2nd International Workshop on Argument for Agreement and Assurance (AAA 2015), Kanagawa Japan, November 2015

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2nd International Workshop on Argument for Agreement and Assurance (AAA 2015), Kanagawa Japan, November 2015

On the Interpretation Of Assurance Case Arguments John Rushby Computer Science Laboratory SRI International Menlo Park, CA John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 1

Introduction I m focused on the assurance and certification of software for commercial airplanes Currently assured by DO-178C numerates 71 objectives that must be satisfied for the most critical software e.g., nsure that each High Level Requirement (HLR) is accurate, unambiguous, and sufficiently detailed, and that the requirements do not conflict with each other [Section 6.3.1.b] It seems to work: no incidents due to flaws in software implementation DO-178C is about correctness of implementation wrt HLR ARP 4754 and others are concerned with safety of HLR John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 2

Introduction (ctd.) But the world is changing NextGen integrates once separate air and ground systems Unmanned vehicles in same airspace More autonomous systems New methods of software development and assurance We don t really know why DO-178C works So difficult to predict impact of changed environment And difficult to update (10 years to go from B to C) So look at Assurance Cases as a possible way forward Retrospective reformulation of DO-178C as an assurance case (Michael Holloway) Then look for a scientific basis to assurance cases John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 3

Assurance Cases The idea is that we make the case to justify deployment of some system by Stating the claim that it must satisfy Generally safety- or correctness-related Developing evidence about its assumptions, design, implementation, performance etc. Constructing a structured argument that justifies the claim, based on the evidence How should we interpret these arguments? And what are the expectations on them? compelling, comprehensible and valid [00-56] Are these all the same? John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 4

Complications: Inductive and Deductive Arguments The world is an uncertain place (random faults and events) Our knowledge of the world is incomplete, may be flawed Our reasoning may be flawed also So an assurance case cannot expect to prove its claim Hence, the overall argument is inductive vidence & subclaims strongly suggest truth of top claim Rather than deductive vidence & subclaims imply or entail the top claim John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 5

Complications: Confidence Items If the overall argument is inductive Does that mean all its steps may be inductive too? Traditionally, yes! Considered unrealistic to be completely certain cf. ceteris paribus hedges in science Can add ancillary confidence items to bolster confidence in inductive steps vidence or subclaims that do not directly contribute to the argument i.e., their falsity would not invalidate the argument But their truth increase our confidence in it h? John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 6

Complications: Graduated Assurance Assurance is expensive, so most standards and guidelines allow less assurance effort for elements that pose lesser risks.g. DO-178C 71 objectives for Level A, 33 with independence 69 objectives for Level B, 21 with independence 62 objectives for Level C, 8 with independence 26 objectives for Level D, 5 with independence So if Level A is compelling, comprehensible and valid The lower levels must be less so, or not so We need some idea what is lost, and a measure of how much John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 7

Proposed Interpretation Clearly need a semantics to account for all this I m going to propose a simple, even obvious, semantics for a sound assurance case I further propose that only sound assurance cases should be accepted However, sound assurance cases can have different strengths John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 8

Structured Argument In a generic notation (GSN shapes, CA arrows) C AS C: Claim AS: Argument Step SC: Subclaim : vidence SC AS A hierarchical arrangement of argument steps, each of which justifies a claim or subclaim on the basis of further subclaims or evidence John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 9

Argument Steps and Layered Arguments We decompose top-level claim into conjunction of subclaims And iterate Until we get down to subclaims supported by evidence Provide a narrative justification for each step asier to understand when just two kinds of argument steps Reasoning steps: subclaim supported by further subclaims vidential steps: subclaim supported by evidence Call this a simple form argument Can normalize to this form by adding subclaims In the paper I explain how to give a direct interpretation John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 10

Normalizing an Argument to Simple Form C AS C RS SC SC SC AS S S RS: reasoning step; S: evidential step John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 11

Why Focus on Simple Form? The two kinds of argument step are interpreted differently vidential steps These are about epistemology: knowledge of the world Bridge from the real world to the world of our concepts Have to be considered inductive Multiple items of evidence are weighed not conjoined Reasoning Steps These are about logic/reasoning Conjunction of subclaims leads us to conclude the claim Deductively: subclaims imply claim (my preference) Inductively: subclaims suggest claim Combine these to yield complete arguments Those evidential steps whose weight crosses some threshold of credibility are treated as premises in a classical deductive interpretation of the reasoning steps John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 12

Weighing vidential Steps We measure and observe what we can e.g., test results To infer a subclaim that is not directly observable e.g., correctness Different observations provide different views Some more significant than others And not all independent Confidence items can be observations that vouch for others Or provide independent backup Need to weigh all these in some way Probabilities provide a convenient metric And Bayesian methods and BBNs provide tools John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 13

The Weight of vidence? Plausible to suppose that we should accept claim C given evidence when P (C ) exceeds some threshold These are subjective probabilities expressing human judgement xperts find P (C ) hard to assess And it is influenced by prior P (C), which can express ignorance... or prejudice Instead, factor problem into alternative quantities that are easier to assess and of separate significance So look instead at P ( C) Related to P (C ) by Bayes Rule But easier to assess likelihood of observations given claim about the world than vice versa John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 14

Confirmation Measures We really are interested in the extent to which supports C... rather than its negation C So focus on the ratio or difference of P ( C) and P ( C),... or logarithms of these These are called confirmation measures They weigh C and C in the balance provided by Suggested that these are what criminal juries should be instructed to assess (Gardner-Medwin) Good s measure: log P ( C) P ( C) Kemeny and Oppenheim s measure: P ( C) P ( C) P ( C) + P ( C) Much discussion on merits of these and other measures John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 15

Application of Confirmation Measures I do not think the specific measures are important Nor do I advocate applying these methods to the evaluation of individual arguments Rather, use BBNs and confirmation measures for what-if investigations Can help in selection of evidence for evidential steps e.g., refine what objectives DO-178C should require xample (next slides) use of artifact quality objectives as confidence items in DO-178C John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 16

Weighing vidential Steps With BBNs Z O A Z: System Specification O: Test Oracle T S V S: System s true quality T: Test results V: Verification outcome A: Specification quality C C: Conclusion xample joint probability table: successful test outcome Correct System Incorrect System Correct Oracle Bad Oracle Correct Oracle Bad Oracle 100% 50% 5% 30% John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 17

xample Represented in Hugin BBN Tool John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 18

valuating Reasoning Steps When all evidential steps cross our threshold for credibility, we use them as premises in a classical interpretation of the reasoning steps Deductive: p 1 AND p 2 AND AND p n IMPLIS c Inductive: p 1 AND p 2 AND AND p n SUGGSTS c I advocate the deductive interpretation, for three reasons There is no classical interpretation for inductive reasoning Many proposals: Dempster-Shafer, fuzzy logic, probability logic But none universally accepted And they flatten the argument (forthcoming slide) Inductive reasoning is not modular: must believe either the gap is insignificant (so deductive), or taken care of elsewhere (so not modular) There is no way to evaluate the size of the gap in inductive steps (next slide) John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 19

The Inductive Gap Must surely believe inductive step is nearly deductive and would become so if some missing subclaim or assumption a were added p 1 AND p 2 AND AND p n SUGGSTS c a AND p 1 AND p 2 AND AND p n IMPLIS c If we knew anything at all about a it would be irresponsible not to add it to the argument Since we did not do so, we must be ignorant of a Follows that we cannot estimate the doubt in inductive argument steps John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 20

Probabilistic, Fuzzy and D-S Interpretations Insensitive to logical content of reasoning steps ffectively replace each subclaim by its supporting evidence Thereby flattening the argument C AS C S SC AS John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 21

Flattened Arguments There s a reason we don t do this An assurance case is not just a pile of evidence That s DO-178C, for example It is an argument With a structure based on our reasoning about the system So the reasoning steps should be interpreted in logic John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 22

Graduated Assurance I ll say an assurance case is valid if its reasoning steps are judged to be deductively valid xpect to see justification in some form A valid case is sound if in addition its evidential steps cross the threshold for credibility All inductive doubts located here For graduated assurance, need some additional notion of argument strength One approach to weakening an argument for lower levels is to reduce the threshold on evidential steps But others actually change the argument.g., Level D of DO-1788C removes the Low Level Requirements (LLR) and all attendant steps John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 23

valuating Argument Strength Under Reduced Thresholds Although I don t advocate flattening then BBNs As a way to evaluate soundness of an argument It could be a way to quantify strength of a sound argument More simply Just sum (Adams Uncertainty Accumulation) Or multiply (independence assumption) The probabilities calculated (by BBNs) for evidential steps Beware of gaming: Combining subclaims to maximize strength measure Could do this on an ordinal scale (low, medium, high, etc.) Note that it s a weakest link calculation Graduated assurance retains soundness, reduces strength John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 24

valuating Argument Strength Under Changes Recall Level D of DO-1788C changes the argument Removes everything to do with LLR Reason for LLR is not just more evidence, but the credibility of the overall argument strategy More credible to go from HLR to OC via LLR (Levels A, B, C) Than in a single leap (Level D) So there s more to it than just evidential strength Topic for future work: related to ability to withstand defeaters John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 25

Conclusion Interpretation is a combination of probability and logic (Possibly informal) probabilities for evidential steps Logic for reasoning steps Case is sound if evidential steps cross some threshold and reasoning steps are deductively valid All inductive doubt is located in the evidential steps Inductive reasoning steps are too low a bar Graduated Assurance may weaken evidential support Overall strength of a sound case is then determined by weakest evidential step Can formalize this in probability logic, but I think the real appeal has to be to intuition and consensus... Deeper notion of strength needed for other forms of graduated assurance: defeaters and argumentation frameworks may be the way to go here John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 26

Links Lengthy report: http: //www.csl.sri.com/~rushby/abstracts/assurance-cases15 What do you think? John Rushby, SR I Interpretation of Assurance Case Arguments 27