To live or die Preventing the worst scenarios for Syria s uncertain future Written for: Alistair Burt MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 09 November 2012 Ø Executive Summary In face of a state of civil war in Syria and the possibility of a prolonged conflict action is highly advisable. The current UK government approach should be extended and reinforced to protect the lives of the Syrian people, prevent further contagion in the region, the prolonging of the conflict and further jihadism in the UK by citizens radicalised in Syria. Therefore, the dialogue with Russia and China and non- lethal support for the opposition need to continue. Investments need to be maintained to prevent instability and secure influence in Syria, and greater efforts are required to create a coherent opposition and guarantees for minorities. Ø Context and importance The conflict in Syria, now a civil war, has already lasted for over twenty months (BBC(c) 2012). Reform protests that began in February and March 2011 quickly spread across the country as security forces used brute force to stop the protests (Amnesty International). Violence has now spread to the major cities (Sharp and Blanchard 2012: 2) and the humanitarian situation is grave and deteriorating (Ban 2012). So far almost 36,000 people have lost their lives (Muir 2012), 335,000 have fled to neighbouring countries (Ferris 2012), and one million people are displaced within Syria (BBC(a) 2012). 1
The conflict is both about government reforms and the redistribution of power from the Alawite minority of President al- Assad to the Sunni majority (Nasr 2012). In Iraq a similar situation led to civil war after the US invasion in 2003 and lasted until 2008, acute instability still persisting today (Wong 2012, Ollivant 2012). The opposition is led by and mainly made up of members of the Sunni majority (Nasr 2012), but is divided into Religious Groups in Syria (popula:on 22.5 million) Sunni Muslim, 74% Alawite Muslim, 11% Chris\an, 10% Druze, 3% Other Muslim, 2% Information from Minority Rights Group International 2011 several groups (Abdulhamid 2012). The regime is supported by the Alawite and other minorities including the Christians and Druze (Indyk 2012). Several outside players have become involved in the conflict, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey supporting the opposition, while the Assad regime receives support from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah (Chulov 2012). Both parties want total victory and are unwilling to negotiate, thus currently an end to the fighting seems unlikely (Herzog 2012: 2). Ø Analysis and outlook The following outlines the two most likely scenarios for developments within Syria until 2015. A.) Fighting continues until the opposition prevails. Due to the support by outside players Assad s forces will probably be able to continue fighting for several months. A very strong motivation that should not be underestimated is that Assad and his supporters probably see kill or be killed as their only option and are committed to fight to their death (Indyk 2012), an assumption reinforced by Assad s statement that he would live or die in Syria (Black 2012). However, the on- going fighting will eventually wear Assad s troops down (Pollack 2012), leaving the opposition in control of the country. 2
Politically a transition might be lengthy and violent Largest opposi\on groups: The Na\onal Coordina\on Commieee Syrian Na\onal Council Free Syrian Army (Landis 2012: 73). There are deep divisions among the opposition over what kind of state should emerge (The Economist 2012) which could take long to resolve. Due to their sponsorship of certain groups Qatar, Saudi Arabia and others might have an influence on this issue, Information from BBC(d) 2012 and it is unclear if their aims match those of the UK (Borger and Weaver 2012). If the opposition is unable to unify around some kind of authority, opposition factions could turn against each other and prolong the civil war (Sharp and Blanchard 2012: 6). Economically Syria will need help to rebuild what was destroyed, allowing outside actors some influence. Important sectors of the economy will have suffered and business will require investments to pick up their activities again. There will also be problems due to the devaluations of the Syrian currency and high unemployment (Abboud 2012). Acts of revenge against regime supporters are highly likely (Pollack 2012), and Syria will face the challenge of reintegrating these groups back into society. The longer the conflict lasts the harder this will become (Abrams, Danin, Husain, Zenko 2012) and the possibility of future tensions will remain. Refugees and displaced people will also pose a problem as displacement usually takes a long time to resolve (Ferris 2012). Kurds, who have taken over some areas in the north of Syria, might ask for an autonomous region and cause tensions with Turkey (Davies 2012, Wilkens 2012). 3
B.) Continuing civil war. The Alawites could draw back into their territories to continue the fight, causing a disintegration of the state, breaking it up into different regions (Friedman 2012). A prolonged conflict could last for years (Nasr 2012), causing more casualties, greater refugee flows and further destruction of the country (Singh 2012). There could also be regional impacts, as neighbouring countries are destabilised by continuing refugee flows (Cofman Wittes 2012), and the sectarian conflict spreads to countries like Lebanon and Iraq, both with a history of sectarian conflict (Jeffrey 2012). If not properly secured Syria s chemical weapons could fall into the wrong hands and could be used for terrorist attacks against Israel or the West (Stewart 2012). A lack of order creates opportunities for extremist groups like al Qaeda to take root (Sharp and Blanchard 2012: 6). A prolonged conflict also affects the United Kingdom as recently UK citizens have joined fundamentalist groups in their fight in Syria. This could lead to their radicalisation, and make them a security threat when they return (BBC(b) 2012; Gilligan 2012). Policy Implications. Syria s internal future is marked by great uncertainty (Friedman 2012); no plan will guarantee a definite orderly transition. However, UK intervention might shape the outcome to an extent: reducing the likelihood of the worst scenarios and averting the risks regime change entails (Singh 2012). 4
Ø Critique of policy options 1) Full scale military intervention. This could include the establishment of a no- fly zone taking out Syria s air defences and might help the opposition to prevail faster (Doran and Boot 2012). However, due to the position of the air defences an attack against them would lead to many casualties (Landis 2012), and the absence of a UN Security Council resolution creates a legal problem. Additionally, it does not guarantee that sectarian violence ends, as shown in Iraq (Marcus 2012), and sufficient commitment would be required for an intervention to be successful (Herzog 2012: 6). 2) Humanitarian corridors / safe zones. This option has been called for by Turkey, and would provide more help to the population. However, if the Assad regime does not agree, this would have to be enforced requiring troops on the ground. But no Western power seems willing to commit troops, and this option would also not stop the fighting (Marcus 2012). 3) Extension of current approach. So far the current approach has not been able to reach the UK objective of securing a transition to a more democratic and stable Syria, therefore, it needs to be extended. Current non- lethal assistance to the opposition, the diplomatic efforts toward Russia and China and providing necessary funds (Hague 2012) should continue. The work with the opposition to provide a viable alternative needs to be extended and a greater focus placed on guarantees for minorities. 5
Ø Recommendations Non- lethal assistance to the opposition should continue, including financial support and training for opposition forces (Herzog 2012: 5-6). Training could professionalise them, improve their coherence, and prevent a break- down of order in a post- Assad Syria (Singh 2012). It could also make the opposition more effective, helping to end the conflict faster. However, further investigations are needed to reveal which groups are interested in an orderly transition (Cofman Wittes 2012). Should the opposition succeed in forming a new inclusive body this might become easier. Subsequently, greater assistance and financial support are possible which will allow some influence on the opposition and Syria s future, not simply leaving this to other states (Herzog 2012: 6). Efforts to create a more coherent opposition, like the on- going work on a transition plan, and the attempt to create the Syrian National Initiative in Doha in November 2012, should continue (Borger and Weaver 2012). An orderly transition is only possible if the opposition manages to create a coherent leadership that offers a viable alternative (Indyk 2012), able to take over after Assad s fall to prevent chaos (Marcus 2012). A transition plan needs to include guarantees for minorities, protecting them from retribution and persecution, as well as exclusion in post- Assad Syria (Indyk 2012). Financial assistance needs to be maintained to help refugees, as well as supporting neighbouring countries to prevent their destabilisation as a result of the refugee flows (Singh 2012). The dialogue with China and Russia needs to continue, persuading them that their interests will be secure in a post- Assad regime, as their cooperation is important for progress in Syria (Alterman 2012: 5). Also plans should be made to keep Syria s weapons safe (Singh 2012). 6
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