Studies in Brain and Mind Volume 8 Editor-in-Chief Gualtiero Piccinini, University of Missouri - St. Louis, U.S.A. Editorial Board Berit Brogaard, University of Missouri - St. Louis, U.S.A. Carl Craver, Washington University, U.S.A. Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A. Oron Shagrir, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel Mark Sprevak, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, U.K.
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Eva Schmidt Modest Nonconceptualism Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content 123
Eva Schmidt Philosophy Department Saarland University Saarbrücken, Germany Studies in Brain and Mind ISBN 978-3-319-18901-7 ISBN 978-3-319-18902-4 (ebook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-18902-4 Library of Congress Control Number: 2015944326 Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Printed on acid-free paper Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www. springer.com)
Acknowledgments This book is a descendant of my dissertation. I started my research into matters of conceptual and nonconceptual content in late 2005 on Sven Walters advice, and I thank him for pointing me in the direction of this intriguing topic. I am greatly indebted to my supervisor Heinz-Dieter Heckmann and my advisors Niko Strobach and Frank Hofmann for their support and their very helpful comments. I am obliged to the faculty of the Department of Philosophy at Saarland University for stimulating discussions of my work, especially to Susanne Mantel, Uwe Meixner, Ulrich Nortmann, and Corina Stroessner. Moreover, I would like to thank Assaf Weksler, Axel Schubert, and Oliver Petersen for reading and commenting on the sections of the book. I have presented parts of the book on a number of occasions, and I am thankful to the audience for the enlightening discussions. In 2009, I gave presentations at the GAP.7 conference in Bremen and the Second European Graduate School in Philosophy of Language, Mind and Science in Lausanne. In 2011, I presented at the conference on the Theory-Ladenness of Experience in Düsseldorf and at the European Epistemology Network Meeting in Lund. In 2012, I presented at the workshop on Perception and Knowledge in Graz and at the workshop on New Work on Concepts in Luxembourg. Finally, in 2013, I gave presentations at the workshop on Minds without Magic in Bielefeld and at the workshop on Epistemic Justification and Reasons in Luxembourg. Among the many helpful commentators, I am especially grateful to Annalisa Coliva, Tim Crane, Marian David, Christian Nimtz, Raphael van Riel, Susanna Schellenberg, Maja Spener, Mark Textor, Michael Tye, and Timothy Williamson. Material from Sect. 6.2 has been published as The Argument from Animal and Infant Perception in Teorema. The section has profited considerably from the suggestions of an anonymous referee. Parts of Chap. 8 have been published in the Journal for General Philosophy of Science as Does Perceptual Content have to be Objective? A Defense of Nonconceptualism. Here as well, my thanks go to the anonymous referees for their extremely helpful comments. I would also like to thank an anonymous referee for Springer for the comments and Gualtiero Piccinini for his support in preparing the manuscript for Springer s Studies in Brain and Mind series. v
vi Acknowledgments Finally, I am deeply grateful to my family for their persistent support and patience. Most of all, I thank Robert McGee for his advice with respect to both organization and philosophy and for encouraging me in my philosophical pursuits.
Contents 1 Introduction... 1 2 Content, Concepts, Concept Possession... 7 2.1 Content: Correctness Conditions, Propositions, Internal Perspective 7 2.1.1 Correctness Conditions... 8 2.1.2 Propositions and Other Abstract Objects... 10 2.1.3 InternalPerspective... 15 2.2 Concepts and ConceptPossession... 21 2.2.1 Three Conceptionsof Concepts... 21 2.2.2 The Relation Between Concepts and Conceptual Abilities... 28 3 Nonconceptual Content... 31 3.1 The State View and the Content View... 31 3.2 The Relation Between the State View and the ContentView... 33 3.3 EvenMore Varieties of Nonconceptualism... 38 3.4 Defendingthe State-to-ContentPrinciple... 46 3.4.1 Existing Defenses of the State-to-ContentPrinciple... 47 3.4.2 A Better Defenseof the State-to-ContentPrinciple... 58 3.5 Summary... 71 4 Arguments from Phenomenology... 73 4.1 The ArgumentfromFineness of Grain... 74 4.1.1 Arguments from Fineness of Grain, Richness, and Determinateness... 74 4.1.2 The Demonstrative Strategy Against the Argumentfromthe Fineness of Grain... 78 4.1.3 Demonstrative Concepts?... 80 4.1.4 Demonstrationvia GeneralConcepts... 86 4.1.5 Conceptualizable,But Not Conceptualized... 91 4.1.6 The Phenomenal Adequacy of Demonstrative PerceptualContents... 92 4.1.7 Conclusion... 97 vii
viii Contents 4.2 The Argument from Situation-Dependence and Inextricability... 97 4.2.1 Context-Dependence... 98 4.2.2 Object-Dependence and Inextricability... 98 4.2.3 Presentationof the Argument... 100 4.2.4 A ConceptualistReply: Situation-DependentConcepts... 102 5 The Argument from Contradictory Contents... 105 5.1 Presentationof the Argument... 105 5.2 Two Clarifications: Only One Concept,Only One Content... 110 5.3 The First Objection:Two Distinct Contents... 111 5.4 The SecondObjection:Against (PCI)... 114 5.5 NonconceptualContentand Contradictions... 120 5.6 Results... 122 6 Arguments from Concept Possession... 125 6.1 The ArgumentfromMemoryExperience... 125 6.1.1 Presentationof the Argument... 125 6.1.2 The First Objection: Mary Did Not See the Dodecahedron.. 128 6.1.3 The SecondObjection: OtherConcepts of the Die... 132 6.1.4 Content and CognitiveAppreciation... 135 6.1.5 Results... 138 6.2 The ArgumentfromAnimal and InfantPerception... 139 6.2.1 The Argument... 139 6.2.2 MotivatingPremise (1): Content,But No Concepts... 140 6.2.3 MotivatingPremise (3): ContentOverlap... 143 6.2.4 The First Objection: Abandon the Generality Constraint... 145 6.2.5 The SecondObjection: MerePerceptual Sensitivity... 150 6.2.6 Results... 152 6.3 The Argument from Concept Acquisition... 153 6.3.1 Introduction... 154 6.3.2 Presentationof the Argument... 156 6.3.3 The First Conceptualist Response: Innate Concepts... 158 6.3.4 The Second Conceptualist Response: Undemanding Concept Acquisition... 160 6.3.5 AcquiringPerceptual-DemonstrativeConcepts... 162 6.3.6 Results... 166 7 The Epistemological Objection... 167 7.1 The Myth of the Given... 168 7.1.1 Some Epistemological Background... 168 7.1.2 The Dilemma for the Foundationalist... 172 7.1.3 The Conceptualist Solution: Taking the First Horn of the Dilemma... 175 7.2 The First Objection:The Logical Space ofreasons... 177 7.2.1 Clarifying Logical Space... 177 7.2.2 The Argumentfromthe Logical Space of Reasons... 179
Contents ix 7.2.3 A Defense of Nonconceptualism: The Logical Space of Content... 181 7.3 The Second Objection: Reasons Must Have Conceptual and Propositional Format... 184 7.3.1 The Argument... 184 7.3.2 The Modest NonconceptualistReply... 188 7.3.3 Problems for the Modest Nonconceptualist Account... 198 7.4 The Third Objection: An Argument from Cognitive Access... 210 7.4.1 Access Internalism and Conceptualism... 210 7.4.2 The First Nonconceptualist Reply: Accessible NonconceptualContents... 216 7.4.3 The Second Nonconceptualist Reply: No Need for Occurrent Access... 220 7.4.4 Mentalism as an Alternative to Access Internalism... 224 7.5 Results on the EpistemologicalObjection... 228 8 The Objection from Objectivity... 233 8.1 The Argument... 234 8.2 The First Reply: No Need for ConceptualContent... 237 8.3 The SecondReply: No Needfor a Belief-Based World-View... 238 8.4 The Third Reply: No Need for Presentation as Objective... 242 8.5 A Conceptualist Comeback: Objective 2 ContentIs Not Genuine... 250 8.6 Results... 254 9 Modest Nonconceptualism Vindicated... 257 9.1 TakingStock... 257 9.2 Modest Nonconceptualism... 260 Bibliography... 263
List of Figures Fig. 5.1 The Müller-Lyer drawing (Müller-Lyer 1889)... 111 Fig. 5.2 The Necker cube (Necker 1832)... 112 Fig. 6.1 An octahedron... 126 Fig. 6.2 A dodecahedron... 126 xi