HEIDEGGER AND WITIGENSTEIN Towards a Dialogue Between the Analytic and the Phenomenological Traditions THOMAS A. FAY Heidegger has, especially since his famous inaugural lecture upon assuming the chair of philosophy at Freiburg in 1929, often been portrayed, and attacked, as an antilogician, an implacable foe of logic, etc. Indeed in one of the most frequently quoted of his statements concerning logic from this address he asserts: The Nothing is the source of negation and not the other way around. If this breaks the might of understanding in the field of questioning into the Nothing and Being, then the fate of the dominance of "logic" in philosophy is also decided. The very idea of "logic" desintegrates in the whirl of a more primordial questioning. 1 But this statement, deliberately polemical in tone, has frequently been misunderstood. Heidegger was not, or so I should like to argue, the anti-logician, the disdainer of logic that he has often been portrayed to be, and it is indeed this caricature of his position that has been one of the most formidable obstacles to a fruitful dialogue between the continental, phenomenological approach to philosophy and the Anglo-analytic approach. What I 1... das Nichts ist der Ursprung der Vemeinung, nicht umgekehrt. Wenn so die Macht des Verstandes im Felde der Pragen nach dem Nichts u nd dem Sein gebrochen wird, dann entscheidet sich damit auch das Schicksal der Herrschaft der 'Logik' innerhalb der Philosophic. Die Idee der 'Logik' selbst 15st sich auf irn Wirbel cines ursprunglicheren Fragens. Was ist Metaphysikl, 7th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1949), pp. 36-37. Hereafter, WM. All translations are my own. Dialogos, S4 (1989) pp.. 21-33.
should like to attempt to do in this article, then, is this -to take two of the most important representatives of these two traditions, Heidegger and Wittgenstein and show that it is possible to bring them together in a dialogue which will be mutually fruitful to each. Heidegger, far from being a despiser of logic, has been immensely interested in it from the very beginning of his way. Indeed, in the year 1912, the year which marked the beginning of his literary output, a work appeared in which he manifested both a high degree of interest and competence in logic, and the new developments in symbolic logic. 2 In his early y~ars he was concerned primarily with the question of foundations, and he saw certain inadequacies in the symbolic method of logic in coming to grips with these problems.3 This, however, should not be construed as an attempt on his part to denigrate logic in general, and symbolic logic in particular, since many of the leading logicians of the time were themselves also concerned with these problems and also saw certain inadequacies in symbolic logic in regard to foundational problems. In the text of the inaugural lecture quoted above, which is no doubt the best known and most frequently quoted of his statements on logic, the text of the inaugural lecture at Freiburg, the word logic is placed in quotes. In the misunderstanding and misrepresentation of his position on logic, this is a point that is frequently overlooked. As Heidegger himself has pointed out, the quotations marks were used to indicate that logic in this context has a special sense. 4 The "idea of logic which disintegrates in the whirl of more primordial questioning" is not logic itself, or symbolic logic, but rather a 2 "Neuere Porschungen Ober Logik, Literarische Rundscbau fur das katholiscbe Deutschland, XXVII (1912), cols. 465-472, 517-524, 567-570. 3 Ibid., col. 570. 4 In the Nacbwort to the inaugural lecture which dates form 1943, Heidegger attempted to dissipate some of the confusion which resulted from the lecture (WM, p. 45) by pointing out that the "logic" which was spoken of was placed in quotes in order to indicate that it is only one way of interpreting thought: "Warum setzt die Vorlesung diesen Titel zwischen AnfOhrungsstriche? Urn anzudeuten, dass die 'Logik' nur eine Auslegung des Wesens Den kens ist... (WM, p. 47). My emphasis. 22
logic which would constitute itself as the only valid mode of thought.5 As we move into the mid thirties a change in tone takes place in Heidegger's statements on logic. The logic-question Heidegger tells us is subsumed into what is for him the larger question, language. By 1934 this transformation had already occurred: Since the lecture course entitled "Logic" which was held in the summer of 1934, there lies concealed behind this title "Logic" a transformation of logic into the quest after the essence of language... "6 As Heidegger's thought developed he saw more clearly the danger which threatens the very essence of man himself. 7 At this juncture of world history technicity is seen as a manifestation of the spirit of metaphysics of especial importance, and symbolic logic is seen as closely related to the advancement of technology. Hence the tone of Heidegger's remarks on logic in general and symbolic logic in particular becomes much more biting. This is not at all to say that Heidegger rejects all logic, or sees it as the work of the devil, or a blockage to thought. On the contrary in all of his statements on logic he has insisted on its legitimate areas of competency, and insisted that it is a valuable study, and produces much useful knowledge.8 Because, however, there is the all too prevalent tendency within our technological age of viewing language solely from the perspective of its tool character, as a means for the advancement of technology through formalization, he has attempted to vindicate as sharply as possible 5 Otto Poggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), p. 273. 6 "Seit der Vorlesung 'Logik' im Sommer 1934 [verbirgt sich) hinter diesem Titel 'Logik' die Verwandlung der Logik in die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache... Was heisst Denleen? (TObingen: Niemeyer, 1961), p. 100. Hereafter, wo 7 Vortrage und Aufsatze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), pp. 72-73. 80, 98-99. Hereafter, VA. 8 See fo r example Die Frage nach dem Ding (TObingen: Niemeyer, 1962), pp. 121-122. Hereafter DF. See also Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), pp. 160-161. Hereafter, US. 23
another aspect of language. Over and above the needs of a developing technology there is a more fundamental need still, the human need, and since language is so closely related to the essence of human-being, the human element, that is, the non-tool character of language must be vindicated. If seen in this light, the statements of the late Heidegger on logic are placed in perspective, and it becomes clear that in bringing out this aspect of language he is saying something that is urgently needed at this point in history when man is in danger of being destroyed by his own creations. Perhaps these few brief remarks will be of h.elp in clarifying Heidegger's position on logic and language and will prove useful in removing some of the misunderstanding and misrepresentation of this position. By showing what Heidegger understands by logic and what role he would accord to it, and by showing that he certainly does not regard logic with hostility or disdain, our purpose is to make his thought more accessible to the modern logician, and, hopefully, to facilitate a dialogue between the two traditions. If the logician's image of Heidegger is that of an antilogician who wishes to destroy logical thought, this is surely something which creates a needless obstacle to dialogue between the two traditions. In showing what Heidegger's position on logic is it is to be hoped that at least some of the obstacles to dialogue which are based on misunderstanding and misrepresentation will be removed. In attempting to join the two traditions, the continental and the Anglo-analytical, in dialogue one of the most fruitful of the possible starting points for such an encounter is the question of sense. In the early Wittgenstein, that is the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, he declared that the statements of metaphysics are nonsense. In this way he became a kind of paradigm of the movement of logical positivism, influencing through the Tractatus such leading logicians as the members of the Vienna Circle, e.g. Waismann, Schlick, Feigl, Ayer, and Carnap. Heidegger for his part, from the very beginning of this way, has also been preoccupied with the question of sense--the sense 24
of Being, die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein.9 Indeed in Sein and Zeit the first page announces the purpose of this monumental work: to raise anew the question of the sense of Being (Sinn von Setn). 1 0 Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein were critical of Western metaphysics. For both Heidegger and Wittgenstein philosophy is not a science like the natural sciences, nor is it a body of doctrine. For both it is an activity. Wittgenstein also insisted on the necessity of a kind of primordial experience that some thing is. Thus he remarks: When I have it I wonder at the existe nce of the world. And I am then inclined to use such phrases as 'How extraordinary that anything should exist!' or 'How extraordinary that anything should exist!' or 'How extraordinary that the world should exist!' 11 And Heidegger in a way that is strikingly similar states: Man alone of all beings, called by the voice of Being, experiences the wonder of all wonders: that a being is.12 Also, in both Heidegger and Wittgenstein in the face of this mystery of Being, silence is enjoined by both. For Heidegger, thought which thinks on Being as truth, that is, as simultaneous revelation and concealment, must follow a logic which corresponds to both the revelation, and the concealment. It must bring the truth fo Being's revelation into openness in language, but it must also abide in the concealment, and cor-responding to this, it dwells in the mystery in silence. The logic of such a thought which is a silent speaking, and a speaking silence cor-responding to Being's revelation and concealment is "sigetic." 1 3 For 9 See for example his response to William Richardson in his Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. xi. 10 Sein und Zeit, loth ed. (TObingen: Niemeyer, 1963), p. 1. Hereafter, SZ. 11 From a lecture of Ethics at Cambridge in 1929, published in the Philosophical Review, LXXIV (1965), 8. 12 "Einzig der Mensch unter allem Seienden erfahrt, angerufen von der Stimme des Seins, das Wunder aller Wunder: DaB Seiendes ist. (WM, pp. 46-47). 1 3 From the Greek verb sigav, to keep silent. 25
Wittgenstein too, there is the realm of the inexpressible-this is the mystical. There is, indeed, the realm of the inexpressible. This makes itself manifest. It is the mysticap4 And what is this mystical realm? It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. 1 5 Further, the experience that something ts is so necessary that without it logic itself is impossible. The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something ts.. _16 Since this experience that something ts is necessary before one can undertake logic, it would seem that logic requires it as its foundation. Heidegger for his part also saw that logic stands in need of a foundation, in his case that there be a primordial grasp of Being. As we h4ve also seen Heidegger speaks of a sigetic logic, a logic of appropriate silence which cor-responds both to Being's revelation as well as its concealment. Wittgenstein also speaks of the necessity of silence-"concerning that of which we cannot speak, of this we must remain silent." 17 We have also seen that Wittgenstein makes a distinction in the Tractatus between what can be said and what cannot be said but which manifests itself. If we interpret this from Heidegger's standpoint this could be called the "inaccessible unavoidable" (das unzugangliche Unumganglicbe). 1 B It is unavoidable because it is Being, that by which the beings which we encounter come into presence and abide. Wittgenstein has seen that it is 14 Tractatus Logico-Pbilosopbicus, trans. by D.P. Pears and B.F. McGuinness London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 6.522. 15 Tractatus, 6.44. 16 Tractatus, 5.552. 17 Tractatus, 7. This is my own translation, not that of Pears and McGuinness. 18 VA, pp. 62-67. 26
"unavoidable" and hence felt constrained to insist on the necessity of an "experience" that something is, which is prior to all logic. He has also seen that it is "inaccessible" to logic as logic, and hence has also pointed out that the logician as logician cannot speak of it. But because he cannot speak of it, this does not mean that it does not exist-"there is, indeed, the realm of the inexpressible"-"es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches." 1 9 This is the realm of Being, that things are at all; this is the mystical. "It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. "2o For Heidegger-"Es gibt das Sein;" 21 for Wittgenstein-"Es gibt Unaussprechliches." And it seems that what is inexpressible, that is the mystical, is that the world is. "It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exjsts." What Heidegger speaks of as das unzugangliche Unumgangliche. finds a positive correlate in Wittgenstein's statement: "The,re is indeed the inexpressible. It manifests itself, it is the mystical. "22 The positive result of these considerations is to show that if one reads Wittgenstein from a standpoint there are substantive areas of agreement between them. This, it is to be hoped, may have the effect of interesting the logician in Heidegger's thought, and the Heideggerian in the work of one of the greatest analytical philosophers of the twentieth century. But over and above this what other result has this dialogue achieved? We have seen that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein concluded that the statements of metaphysics are nonsense. Further, we have noted that Heidegger has also seen a deep ambiguity in the statements of metaphysics which purport to speak of being as being (gn " 11 n) but reajly does not speak of Being (Sein), but rather of a being (das Setende), and hence has also been critical of metaphysics. Wittgenstein, however, reached an impasse at the end of the Tractatus. He concluded that not only the statements of metaphysics and ethics are nonsense, but also, on the basis of his own 19 Tractatus, 6.522. 20 Tractatus, 6.44. 21 Ober den Humanismus (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1947). p. 22. 22 Tractatus, 6.552. 27
principles, that much of the Tractatus itself is nonsense. Yet Wittgenstein has said many important and valuable things in the Tractatus. We have suggested that perhaps a way out of the selfdestroying position of the Tractatus can be found by reading Wittgenstein form the standpoint of Heidegger. Heidegger, as we have noted, lays stress upon a pre-ontological grasp of Being. In reading Wittgenstein from a Heideggerian point of view we have stressed certain elements in his thought which were suggested by Heidegger's notion of the pre-ontological grasp of Being-the necessity of a grasp that something ts, that this grasp that something ts is prior to logic. By giving a Heideggerian reading to Wittgenstein we have attempted to move beyond his stated position in which the statements of metaphysics are nonsense. The advantage of such a position is that in this way the positive insights of the Tractatus are retained without being committed to the self-destroying position that all metaphysical statements are nonsense. We have also seen that in Heidegger's view the assertion must be grounded in something more primordial, that is, the preontological grasp of Being, and further that without this, logic is without foundation. In reading Wittgenstein form a Heideggerian standpoint we have also laid stress on the fact that Wittgenstein states that a grasp that something ts is prior to logic. Since the question of the foundation of logic is of such importance to the logician, there is very definite advantage in reading Wittgenstein in this way-it offers a clue to the foundational question. The theme of "world" is also of considerable importance to both Heidegger and Wittgenstein. In the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus the question of sense and the limits of language are closely related to the notion of world. In the early Heidegger of SZ his efforts were exerted to overcome the Cartesian subjectobject dichotomy, and so he conceives of man as In-der-Weltsetn. The world is conceived of as a total relational complex, a horizon of meaningfulness. This can find its positive correlate in Wittgenstein's notion of world both in the Tractatus and in the Pbtlosopbtcal Investigations. For Wittgenstein also an object is constituted as an object because it is in a relational complex. It 28
can be meaningful only within such a relational complex. The meaning of a word in a language-game is never understood in isolation from the language-game in which it is used. It presupposes a total context of meaningfulness. Thus Wittgenstein points this out by an example which is almost as famous as the one which Heidegger uses to illustrate the Als-struktur, his famous hammer, except that for Wittgenstein it is the brake-lever. 'I set the brake up by connecting up the rod and lever'-yes, given the whole rest of the mechanism. Only in conjunction with that is it a brake-lever and separated form its support it is not even a lever; it may be anything or nothing. 23 This position of Wittgenstein stressing as he does the necessity of a total relational complexus, is very close to Heidegger's hermeneutic "as" structure of interpretive comprehensive in SZ. We might also speak with justification of the hermeneutical structure of language in both Heidegger and Wittgenstein. For Heidegger language is not merely a communication means, or one faculty man has among many other. Man lives in language; through language a world is summoned forth and things are cosummoned with it. Language creates a space in which man may dwell. Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations points out the inadequacy of the ostensive definition as a key to understanding language, and shows that the ostensive definition must rest upon something which is more fundamental. If it is to be understood at all, it must presuppose a linguistic context, and it is only within such a linguistic context that it has meaning. Man is not introduced into language from without as a stranger is who goes to a foreign country and acquires the Ianguage.24 He is immersed in it and the very language which the logician attempts to analyze enters both into the interrogation and the answers to the questions which are posed. As a consequence of this position, it seems that we can,.with justification, speak of a hermeneutical structure of language in Wittgenstein also. 23 Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), 6. Hereafter, PI. 24 PI, 32. 29
Again, we see that there are some very striking similarities between Heidegger and Wittgenstein, but the question may be asked-what is the advantage of reading Wittgenstein in this way? Logicians are, to be sure, very much concerned with such problems as meaning, sense and reference, naming, definition, referential context, and so on. By looking at Wittgenstein's thought from a Heideggerian angle of vision, we may interpret his position on language as hermeneutical. But what advantage does this offer? In terms of the very difficult question of meaning, in the hermeneutic approach stress is laid upon Wittgenstein's view that the problem of meaning, and the related problem of naming become problems when the object is regarded as an object to be stared at. Thus Wittgenstein remarks concerning the problem of meaning: The philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours. 2 5 And concerning naming he remarks: This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object. -And you really get such a queer connexion when the philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word 'this' innumerable times. 2 6 Viewing Wittgenstein through Heideggerian eyes this element in his thought becomes important because of what Heidegger has said concerning the split between man and the things of his world. Heidegger, as we have noted, attempted to overcome this split by conceiving of man in SZ as to-be-in-the-world, not radically split off from the things of his everyday concerns, but involved with them. The positive advantage of bringing Heidegger into contact with Wittgenstein on the questions of meaning and naming then is this. If we read Wittgenstein from the 25 PI, 2. 26 PI, 38. My emphasis. See also PI, 120. 30
vantage point of Heidegger, stress will be given to the above mentioned texts in Wittgenstein which emphasize the hermeneutical structure of language. 2 7 Meaning and naming become problems only when we accept the Aristotelian correspondence theory as a starting point. And Heidegger, of course, has attempted to overcome the cleavage of world and thing which this theory presupposes. In reading Wittgenstein from Heidegger's view point we stress the fact that the concrete meaning structures have meaning only within a total relational complex; the thing is thing only in a world which is Dasein's project. Thus, this way of interpreting Wittgenstein has the positive advantage of offering a simple and satisfying approach to the questions of meaning and naming. In terms of the problems of definition and naming, the hermeneutical approach also offers certain advantages. It will mean, among other things, that emphasis is placed on that part of Wittgenstein's thought in which he insists on the necessity of the total linguistic context of the language-game for meaning to be meaning. But there is a certain weakness in Wittgenstein's position inasmuch as Wittgenstein, inconsistently it would seem, in view of what he has said about the ostensive definition, regards the name as a label. Thus he states: It will often prove useful in philosophy to say to ourselves: naming something is like attaching a label to a thing. 28 By bringing his thought into contact with Heidegger this weakness can perhaps be overcome. Heidegger, as we have noted many times, places great importance on poetic naming. It calls forth both world and thing together. Thus the cleavage between thing named and the name which seems to be at least implicit in Wittgenstein's view that the name is a label applied to the thing can be overcome by stressing the role of poetic naming. And it would seem that this is in accord with Wittgenstein's basic position since by laying emphasis on the inadequacy of the ostensive definition, and by stressing the necessity of a total 27 For example, PI, 2, 38, 120. 28 PI, 15. See also PI, 26 where he again makes the same point. 31
linguistic context if there is to be meaning, he also seems to be desirous of avoiding a cleavage between the object and the name. Wittgenstein also stresses the tool character of words. In so doing he is saying something which is very valuable since his purpose is to show the variety of ways in which words can function. He has also stressed the importance of ordinary language, so much so in fact that it becomes the sole criterion of meaning. The philosopher's work is merely descriptive,29 which in the end, "leaves everything as it is."30 But there are surely certain weaknesses in this position. If adhered to strictly it would result in the stagnation of language. It also ten ds to make the philosopher the prisoner of his own limited perspectives. Further, it does not seem to take sufficient account of the triteness, emptiness, and banality to which ordinary language so often falls prey. Heidegger, on the other hand, has insisted on the non-tool, non-use character of language, and for this reason has given great importance to the poetic. As he sees it, it is precisely the stance of use toward language which produces the triteness and banality which so frequently characterize it. Thus, bringing Wittgenstein into contact- with Heidegger offers and additional advantage. There are statements in the Philosophtcal Investigations in which Wittgenstein shows an appreciation for the poetic element in language, but they lie largely undeveloped, merely suggestions. By bringing Wittgenstein into contact with Heidegger the importance of the poetic to language, as well as its dynamic, evolutionary character are brought to the fore. And this would seem to be most important, since as Heidegger sees it, language is only adequately understood when seen in relation to the poetic, and further, the language-question is essentially tied up with the question of the destiny of man himself. No doubt many would disagree with the interpretation of Wittgenstein which we have attempted. This interpretation, it could be argued, is not faithful to Wittgenstein's basic intent, and in fact is a highly arbitrary use of texts to suit a 29 PI, 109, 124. 30 PI, 124. 32
preconceived purpose. If there are very obvious, and very real differences between Heidegger and Wittgenstein which cannot be denied, is it not futile to attempt to bring these two very different methods of thought together? It surely would be easier to simply say that they are saying different things and let it go at that. But given the fact that one of the most urgently needed tasks at this juncture in the history of philosophy is dialogue between the two traditions, it does not seem that it would be the most profitable course of action, and hence our effort has been to try to stress areas in the thought of each which can be used as starting points toward dialogue. St. john 's University 33