Shame and Philosophy

Shame and Philosophy

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Shame and Philosophy An Investigation in the Philosophy of Emotions and Ethics Phil Hutchinson Manchester Metropolitan University

Phil Hutchinson 2008 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2008 978-0-230-54271-6 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-36028-4 ISBN 978-0-230-58318-4 (ebook) DOI 10.1057/9780230583184 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hutchinson, Phil. Shame and philosophy : an investigation in the philosophy of emotions and ethics / Phil Hutchinson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Emotions (Philosophy) 2. Shame. I. Title. B105.E46H88 2008 128.37 dc22 2008011120 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08

Contents Preface Acknowledgements vi viii Introduction 1 1 Experimental Methods and Conceptual Confusion: Philosophy, Science, and What Emotions Really Are 7 2 To Make Our Voices Resonate or To Be Silent? Shame as Fundamental Ontology 42 3 Emotion, Cognition, and World 87 4 Shame and World 123 Notes 156 Bibliography 181 Index 189 v

Preface Emotions research is in. It is no longer the philosophical equivalent of an odd backwater, as one philosopher, writing just over 10 years ago, referred to it. The backwater has been discovered and the developers have moved in. To stretch the metaphor, philosophy of the emotions seems to have been transformed from odd backwater to boomtown. Does this transformation amount to progress? My thoughts on this question will emerge in what follows, if they are not made somewhat clear now by my choice of metaphors. In short, I am cautious (maybe even sceptical) as to the direction in which most of the developers of the former backwater would like to take us. It sometimes feels like a challenge to simply keep pace with the number of new theories emerging; the boomtown, it seems, is beginning to sprawl... Just over 10 years ago, about the same time as the philosophy of the emotions was being depicted as an odd backwater (a depiction which seems in retrospect to have triggered, or coincided with, the boom), I decided that I wanted to write on shame. I made the decision after reading Primo Levi s If This is a Man and The Drowned and the Saved. At that time, as I read Levi, I was unaware of the existence of an area of philosophy devoted to explaining the emotions; of course, it did not take me long to find out that there was, and thus, for me to see that being dragged into all sorts of debates that had not been my initial concern was unavoidable. A few years later I attended the Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference on Philosophy and the Emotions, hosted by my (then) home department at Manchester University. This confirmed to me what had hitherto been suspicions. Lots of arguments took place regarding the merits or otherwise of the various theories that currently dominated the literature. More general arguments took place about the merits or otherwise of the (neo-)jamesian approach in contrast to the cognitivist (judgementalist) approach (and vice versa): The cognitivist approach after a period of dominance in philosophy of the emotions was coming under strong attack from adherents to the (neo-)jamesian approach an approach which had been bolstered by the recent increased prominence of research in cognitive neuroscience. While, as the reader will deem from the following chapters, I do believe these disputes need to be studied by anyone serious about studying the emotions, they can leave one a vi

Preface vii little cold if one s initial interest was prompted by a desire to make sense of (and grasp the philosophical/ethical significance of) emotional episodes (such as those reported by Levi). It is important, in allowing oneself to be dragged into such disputes, not to lose one s grip on that which brought one to study the emotions in the first place; that is to say, one should endeavour to keep in mind one s initial purpose. In this book I do not provide another theory of the emotions (or of shame). I do not add a suburb (however pretty) to the boomtown. I offer, such that one might find it useful, a framework for understanding: worldtaking cognitivism. My hope is that this will enable some to gain clarity regarding emotional expression and help them resist the temptations of the boomtown resist the temptation to think that we need another (only better, more complete) theory of the emotions. Having submitted the book for publication, I still feel there is much more of worth that might be said about shame. And I hope to contribute something to this end in the future. It continues to strike me despite a number of publications appearing as this book goes to press how odd it is that shame gets such little attention. If I persuade readers of little else, I should like to have persuaded them that shame should be accorded central concern by anyone interested in moral psychology.

Acknowledgements Much of the material which makes up Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of this book first saw light as part of my PhD thesis. I thank my supervisors at Manchester, Harry Lesser and Veronique Pin-Fat, and my examiners, Peter Goldie and Nigel Pleasants, for their very helpful comments. A number of people have read the manuscript (less much of Chapter 4) and taken the time to offer extensive and thoughtful criticism and comment. I would like to mention David Cockburn, Rupert Read and Wes Sharrock; I am indebted to, and thank, each of them. Richard Hamilton read early versions of Chapters 1 and 3; Ulrika Björk kindly read and gave extensive comments on Chapter 2; I should like to thank them both for their comments. I should also like to thank my editors at Palgrave, Pri and Melanie, Dhivya at Integra-India and my former editor at Palgrave, Dan Bunyard, who before leaving Palgrave (nothing to do with my having just submitted the manuscript, I like to think) initially invited me to publish this material. Thanks to Jean Sanders for compiling the index. Of course, I bear sole responsibility for what follows. I have presented sections of the book at various research seminars and conferences over the past 7 years; these include Åbo Akademi University, Finland; ALWS Conference, Kirchberg am Weschel, Austria; Philosophy Research Seminar, University of Hertfordshire; Lampeter Philosophy Colloquium; British Society for the Philosophy of Science Conference, Glasgow; Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference on Philosophy and the Emotions, Manchester University; Emotions and Self-Knowledge Symposium, Stockholm University; the Human Sciences Seminar, Manchester Metropolitan University; and Mind and Society 10, Manchester. Thanks to all those who raised questions. I should also like to give thanks in particular to the philosophers at Åbo Akademi University. In addition to inviting me to speak at their conference, Emotions and Understanding, in 2005, they invited me back the following year to deliver a week-long series of lectures and workshops. On the latter occasion, I had the privilege of delivering all of the following material (less much of Chapter 4). I thank Ylva Gustafsson, Lars Hertzberg, Tom Kettunen, Jacek Kornak, Camilla Kronqvist, Olli Lagerspetz, Hannes Nykänen, Tove Österman, Hugo Strandberg and Göran Torrkulla for some of the most stimulating conversations viii

Acknowledgements ix I have had in any philosophical forum. I have also benefited much from extensive correspondence with (Åbo alumni) Michael McEachrane. The (2005) conference at Åbo also provided me with the opportunity to meet and talk at length with in addition to some of those already mentioned above Jack Canfield, Kathleen Higgins, Dina Mendonça, Brian Parkinson, Robert C. Roberts and Robert Solomon; I gained much from my conversations with each of them over the four days of the conference. I am sad that Bob Solomon will not see the book. I was given (little but much needed) teaching relief at Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU), thanks to a grant from Peter Gilroy at the MMU Research and Enterprise Development Unit and a Promising Research Fellowship awarded by the same unit. Michael Loughlin and Stewart Crehan, my colleagues at MMU, have also been supportive, insisting on occasion that I leave my office and go with them to the pub to talk about film (mainly Herzog), football (mainly Arsenal), music (mainly John Coltrane) and politics (mainly...no; that would be another book, or two, or three) over a drink. One usually finds a list of friends and family appended to the acknowledgements. In this case I want to emphasise that this book might well not exist if it were not for the genuine support and friendship of the following people at various times over the last 8 years: Helen Caddick, Suchetana Chattopadhyay, Karen Chung, Ian Cross, Mira Dimitrova, Ayo Dove, Dan Firth, John Game, Richard Hamilton, Kacey Harrison, Jenny & Tony Hutchinson and John & Miles Hutchinson, Charlotte Jarman, Greg Lawrence, Frank Lores-Penalver, Steven Marshall, Askala McMorris, Ekua McMorris, Michael Nedo, Ayanna Prevatt-Goldstein, Rupert Read, Philippe Rouchy, Cris Sanchez-Gonzalez, Wes Sharrock, Susan and Michael Wood, and Tom Young. It was Tom Young, along with John Game and Sudipta Kaviraj, who inspired and encouraged me to pursue my academic interests, when I was an undergraduate. I hope that they are not too disappointed. I should also mention Simon Munnery, a late night/early morning conversation with whom, some 10 years ago, started me thinking about shame. For never failing to put a smile on my face, even at times when I was sure it was not possible, I want to thank Amber, Ebony, Maisie, Mia, George, Samuel and Taitu (sorry this is not as interesting as the books I usually give to you all). Finally, madeleine kennedy-macfoy...thanks so much.