SECULARISM: LIBERALISM S ACHILLES HEEL AT

SECULARISM: LIBERALISM S ACHILLES HEEL AT THE END OF HISTORY Ploutarchos Evlogimenos In his 1989 article and in a book in 1992, Fukuyama indicated that we have reached the end of history. Written in the euphoric time which saw the retreat and fall of communism, and thus signalling the end to the Cold War, Fukuyama s thesis claimed the unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism 1 and that the ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved on. 2 Fascism and communism (liberalism s two beaten opponents) may not yet be six feet under, but it would be hard to make the case they are not at least terminally ill. With the latter out of the way Fukuyama suggests two other possible rivals; religion and nationalism. 3 However, they are both dismissed as assailable by the liberal project. Several criticisms and even outright refutations of Fukuyama s thesis have appeared ever since the 1989 article was published, many expanding on the potential of religion and nationalism as rivals to liberalism. My discussion will also challenge the end of history by considering one of the aforementioned rivals: religion. My aim is not to relentlessly criticize or refute Fukuyama s claim, but add a mark of caution to the general debate concerning the global spread of liberalism and liberal democracies. My contention is that religion must not be underestimated as it has the potential to rock the roots of liberalism. Fukuyama s argument will be used as a starting and reference point M.Sc. candidate (International Public Policy), School of Public Policy, University College London (expected November 2005). Contact with questions/comments: ploutoe@yahoo.co.uk. 1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History? The National Interest, no. 16, summer, (1989), p. 3. 2 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin Books, 1992), p. ix. 3 Fukuyama, The End of History, p.14. INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW, vol. I, no. 1 (September 2005): 111-120. [ISSN 1748-5207] 2005 by The School of Public Policy, University College London, London, United Kingdom. All rights reserved. 111

112 I N T E R N A T I O N A L P U B L I C PO L I C Y R E V I E W for my discussion. I will argue that the secular, a pillar for modern liberalism, can be an inherently intolerant principle thus compromising the whole liberal democracy project. This contradiction leaves the promises of liberalism and specifically liberal democracy exposed to an internal identity crisis but also external criticism. To illustrate my discussion I will use the case of French secularism and the possible challenge posed to it by French-Muslims. I will start my discussion by defining liberalism. I will then outline Fukuyama s thesis and consider some problems facing the global spread of liberalism. I will then move on to the French secularism illustration, first introducing a definition and discussion on secularism and its roots. If we are at the end of history, one would expect the prevailing and universal ideology to be free of contradiction. I label my discussion as a caution because even though I indicate a contradiction in liberalism which may hinder it global assurgency, I do not believe that it is an irreconcilable one. Generally liberalism is based on the primacy of an individual s freedom to develop one s self and cultivate their capacities. Liberalism also comes to be associated with toleration, be it of religious, political, gender or racial concerns etc. Liberalism also bears definitional connections to societies which are organised around a free market. Fukuyama identifies political liberalism as the rule of law that recognises certain individual rights, which he classes into the three general groups of civil rights, religious rights, and political rights. 4 He defines liberal democracy, the form of government which will prevail at the end of history, as the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty. 5 It must be noted that when trying to define liberalism one is confronted with the array of variations and meanings attached to it. For the purposes of my discourse it is not necessary to explore all of these; the above summary will suffice. Inspired by the eminent collapse of communism in 1989, Fukuyama s version of the end of history - indicating an end to ideology not of events stops at liberalism and the universalization of that notion. Following Hegel and, to some extent, Plato s notion of thymos (spirit and desire) he states that the progression of history was not predominantly situated in material forces (as in Marxism) but in in the realm of human consciousness. 6 Material or economic interpretations of history are deficient as man is not simply an economic animal. 7 The claim is that all ideologies which have challenged liberalism have failed: nationalism and fascism (e.g. Nazi Germany), communism (Soviet bloc) and religion (at least in the predominantly secular West) have failed to take precedence over liberal values. However, the end of Fukuyama s article on the end of history (1989) and his book (1992) leave the 4 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, p.43 5 Ibid. p.42 6 Fukuyama, The End of History, p.5. 7 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, p. xvi.

V O L. I, N O. 1 SEPTEMBER 2005 113 future open; not to a new ideology but to the reoccurrence of an old one. The thymos and megalo-thymia which characterise and drive man find temporal appeasement in liberal societies. 8 The stark acknowledgment at the end of both his article and book (more so in the latter case) is that further ideological revolution, generated from the inability of liberalism to constantly satisfy everyone will always provide the setting for someone to go back and restart history. 9 Fukuyama s attempt to present us with end of history and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government, 10 invokes the debates on globalization, specifically those centred on the discourse of a global culture. Is it possible to claim singularity in culture? As Antony Smith points out, it is not. 11 Despite the defined and regular patterns of interconnectedness and global exchange entailed by globalization, it is not possible to claim more than the existence of a trend towards the existence of some features that are shared nevertheless by many different cultures. An interconnected world may facilitate and normalize the exchange of cultural influences yet cultural traditions do not derive from or descend upon, mute and passive populations on whose tabula rasa they inscribe themselves. 12 It follows that liberalism (a Western construct) may be resisted by some as being foreign to their culture. To enforce it on those would contradict liberalism itself and tend towards a 19 th century European imperialist drive, a point which Fukuyama recognizes. 13 To Fukuyama s admittance liberalism is vulnerable to thymos 14 due to gaps in liberalism s ability to satisfy certain desires. One of these desires is that for recognition, which can be satisfied by religion and nationalism. 15 Recognition leads to the matter of the Other. This Other does not denote a sophisticated academic or ideologically laden term. It signifies alternative and difference. In the parlance of the anthropology discipline, the Other is what defines the us VS them division. 16 To declare the undisputed end of history arguably the Other must be decisively dealt with and the aforementioned division ubiquitously resolved. Dealing with the Other does not mean eliminating it. In terms of religion and thymos it would imply creating religious iso-thymia; an appeasement of human spirit which religion evokes. 8 Ibid. p. 329. 9 Ibid. p. 334. 10 Fukuyama, The End of History, p. 4. 11 Anthony D. Smith, Towards a Global Culture, in The Global Transformations Reader, (eds.) D. Held & A. McGrew (Padstow : Polity Press 2000), p. 245. 12 Ibid. p. 45. 13 C.f. Fukuyama, The End of History, p.16. 14 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, p. 334. 15 Ibid. p. 238. 16 C.f. Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge, (London, Fontana Press1983).

114 I N T E R N A T I O N A L P U B L I C PO L I C Y R E V I E W Fukuyama implies that liberalism finds appeasement of religion in secularism; (although he does not explicitly use that term): modern liberalism itself was historically a consequence of religious based societies which failing to agree on the nature of the good life, could not provide even the minimal preconditions of peace and stability. 17 Secularism must deliver the promise of religious iso-thymia every time if liberalism is to become a truly global ideal. Secularism is generally taken to express the attitude that religion should have no place in civil affairs. 18 Modern secularism is liberal democracy s attempt to make citizenship to one s state the primary principle of identity: it is an enactment by which a political medium (representation of citizenship) redefines and transcends particular and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated through class, gender, and religion. 19 However, by denoting the existence of these practices the secular becomes a notion defined by its opposition to something. Furthermore, by trying to create an identity by asserting the primacy of one principle of identity (e.g. citizenship) over the rest (e.g. religion) secularism arrogates to itself the right to define the role of religion in politics, thus closing up the political space and acting like a faith intolerant of other faiths. 20 Historically secularization originates from the West as an interpretive paradigm which allows us to discuss and comprehend the interrelated themes of social and religious change, within the region in respect to Christianity. 21 The Peace of Westphalia introduced the principles of territorial sovereignty, established the independence of states and gave strength to the concept of sovereign states, thus overthrowing the notions of a universal religious authority acting as final arbiter of Christendom. Then the argument can be that secularism is the teleological development of Christianity s role in the public sphere; secularization, in other words, remains situated within the broader Christian context. 22 Fukuyama concedes liberal democracy emerged first in the Christian West and that the universalism of democratic rights can be seen in many ways as a secular form of Christian universalism. 23 In this 17 Fukuyama, The End of History, p. 14. 18 Heiner Meulemann, Enforced Secularisation Spontaneous Revival? European Sociological Review, Vol. 20, no. 1, February (2004), p. 47. 19 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, (Stratford, Stratford University Press, 2003), p.5 emphasis added. 20 Elizabeth S. Hurd, The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations, European Journal of International Relations, vol.10(2), (2004), p. 237 and 256. 21 Stephen J. Hunt, Religion in Western Society, (Basingstok: Pelgarve, 2002), p. 15. 22 Hurd, The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations, p. 241. 23 Francis Fukuyama, History Is Still Going Our Way: Liberal democracy will inevitably prevail, Friday, 5 th October 2001: http://chnm.gmu.edu/ematters/issue6/911exhibit/emails/fukuyama_wsj.htm.

V O L. I, N O. 1 SEPTEMBER 2005 115 regard, liberalism is rooted in a secular tradition which defines and establishes itself in respect to a Christian morality. The suggestion is that the secular in this case separates the role of Christianity from civil affairs; secularism is a unique Western achievement (and) it follows that ( ) those who are not Western cannot be secular. 24 Secularism is designed to confine the Christian element. Liberalism is the post-christian Church de facto organizing order of society, but although it may keep the Christian Church authority away from civil affairs it does not necessarily do the same for the Christian Ethic. 25 Then, how does secularism, and consequently liberalism, fare in regards to other religions? To investigate this I will use the case of French secularism and French-Muslims. I will mainly do this through a discussion using the headscarf affair 26 as it can be seen as epitomizing the challenges and discourses Islam poses to French secularism and liberalism. 27 In France the notion of secularism is tantamount to laicite, a constitutional definition describing the neutrality of the state towards religious and other convictions, in order to build a state for all. In terms of the French state this dates back to 1905 when a law separating church and state was passed by the French parliament, Terminating Napoleon s Concordant of 1801 with the Vatican. In the French Republic, religion cannot, must not be a political project It [is] necessary to preserve the national principle of secularity - separating religion and state. 28 The following literature review aims to highlight aspects of the headscarf affair in France, revealing the clashes of Islam and secularism. By this I want to demonstrate a certain intolerance inherent in secularism and how this may obstruct the universalization of liberalism. Emmanuel Terray finds the debate on secularism and the hijab (headscarf) underscored by matters of immigrants cultural integration and gender concerns. 29 His findings are a result of a critical study of Bernard Stasi s report Laicite et Republique. The report was ordered by a Presidential Commission in July 2003 (headed by Stasi in his capacity of 24 Hurd, The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations, p. 251. 25 C.f. Madeleine Bunting, Secularism gone mad: Chirac's determination to ban Muslim headscarves from schools will cause years of confrontation, The Guardian, Thursday 18 th December 2003: http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1109242,00.html, Hurd, The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations, p. 248, Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, in Political Writings, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994). 26 This originates in a long debate over headscarves that has divided France since 1989, when l'affaire du foulard ("the headscarf affair") saw two young Muslim girls expelled from their school in Creil, near Paris, for wearing headscarves, thus going against the French secular tradition. 27 Arun Kapil, On Islam in the West and Muslims in France: Views from the Hexagon, Third World Quarterly, vol.18(2), (1997), p. 383. 28 Sentiments of French Government as expressed by Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin source: BBC news-online 03/02/04 29 Emmanuel Terray, Headscarf Hysteria, New Left Review (26) March/April (2004).

116 I N T E R N A T I O N A L P U B L I C PO L I C Y R E V I E W Mediator of the Republic) and it is on this reports recommendation that the National Assembly voted favourably on a religious symbols ban in February 2004. Terray concludes that the effects of the report will be the exclusion and not - as claimed by the report - the republican and egalitarian inclusion of all in the French state. The reason for this exclusion is the fact that the French government underplays the role of the cultural and gender contentions, covering them with rhetoric of secularism. Antoine Boulange argues that the French government has misguidedly put abstract idea of secularism above the civil rights of Muslims 30. Boulange, writing from a modern-marxist perspective, identifies problems of Muslim-immigrant integration and gender concerns behind the French government s calls of secularity. His focus is to demonstrate how this post-9/11 Islamophobia and thus demonization of the French-Muslim population leads to a weakening of the working class in France. 31 Lina Liederman conducts a comparative study of the attitudes towards the headscarf in the UK and France in her research of pluralism in education in these two countries. 32 Through her study she identifies and compares the primary issues in each country. Liederman identifies some of the latter as women s issues (and) discrimination. 33 Moreover and similarly to Terray, Liederman finds that these issues are shrouded by a republican, secular rhetoric; the absence of consistent references on ( ) race relations in the French Islamic headscarf debate implies a particular French dislike or uneasiness with the notion of race. 34 Soysal explores the compatibility of notions of (Western) European citizenship with organised Islam within Europe. 35 She writes on the hijab case in France in terms of human and citizenship rights. In brief the argument is that the prevalence of Universal Human rights has come to somewhat diminish claims to national citizenship in the European domain. Thus the integration of Islam in Europe, Islam being a borderless sense of identity, is hard to address simply through the means of secular rhetoric, without addressing specific issues of culture. All these studies criticise to some extent France s strong secular beliefs as counter productive. Secularism as presented by the French authorities in the hijab affair will have 30 Antoine Boulange, The Hijab, Racism and the State, International Socialism, Spring (2004). 31 Boulange, The Hijab, Racism and the State p. 23. 32 Lina M. Liederman, Pluralism in Education: the display of Islamic affiliation in French and British schools, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol.11, no.1, (2000). 33 Liederman, Pluralism in Education: the display of Islamic affiliation in French and British Schools, p. 109. 34 Liederman, Pluralism in Education: the display of Islamic affiliation in French and British schools, p. 110. 35 Yasemin N. Soysal, Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: Organised Islam in European Public Spheres, Theory and Society Vol. 26/4, (1997).

V O L. I, N O. 1 SEPTEMBER 2005 117 the effect to ban and exclude 36 or oppress Islam in France. 37 Such oppression undermines the liberal notions of toleration and freedom to cultivate one s full capacities. Boulange evokes elements of Huntington s clash of civilizations 38 which has generated a perception of Islam as a threat to Western civilisation. In a post-9/11 world Boulange sees France as acting in a way which exemplifies Western Islamophobia. Soysal argues that symbols such as the hijab seize being religious symbols and become means of cultural and political expression. Thus their bearers defend them on the grounds of human rights. 39 Miriam Feldblum argues on the grounds of Soysal s reasoning that there are two levels to the hijab affair. 40 On the grounds that it evokes universal human rights, it is an attack on the French notion of secularity and also a threat to the French model of national integration which eschews ethnic related rights. In such a case secularism creates a politics of exclusion situation. It thus undermines the project of liberal democracy. Individuals and groups who dissent from secular transcendental/temporal delineation are shut out of public deliberation before it begins; secularism runs the risk of shutting down new approaches to negotiations between religion and politics. 41 The survival of liberalism and its universal spread is only possible if its baseline, secularism, manages to take a neutral stance, not one of exclusion. Thus, taking the French example, secularism antagonises the non-christian, and undermines liberalism. The secular project should create a basis for the political which whilst preventing the religious from taking over civil affairs it should not exclude it as an identity. Exclusion of something from the political is the political gesture par excellence. 42 Secularism should define the limits of the game and liberalism should be the political mediator between the different identities. In its expansion over the globe liberalism will encounter many identities, some of which will be contained within the same political space (e.g. French-Muslims VS other French citizens in France). Each identity is fated to contend in various degrees in multifarious ways with others it depends on to enunciate itself; that politics the issue is not if but how. 43 36 Terray, Headscarf Hysteria, p. 127. 37 Boulange, The Hijab, Racism and the State, p.23. 38 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations, Foreign Affairs v. 72, no. 3, Summer, (1993) and Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the Decline of Religion, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 39 Yasemin N. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational membership in Europe, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994) and Soysal, Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: Organised Islam in European Public Spheres. 40 Miriam Feldblum, Reconstructing Citizenship: Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France, (New York, State University of New York Press, 1999) 41 Hurd, The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations, pp.239-241. 42 Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, (London, Verso, 1999), p. 82. 43 William E. Connolly, The Augustinian Imperative, (London, Sage Publications, 1993)

118 I N T E R N A T I O N A L P U B L I C PO L I C Y R E V I E W France and generally European societies are not prone to acknowledging some legitimate role for religion in public life and in the organization of collective group identities. Muslim organized collective identities and their public representations become a source of anxiety not only because of their religious otherness as a non-christian and non-european religion, but more importantly because of their religiousness itself as the other of European secularity. 44 The liberal democracy project tries to propagate iso-thymia through a series of institutional arrangements: popular sovereignty, rights separation of powers and the rule of law. 45 As a notion it is not inherently global but it is rooted in Western Europe and the secularization of Christianity. It therefore runs the risk of isolating its Other religions (i.e. the ones it defines itself contrary to), proliferating thymos and exasperating differences. This is exemplified by the case of the French Muslims. Thus secularism is not always democratic and neutral. 46 A possible way to change this is if secularism redefines itself thereby incorporating more religions so that it is not solely situated within a Christian context. Secularism rooted in Christianity provides the liberal democratic project a false sense of certainty and triumph. This becomes its Achilles heel, leaving it vulnerable to self-contradiction of its tolerance and individual freedom ideals. The two-sided tragedy of liberalism is that it doesn't know its own limits, and neither does it know its own strength. If it knew both of these, it would find the self-confidence and humility to understand and learn from those who challenge it. 47 44 Jose Casanova, The New Religious Pluralism and Democracy, Panel Discussion, George University, April 21-22, 2005: http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:lclz5wogexsj:irpp.georgetown.edu/agenda.doc+secular ism+casanova&hl=en 45 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, p.333. 46 Hurd, The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations, p. 240. 47 Bunting, Secularism gone mad: Chirac's determination to ban Muslim headscarves from schools will cause years of confrontation.

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120 I N T E R N A T I O N A L P U B L I C PO L I C Y R E V I E W Meulemann, H. Enforced Secularisation Spontaneous Revival? European Sociological Review, vol. 20, no. 1, February (2004). Smith, A.D. Towards a Global Culture. In The Global Transformations Reader, eds. D. Held & A. McGrew. Padstow: Polity Press, 2000. Soysal, Y.N. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational membership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Yasemin N. Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: Organised Islam in European Public Spheres, Theory and Society Vol. 26/4, (1997). Terray, E. Headscarf Hysteria, New Left Review (26) March/April (2004). Weber, M. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, in Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Zizek, S. The Ticklish Subject. London: Verso, 1999.