12 17 March 2015 Will Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan Form a Coalition Against Iran? Lindsay Hughes FDI Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme Key Points Iran has troops and allied militias fighting Islamic State forces in Iraq, north of Saudi Arabia, and supports the Shi a Houthi rebels who have consolidated their hold on Sana a, the capital of Yemen, immediately to the south of the Kingdom. This is an unprecedented situation and poses a security dilemma for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has recently held discussions with the leaders of Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and some Gulf Co-operation Council states, all of which are Sunnimajority. If this is the beginning of a Sunni versus Shia power play, there is the risk of a major deterioration in Sunni-Shia relations, which could lead to further war in the Middle East. Summary Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently visited Riyadh at the invitation of King Salman. This occurred a day after Salman held talks with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al- Sisi. Erdoğan s visit was followed, in turn, by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The leaders of Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have also visited Salman since mid- February, and other Arab leaders are due to follow. This has led to speculation that Salman is attempting to unify Sunni Muslims against Shi ite Iran.
Analysis Saudi Arabia, which does not have a comfortable relationship with Iran, has reason to be wary of Tehran s intentions in the region. Tehran has taken the lead in fighting Islamic State (IS) forces in Iraq and Syria, pitting its military and its proxy army, Hezbollah, against the terrorist movement. Shia militiamen and Iraqi forces have re-captured Alam, a town on the outskirts of Tirkrit, which is itself an IS stronghold. It is the involvement of the Shia militiamen and that of the Iranian advisors, including General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran s Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, who are directing their efforts, that have been a key factor of the Iraqi offensive. This places Iranian forces to the immediate north of Saudi Arabia. As if that were not concerning enough for Riyadh, Tehran-backed (Shi ite) Houthi forces have consolidated their hold on Sana a, the capital of Yemen, to the south of Saudi Arabia. To emphasise its support for the Houthis, Tehran has initiated a regular direct flight to Sana a and has stated its willingness to supply them with fighters and weapons. Saudi Arabia thus finds Iranian forces simultaneously to its immediate north and south for the first time. To compound this concern, Riyadh appears to have little, if any, confidence in the on-going negotiations between the US, the other permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (the so-called P5+1) in their efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a military nuclear capability. If Iran does indeed develop nuclear weapons under the guise of using its nuclear programme for the generation of energy, Saudi Arabia will find itself distinctly on the back foot security-wise and may feel that its role as the Sunni regional leader is being undermined. A distinct possible outcome is that the Shi ites will be seen to dominate the majority Sunnis. It is probably this perception that has caused Saudi Arabia to become the world s largest importer of arms, spending US$6.5 billion in 2014. Enter Turkey. Erdoğan s meeting with Salman reportedly focused on plans for Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad, together with other countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council, to form a Sunni coalition to fight IS. This is an interesting idea in itself, as it appears to be a bid to demonstrate to the world (and, more likely, domestically in the relevant countries), that Sunni Islam also condemns IS s murderous activities and will not take a back seat to Shi ism. It is even more likely that Riyadh wants to take the necessary precautions to ensure that Tehran is isolated in the Muslim world, just as it is vis-à-vis the West. Turkey has maintained a fairly balanced relationship with both Riyadh and Tehran. Ankara s security outlook coincided with Riyadh s on the Syrian issue, with both agreeing that Bashar al Assad had to be replaced. Turkey, moreover, fears that the Syrian conflict could spill over its border, giving ethnic Kurds an excuse to take up arms openly against Ankara. Consequently, it was reported that Turkey and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement to increase their support to the Syrian rebels who are fighting Assad s forces. Salman reportedly also agreed to support Turkey s declaration of a no-fly zone. It is, however, a statement from the pro-turkish government paper, Yeni Safak, which sums up the degree of antipathy both leaders feel towards Iran: Iran s sectarian approach in the region was on the agenda of the two leaders. Both were disturbed by Iran s expansionist and sectarian attitude. Iran is Page 2 of 5
spending massive resources on shedding Muslim blood and destabilising Muslim countries. Turkey s previous decision to balance its relationships with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, it would appear, has been discarded by the Muslim Brotherhood-leaning Erdoğan in favour of ties with Riyadh. This will explain Salman s discussions with Egypt s al Sisi, who overthrew and declared the Brotherhood and Hamas illegal in Egypt, thus bringing Cairo and Ankara into direct opposition. Salman knows he will have to use considerable diplomacy to remove this fly from the Sunni ointment. Salman has also held talks with Sharif of Pakistan. Sunni-majority Pakistan shares a common border with Iran and has witnessed frequent Sunni-Shia violence domestically. Both countries have a rather strained relationship, which was exacerbated when Iranian border guards were kidnapped by Pakistani militants and moved across the border into Pakistan. Islamabad, for its part, has frequently claimed that Iran seeks to destabilise Pakistan by encouraging the Shi ite population in Pakistan s Baluchistan province to secede. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, have a close relationship. Pakistan has provided troops to Saudi Arabia before, notably in 1979 after Shi ite militants stormed the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and Saudi Arabia has made large financial grants to Pakistan, including one for US$1.5 billion last year when Salman visited Islamabad. Pakistan is the only Muslim-majority, nuclear-armed state. There has been speculation that Pakistan s nuclear programme had been financed by Riyadh since the 1970s. The fact that Pakistan is Sunnimajority, borders Iran and has a strained relationship with that state only adds to its importance in Riyadh s perception. A measure of Pakistan s importance to Saudi Arabia may be gauged from the fact that Sharif was the only leader who was notified that King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud was very ill, enabling him to visit Riyadh in January this year to pay his respects before Abdullah died. When Sharif visited Riyadh this time around, he was met at the airport by Salman, a reception not usually accorded by the King to other leaders. Sharif will also remember that it was Saudi Arabia that persuaded General Pervez Musharraf to free him from prison, enabling him to find refuge in Jeddah. In the last couple of days, however, at least one report has alleged that Islamabad has declined to join Riyadh s coalition. While this may be true at this time, the fact remains that Islamabad will not hesitate to come to Riyadh s aid should there be any hint of direct conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Again, a mercenary perception of this refusal could be that Pakistan is using Saudi Arabia s concerns to obtain more funds or other concessions such as, for instance, oil at a reduced price to support its creaking energy infrastructure. There is little doubt that Pakistan, which receives major financial donations from Saudi Arabia, will hesitate to assist its golden goose when needed. If Salman is indeed trying to create a Sunni coalition against Iran, he will need to ensure that Shi ites in countries other than Iran and especially those who form the majority on Saudi Arabia s east coast do not feel that they are being targeted. Any miscalculation or perceived atrocity by Sunni troops against Shi as will be seen as an attempt to create a Sunni Page 3 of 5
dominance over the minority Shi a once and for all, bringing an end to a centuries old issue. There is an added danger; the Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was very recently admitted to hospital suffering from prostate cancer and is, according to some reports, in a critical state. Whether this is true or not, there is every possibility that Iran will move to ensure that there is no perception of weakness in its political structure that could be caused by his death. It is likely to intensify its strikes against IS, which will necessitate more troops and lead to an increasing number of clashes, which will, in turn, add to Riyadh s concerns. This could potentially lead to war within the Muslim civilisation, one in which there will be no winners. Pakistan already has nuclear-armed missiles but does not have a no first strike nuclear policy. This leaves Islamabad free to use this component of its arsenal in any war with an enemy, be that India or Iran. Pakistan also has tactical nuclear weapons, the use of which, it believes, will not necessarily lead to all-out nuclear war. Iran, however, now has a delivery system capable of carrying nuclear warheads and will soon have the nuclear weapons technology it apparently desires. Should Pakistan use its tactical, battlefield nuclear weapons against its troops, Iran will be forced to retaliate with its larger-scale nuclear weapons, which could soon lead to all-out nuclear war. Most alarming, however, is the fact that both sides appear to have few compunctions about using these weapons and seem to have the political will to use them. ***** Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International. Page 4 of 5
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