Security Threats in the Levant Basin

Security Threats in the Levant Basin

Overview Petrochemical interest in the Levant Basin lies overwhelmingly in recoverable natural gas, with an estimated 3,500 billion cubic metres (bcm) in existence; Despite endemic security problems facing the region, increasing demand for gas could see the Levant Basin become a key provider of global energy in the next decade; This presentation will assess these security risks, beginning with two key developments of the past six months, before moving geographically from the Sinai Peninsula through to North Lebanon.

Egypt Coup The overthrow of the Morsi regime has had a number of effects on the region including: Increased militancy in the Sinai Peninsula, where the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood has created a lack of law and order; A change in the targets of these militant groups, whose previous focus on attacking Israel has been replaced by an increase in attacks on Egyptian security forces; The potential weakening of Hamas, as the support from the Morsi government has been replaced by hostility from the Egyptian security forces, who accuse it of aiding Sinai-based militant groups.

The Syrian Conflict The conflict in Syria has developed significantly in the past six months and a number of these factors are likely to affect the wider region: The increased fighting strength of Assad regime, driven by the growth of Iranian/Hizbullah trained local militias, and an influx of Hizbullah/Iraqi Shiite units; The decrease in Western/US influence caused by the failure to carry out military strikes following the use of chemical weapons will have emboldened the regime; Increased conflict between rebel groups (secular, Islamist, and Kurdish) could spread the fighting further beyond Syria s borders.

The Sinai Region The most likely area to see an attack target the petroleum sector. This could include rockets targeting the city of Eilat, or pipelines outside of the city. Already insecure following the revolution in 2011 - militants including Ansar Jerusalem and MSC able to launch attacks on Israel/petroleum facilities; This risk is mitigated by the success of Israel s Iron Dome systems, and by the IDF s ability to successfully fend off the rare cross-border attacks; The increased focus of Sinai-based militant groups on targeting the Egyptian security forces could also lower this threat.

The Gaza Strip The most likely area to see a terrorist attack rather than a specific attack on the sector. Rocket attacks on either Eshkol or Ashkelon Regional Council areas could potentially occur fortnightly, with Qassam rockets (15km range) used most frequently; Operation Pillar of Defence showed escalatory fighting following targeting of militant commanders/high casualty strike can occur with little notice, and include rocket fire targeting southern Israeli towns within a radius up to 75km; Developments of last six months have weakened Hamas; however other aggressors have lesser capability but greater aspiration; The success of Iron Dome can also mitigate this risk, though rockets are unlikely to be intercepted unless targeted at populated areas.

The Golan Heights Despite the ongoing conflict, Israel s border with Syria is often it s most stable. Despite this, a number of risks exist: While direct attacks are unlikely, accidental cross-border ordinance fire is relatively common in spill-over fighting from Syria; this is not expected to trigger retaliatory violence greater than occasional Israeli artillery fire; However, targeted violence could occur should further Israeli airstrikes inside Syria lead to retaliation from the Assad regime; this could include rocket and artillery fire by the Syrian Armed Forces, or the use of Palestinian militant proxies such as the PFLP-GC.

The Israel/Lebanon Border The risk of war between Israel and Hizbullah is high, and could be sparked in a number of ways: Further Israeli airstrikes on Syria - or on weapons transferred to Lebanon - could lead to an IAF attack on Hizbullah targets which could trigger a wider conflict; Rocket attacks by Hizbullah would target Northern Israel, especially Haifa, putting sector infrastructure at risk; Iron Dome would likely be successful in intercepting a high percentages of rockets, though Hizbullah does possess the capability to fire large volleys of rockets in an attempt to overwhelm system.

Lebanon With civil conflict a real risk in Lebanon following six months of the most serious violence since the civil war, it is worth addressing the country in more depth. Political unrest is directly affecting the petroleum sector, the resignation of Prime Minister Mikati and continuation of a caretaker cabinet has paralysed the legislative progress; Due to polarisation over the conflict in Syria, a new cabinet is unlikely to form, and Parliament is unlikely to convene in the foreseeable future; However, it is worth noting that political deadlock can be resolved swiftly in Lebanon once compromise is reached.

Lebanon Conflict risks driven by sectarian division and the war in Syria also indirectly affect the sector, with street violence and mass-casualty attacks possible across the country: Beirut South Beirut Shia neighbourhoods are at continued risk of mass-casualty bomb attacks; limited street fighting could spread to interface areas; Tripoli Continued sectarian fighting throughout past six months shows violence can begin with little notice; continuing threat of masscasualty car-bomb attacks; Sidon Truce between Palestinian factions could break leading to limited street fighting and there is the potential for attacks on LAF by Sunni militants; Bekaa Valley Regular rocket fire from Syria, particularly targeted at Shia towns such as Hermel, whilst a regime offensive in Qalamoun could cross border;

For more information: www.strategic-analysis.org 020 7340 4520 ruth.lux@strategic-analysis.org