Thrasymachus: An Introduction to Plato s Republic DR. KEITH WHITAKER Wise Counsel Research CORE CURRICULUM Boston University 2018
Detail of Melencolia I, an engraving by Albrecht Dürer (1514) Location: Minneapolis Institute of Arts, Minnesota
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I The Republic is one of Plato s few narrated dialogues: that is, rather than seeing the dialogue played out as a drama, we hear it recounted by Socrates himself. This form of presentation has a great advantage: it allows us to hear Socrates observations on the setting and the other characters in the conversation. It also has a great disadvantage: we can be overly swayed by Socrates observations. This is a problem because Socrates is known as and called out in this very dialogue as an ironist. One cannot take what he says as the simple truth. Perhaps the most important instance in the Republic of this problem concerns Thrasymachus, the foreign sophist with whom Socrates has his third and by far longest conversation about justice in Book One. Socrates narration about Thrasymachus is the most striking in the book. Socrates describes Thrasymachus leaping at him like a wild beast. Socrates describes himself as afraid. Later Socrates describes Thrasymachus cutting laughter and, further on, his reluctance to speak, his sweating, and his angry silence. It is no wonder that many readers and even other participants in the dialogue assume that Thrasymachus is Socrates enemy. However, when another character implies just this in Book Six saying that Thrasymachus would not accept Socrates comments there about the antagonism between the philosopher and the city Socrates surprisingly replies, Don t slander Thrasymachus and me, when we ve just become friends, not that we were enemies before. Earlier in Book Five, when Socrates hesitates to bring up the three waves of female education, community of women and children, and the rule of philosopher kings, Thrasymachus joins the rest of the group in urging him to continue. And unlike disgruntled interlocutors in other dialogues, Thrasymachus does not walk off in disgust. He apparently listens, with attention, to the remaining eleven hours of conversation. So is this wild beast Socrates enemy or friend or something else entirely? What makes him enter the dialogue so loudly and then continue to listen so quietly? My belief is that these are not just questions about some character in a story, that is, questions of merely literary interest. Rather, my claim is that Plato wants us to think with some care about Thrasymachus, as someone, the understanding of whom bears great importance to understanding Socrates particular activity. In short, 5
understanding Thrasymachus is a prelude to understanding the Republic, that is, to understanding philosophy. II Since the conversation with Thrasymachus is not the first, and certainly not the last, in the Republic, it is necessary to say a few words on the rest of the book. The Republic occupies ten books. Its theme is justice. The treatment of that theme falls into three main parts: Book One: the inquiry into the question what is justice Books Two to Nine: the proof that justice is good in itself Book Ten: the proof that justice also brings the greatest rewards. Put most succinctly, the first book is an inquiry into what justice is; the remaining nine books are a defense of the just life as best. In these nine books the characters also continue to attempt to define justice. But that attempt to define justice is conditioned by their main goal, which is to defend it. Only in Book One is the inquiry the question, What is justice? largely unencumbered by the desire to defend the object of their inquiry. The title of the book sheds light on this theme. Republic translates the Greek word, politeia. Politeia in turn comes from the Greek word polis, city, from which we get the word politics. Politeia is sometimes translated as constitution. A constitution is that which knits together a community. Politeia may also be translated as regime. Regime in turn points to the word regimen, which means a rule or a way of governing your life, or simply, a way of life. Most simply, the Republic is about the question, What is the best way of life? The Romans translated politeia as res publica, from which we get Republic. Res publica is literally the public thing. This translation underscores that even though it may bear special importance for each of us as an individual, the question of the best life is not a simply private matter. It is not a whim or idiosyncrasy. What s common is more complete; what s private is deprived. In Greek a private man is an idiotes, from which we get the word idiot. But an idiotes is one who sticks to himself, his own thing: one who minds his own business. These observations pose the question: Is the best way of life the same for an individual and a collective? Perhaps the safest thing to say is that every constitution or regime looks up to or honors above all a certain way of life. In Books Three to Seven of 6
the Republic, Socrates argues that the most just regime will honor above all the most complete, most perfect way of life, which he explains is the life of philosophy. Below that it will honor the life of guarding the city, protecting one s fellow citizens. It will give the least honor to a life of pursuing individual comfort or money. This business of honoring is not just a matter for cities in speech. Consider our city, namely, our country. Whom do we honor? Intellectuals? Warriors? Billionaires? It seems possible to say that our regime honors most what Socrates called the lowest class: money-makers. Doing so may offer some real benefits. We may live longer and more comfortably. But do we live better? Our hierarchy of honor seems exactly the reverse of the order prescribed in the Republic. Socrates begins the narration of the Republic by saying, I went down to the Piraeaus yesterday, with Glaucon, the son of Ariston Glaucon is Socrates main interlocutor through most of the Republic. He is ambitious. He comes from a noble family. Indeed, he is the older brother of the author, Plato. In a way, the Republic is the closest that we come to a dialogue between Socrates and his star student, Plato. Since Plato never presents such a conversation a conversation between two philosophers we must do what we can to construct such a conversation using the hints he gives us in Socrates conversations with other characters, such as Thrasymachus. Socrates tells us that he and Glaucon are heading back to the city proper when they are accosted by a foreign resident named Polemarchus, along with Glaucon s brother Adeimantus and a few others. Polemarchus orders them to wait. Socrates asks if they could persuade Polemarchus to let them go. Polemarchus says he won t listen. Instead, he and Adeimantus persuade Glaucon to follow. Socrates then bows to Polemarchus command. Here, at the beginning of the Republic a dialogue in which the characters found a city in speech we witness the founding of another sort of community: the community of the ten people who participate in the conversation. What founds this community? Persuasion brings in Glaucon. What brings in Socrates, the philosopher? Force, or the threat of force. Even a supposedly rational community is founded via combination of persuasion and force. Again, Book One concerns itself with an inquiry into what is justice. There occur three definitions of justice in Book One: 1) Cephalus, Polemarchus elderly father: Justice is paying back what you owe and telling the truth 2) Polemarchus: Justice is helping friends and harming enemies. 3) Thrasymachus: Justice is the advantage of the stronger. 7
Later, in Book Four, Socrates and Glaucon come to a fourth definition: Justice is minding your own business. This is the definition they rely on through the rest of the Republic. Socrates begins the dialogue proper with Cephalus, Polemarchus father, who is very old. Socrates asks Cephalus to speak about something Cephalus knows about: old age. Cephalus says that it s good to be old because he no longer feels the passions of youth especially sexual desire and he has the time and resources to pay back what he owes to gods and men. On the basis of these comments, Socrates asks Cephalus if he would define justice this way: Paying back what you owe and telling the truth. Cephalus agrees. Cephalus definition of justice makes some sense. Justice is not a right to something. Rather, it is a definition of doing what s right. He is giving to others what he owes them: either property or the truth. He is taking responsibility. In fact, he implies that the good of owning stuff is that it allows you to be responsible. Owning allows you to fulfill your owing. Contrast Cephalus with people today who praise freedom but by freedom means freedom from certain things debt or work or obligations. Money is freedom, as some people say. Cephalus sees freedom as freedom to to do your duty. That s what wealth allows. You don t have to bow to your own needs, the way poor people and slaves do. It is also possible to infer from his mention of the gods that Cephalus believes that he owns so much because he does his duty. As John D. Rockefeller said about 100 years ago, or as Lloyd Blakenfein, the Chairman of Goldman Sachs, said a few years ago: God made me rich. I deserve my wealth, because I am just. Socrates immediately pokes holes in Cephalus definition. What if you owed a weapon to someone who has gone crazy and would use it to harm himself or others? It wouldn t seem right to give back what s owed. Cephalus shows no interest in pursuing complexities, and he soon leaves to make some sacrifices. But his example underscores the importance of the question of justice. It is the question of how to live your life. And its answer may involve not just this life but the life to come. Socrates reiterates this point later with Thrasymachus, that the question of justice concerns the whole of life. Glaucon and Adeimantus also return to it in Book Two: they demand that Socrates show them that the just life is worth living, right to the end. Polemarchus, Cephalus son, inherits the argument from his father. At the same time, he modifies the definition, using a new authority, a poet, Simonides. Polemarchus asserts that justice is Helping friends and harming enemies. 8
Polemarchus definition assumes a community: friends and enemies. Us and them. His definition of justice involves not just giving back stuff but giving yourself: devotion to a group of which you are a part, a whole greater than yourself to focus not on your private advantage but on the common good. It is a powerful appeal. Socrates does not exactly refute Polemarchus definition of justice. Rather, he helps Polemarchus refine it. When we say we want to help our friends, what do we mean? We mean we want to do them good. And by friends, we mean true friends, that is, good people. So it is just to do good to the truly good who are our friends. And when we say we want to harm our enemies, do we want to make them worse, that is, more unjust? No, justice couldn t be about making people more unjust. So, Polemarchus agrees, justice is really doing good to the good who are our friends and harming no one. Socrates correction to Polemarchus definition may sound fine. But it contains a troubling consequence. Polemarchus agrees to replace our merely apparent friends with our true friends, the good. But who are our merely apparent friends? They are very likely our first friends, our family members. And who can say that their family members are all good? Socrates thus continues the process that began with the removal of father Cephalus from the scene; it is a process that comes to fruition in Book Five, when he proposes that the most just city would function as one family, i.e., there would be no nuclear families, as we call them; all citizens would call each other mother, father, sister, brother, daughter, son. This is the logical consequence of delimiting friendship by the good. Again, this modified definition of justice doing good to the good who are our friends and harming no one Socrates does not refute. Could it be that this modified definition is closest to the philosopher s own understanding of justice? III We can t be sure. For at this point something dramatic happens. Thrasymachus, the Chalcedonian, a foreigner, an alien, bursts into the conversation to criticize Socrates and to offer his own definition of justice. From this point, my focus will be on understanding Thrasymachus and his conversation with Socrates. First, a word on Thrasymachus outburst. Cephalus offered his definition under Socrates prompting. Polemarchus offered his definition to help his father. Thrasymachus enters the argument with no invitation and on his own volition. Indeed, Socrates, as narrator, observes in an aside that 9
Thrasymachus had been itching for some time to break into the conversation. The first thing to notice about Thrasymachus is that he wants to others to notice him. Socrates, as narrator, says that Thrasymachus clearly wants to share his own definition of justice, even though Thrasymachus waits for the others to cajole him into doing so. The reason for this desire seems to be that Thrasymachus is a teacher. Socrates calls him a sophist, literally, a professor of wisdom. As a teacher, he is looking for students. And to find students, he must show something of his knowledge. He must advertise his wares. That is what he does by inserting his definition of justice. Thrasymachus defines justice as the advantage of the stronger. He clearly thinks very highly of his definition. He does not expect it to be questioned. He expects it to be praised. He demands to know why Socrates does not immediately praise it. There is something presumptuous in Thrasymachus demand for praise. But there is something important in it too. He wants to be admired. One wants to be admired for an excellence, a virtue, that one possesses. Thrasymachus cares about excellence, not as an abstract theory but as something to possess, for himself. But if he or anyone else possesses excellence, and excellence is a good thing, why does he demand praise too? Why not rest content with possessing this goodness in his case the knowledge of justice that he claims to have? These are questions to which we shall return. At this point, it may be enough to reply that virtue, or this virtue at least, carries with it a natural demand for acknowledgement, a claim of rank or superiority. To use Kant s much later formulation, it should shine like a jewel. Before going on, let s consider Socrates and Thrasymachus entire conversation in outline. It falls into three main parts, marked by what I will call an ascent, a climax, and a decline. Both the ascent and the decline include a brief side conversation: in the former, between Polemarchus and Cleitophon (a would-be supporter of Thrasymachus), and in the decline, between Socrates and Glaucon. In the ascent Socrates clarifies what Thrasymachus means by the advantage of the stronger. He does not mean physical strength. He means rule, political strength: the power to make the laws, reward and punish. Further, Thrasymachus does not mean that anyone in power is thereby stronger. The rulers must know what they are doing; they must know and so command their true advantage. Knowledge is the key condition for strength. 10
On the basis of this condition, which Thrasymachus himself illustrates with the example of a doctor, Socrates explores the analogy between the ruler and other knowledgeable artisans, such as doctors, pilots, and horsemen. Socrates gets Thrasymachus to agree that in the arts the artisan rules for the good of the subject of the art, not for his own good. This result leads to the climax, in which Thrasymachus offers a long speech Socrates, as narrator, likens it to a flood in praise of injustice. Justice is the advantage of the stronger, that is, it is another s good. More specifically, justice is the advantage or good or profit of the unjust. In any dealing, private or public, the unjust man gets the better of the just. Above all, in politics, the most completely unjust man the tyrant gets all goods, the most profit, and is most happy. Once he delivers this climactic speech, Thrasymachus makes as if to leave, but the group persuades him to stay. Socrates, in particular, asks him to remain to teach them what he means. The rest of the conversation is anti-climactic, a decline. First, Socrates returns to the arts and gets Thrasymachus to agree, again, that each art seeks the good of those served by it, and so each art relies on a separate art the art of making-money to get paid. Thrasymachus seems relatively untroubled by this addition. After all, perhaps injustice is merely another name for the perfection of this art of making a profit? This point is where Socrates and Glaucon discuss, as an aside, that the best people in a city will rule not for money or even honor but out of necessity, by being forced. Socrates then gets Thrasymachus to clarify that injustice is, in essence, prudence, by means of which the unjust person will get more. Injustice is a virtue, and so, Thrasymachus agrees, it is similar to wisdom and goodness. But Thrasymachus also must agree, again on the basis of the arts, that other knowers (such as musicians or doctors) seek the right amount, not more. On this basis, he is forced to agree that justice, which does not seek more, looks more like wisdom and happiness than injustice. Socrates, as narrator, observes that Thrasymachus assents to these points with a great deal of reluctance and sweating. Socrates arguments touch a nerve. In the conclusion of the conversation, Socrates gets Thrasymachus to agree that justice (in the sense of cooperation) makes any group (including the individual, understood as a union of various parts of the soul) stronger, while injustice makes groups weaker or totally ineffectual. And, likewise, Thrasymachus agrees that if the soul has an end, it is living a good life, which will be served more by justice than by injustice. Thrasymachus says he is just playing along here. He could have pointed out that in these arguments Socrates is treating justice instrumentally: it 11
serves political cooperation or the individual s quest for the good life. That is, Socrates is treating justice as a tool, which is what Thrasymachus in effect said it is. But instead of disputing, Thrasymachus says that he is allowing Socrates to feast on the arguments. Socrates himself admits at the end of the book that the conversation has, in a certain respect, been a failure. In his desire to feast, he has made arguments about justice. But he never clarified what justice is. They remain ignorant. IV With this overview in mind, let s consider the main themes of Socrates and Thrasymachus dialogue. As we ve seen, Thrasymachus locates his definition of justice the advantage of the stronger in the context of politics. He is thinking about rule: who rules and who is ruled. When he says, the stronger, he has in mind the rulers. Justice is the advantage the benefit, the good of those in charge, not only in a household or in a business but in a city or country. This is a view of politics that is familiar at all times, including today. People say, The system is rigged. Those in charge simply serve themselves. They convince the people the fools, the sheep that this rigged system is just. They call anyone who bucks the system unjust, subversive, law-breaker, or criminal. Those names are tools they use to keep the sheep down and to profit from them. Thrasymachus speaks about the advantage of the rulers. He therefore implies a question: Who should rule? What justifies this person ruling versus that person? This is political justice in its most fundamental sense: the answer to the question, Who should rule? The answer to this question precedes any criminal law or punishment, for those who rule make the laws and exact the punishments. Some will rule; others will be ruled. What makes this difference fair? That is the question of political justice. It is a question that animates the central books of the Republic, as Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus found their city in speech. Socrates goes on to argue that it is most fair, most just for the wise to rule that is, for those with the highest or most comprehensive knowledge to possess the highest and most comprehensive authority. In this respect we can begin to spy a possible common ground between Socrates and Thrasymachus. For Thrasymachus identifies the stronger, the correct rulers, as people who possess a certain knowledge: they know the truth about justice. 12
So, Thrasymachus says that the system is rigged, and justice is the advantage of the stronger, the rulers. But rather than being dismayed at this conclusion, he seems almost pleased with it. Why? One way to understand this definition that justice is the advantage of the stronger would be to assume that people are herd animals and that every community is a sort of herd. What does the single member of the herd say? If I am only for myself, I am lost. Therefore, I will do my duty and serve the common good, and I will deserve to be saved. That is justice. Injustice is not doing your share. From this perspective, the stronger is the herd, the greater number. What s advantageous for the stronger is just. This is clearly not Thrasymachus understanding. To the contrary, he would say, No, don t be a sheep. Be independent. Cast off the rules. Be free. Don t be a fraction. Be whole. See through the lies. See the truth especially about justice. By his words and deeds Thrasymachus makes clear that the key to living in this way is to act with knowledge and daring, brains and guts. People with guts and no brains are hot-heads who stand up for themselves but do so recklessly. People with brains and no guts are egg-heads who may see the truth but let others steamroll them. The combination of brains and guts, not the herd, is strength. That combination is what makes one the stronger. Acting with brains and guts makes you deserving of advantages, advantages that you claim through ruling. And that is only just. Justice is the advantage of the stronger, understood not as the herd but as the master. Incidentally, the praise of this combination brains and guts aimed at rule is the first step towards a knowledge of rule, that is, a science of rule, that is, a political science. Thrasymachus and the other sophists began what has come to be called political science. At its root, political science is not value-neutral. It doesn t just seek to predict this or that election. It isn t just about how to influence public opinion or run an effective campaign. It aims to teach you how to live, how to live well. V Thrasymachus claim that justice is the advantage of the stronger sounds wicked. In his central, climactic speech he goes so far as to praise injustice. Thrasymachus decisively rejects the vision of the common good that Polemarchus had reached for in his definition of justice. Everyone is out for himself, some more intelligently and bravely than others. Further, though he doesn t say as much, Thrasymachus implies that acting unjustly will bring no punishment in the afterlife (nor, it seems, will 13
acting justly bring any sort of heavenly reward) even though the most perfectly unjust man will, among much else, despoil temples. Thrasymachus is silent about the gods, but his implication is clear: either they are not, or if they exist they do not care about us human beings. Thrasymachus does not offer an argument for his rejection of the common good and the gods. Perhaps it is possible to spy a beginning of such an argument in his climactic speech, in his observations about the just and unjust man: the latter will always get more than the former, in private contracts, as a citizen, and in political offices. It seems that Thrasymachus has observed life and seen just people repeatedly taken advantage of by the unjust. Maybe he even saw people he admired brought low by scoundrels. The heat of his speech suggests that he insists that the others and he himself face up to the ugly truth. But observations can be interpreted different ways. And because he does not offer an argument, it would be possible for someone to reply to Thrasymachus rejection of conventional morality this way: Thrasymachus, you say that the just man often comes out worse at the hands of the unjust man. You say that justice is another s good. I would say the same thing. You have simply stated the problem, a problem that any thinking person who sacrifices on behalf of others must feel. But the existence of selfish individuals does not refute the common good or justice. Indeed, such desires are the condition for our rising above them and choosing to act justly. Further, while no one can prove that God notices our goodness or wickedness, neither do you prove that God doesn t. Choosing to act justly could make for both the most fulfilling life and the most rewarding eternity. Could Thrasymachus hear such a response? It s not clear. He is heated. He would probably call it naïve. He calls Socrates naïve several times, but he seems to think that Socrates is pretending to be naïve. Thrasymachus suspects that Socrates secretly agrees with his, Thrasymachus, definition. Both naïveté and pretense make Thrasymachus angry. In his narration, Socrates emphasizes Thrasymachus anger and his heated appearance. He seems to want to cast Thrasymachus, at least at this point, in an unattractive light. But there is something to respect even here. One of the attractions of Thrasymachus is his directness. He wants answers. He gives a straight answer to Socrates question. He doesn t riddle. To the contrary, he bridles at the appearance of Socrates irony. Aristotle calls irony a vice, with respect to telling the truth. Thrasymachus may be incorrect, but he seeks to tell the truth. 14
VI In any event, it is striking that Socrates does not offer the response sketched above, the moral response to Thrasymachus attack on justice. Socrates does not directly attack Thrasymachus definition of justice the advantage of the stronger. Instead he critiques Thrasymachus identification of the stronger with knowledgeable rulers. Socrates argument comes down to the point that, in practice, intelligent ruling means benefiting the ruled, serving their good, not serving your own good. That is what good doctors do for their patients, pilots for their passengers, and even shepherds for their sheep. Socrates does not deny that the ruler may also benefit from his rule. After all, pilots want to get safely to port too. However, he makes the case that the ruler s first concern is the good of the ruled. In response to Socrates argument, Thrasymachus has a choice of one of two paths. He could drop his own definition of justice and instead say that justice is the common good, not the private advantage of the rulers or of anyone else. That is, he could return to Polemarchus view. As we have seen, Thrasymachus would consider such a position as hopelessly naïve. His outburst rejects the conclusion that Socrates and Polemarchus came to. By taking up the subject of knowledgeable rule, rather than the common good, Socrates leaves aside the point that Thrasymachus rejects and instead focuses on the point that Thrasymachus holds fast to. So, instead, Thrasymachus could either accept Socrates argument and cease to identify the stronger with knowledgeable rulers, or he could reject Socrates argument about knowledgeable rulers serving the ruled. The surprising thing is that Thrasymachus does neither of these two. He refuses to accept Socrates argument that knowledgeable rulers serve the good of the ruled as applied to political rulers. But neither can he find a way to reject it. Instead, after his climactic defense of tyranny, he finds himself largely reduced to playing along. Why? My hypothesis is that Socrates argument has touched a nerve in Thrasymachus and Thrasymachus knows it and further, that Plato portrays Thrasymachus struggle here because understanding this nerve is key to understanding the rest of the Republic and philosophy itself. The nerve Socrates has touched concerns Thrasymachus attachment to knowledge. First, why does Thrasymachus not embrace Socrates argument and say, Yes, you re right, knowledgeable rulers including political rulers do not put their own advantage first? He could then add, So, knowledgeable rulers are not whom I meant by the stronger. 15
Pride may play a part in holding him back from this solution. Professional considerations may too: he may feel he has been discomfited enough in front of a group of potential students. More importantly, as we have seen, when Thrasymachus speaks about the stronger what he means are those who see through the lies, who know justice, who possess knowledge of ruling. (When his would-be supporter Cleitophon tries to help him out by interjecting that what Thrasymachus means by stronger are people who have power but lack knowledge, Thrasymachus rejects this solution.) To agree with Socrates would mean that Thrasymachus would have to admit that rulers might lack knowledge and yet still be stronger at seizing their own advantage. Thrasymachus would have to agree that something other than knowledge is requisite for securing your own good, that is, knowledge is not sufficient for securing the knower s own good. Agreeing with Socrates would force Thrasymachus, a political scientist, not just to admit his own ignorance about rulers. It would also force him, a man who professes knowledge and its superiority, to wonder about the sufficiency of knowledge itself. It would force him to question the goodness of his own life, at pretty much every important level. So why then does Thrasymachus not effectively defend his identification of the stronger with the rulers who know justice (i.e., who see through it) and who act upon that knowledge? Part of his problem could be that, despite his words, Thrasymachus own actions suggest that he himself has doubts about the goodness, the advantage of ruling. He is a foreign teacher. He travels from city to city seeking students. He teaches. He doesn t stay in one place and seek to rule. Perhaps he lacks the daring to do so. Still, as we have seen, he openly praises what most people call the highest injustice. That takes guts. But Thrasymachus praises injustice in a search for students, not in search of rule. He praises tyrants but he does not seek to be one. Thrasymachus is a teacher, and teaching is a private activity. His attachment to private life suggests that he senses that ruling does not give the daring, wise man or even the daring man who cares about the truth all that he, Thrasymachus, believes that such a knower deserves. Might he claim to rule indirectly, through the students whom he teaches to gain power and influence in their cities? Perhaps. Yet the point remains that they would rule, not he. He would remain at a remove from rule itself. So, more decisive than his praise of rule is, as suggested above, Thrasymachus attachment to knowledge. By why would that attachment to knowledge get in the way of his defending knowledgeable rulers as the stronger? 16
Again, Thrasymachus is a professor, so knowledge is his stock in trade. And to attract students Thrasymachus announces a daring doctrine: that justice serves the profit of the (knowledgeable) rulers. Now, Thrasymachus demands praise for this insight and its announcement. He does not expect congratulation, as though he had won some good for himself. He sees his knowledge as praiseworthy, as noble, not a solely selfish good, like winning the lottery. Put another way, Thrasymachus extols selfishness but does not act selfishly. (Early in the conversation, before he gives his definition, Thrasymachus asks for pay. Glaucon and the others volunteer to pay him, but it seems he never collects.) As a teacher, he seeks to do good for his students. He doesn t believe that he is duping them or taking advantage of them far from it. Indeed, he gets angry at Socrates when he believes that Socrates is taking advantage of these young people. That is, he gets angry at the appearance of injustice. Thrasymachus seems to believe that his knowledge is a very great good not just for himself but also and especially for others. Indeed, he appears to know that displaying his knowledge puts himself at some risk. Simply possessing this knowledge is not enough for him. It is not enough for him to know: he must also teach, that is, publicize his knowledge, not hide it the way he thinks Socrates is hiding his knowledge. Thrasymachus teaches, he speaks openly and directly, in order to serve another s good, not simply his own good. Does he even believe that by serving this greater good he will make himself deserving of his own good? In short, does something like belief in a common good stand behind Thrasymachus words and deeds? That s hard to say. What does become clear is that Thrasymachus wants to identify injustice, getting more, with a sort of knowledge (prudence), and hence with virtue; but he also wants to identify this virtue with wisdom, goodness, seeking the right amount, and hence justice. This virtuous knowledge will supposedly get one more but also shine with a sort of rectitude. Behind his reluctance to answer and his sweating seems a recognition on Thrasymachus part of how much he expects from knowledge, how much he hopes will come from his knowing and his sharing his knowing with others. This recognition deeply pains him, but it also gives him pause. (This may be why Plato interjects the side conversation between Glaucon and Socrates on the best men needing to be forced to rule in the midst of the decline of the conversation between Socrates and Thrasymachus. This may be a moment in which Thrasymachus glimpses a good, an advantage, for a certain type of knower that is higher, more selfsufficient, than the supposed good he expects from teaching. This is a glimpse of something that the rest of the Republic expands magnificently, which may explain why Thrasymachus sticks around for the remaining 17
eleven hours. It may also explain why we nowhere hear of Thrasymachus the sophist after this conversation. Perhaps Socrates was effective in turning him to philosophy.) None of this is said in criticism of Thrasymachus. If one thinks about the Republic as a whole, Plato puts Socrates conversation with Thrasymachus the only truly one-on-one conversation in the Republic, in the center, in between Socrates brief conversation with a father-son dyad and Socrates long conversation with two brothers. The conversation with Thrasymachus is central to the entire dialogue. Thrasymachus brings together, in one character, the desire to deserve praise, the concern for excellence, an attachment to politics, a commitment to teaching, and, above all, a refusal to live a lie. The latter sets him apart from all the other interlocutors besides Socrates: all of them, including Glaucon, want to defend justice even more than to know it. There is no doubt more that we could learn from reflecting on Thrasymachus. My hope is that this much is sufficient to defend the philosopher s striking statement about him, that we ve just become friends, not that we were enemies before. 18
2018 Keith Whitaker. All rights reserved. The text appearing herein has been adapted for print from a lecture delivered on November 21, 2017, to the students of CC 101: The Ancient World, the first-year humanities course in the Arts & Sciences Core Curriculum at Boston University. Dr. Whitaker studied at BU from 1989-1993, and is himself an alumnus of the Core program. He is founder of the think tank and consultancy, Wise Counsel Research. He has produced translations on Plato and written books and articles on philosphy, ancient and modern. Readers interested in asking follow-up questions, or who wish to learn more about his consulting work, can contact him via keith@wisecounselresearch.com. This pamphlet has been published as a special stand-alone supplement to the Spring 2018 edition of The Journal of the Core Curriculum, Volume XXVII. The full contents of that issue can be accessed online via bu.edu/core/journal. Print copies of this pamphlet can be requested by contacting core@bu.edu. www.bu.edu/core