Sixth Conference of the Dutch-Flemish Association for Analytic Philosophy

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Sixth Conference of the Dutch-Flemish Association for Analytic Philosophy VAF 2014 January 29-31, 2014, University of Groningen Conference venue: Rooms and University of Groningen Bloemstraat 36 9712 LE Groningen The Netherlands Keynote speakers: Rosanna Keefe (Sheffield), Validity, normativity and degrees of belief Can we illuminate the nature of validity or the choice between alternative logics by appealing to the distinctive normative role of valid arguments? How should we characterize that normative role once we acknowledge that many of our beliefs are merely partial? I will show that Hartry Field s principles fail. I will argue that the problems identified will carry over to alternative principles and that normativity cannot provide the key to understanding validity. F.A. Muller (Rotterdam/Utrecht), What is an elementary particle? Between physics and metaphysics The theoretical framework of the Standard Model of Elementary Particles and their Interactions, which comprises three of the four known physical interactions (bracketing dark matter and dark energy), is that of relativistic quantum field theory. The prima facie ontology of such a theory is that of quantum fields. What are quantum fields? How are they related to elementary particles? Are there elementary particles? What are they, if there are any? These questions occupy some philosophers of physics and do not occupy metaphysicians. We shall delve into the questions what elementary particles are and whether there are any. We shall answer in the negative. This makes the question what quantum fields are more urgent. We shall come up empty. The way is then paved for a novel and shining ontology of structures. Benjamin Schnieder (Hamburg), Grounding and Dependence According to Quine, the goal of ontology is simply to determine what entities there are. But philosophers in a broadly Aristotelian tradition would think that there is more to ontology. In particular, a further crucial goal is to understand how certain entities depend for their existence and/or identity on other entities. Apart from the notion of existence, a notion of ontological dependence then plays a crucial role for an understanding of what ontology is about. Similarly, while the goal of science in general might simply be taken to determine what truths there are, philosophers in a broadly Aristotelian tradition would think that there is more to science. In

particular, a further crucial goal is to understand how certain true propositions depend for their truth on other true propositions. Apart from the notion of truth, a notion of dependence between truths (in recent terminology: grounding) then plays a crucial role for an understanding of what science in general is about. To many philosophers, the ideas of ontological dependence and grounding seem to be related. But how exactly they might be related is a matter of dispute and the main topic of my talk.

Wednesday 29 January 09.00-09.15 Opening () Keynote: Rosanna Keefe, Validity, 09.15-10.15 normativity and degrees of belief () 10.15-10.30 Break 10.30-12.00 Parallel Sessions 10.30-11.00 10.30-11.00 A. Marra (Tilburg) B. Dunnaway (Oxford) How ought and know interact: a dynamic semantics solution to the Miners Paradox Horizontal relative fundamentality (CANCELLED) 11.00-11.30 11.00-11.30 D. Kretz (Berlin) M. Eronen (Leuven) Why queerness is not enough: against moral Robustness, models, and reality eliminativism 11.30-12.00 11.30-12.00 T. Gkouvas (Antwerp) A. Hertroys (Utrecht) Legal truth without legal facts: between Constructive empiricism and actuality quantification and truthmaking 12.00-13.30 Lunch 13.30-15.00 Parallel Sessions 13.30-14.00 13.30-14.00 G. Feis (Milan) A. de Jong (Utrecht) The type/token distinction: social ontology A refutation of Putnam s antirealism and analytic metaphysics 14.00-14.30 14.00-14.30 A. Kaufmann (Antwerp) G. Leegwater (Rotterdam) Animal social ontology On the Colbeck-Renner claim: is quantum mechanics complete? 14.30-15.00 14.30-15.00 J. Kloeg (Rotterdam) S. Verhaegh (Groningen) Community rules: a response to Kripkenstein against metaphysics An apparent inconsistency in Quine s metaphysics

15.00-15.15 Break 15.15-16.45 Parallel Sessions 15.15-15.45 15.15-15.45 S. Van Tongerloo (Leuven) M. Campdelacreu (Barcelona) Borders as institutions: a modular analysis Supplementing Sutton s answer to the grounding problem 15.45-16.15 15.45-16.15 B. Bewersdorf (Groningen) N. Conolly (Dublin) Conceptual learning Against ontological permissiveness 16.15-16.45 16.15-16.45 F. van Caspel (Nijmegen) J. van der Herik (Rotterdam) On the nature of mental properties Is information out there? 18.30 Conference dinner EUR 16 (drinks excluded) To be paid in cash! Indian restaurant Kleine Moghul Nieuwe Boteringestraat 62 050-3188905

Thursday 30 January Keynote: F.A. Muller () 09.15-10.15 What is an elementary particle? Between physics and metaphysics 10.15-10.30 Break 10.30-12.00 Parallel Sessions 10.30-11.00 10.30-11.00 L. Decock (Amsterdam) and I. Douven (Groningen) K. Egerton (London) Cognitive metaphysics Knowledge, explanation, and fundamentalism in metaontology 11.00-11.30 11.00-11.30 A. Ramos Díaz (Leuven) R. Knowles (Manchester) An argument for the impossibility of Heavy duty platonism naturalizing thought 11.30-12.00 11.30-12.00 V. Triviño (Murcia) and M. Cerezo (Murcia) M. Lipman (St Andrews) Species as individuals and the thesis of 3D- Making sense of perspectival facts 4D equivalence 12.00-13.30 Lunch 13.30-15.00 Parallel Sessions 13.30-14.00 13.30-14.00 P. Fazekas (Antwerp) and G. Kertesz (Durham) J. Miller (Durham) A Hamiltonian account of causation Failing better: in defence of metaphysics 14.00-14.30 14.00-14.30 R. Mátyási (Budapest) M.P. Seevinck (Nijmegen)

An argument against causal eliminativism of ordinary objects The promise of Whitehead s metaphysics: lessons for 21st century thought 14.30-15.00 14.30-15.00 M. Simionato (Venice) An argument for metaphysical nihilism 15.00-15.15 Break 15.15-16.45 Parallel Sessions 15.15-15.45 15.15-15.45 S. Siriwardena (Cambridge) N. Wildmann (Hamburg) On absence causation: an examination of the Load bare-ing particulars predominant theories of token-level absence causation 15.45-16.15 15.45-16.15 N. Kitamura (Tokyo) L. Azzano (Pisa) The world among other truthmakers Dispositions, manifestations, possibilities: for a safe and sane (actualist) ontology of modality 16.15-16.45 16.15-16.45 S. Wintein (Rotterdam) J. Reinert (Tilburg) On the strict-tolerant conception of truth Hybrid approaches to possible and impossible worlds: the irrelevance of ontological (dis-)parity

Friday 31 January Keynote: Benjamin Schnieder 09.15-10.15 () Grounding and Dependence 10.15-11.15 Parallel Sessions 10.15-10.45 10.15-10.45 T. Kuipers (Groningen) S. Greve (Oxford) Concretizations of two-sided nomic truth approximation Reality through modality: what conceivability can teach us 10.45-11.15 10.45-11.15 F. Nappo (St Andrews) K. Łacina (Cracow) Vagueness in reality and the problem of the many Can predicating the present of an event have a truth value? 11.15-11.30 Break 11.30-12.30 Parallel Sessions 11.30-12.00 11.30-12.00 R. van Woudenberg (Amsterdam) T. De Mey (Rotterdam) The metaphysics of degrees Thought experiments in analytic metaphysics 12.00-12.30 12.00-12.30 C. Engelsma (Groningen) J. de Grefte (Groningen) The ontology of reasons and the epistemic regress problem The material theory of induction: three worries

Speakers: Lorenzo Azzano (Pisa) Benjamin Bewersdorf (Groningen) Marta Campdelacreu (Barcelona) Frank van Caspel (Nijmegen) María Cerezo (Murcia) Niall Conolly (Dublin) Lieven Decock (Amsterdam) Igor Douven (Groningen) Karl Egerton (London) Coos Engelsma (Groningen) Markus Eronen (Leuven) Peter Fazekas (Antwerp) Guglielmo Feis (Milan) Triantafylos Gkouvas (Antwerp) Job de Grefte (Groningen) Sebastian Greve (Oxford) Jasper van den Herik (Rotterdam) Abram Hertroys (Utrecht) Andries de Jong (Utrecht) Angelica Kaufmann (Antwerp) Gergely Kertész (Durham) Naoaki Kitamura (Tokyo) Julien Kloeg (Rotterdam) Jens van t Klooster (Antwerp) Robert Knowles (Manchester) David Kretz (Berlin) Theo Kuipers (Groningen) Kamil Łacina (Cracow) Gijs Leegwater (Rotterdam) Martin Lipman (St Andrews) Alessandra Marra (Tilburg) Róbert Mátyási (Budapest) Tim De Mey (Rotterdam) James Miller (Durham) Franceso Nappo (St Andrews) Antonio Ramos Díaz (Leuven) Janine Reinert (Tilburg) M.P. Seevinck (Nijmegen) Marco Simionato (Venice) Shyane Siriwardena (Cambridge) Stijn Van Tongerloo (Leuven) Vanesa Triviño (Murcia) Sander Verhaegh (Groningen) Nathan Wildmann (Hamburg) Stefan Wintein (Rotterdam) René van Woudenberg (Amsterdam)