THESES SIS/LIBRARY TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2 FACSIMILE: +61 2 6125 4063 THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY EMAIL: library.theses@anu.edu.au CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA USE OF THESES This copy is supplied for purposes of private study and research only. Passages from the thesis may not be copied or closely paraphrased without the written consent of the author.
STUDIES IN NIN3TEENTH OEKTURY ENGLISH AGNOSTICISM by TIAVID W. DOC'.ri:RILL A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian National University.
(ii) I alone am responsible for the text of this thesis and the views maintained in it. ~tv.~ 0
(iii) Preface Chapter l Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Contents Introductory T.H. Huxley and the Meaning of 'Agnosticism' 'The Origin and Pattern of I'iineteenth Century Agnosticism Agnosticism, :Positivism, Empiricism Page v 2 49 91 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Learned Ignorance H.L. Mansel (1): The Limits of.l'hought H.L. Mansel (2): The Limits of 'Thought and Christian Belief The Choragus and Coryphaeus of Agnosticism 136 194 218 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 The Nature of Science Science as the Discovery of Universal Laws Science as the Method of Discovery 255 2'82 The Science of Ethics Chapter 9 Chapter 11 W.K. Clifford and the Scientific Basis of Morals 325 Leslie Stephen's 'The Science of Ethics' 426
(iv) Chapter 12 Chapter 13 Bibliography Moral Obligation and Responsibility: Two Difficulties in the Science of Ethics Conclusion 468 494 500
(v) Preface This thesis is an essay in the history of ideas. It is an attempt to characterize in detail some of the main features of agnosticism - the intellectual movement gathered around T.H. Huxley, H. Spencer, J. Tyndall, L. Stephen, and W.K. Clifford, during the last four decades of the nineteenth century. General accounts of this movement already exist - for example, A.W. Benn, The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, R. Metz, ~undred Years of British Philosophz - and there are good studies of some of the individual figures - for example, H. Petersen, Huxlez: Prophet o! ~cience, N. Annan, Leslie Stephen, but, as far as I know, no one has produced a detailed historical study of the agnostics as a group, particularly as a group of philosophers. This work is an attempt to meet this need. Obviously, an historical account of an intellectual movement must not only provide expositions of its distinctive doctrines, it must also place the school generally in the context of its age. The 'Introductory' section is concerned with this latter aim. It may appear, at first, to be out of proportion to the rest of the work, but in view of what has been written about agnosticism it has been necessary to go
(vi) beyond a general exposition of agnostic doctrines and their roots to consider in what sense the agnostics can be called by that name, and to explain how agnosticism differs from empiricism - J.S. Mill, A. Bain, G. Croom Robertson - and positivism - R. Congreve, F. Harrison, J.H. Bridges - two other Victorian intellectual movements. In the first section the following points are made. The pattern of agnostic theory is based on three doctrines: that there are necessary limits to knowledge, and the objects of metaphysical speculation fall outside these limits; that the methods of science are the only rational and moral means by which knowledge is to be gained; the groundlessness of the Christian faith. Examination of what HUXley and his contemporaries have to say on the nature of agnosticism shows that the word was often used to designate this pattern of belief. The origins of agnosticism are found in three deeply rooted nineteenth century British intellectual tendencies: a distrust of metaphysical speculation, faith in the power of science, and dissatisfaction with Christian orthodoxy. In different ways each of these tendencies gain expression in agnosticism, positivism, and empiricism. Of these three movements agnosticism
(vii) was the last to appear. But while it owes a certain amount to both movements, particularly empiricism, it did not, like positivism, accept Comte as its prophet, and unlike empiricism it found in the concept of evolution as used in Darwin's On the Origin of Species a way of understanding nearly all aspects of the universe. Basically, these are the points which separate agnosticism from positivism and empiricism. The remaining sections of the work expound the agnostics' doctrines. The organization of the material is based on two principles: one is that the main elements in the pattern of agnostic belief should be set out; the other is that attention ought to be paid to the particular stresses in their system of thought. As the agnostic rejection of Christianity is based on their theories of ignorance and the nature of science and morality there is not a separate section dealing with their anti-christian position, but there is one which deals with agnostic theories of the limits of knowledge, particularly as they bear upon theological matters - 'Learned Ignorance' - and another dealing with agnostic theories of science. In 'Learned Ignorance' the theories of H.L. mansel are examined in some detail because his work, despite its Christian purpose, exercised a strong influence upon the agnostics, as is seen by the use Spencer and
(viii) Stephen make or his doctrines in recommending their anti-christian positions. In the next section, 'The Nature of Science', the differences between Clifford and the other agnostics over the nature of science are discussed, particularly with reference to the criticism their theories received from Christian apologists who wished to deny that there is any real conflict between science and religion. 'The Science of Ethics' is the final section of the work. From one point of view this section is a development of the preceding one; for the agnostic claim that science alone provides sure knowledge means that they had to be able to show how science can provide knowledge of the foundations and superstructure of morality. They took to this task with great seriousness; the most elaborate products of the agnostic movement deal with this problem. Here the leading figures are Clifford, Spencer, and Stephen, with HUXley joining hands with those Christian and non-christian critics who claimed that moral obligation could not be completely explained in scientific terms. On the question of moral responsibility and determinism, the agnostics present a solid front against those who assert that the two are incompatible. Because of the extent of agnostic ethical writings it has seemed
(ix) best to consider them in a separate section. In the 'Conclusion' the significance of the agnostic movement is discussed, Three points are made: firstly, that philosophically the products of agnosticism are not of much intrinsic worth; secondly, that their writings are important for the influence, often a negative influence, they had upon philosophers of greater stature - for example, H. Sidgwick, w. James, s. Alexander, J. ward; thirdly, the movement is of importance if we are to Understand the change that came over the Victorian frame of mind between 1860 and 1900, for while it is difficult to assess causes in such a matter it does not seem unlikely that the agnostics played some part in producing this change. This thesis was prepared under the supervision of Professor John Passmore. I am deeply indebted to him for his help and encouragement in writing it.