categorical superiority of katastematic pleasure. Moreover, this seems to be a bad argument for even the weaker claim that katastematic pleasure is a (lesser) good. Comparative preference does not support noncomparative value. This should be clear from the fact that the same appeal to preferences would show that an evil that is smaller than another one is actually a good. A different idea is that kinetic pleasures tend to be mixed. Kinetic pleasures are often produced by sating desires. But the desires themselves cause disturbance and anxiety. We might say that this is even part of what it is to desire, namely to want the world to be in a way that it is not (at the moment). But if desire brings kinetic pain, then there is a way in which the life of kinetic pleasure must always be hedonically mixed. We avoid or minimize mixed pleasure if we desire less. By desiring less we achieve what Bentham would call purer pleasures, pleasures followed by pleasure, rather than pain. Indeed, one possibility might be that katastematic pleasures just are pure, rather than mixed, pleasures pleasures followed by pleasure, rather than pain. Though this interpretation has some virtues, it does not represent katastematic pleasure as fundamentally different from kinetic pleasure, mush less as superior to it. For on this reading, katastematic pleasures are just kinetic pleasures that are especially pure. But then they are in fact a special class of kinetic pleasure and superior, if at all, only because they produce more net kinetic pleasure overall. Similar remarks apply to the Epicurean appeal to adaptive considerations to support the doctrine of katastematic pleasure. The Epicureans recognize control as a constraint on eudaimonia (De Fin i 63, ii 86-87). A life of intense pleasures, like an expansive conception 3
of happiness, might seem to require large amounts of external goods (e- goods). But e- goods are not fully within our control. When they are lost and intense desires are frustrated, this produces intense pain. Even when e- goods are not lost and the associated desires are eventually satisfied, their vulnerability still produces anxiety and pain that offsets these pleasures. Because our desires are malleable and we can modify the sources of our pleasure, control supports a policy of adapting our desires to our resources (De Fin ii 90-91; 21B4-5). In this way, they might argue, only a tranquil life - - free of intense desires and kinetic pleasures - - can maximize net kinetic pleasure. This argument should remind us of a similar argument in Plato's Gorgias. Like that argument, this argument seems to fall short of the desired conclusion. Whereas control may justify some adaptation of desires, it's hard to believe that we are most likely to maximize net kinetic pleasure by aiming at the neutral state (cf. De Fin ii 90-91). Moreover, this argument would defend tranquility as a strategy for maximizing net kinetic pleasure, not the intrinsic value of katastematic pleasures. THE HEDONIST GOAL OF EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHY The Epicureans see the main aim of philosophy as confronting and, if possible, removing the fear of death (KD 11-12; 25B). They think that Greek myths about highly anthropomorphic gods, in particular, those describing the retribution of the gods cause us to fear death and an afterlife (23A4-5). We should distinguish between two forms the fear of death might take: (a) taking death as an appropriate object of regret and (b) preoccupation with death. The Epicureans may have been most concerned with (b) but they attacked (b) by attacking (a). Different claims would serve Epicurean purposes. Atheism: There are no gods. Divine Noninterference: There are gods, but they are indifferent to us or at least do not interfere in human affairs. Divine Benevolence: There are gods who intervene in human affairs, but they are perfectly benevolent and do not punish people after death (capriciously?). Invulnerability: If there are gods and they interfere, we cannot be harmed by death. Perhaps surprisingly, the Epicureans, at least as a group, are attracted to each of these strategies. AGAINST DIVINE INTERFERENCE Most Epicureans are not atheists (23B2, B3, E2); instead, they argue against divine interference. Unlike Aristotle, they do not recognize natural teleology. 1. We do not need to appeal to any designer's goals that nature should have the form it does (13D3, F1, H2). 2. We can explain everything about (our part of) the world by reference to material- efficient causal claims (13E1-3). Epicurean hostility to natural teleology is perhaps clearest in their hostility to Stoic claims about divine design and governance of the world (cf. 13J2). They were impressed by what we now call the problem of evil (13F6). 4
5 1. If gods had made the world, they would have made a perfect world, that is, the best of all possible worlds. 2. The existence of evils, imperfections, and disasters implies that this is not the best of all possible worlds. 3. Hence, the world is not the product of divine design. Epicureans also argue against divine intervention by appeal to the doctrine of katastematic pleasures (13H1, 23C1, E4-5). 1. Happiness consists in contentment and freedom from anxiety. 2. Freedom from anxiety is most realized in freedom from planning and work. 3. The gods are the most blessed and happy. 4. Hence, the gods must be idle. 5. Hence, the gods must not intervene in the natural world. That (2) might be true is part of what makes (1) hard to believe. An inactive life, free from anxiety, is, as Callicles claims, a life fit for a corpse or a stone (G 492e, 494a7- b3), or, as Aristotle claims, a life fit for grazing animals (NE 1095b16-20) or children (1174a2-4) (cf. De Fin ii 40-41). INVULNERABILITY The Epicureans also argue that we are invulnerable to harm. Our reconstruction of these arguments is somewhat complicated by Epicurean ambivalence about immortality. Sometimes they seem to claim that a soul is essentially part of a larger compound and, therefore, cannot survive the destruction of the bodily part of the compound (14F2-3, G). At other times, they seem to claim that when the body perishes, the larger compound breaks up, but the smaller compound - - the soul - - can continue to exist. However, when the soul separates from the body, it loses its perceptual and sensory capacities, because these depend upon the capacities of a body (14A3-6, G, 24A1). On this account, the Epicureans believe that an insensate soul survives death. The Epicureans can allow that dying might be bad, if it is painful. They argue only that death is not bad. One puzzle is what is wrong with killing someone (painlessly) if death is not bad. THE EXISTENCE REQUIREMENT The first argument assumes that one does cease to exist when the body perishes and appeals to an existence requirement (24A4, E5). 1. Harm presupposes a subject of harm. 2. Death implies nonexistence. 3. Hence, after death there is no one to be harmed. 4. Hence, death is not a harm. 5. Hence, death cannot be bad.
If there can be impersonal bads, then the inference from (4) to (5) is invalid. Some things may be bad even if no one is harmed. Some actions and events affect not only how well- off people are but also who exists. If x occurs, X will exist and be very well- off (and Y will not exist); if y occurs, Y will exist and be somewhat less well- off (and X will not exist). y may be worse than x, but it may be worse for no one. 1 We normally evaluate what counts as a harm counterfactually; for instance, something usually counts as a harm if it makes you worse- off than you would have been otherwise. In these cases, the person in question would not have existed in the relevant counterfactual situation. This possibility might seem to apply to death. When X dies, the world may contain less pleasure than it otherwise would have. If so, death seems bad even if there is no one for whom things are worse. Moreover, death is not just impersonally bad; it can be bad for me, not because bad things happen to me in death, but because death prevents me from realizing goods. I harmed by death, not after death, because of lost goods. If so, this blocks the inference from (3) to (4). DEATH IS PAINLESS Epicureans also think that death is not bad, even if one's soul survives death, because a disembodied soul experiences no pain (De Fin ii 100). 1. Hedonism. 2. After death the soul is insensate. 3. Hence, the dead experience no pain. 4. Hence, the dead cannot be harmed. 5. Hence, the person whose life it was is not harmed by death. 6. Hence, death is not bad. Consider, first, a kinetic reading of (1). (2) is questionable. No doubt, when my soul is disembodied, it cannot experience bodily pains, but this does not show that it cannot experience pain. Indeed, the Epicureans presumably think that gods are, in the relevant sense, disembodied, yet, as we have seen, they think that the gods can be happy. If this means that they can experience non- bodily kinetic pleasure (cf. 14B2), then it's hard to see why they couldn't experience non- bodily pain. If so, a disembodied soul can experience pain. Even if a disembodied soul cannot experience kinetic pleasure or pain, we could still object to the inference from (4) to (5) on the grounds on which we challenged the Existence Requirement. Now consider a katastematic reading of (1). (3) is plausible, but this threatens to make death the highest good. 1. Katastematic Hedonism: freedom from pain is the highest good. 2. At death the soul becomes insensate. 3. An insensate soul is perfectly free from pain. 4. Hence, an insensate soul is the highest good. 5. Hence, we have reason to bring about our deaths. 6 1 Compare Derek Parfit's discussion of the Non- Identity Problem in Reasons and Persons.
These conclusions are not only strongly counter- intuitive, but run contrary to explicit Epicurean claims. The many sometimes shun death as the greatest of evils, but at other times choose it as a release from life's <evils. But the wise man neither deprecates living> nor fears not living.... Much worse, however, is he who says `It's a fine thing never to be born. Or, once born, to pass through the gates of Hades with the utmost speed` [Letter to Menoeceus 124-27/24A 6,8]. And, of course, this argument is only as compelling as the doctrine of katastematic pleasures on which it rests. THE SYMMETRY ARGUMENT The Epicureans think that we should assimilate our attitude toward death to our attitude toward prenatal nonexistence (De Fin i 49). Lucretius states this Symmetry Argument most clearly. From all this it follows that death is nothing to us and no concern of ours, since our tenure of the mind is mortal. In days of old, we felt no disquiet when the hosts of Carthage poured into battle on every side when the whole earth, dizzied by the convulsive shock of war, reeled sickeningly under the high ethereal vault, and between realm and realm the empire of mankind by land and sea trembled in the balance. So, when we shall be no more - - when the union of body and spirit that engenders us has been disrupted - - to us, who shall then be nothing, nothing by any hazard will happen any more at all. Nothing will have power to stir our sense, not though earth be fused with sea and sea with sky [DRN iii 830 51/24E1-2]. Later, he expresses the same appeal to symmetry. Look back again to see how the immense expanse of past time, before we were born, has been nothing to us. Nature shows us that it is the mirror image of the time that is to come after we are dead. Is anything there terrifying, does anything there seem gloomy? Is it not more peaceful than any sleep? [DRN iii 972 77] The Symmetry Argument has something like this structure. 1. Death brings nonexistence. 2. Postmortem nonexistence is no different than prenatal nonexistence. 3. We do not regret our prenatal nonexistence. 4. Hence, we should not regret our death. This is a wonderful argument, but symmetry is a two- edged sword. Symmetry could be exploited to expand regret, as well as to contract fear. 7
8 1. Death brings nonexistence. 2. Postmortem nonexistence is no different than prenatal nonexistence. 3. We do regret our death. 4. Hence, we should regret our prenatal nonexistence. We should also ask whether the symmetry is robust. It seems straightforwardly possible that I might have lived longer. But could I have lived earlier (and lived until the same age as I actually will)? Some might appeal to the essentiality of origin to argue that we essentially originated as the particular zygote we did. But even if this is true, we might wonder if it makes my date of conception, much less my date of birth, essential. And even if my date of birth was essential, we could imagine discovering that it was earlier than we had thought. Metaphysical possibility is one thing; epistemic possibility is another. We could assume that whatever my actual date of birth is, I could not have been born earlier. But we could nonetheless be mistaken in our beliefs about our actual date of birth (hospital or adoption agency records might have gotten mixed up). If so, why isn't it legitimate to wish that one discover that was actually born earlier than one believes one was? 2 HEDONISM AND VIRTUE Hedonism would seem to imply that conventional virtues can have only instrumental value. The Epicureans recognize and accept this consequence of hedonism (KD 33-36; De Fin i 47-53, ii 78-85; 22A, B, M). Torquatus says Hence justice cannot correctly be said to be desirable in and for itself; it is so because it is so highly productive of gratification [De Fin i 53]. Epicureans want to insist that a sensible strategy for pursuing my own pleasure requires moderation. So when we say that pleasure is the goal we do not mean pleasures of the profligate or the pleasures of consumption... but rather lack of pain in the body and disturbance in the soul. For it is not drinking bouts and continuous partying and enjoying boys and women, or consuming fish and other dainties of an extravagant table, which produce the pleasant life, but sober calculation which searches out the reasons for every choice and avoidance and drives out the opinions which are the source of the greatest turmoil for men's souls [Letter to Menoeceus/21B5]. One line of argument appeals to the superior value of katastematic "pleasure" to defend the greater value of the ascetic life as compared with the "tumultuous life" of the person who has a great deal of kinetic pleasure (e.g. fish). This argument will be only as plausible as the doctrine of katastematic pleasures. Another line of argument appeals only on kinetic pleasure and the adaptive argument we have already encountered. This argument is better, but has it limits, as we have observed. Even if it works for apparently self- confined virtues, such as moderation, why 2 See the wonderful defense of the robustness of this second symmetry argument in Philip Mitsis, "Epicurus on Death and the Duration of Life."
should the enlightened hedonist be concerned with the happiness (pleasure) of others, as justice requires? JUSTICE The Epicureans offer an account of the origin and nature of justice in terms of mutually beneficial norms of social interaction, which is reminiscent of the account of justice provided by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Republic ii (358e- 359b). Justice was never anything per se, but a contract, regularly arising at some place or other in people's dealings with one another, over not harming or being harmed [KD 33/22A3]. Taken generally, justice is the same for all, since it is something useful in people's social relationships [KD 36/22B1]. On this view, one benefits from another's justice but not from one's own. Though being just is not good in itself, it is a means to enjoying the benefits of other people's justice. If one could be confident that one's own injustice could go undetected, this would apparently be best. One would enjoy the benefits of the justice of others without the costs of one's own. But the Epicureans think that the possibility that one's injustice will be detected, even if it goes unrealized, will create painful anxiety that outweighs the benefits of injustice (KD 34-35/22A4-5). They appear to reasons as follows. 1. Justice consists in conformity to norms of cooperation and restraint that are part of a mutually advantageous system of cooperation and restraint. 2. In order to maximize my own pleasure, I must be a beneficiary of systems of cooperation and restraint. 3. The benefits of systems of cooperation and restraint are available only to those who appear cooperative and restrained. 4. Given the possibility and fear that noncompliance will be detected, the least costly way for me to maintain the appearance of cooperation and restraint is for me to conform to norms of cooperation and restraint. 5. Hence, it is instrumentally valuable for me to be just. There are several questions about this argument worth pursuing. Is (1) true? Is the scope of justice limited to mutually beneficial coordination and contract? Aren't there obligations of justice to those from whom I stand nothing to gain by mutual cooperation and restraint, such as future generations or the infirm? Is (2) true? Does the cost of being excluded from mutually beneficial cooperation always outweigh the benefits of noncompliance? What if I can make a huge killing - - that will set me up for life - - by cheating you this one time? Mightn't this be worth the price of never being able to deal with you again and acquiring a bad reputation? Is (3) true? Are all the benefits of cooperation excludable? What about public goods? But fairness/justice presumably requires that I do my part in their provision. Is (4) true? Is it always reasonable to think that noncompliance will be detected, and is fear of detection always reasonable? Presumably, noncompliance would often go 9
undetected, and then the prospect of exclusion from future cooperation and restraint gets no hold. It s true that it may be hard to know when noncompliance will go undetected, so that there can be reasonable fears of noncompliance being detected even when in fact it will not be. Compliance could still be justified as a way to avoid fear of and consequent anxiety about detection, even in cases in which noncompliance would go undetected. But surely this is not always true. Surely there must be cases in which one should be very confident that injustice would go undetected. But then it would be unreasonable to have significant fear of or anxiety about detection. But then it would also be unreasonable to discount the benefits of injustice much because of the very remote possibility of detection. In such circumstances, the maximizer of expected utility will still find that the expected benefits of noncompliance outweigh the expected costs. Is (5) sufficiently robust? Even if noncompliance will in fact be detected, what if one could be unjust with impunity? Shouldn't the eudaimonist defense of justice be counterfactually stable, as Glaucon and Adeimantus insist in their discussion of the Ring of Gyges? The Epicureans may think they needn t concern themselves with mere counterfactual instability of the sort exhibited by the Ring of Gyges provided their instrumental defense of justice is extensionally adequate. Consider in this context Cicero s critical discussion of the Epicurean reaction to the Ring of Gyges. If a wise man, then, were to have the same ring, he would think himself no more free to do no wrong than if he did not have it. For a good man pursues aims that are not secret, but honourable. On this topic some philosophers [Epicureans] who are not at all bad men, but not clear- thinking enough, say that Plato has produced a fictional and fabricated tale, as if indeed he were justifying it either as actually having happened or even as possible. But the force of the ring, and of the example, is as follows: if no one were going to know, if no one were even going to suspect, when you did something for the sake of riches, power, despotism or lust, if it would always be unknown by gods and by men alike then would you do it? They deny that that could have been possible, although it could indeed happen. But I am in fact asking what they would do if the thing that they deny is possible were possible. They persevere in a boorish manner; they deny that it is possible and insist upon that, failing to see the force of the story. For when we ask what they would do if they could conceal it, we are not asking whether they could in fact conceal it. Rather, we are turning the screw, so to speak, so that if they reply that, given the proposed impunity, they would do the expedient thing, they admit that they are iniquitous; if they deny it, they concede that everything dishonourable should on its own account be avoided [De Officiis iii 38-39; cf. De Re Publica iii 27]. It s clear that Cicero accepts Plato s demand that justice be good in itself and Plato s assumption that this requires a counterfactually stable defense of justice. It s a little less clear what mistake Cicero thinks the Epicureans make. Since they explicitly deny Plato s claim that justice is good in itself, it s not clear that they would be troubled by admitting that their defense of justice as expedient would not hold up in all possible circumstances. He suggests that they dismiss the Ring of Gyges as a mere fabrication, at one point suggesting that they deny that it is actual, at another point suggesting that they deny that it is possible. 10
Cicero responds that the Ring of Gyges is only supposed to be possible, not actual, and that it is possible, presumably because there s nothing inconsistent in the story. But the Epicurean claim may be that extensional adequacy is enough. An adequate defense of justice need only succeed in the world as we find it; it need not apply to purely hypothetical worlds that are very much different. If that is their claim, then one can imagine two responses. First, one might insist, as Plato and Cicero do, that an adequate defense of justice should show it to be intrinsically, and not just instrumentally, good and that this requires counterfactual stability. Without counterfactual stability, the defense depends upon contingent features of the environment of the just person and not on justice itself. Second, one might insist that the Ring of Gyges is relevant to the extensional adequacy of the Epicurean defense of justice. For the Ring of Gyges is allegorical and not just hypothetical. It points to the fact that many people in the actual world have opportunities to commit injustice with impunity. So the instability that concerns Glaucon and Adeimantus is not merely counterfactual. If so, even those concerned only with extensional adequacy need to take the challenge posed by the Ring of Gyges seriously. The first objection challenges the Epicurean willingness to settle for extensional adequacy; the second objection challenges the extensional adequacy of the Epicurean defense of justice. 11