Gulf Futures Center POLICY ANALYSIS PAPER (N. 03) 1 January 2018 Abdalla Mosa Altayer 1
Contents Introduction The Deadly Alliance Confusing Questions Future Scenarios 2
Introduction There was a time I was relieved and optimistic at the sight of two Arab leaders on the diplomatic theatre: i.e. President Saleh and former Secretary-General of the League of Arab States Amr Moussa. I shared this sentiment with Saleh, and his response was: "You have a high Arab national sense." I was then at the presidential palace in Sana'a, in the last week of April 2008, and he was looking forward to pumping more "warmth" into the Saudi-Yemeni relations. He then told me that Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the time, "knows the influential Yemeni elite even more than some of Yemeni ministers." I had been in the hospitality of Saleh for less than two days, and I felt an affinity for Sana'a. So, I promised him to come back and lecture at one of his educational initiatives. I was familiar with Yemen, but that was my first time visiting. The nature of the geographic proximity with Yemen made its news somewhat important to the young children of our age in the Asir region at the time. President Ibrahim al-hamdi (1974-1977) was assassinated. President Ahmad al- Ghashmi (1977-1978) who had ruled for less than one year was equally assassinated, followed by Ali Abdullah Saleh (1947-2017) who was the third president to be assassinated on December 4th, 2017. President Saleh stepped down in 2012 after an uprising pushed thousands to demonstrate on the streets, as part of the wave of the "Arab Spring" that swept through several Arab countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen). Saleh had unified North and South of Yemen in May 1990; and despite the difficult conjunctures of Yemen and its tribal and sectarian structure, he managed to rule for over 33 years, during which he was "stomping on snake heads" as himself put it during a television interview. What he could not accomplish - and which seemed intentional - 3
was subduing the tribes to the State authority. He had no desire in taming the tribes or even undermining the interests of the tribal leaders. However, whether willingly or unwillingly, he ended up empowering his rivals, i.e. Houthis, Tribal leaders and Hashemites. The Deadly Alliance Yemen can be divided into two main sects: The Zaidi and the Shafi'i. For the longest time, the differences between them were indiscernible. This was such, as they prayed in the same mosques, and generally the interaction between both sects created the identity of Yemen. In 1990. A Zaidi school movement was established, and had its curricula and activities, namely the Forum of the Young Believers (elshabab almo'men), which was under the Yemeni State's care. The Secretary-General of the Forum of the Young Believers, Mohammed Yahya Salam Ezzan, describes the beginning as, "organizing the existing cultural seminars and updating the content in regard to the quality of the materials taught, while we tried to update the curricula so that we could dispose of a lurking confusion." In an interview with Mareb Press, published in April 2007. Ezzan added that the movement was educational and cultural, with the intention of keeping the Zaiyydia strong at heart, in mind, as well as socially. This would allow the Yemenis to deter any probable hegemony of Salafism. Sa'dah is the Houthis' main homestead. According to a report published by CNN Arabic on March 15th, 2015, it is the hometown of the Zaidi subsect, namely the Jarudiyah, whose beliefs are closer to the doctrine of the Twelvers than the rest of the Zaidis in Yemen. Badr al-din al-huthi (1926-2010) spent several years in Iran. Upon his return to Sa'dah, he started criticizing heavily the weak infrastructure and welfare programs, and ended up actively undermining the central 4
government. One serious consequence of his action, though unlikely wished, is that it endorsed Iran's aggressive rhetoric antagonizing the United States, Israel and America's allies, including the late president Saleh. Meanwhile, his charitable projects began to bear fruits in the total absence of the Yemeni Government's attention to the people of Sa'da. The popularity of Badr al-din al-houthi's call, which was identical to accepting the Twelvers sect, increased after the establishment of a Salafist school in Dammaj by Muqbil al-wadai, then allegedly preaching the Salafi (Wahhabi) teachings in Yemen, and expanding such schools to new followers. This created a hostile atmosphere that was exploited by Badr al-din al- Houthi, allowing even more interest in the Twelvers sect. As a result, the Houthi circle began to expand and deepen up in the areas of the Zaidis, especially the marginalized, who represented about 15% of the Yemenis. Mohamed Mustafa Omrani, told CNN Arabic that Hussain the son of Badr al-din al-houthi "was determined to complete his project, establish an Iranian party like Hezbollah and therefore, restore the power to himself as an alleged descendent of the Prophet, entitled to the usurped power." Since the tribe contributed to the fragmentation of loyalties to the central state, which is contrary to the convictions of some intellectuals and reformers, the Houthi's discourse has exploited this vacuum and tried to fill it up with an ideology that is in opposition to the tribe and modernity alike. As such, the oppressed and those who deserted their tribes started, through this new structure, to find a resort and a source of strength and immunity. Hussain al-houthi, who gained more fame than his father, joined the organization of the faithful youth after his return from Sudan in 1999. According to Muhammad Yahya Ezzan, in the interview mentioned above, he was an ordinary man 5
who joined the youth organization in 2000. Later on, he raised the attention by imposing the return to more a traditional rhetoric. One that is impassable to dialogue and openness. This resulted in him along with those who believed in his approach within the organization, to break free and established their own path. Ezzan believes that the ideas on which the Houthis built the armed movement "have nothing to do with the Zaydiyyah. In fact, they [Houthis] do not represent the Zaidi sect, which is embodied in the heritage at hand." It can thus be said without reservation, that the Houthis are a proxy, Iran has acquired, as an intellectual approach and a militia organization. The Houthis fought 6 wars against the government. Hussein Badr al-din al-houthi was killed at the first in 2004. Then five other wars followed, in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009-2010 respectively. Coincidentally, on my visit to Saleh, he was in a tent at the presidential palace garden, conducting a military meeting with his generals. It was then, after the meeting was concluded that he told me: " The Houthi is targeting us (Yemenis) and you (Saudis)." At the time, I thought that he was blackmailing the Kingdom. Several years later, I found out that the Houthis' literatures consider Saudis as infidels because they believe in the legitimacy of Abū Bakr aṣ-ṣiddīq (573-634), Umar ibn Al- Khaṭṭāb (584-644) and Uthmān ibn ʿAffān (579-656(. Hussein Al-Houthi had no such belief. This may justify including Saudis when cursing the Americans, the Israelis and the Jews*. If blood was spilled on both sides - i.e. the Houthis and the army of Ali Abdullah Saleh, - how would they turn from enemies to allies since the start of the Decisive Storm in 2015? Here, I recount, conforming to a Yemeni source that spoke to me in Riyadh about the background of cooperation of Saleh and the Houthi. According to my source, the late president realized, due to his long experience, that the Houthis were heading to control Sana'a in September 2014, and 6
he in turn warned President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi that they would kill both of them (i.e. Hadi and Saleh). Due to lack of trust current and former presidents of Yemen did not cooperate to protect San'a; instead, each of them hoped that Houthis would play for his own best interest. Consequently, Saleh thought that he was smarter; he blessed the Houthi's occupation of the capital city of Yemen and offered them the military and logistical support to expand outside Sana'a. His goal for the Houthis was to consume their enthusiasm and power in wars away from Sana'a. This would help him secure himself and prepare to defeat them one day. Indeed, the Houthis were reassured with his offer and targeted the legitimate government headed by Hadi. They indeed were aware of the game and prepared to defeat both presidents. However, Saleh and Houthis would never expect that there would be an Arab Coalition leaded by Saudi Arabia to help Hadi and reinstate the legitimacy in Yemen. Saleh realized that he missed the boat and he was already trapped with the Houthis. The repulsive alliance between Saleh and Houthis lasted for about three years; and when Saleh seized the opportunity, and without being fully aware of the consequences of his actions, he aroused the ire of the Houthis, as he was quickly branded apostate" by Abdul Malik al-houthi, and was killed within hours on December 4, 2017. What Saleh failed to remember was that Abdul-Malik al-houthi had never forgotten the avenging of his brother Hussein. Confusing Questions Saleh's death raised fundamental questions about the extent of his actual strength. Who are his supporters? Has the Coalition underestimated or exaggerated Saleh's power? Did he have enemies apart from the Houthis? Did the coalition forces erroneously assess the Houthi's power? Was the analysis of the Yemeni scene over the past period based on emotions and wishes or reliable 7
information? Where were the Republican Guards? Was the decision concerning the army and the Republican Guard well in his hands or rather in the hands of the Houthi? Furthermore, how Saleh, with the knowledge that he would be punished by death, took such a fatal decision without taking the necessary precautions? Why his army, the Republican Guard, and the coalition forces did not offer him protection? Did he find himself alone after announcing the breach of his alliance with the Houthis? Why did the West specifically remain silent on the killing of President Saleh, although his assassination was carried out based on a religious fatwa? The above questions are important, substantial and revealing, but unfortunately no observer can answer them. Answering these questions requires information that is available only to intelligence agencies with real resources on the ground. A voice recording that was shared on the social media of Yahya Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, the nephew of the late president Saleh, said that Ali Saleh handed over the state's capabilities three years ago to Houthis, along with the loyalist brigades and the Republican Guard. The Houthis worked on buying allegiances, and administering ideological trainings to senior military officers, which made them loyal to the "master." Thus, his uncle was alone with his own guard when the Houthis attacked his house intending to kill him on December 4th, 2017. Despite the denial of this recording, it does have some credibility if one takes into account the subsequent reactions to the killing of Saleh, where no move of the Republican Guard or the Yemeni army aimed at avenging their political and spiritual leader was noticed. Saleh's assassination was carried out hurriedly. This hideously confirms that the Houthis controlled Sana'a prior to September 2014. The action of seizing the capital city on 21st September made only after they were sure that the 8
Yemeni army and the Republican Guard would fall under their control could they claim the control of Sana'a. This hypothesis would not be excluded if one considers that the Hashemites and the Jarudi Zaidis never recognized the republican rule. Therefore, claims of their involvement in the assassination of Yemeni President Ibrahim al- Hamdi on October 11, 1977, still come up, since he had worked to build a state of institutions in which the power of the Law prevailed. Then, they were involved in the assassination of Al- Ghashmi or at least an attempted assassination, as a recently declassified US State Department document shows (https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=241258&dt=2532&dl=1629). The late president Saleh, who succeeded al-ghashmi, created a mixed state in which tribe, religion and some technocrats fought for power as he played on the conflicts between these components. This hybrid state enabled the Hashemites and the Zaidi extremists, (the Jarudis) - who do not recognize the legitimacy of the republican regime and believe that any rule must be able to prove its filiation to one of the two dynasties (Al Hasan or al-hussain) or the descendants of the Prophet family, - to penetrate the institutions of the state by sowing their elements in the military colleges and inserting Hashimi and Zaidi extremists in the army and the Republican Guard. The accusatory finger is pointed specifically to the Hashemite leaders that are close to President Ali Abdullah Saleh and familiar with his way of thinking and state management style. One of those is Yahya al-mutawakkil, who was sometimes called the first representative of political Hashimiya in the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh. He died in 2003 in a car crash, and there is a lot of talk about the cause of his death. It is noteworthy that the first war between Saleh and the Houthis broke out a year after Mutawakkil was killed. The second accused was Mohammed bin Abdul Malik al- Mutawakkil, who was also a Hashimi, - a man who could be both very close and far vis-a-vis the regime. It is very difficult to classify him in 9
any intellectual or political current. Furthermore, whoever planted the military leaders loyal to the Twelver and the sectarian rule, their commitment to ideological nutrition never ceased, especially by Badr al-din al-houthi and Hussein Badr al-din al-houthi and finally Abdulmalik Badr al-din al-houthi. There are no doubts that the peak of brainwashing occurred in the last three years. This confirms that Saleh was not a significant element in the equation of power on the ground, and that the Houthis had taken control of the armed forces, and were able to build a doctrine of their own, making the fighters obediently committed to the (Master) Abdul Malik al-houthi, who kept up the "alliance" with the late president Saleh just to deceive the majority of Zaidis of Yemen and win their allegiance. The question remains about the role of Operation Decisive Storm, if any, in unifying the Yemeni followers behind the leadership of Houthi, which led to the steadfastness of northern Yemen for three years, while only the ineffectual few joined the legitimate government in the course of the war. The assassination of Saleh came in as the first opportunity for the Houthi to prove that Yemen is united behind him, with or without Saleh. Nevertheless, whatever the tactical or strategic justification for his killing, Yemen has entered a dangerous turn and may not come out of it united. Future Scenarios Forecasting the fate of Yemen is not easy in the absence of information about the nature of alliances on the ground, and the positions of the large tribes, whose leaders mostly reside outside Yemen, especially Bakil and Hashid. Gradually, a picture of the situation will surface in the future and gain greater clarity. It is obvious that the international community is not serious about implementing resolution 2216. what is making things even worse is calling Houthis de 10
facto authorities by the UN's Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen Jamie McGoldrick. I possibly visualize three scenarios that may be foreseen are as follows: First, the Hashemites who have a vision and a project, as well as, cultural depth, higher education, access to the armed forces and government positions, will be those who will decide the fate of Yemen, and Houthi would have the same effect as Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon. That is, he would lead but not rule, and his authority would overarch that of the state. This is a combination of monarchy and the guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. I believe that Muslim Brotherhood of Yemen will not hinder such scenario. Second: Houthi will be able to impose his vision of governance, and thus establish an Islamic Republic, become its supreme guide and thus win the Republicans, the Hashemites and Zaidi extremists. Nevertheless, Houthis' power is generated in Tehran and is affected by internal and outsider factors. Saudi Arabia, USA and educated Yemenis will do everything to fight against such option. Third: the coalition and legitimacy forces will be able to exploit the popular anger and work to attract opponents of the Houthis and the advocates of sectarian rule, while convincing the tribes to preserve their interests, forming a force to face the ideological currents composed of Houthis and Hashemites. The success of the coalition and legitimacy forces in this endeavour depends on their ability to overcome the problems of the Islah Party and southern Yemen, which longs for independence from the north. The scenarios above are first contingent on restoring of the People's General Congress under strong leadership. This may be accomplished by appointing a leader for the clan of Hashid, that could bring its scattered people together and 11
restore some of its influence that went to the Houthi. They are also contingent on the international position, especially that of the Americans, who do not seem to be in a hurry to impose certain solutions before the real positions of strength reveal themselves. * One of the best writing about the Houthis is entitled: "The Houthis Phenomenon" by Professor Ahmad Mohammed Addaghashi. 12
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