Everything or Nothing: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3 1

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY: DO NOT CITE Everything or Nothing: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3 1 Notes: (1) This background "A" case is designed for classes and other interested parties to read in advance of an initial discussion in which they will be asked to analyze the situation facing Ahtisaari and his team at the outset of formal negotiations, and to suggest strategies and tactics for success. A separate "B" case, to be read or summarized after discussion of the "A" case, describes Ahtisaari's approach and how subsequent events evolved. (2) To help readers stay oriented, Exhibit 1 contains a glossary of parties and abbreviations. In early January 2005, Martti Ahtisaari leaned back in his spacious office at Eteläranta 12, looking over the picturesque Helsinki harbor and pondering the upcoming negotiations between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government. The "modern" phase of the insurgency by GAM fighters from the province of Aceh (pronounced "ah-chey") that sought independence from Indonesia had persisted for some 30 years, claiming tens of thousands dead, countless wounded and tortured, as well as economic damage estimated by the World Bank at over $11 billion. In a few short days, Ahtisaari, former Finnish President and longtime diplomat active in some of the world's nastiest trouble spots, would see if he and his team could help foster an elusive accord between the bitter, distrustful parties to the conflict. Only a series of chance events over the prior year had prompted Ahtisaari even to consider involvement in these negotiations, but for the past few months, he and his staff had intensively analyzed their prospects. He had learned that, with great effort, a Swiss NGO had mediated two ceasefires between GAM and the Indonesian government over the past five years. Unfortunately, each of these accords had soon fallen apart, giving rise to mutual recriminations and intensified violence. Ahtisaari and his staff had studied these two efforts along with the history of the conflict and the current political situation. He was encouraged by the newly elected, relatively democratic Indonesian president and his energetic vice-president, each of whom professed an interest in an Aceh deal. Ahtisaari hoped that the new government could act more independently than past regimes from the powerful, semi-autonomous Indonesian armed forces that had consistently advocated the military destruction of GAM and its supporters. After quiet consultations with key players on all sides, and after obtaining assurances of seriousness and willingness to talk, Ahtisaari decided, quietly, to try again. He was under no illusions about the prospects. The barriers to success would be daunting given deep distrust, incompatible positions, and potential for spoilers on all sides. Several factors stood out: The new Indonesian government had pointedly refused to declare a ceasefire during any talks with the GAM "rebels", insisting that it would only negotiate for a comprehensive deal on the full range of issues from Aceh's political and economic status to disarmament 1 Copyright 2010 by James K. Sebenius. Professor James Sebenius and Research Associate Alex Green prepared this draft case. This draft strives to be accurate, but relies on secondary sources, takes minor dramatic license, currently lacks full citations, and should be significantly modified based on what is learned during the Great Negotiator Award events honoring Martti Ahtisaari on September 27, 2010. Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 1

and the provincial role of the national military, to natural resources, and the like. Indeed, the government refused even to free prominent GAM negotiators, which it had imprisoned after the last, failed deal. By contrast, GAM saw these talks in much narrower terms: its core demand was for an immediate, unconditional cease-fire, during which confidence and trust could be built for the parties to more constructively address the larger issues. For decades, GAM had been committed to complete independence for Aceh, and it entered the talks with independence as its inviolable condition. Indonesia had declared Acehnese independence simply off the table. The populous Muslim state was committed to national unity, was opposed to territorial disintegration, and was only willing to discuss its longstanding policy of "special autonomy" for the province and its abundant natural resources. If GAM were somehow, miraculously, to back down from its fundamental independence demand, the province would require strong political representation of its interests within Indonesia. Yet, since independence from its Dutch colonial masters after World War II, Indonesia's dominant political class had sought to forge a unified political identity among its 17,508 fractious and diverse islands, and to avoid a system that fostered primarily "local" pleading. Indeed, a core precept of Indonesian law completely outlawed local political parties, permitting only truly "national" parties that met stringent criteria for support in different regions of the country. Any successful deal would involve arms decommissioning by reluctant, distrustful GAM fighters along with strong limits on Indonesian military activities in Aceh. Almost certainly, such provisions would require outside monitoring by entities such as the UN, EU, or ASEAN nations to be credible. GAM would insist that the monitors be numerous, from "neutral" countries, and well-armed. But, feeling burned by its recent experience with the UN in East Timor, the Indonesian government was adamant about not "internationalizing" the Aceh conflict. On strongly held principle, this would be an issue of state sovereignty, an "internal political affair." Ahtisaari knew that these thorny issues would all be made immeasurably more difficult by years of chilling human rights violations. Despite the obstacles, the parties had privately given their assent in late December 2004 to resume talks in January. As each party pondered its strategy for the negotiations to be held in Finland, natural catastrophe struck. On December 26, the most devastating earthquake in over half a millennium unleashed a series of cataclysmic tsunamis across the region from Thailand to South Africa, killing over 180,000 people but seemingly targeting Aceh for the worst. In less than a day, the rushing water claimed over 130,000 Acehnese lives and heavily damaged the province's infrastructure and economy. Against this tragic backdrop, Martti Ahtisaari and his team were thinking through the most promising negotiating process for bringing a measure of peace to this seemingly cursed province. ACEH, THE DUTCH, AND INDONESIA: A FRAUGHT HISTORY Abundantly rich in resources, Aceh s approximately four million inhabitants about 1.5% of Indonesia's nearly 250 million people had long constituted a distinct province among the Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 2

constellation of islands and communities that form modern Indonesia. 1 [See the map of Aceh and Indonesia in Exhibit 2.] Before the arrival of Dutch colonists, wealth generated by the spice trade enabled Aceh to support a powerful aristocratic Sultanate alongside a well-respected religious caste rooted in a strong tradition of Islamic scholarship and learning. 2 The stability afforded by this wealth lasted into the late 19 th century and enabled the Acehnese to effectively resist colonization by the Dutch longer than nearly any group in the archipelago. Beginning with a military assault in 1873, it took the Dutch thirty years to subdue the territory; full colonial governance was not established until 1912. 3 As the Dutch consolidated power in Aceh, they established rubber and palm plantations that greatly expanded the territory s already considerable wealth. 4 Oil was discovered in the late 1800s by the predecessor to Royal Dutch Shell, and Aceh continued to produce spices that were difficult to procure elsewhere. 5 The nature of Dutch exploitation of these resources exacerbated a pre-existing tension, however, between local Islamic leaders and the institutional Acehnese political class. 6 Dutch colonial managers sidestepped local clerics, placing political elites in charge of resource extraction. This set a precedent for Acehnese distrust of indirect, decentralized governance, especially when exerted from the top down through a leadership that was not locally accountable. At the outset of World War II, the Dutch lost their colonial holdings in Southeast Asia to Japan and when the war came to an end, Aceh was the only colony they did not attempt to reassimilate. 7 Just days after the end of the war, a revolution for Indonesian independence began, and the relative autonomy of Aceh made it a vital territorial partner in the battle for post-colonial statehood. 8 After the withdrawal of the Dutch in 1949, the newly formed Indonesian government merged Aceh with the province of North Sumatra. 9 Many Acehnese were outraged. They had agreed to fight for independence if Aceh could remain a distinct territory within Indonesia. The Acehnese religious class had steadily overthrown the political class of the former Sultanate, and consolidated control over the mechanisms of daily governance in the years leading up to Indonesian independence. Aceh's merger with North Sumatra severely weakened that autonomy. 10 In response, Acehnese Islamic leaders founded a movement to create an independent Aceh within Indonesia. Throughout the 1950s the Indonesian military met armed resistance across the province. In 1959, the government created a special district status for Aceh with political and territorial independence from North Sumatra. This designation allowed Aceh autonomous control over its education and legal systems, helping to bring the violence to a halt. 11 Peace was-short lived, however, and in 1965 an attempted coup in Jakarta resulted in a series of Communist purges that sparked violence throughout country. Seizing upon widespread unrest and anti-communist sentiment, General Suharto overthrew the national government in 1967, ushering in an era of increasing military enforcement of governmental affairs, including legal oversight, education, and international business regulation. 12 For the next thirty years, Suharto would consistently use the Indonesian military to ensure control. Among other things, this allowed resources to be extracted from the province by multinational corporations. 13 In 1976, Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 3

businessman Hasan di Tiro, a descendant of the last Sultans of Aceh, recruited former rebels from the 1950s insurrection alongside Acehnese exiles and others to form an armed resistance group whose mission would be to free Aceh from Indonesian control. 14 The militant Free Aceh Movement Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or more simply, GAM, dedicated to Acehnese independence, had been created. For the next three decades GAM fought an often-fierce guerilla war with Indonesian government armed forces, or "TNI". Depending on the source, this fighting had cost anywhere between 12,000 and 50,000 lives. 15 An estimated 7,000 people had been tortured. 16 Forced conscription, retributive violence, and even the mutilation of corpses were reported in large numbers. 17 Infrastructure was destroyed and the valuable natural resources of the region were extracted by companies who directed most revenue to Jakarta or abroad with relatively little benefit to the indigenous population. 18 Blessed with newly discovered additional hydrocarbon reserves that produced some 30 percent of Indonesia s already vast oil and gas exports, many Acehnese were ironically reduced to bare subsistence living. 19 Caught between the GAM and the Indonesian military (TNI), civilians were doubly governed, and many alleged, doubly afflicted. In order to fund their increasing military operations, GAM leaders instituted "taxes" that were met with widespread resentment, and retribution for nonpayment was often seen as arbitrary and extreme. 20 GAM commanders demanded comprehensive support from the people of Aceh ranging from food and tobacco to assistance in avoiding Indonesia military forces. Informants were frequently purged, with GAM undertaking serious efforts to deal, often brutally, with those they believed were providing information to the military. 21 Asked about GAM retribution in 2005, a civilian said, Idealism is abandoned and fighting becomes an end in itself [...] Many people have nightmares of how the guerillas come down from the mountains and take their revenge. 22 The Indonesian military (TNI) constantly pursued GAM from 1975 onward, but TNI s pressure exerted during its two major offensives in 1975 and 1989 was the most extreme. The TNI onslaught forced much of GAM s leadership underground and into exile. 23 Its political and ideological wing fled across the globe, with leaders settling in Sweden and elsewhere, while its military commanders continued to direct the insurgency in Aceh. In many cases, the whirlwind of violence during the years of insurrection made it difficult for civilians to identify their persecutors. Criminals and TNI soldiers alike were alleged to masquerade as GAM fighters. 24 Parties acted in opportunistic ways, and the conflicting, often ambiguous governance of both the military and GAM led to an often gruesome and unceasing cycle of violence. A 2007 Harvard Medical School study of violence stemming from the conflict in Aceh found that 35% of respondents in the province had fled burning buildings at least once in their lives. 25 With Suharto firmly in power, underpinned by the TNI, GAM s goal of an independent Aceh seemed a distant hope. 26 POST-SUHARTO, PRE-AHTISAARI Suharto died in 1998, bringing an end a 32-year period of often-violent rule in Aceh. An optimistic democratic fervor washed across Indonesia. The new Indonesian government hoped Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 4

to forge a modern national identity separate from Suharto s legacy. The government made overtures including new national laws on resource revenue distribution that would, at least on paper, favor provinces like Aceh. 27 But dreams of a new era were tempered by separatist violence in East Timor. Assimilated into Indonesia in 1976, after centuries of Portuguese not Dutch rule, East Timor was the last territory incorporated into the new nation. 28 Frequently restive, the East Timorese population harbored strong antipathy toward Indonesian governance, treating its army as an occupying force. 29 As Indonesia began taking steps toward becoming a more democratic republic, violence exploded across East Timor, with brutal government military and paramilitary repression that sparked a sustained international outcry. 30 Throughout 1998, the TNI waged a campaign in East Timor, killing thousands through violent repression, starvation, and disease. It sponsored paramilitary groups who inflicted an almost anarchistic type of violence across the island. In 1999, with international outcry at fever pitch, Habibie offered the Timorese population a referendum to determine the future participation of the province as part of the Indonesian polity. It was an offer made in the dark shadow of Indonesian military power, seemingly intended to discourage other independence movements from forming across the country. Though violence and international attention on East Timor waned, the Habibie government became concerned that the Acehnese would demand the same opportunity as the Timorese. 31 As fighting had raged in East Timor, Acehnese membership in GAM grew rapidly. GAM leaders framed the Indonesian government s approach to governing Aceh as one of systematic false promises, unfulfilled as rapidly as they were made. 32 Recognizing that increasing GAM support threatened to attract similar international attention as had been the case in East Timor, President B.J. Habibie and his generals attempted to appease the Acehnese by promising the withdrawal of military forces from Aceh. In November 1999, just three months after East Timor voted for full independence from Indonesia, hundreds of thousands of Acehnese gathered in the capital, Banda Aceh, to demand a referendum for independence. 33 Combining appeasement with force, Habibie announced a new law governing the distribution of resources a law that would favor Aceh by promising significant distribution of revenue directly to the province. 34 At the same time, deeply concerned about mass gatherings, the leading TNI commander in Aceh announced that he would not withdraw military forces from the region. 35 Facing escalating tensions, Habibie s successor, President Abdurrahman Wahid invited mediators from the Henry Dunant Center (later renamed the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, CHD), a Geneva-based non-governmental organization (NGO), to broker a cease-fire in Aceh in 2000. It was the first of what would become five years of failed efforts to reach an accord amidst aggressive relapses into violence. The Humanitarian Pause agreed upon by both GAM and the Indonesian Government in late 2001 led to a cease-fire, in the hope that this pause would build confidence and give rise to broader political negotiations. However, the fragile pact rapidly crumbled amidst mutual accusations of unprovoked violence by both parties. Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 5

Monitors were not prescribed in the agreement, leaving few independent sources to confirm or deny the allegations. 36 Key GAM leaders believed that years of unrest had destabilized the Indonesian government, and that post-suharto Indonesia was near collapse. Abdurrahman may have judged that a pause could allow the Indonesian military (TNI) to reorganize for a largescale offensive. 37 Recriminations grew and, as the agreement collapsed, Abdurrahman left office, replaced by a new Indonesian President, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Megawati was known for being a pragmatic and conservative politician. Her ties to the military convinced many that she would be unwilling to negotiate a solution in Aceh, but her desire to stem GAM s expansion led her to propose a unilateral solution. In 2001, she undertook a number of initiatives to resolve the crisis in Aceh. She shepherded passage of a law allocating 70% of Aceh s resource wealth directly to the province as part of a larger legislation that once again changed the status of Aceh to a province with Special Autonomy privileges, including the creation of a Governor-appointed police force, the appointment of a symbolic, non-political head of state, and the enactment of Shari a laws governing domestic issues. 38 The actual implementation of the Special Autonomy Law faced stiff resistance from the TNI. Having long been a central apparatus of the government under Suharto, the TNI s role in post- Suharto Indonesia was uncertain. The TNI received only 30% of its operational revenue from the state. 39 It therefore maintained a broad network of revenue generating connections to politicians, political parties, businesses, and foundations, many of whom felt threatened by the prospect of a resource-rich Aceh gaining self-governing status. 40 With financial means and power bases independent of the state, the TNI was able to exert strong political pressure to thwart the implementation of Megawati s proposals and had powerful incentives to do so. By the time of its passage, her legislation on special autonomy was significantly weakened and questions would linger for years about the reality of the promised 70% distribution of resource wealth to Aceh. 41 In 2002, with little changed since the Humanitarian Pause, negotiations began once again, mediated for a second time by the CHD, this time with the active participation of William Ury, co-author of the bestselling negotiation book, Getting to Yes, and one of the founders of Harvard s Program on Negotiation. Within the year GAM and the Indonesian Government reached a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). It was the most comprehensive cease-fire to date, and it was intended to build confidence between the two parties, so that later negotiations could lead to a long-term agreement on the future of the province. The international community noted the cease-fire with interest, but amidst similar accusations to those levied during the Humanitarian Pause in 2001, the agreement rapidly began to disintegrate. The Indonesian military (TNI) declared that GAM had been insincere during the CoHA negotiations. TNI officials believed that GAM was suffering from battle fatigue, was increasingly isolated, and vulnerable to eradication by a determined TNI campaign. They believed GAM was amenable to CoHA only because a cease-fire would allow them to reorganize, regroup, recruit new fighters, and purchase more weapons. Fearing a continued, prolonged military engagement, the Indonesian government unilaterally declared a state of military emergency only 6 months after signing the CoHA. 42 In tandem, TNI launched an unprecedented four-pronged assault in May 2003 with the intent of militarily eradicating Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 6

GAM. 43 It was the largest military campaign in Indonesian history and it coincided with the arrest and imprisonment of GAM s CoHA negotiators. 44 While pursuing the military operation, buttressed by 40,000 new troops in Aceh, the government launched an ideological assault, staging parades and rallies by the Acehnese populace to support Indonesia. 45 Troops were sent to villages across Aceh and the government encouraged, often using threats and coercive tactics, the formation of local, pro-indonesian militias to inform on and ferret out GAM fighters. 46 The divide between GAM and the Indonesian Government appeared to be at its greatest. The military offensive had decimated the Acehnese economy; its brutal tactics resonating back over a century, polarizing the population against the Indonesian Government. The International Crisis Group estimated that 80% of Acehnese villages supported GAM. 47 The TNI was convinced that it could militarily eliminate GAM and its supporters, but had failed to capture or kill more than one senior GAM commander. GAM s negotiators were imprisoned, the organization was largely isolated and suspicious of most outsiders. A solution seemed distant. 48 The TNI, GAM, and the Indonesian government had successively aggravated each other to such a degree that neither side trusted the other, neither side cared to negotiate the compromises necessary for peace. Many on each side had come to believe that negotiations mainly offered cover for manipulation, respite, and reorganization rather than a means by which to arrive at sustainable peace. 49 As 2004 began, with negotiations in ruins and violence raging in Aceh, yet another new president, former general Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, took office in Jakarta as the first Indonesian executive elected by popular referendum. 50 He brought a charismatic vice president, Joseph Kulla, in tow. By the end of the year, an unlikely group of politicians and foreigners would bring the parties back to the table for one last attempt at reconciliation. PRELUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS At the start of 2004 two men on opposite sides of the world were furiously searching for an access point to jump start negotiations between the Government of Indonesia and GAM. One, a Finnish businessman with no formal diplomatic experience, was devoting considerable time to gaining access to the reclusive GAM leadership in Sweden. The other, an Indonesian businessman and former government minister, was now Indonesia s first democratically elected vice president; he had quietly sent his emissary to do exactly the same thing as the Finn. Juha Christensen had lived in Indonesia for years, working as a philologist with Liisa Christensen, his wife. After returning to Finland, he continued to travel to Indonesia on business, building extensive ties to trade in the region. Deeply disturbed by the unceasing strife in Aceh, Christensen took it upon himself to find a way to convince both parties to come together. 51 At the same time, Jusuf Kalla, the new Indonesian vice president, had finally reached a position of power that would allow him to explore contacts with GAM s leadership. Kalla had been interested in Aceh for years, maneuvering slowly to find a way to resolve the crisis. President Yudoyono was as familiar with Aceh as Kalla, and with both at the head of the Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 7

executive branch, they discussed ways to end the violence. As a national issue, Kalla and Yudoyono both knew that Aceh was not a priority for most Indonesian citizens, but they also knew that achieving peace could be of symbolic importance for a young nation, suggesting a stronger democracy, enhanced government capability, and attracting needed foreign investment. 52 Kalla sent his adviser Farid Husain to find some way to make connections with GAM field commanders and the leadership in Sweden. In their travels, Husain and Christensen crossed paths and Christensen promised that he could arrange a meeting in Stockholm with high-level GAM officials. 53 In February 2004, Husain traveled to Stockholm and met Christensen in a hotel lobby. For four hours, they waited while GAM leaders resisted Christensen s attempts to introduce them to Husain. Eventually the GAM officials appeared in the lobby, pointedly walked past the two visitors, without acknowledging them, and out the front door. 54 Embarrassed, Christensen thought of one last possibility to keep Husain from leaving in outrage. Within a matter of hours, after a flurry of phone calls, hastily arranged cars, and a last-minute flight to Helsinki, Husain and Christensen found themselves standing at the doorstep of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. 55 After a lifetime of diplomatic politics, Ahtisaari was a well-known figure. The youngest ambassador in Finnish history, he had made a name for himself brokering some of the world s most challenging peace agreements, playing key roles in challenging settings from Namibian independence to Northern Ireland to the Balkans. From 1994-2000 he had served as President of Finland, and that evening, was enjoying a busy post-presidential life as the director of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), an international NGO that he had founded to fill roles that official governments often found difficult to play in dealing with conflicts. 56 With strong personal relationships between Ahtisaari and leaders of institutions like the European Union and the United Nations, Christensen hoped that Ahtisaari s involvement could make both parties more amenable to negotiations. However, first he had to persuade the former Finnish President to participate. That evening Ahtisaari made no promises. He told Christensen and Husain that he was too busy, and negotiations would require a degree of commitment and seriousness by both parties that had not yet been credibly shown. Ahtisaari agreed to explore acting as a mediator, and nothing more. 57 Over the next four weeks Ahtisaari and his staff studied the conflict, dissected CHD s efforts that had led to the failed Humanitarian Pause and CoHA deals, and considered the capability and willingness of GAM and the Indonesian government to successfully navigate a peace process. 58 He privately asked challenging questions of GAM and the Indonesian Government to determine their willingness to begin negotiations in earnest, and in late December, agreed to broker the negotiations so long as both groups would agree to his conditions. 59 To avoid the open-ended character of CHD s efforts, he decided to sharply limit his involvement in negotiations to less than eight months. 60 Both parties would have to agree to restrict all Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 8

communication with the media. It would be understood at the outset that representatives present at negotiations would have the power to make binding decisions. 61 Changes in negotiating teams would be strongly discouraged and both teams would soon be encouraged negotiate directly with one another rather than indirectly (through third parties) via the proximity talks that had often taken place under CHD s auspices. 62 Ahtisaari had drawn a forceful line, and on December 23, 2005 all parties privately agreed, if reluctantly, that negotiations would begin anew under Ahtisaari s conditions. 63 No one knew yet that the negotiations would occur in the shadow of unforeseen trauma. On December 26, a devastating earthquake struck, triggering tsunamis that killed 180,000 people. In less than a day, over 130,000 Acehnese lives were lost, and the subsistence economy of province was dealt a staggering blow. If Aceh were to experience peace, it would have to be brokered in the wake of unspeakable tragedy, and in full, unprecedented view of a world eager to help, with aid workers, money, food, and supplies pouring in from every corner of the globe. 64 PREPARING FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS As representatives of GAM and the Government of Indonesia prepared to meet in January 2005, most observers, and certainly the public, remained deeply skeptical that the cycles of violence and negotiation between the two groups could possibly come to an end. The government had so often broken its promises previously, why should we now believe that the situation would be different, said GAM leader Malik Mahmoud. 65 With many of the GAM negotiators from the failed CoHA talks still languishing in Indonesian prisons with some prominent GAM negotiators drowned when the tsunami flooded their cells and daily military and paramilitary attacks on GAM forces and their sympathizers, prospects looked bleak indeed. Longtime observer and analyst of the Aceh conflict, Edward Aspinall stated that Aceh seemed destined to endure many more years of armed conflict. 66 A peace negotiator said, There was a feeling in the country that Indonesia was being punished by God. GAM [and TNI] were trapped by all of this. 67 Few knew that plans for talks were well underway before the tsunami, and though its shocking effects would influence the peace process, long-held disagreements formed the basis for the two groups to meet. The Government of Indonesia faced a bitter ideological divide between the inner circle of the newly elected president and a predominant number of military and elected officials, who were convinced that only decisive military force could ultimately lead to a positive conclusion for Indonesia. 68 President Yudoyono and Vice President Kalla believed that a diplomatic approach was the only solution that promised political and economic benefits to Indonesia, both domestically and internationally. They felt that a peace accord that ended the violence and kept Aceh as an integral part of Indonesia would cement a sense of national unity and rein in the high financial costs of prosecuting a military offensive. In 2004, the military campaign cost at least $130 million, and they believed that a continued primarily military approach would prove inconclusive. With at least some support in the TNI and the legislature, Yudoyono and Kalla judged that only a peaceful solution could achieve long-standing security. 69 As the first day of negotiations approached, Yudoyono and Kalla made a core decision: that they would use the negotiations to comprehensively address all local, national, and international aspects of the crisis. Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 9

They told their negotiators to be flexible but to embrace two foundational tenets to maintain the territorial integrity of the Indonesian nation with Aceh included, and to uphold the country's laws and constitution. 70 GAM officials also attempted to distill their approach to the negotiations before the first day. Stunned by the tsunami and inundated with reports of the human toll of the catastrophe, GAM s primary focus at the table would be achieving a bilateral ceasefire, with a large, armed UN peacekeeping force for monitoring and enforcement. As violence subsided following initial agreement, it would be possible to negotiate for GAM s long-standing, foundational interest in full independence of Aceh from Indonesia, with total control of its resources. 71 With the talks in prospect, GAM had announced a unilateral cease-fire, but reports had reached Sweden alleging continued TNI activity in Aceh even following the horrific tsunami. 72 For example, the village of Lamtengoh, had lost over 1,000 of its 1,300 citizens to the tsunami's flooding. Of the 70 government riot police stationed in the village, the waters had killed all but three. 73 Despite the GAM ceasefire, the wholesale destruction of the area by the tsunami, and tragic losses on both sides, the TNI reportedly mounted a full military assault on the village, forcing its starving remnant into the mountains. 74 GAM wanted the Indonesian government to match its so-far unilateral cease-fire until negotiations concluded. The response from the Indonesian Government, however, was clear: there would be no cease-fire. Fearful that GAM would use a cessation of violence to regroup and raise funds, the Indonesian team refused to halt military action during the talks. 75 As Ahtisaari and his team began to formulate their approach to this bitter tangle of issues, they faced hard questions: what process choices would be most promising? How should they help the parties deal with so many conflicting positions? The government demanded comprehensive talks; GAM wanted a ceasefire first. GAM demanded independence; the government would not grant it, even opposing any "local" Acehnese political parties as illegal. Having experienced so many "broken government promises" over so many years, GAM demanded a large group of armed, international monitors to enforce any deal; the government was dead-set against any "internationalization." How could these interests be reconciled in an atmosphere of bitter distrust, especially given the legacy of military violence and human rights abuses? In the midst of deciding how to proceed, Ahtisaari's glance swept past a memento that Nelson Mandela had given him. Perched on a shelf in Ahtisaari's Helsinki office was a simple piece of rock, quarried from Robben Island, the maximum security prison where the South African leader had been held for 27 long years. It seemed to evoke Mandela's incredible persistence and ultimate absence of bitterness even after great wrongs had been inflicted. Perhaps it augured hope for these negotiations as well, but what concrete actions what specific strategy and tactics could a third party employ to help transform flickers of hope into a sustainable agreement? Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 10

Exhibit 1: Partial Glossary of Parties and Abbreviations Ahtisaari, Martti President of Finland (1996-2000), lifetime diplomat, and founder of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). Principal mediator of the Helsinki negotiations which led to the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) AMM The Aceh Monitoring Mission, responsible for overseeing disarmament, troop withdrawal, and reintegration of GAM members after the signing of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding. Comprised of monitors from the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a regional inter-state organization that contributed monitors to the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), alongside the European Union (EU). CHD Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, formerly The Henry Dunant Center, a Geneva-based, nongovernmental organization responsible for mediating two rounds of talks in the half-decade prior to the 2005 Helsinki negotiations. Christensen, Juha Finnish philologist and businessman with extensive ties to Indonesia who served as a senior, albeit informal, advisor throughout the Helsinki negotiations. His interest and involvement led directly to the 2005 Aceh negotiations as well as the involvement of Marti Ahtisaari. CMI The Crisis Management Initiative, an international non-governmental mediation organization founded by Martti Ahtisaari. CoHA The Cessation of Hostilities Agreements, a short-lived accord reached between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in 2003. di Tiro, Hasan Founder of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in 1976. A onetime businessman and descendant of the last Sultans of Aceh, he led the organization from exile in Sweden for decades. He returned to Aceh in 2008 and died in June 2010 at the age of 84. EU The European Union, a regional inter-state organization that contributed monitors to the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), alongside the European Union (EU). Feith, Pieter Head of the NATO Balkans Task Force (1995-2001), Deputy Director for Politico- Military Affairs for the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (2001-Present) and head of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) from 2005-2006. GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, also known as the Free Aceh Movement, founded in 1976 by Hasan di Tiro with the intent of achieving national independence for the province of Aceh. GoI The Government of Indonesia, against whom the Free Aceh Movement waged a 30-year insurgency. Husain, Farid Deputy Minister under Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and a trusted ally of Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla. A leading negotiator on behalf of the Government of Indonesia (GoI), he is widely credited with making the initial overtures that led to the Helsinki negotiations. Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 11

HDC The Henry Dunant Center, later renamed the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, a Geneva-based non-governmental organization responsible for mediating two rounds of talks in the half-decade immediately prior to the 2005 Helsinki negotiations. Kalla, Jusuf Vice-President of Indonesia during the Helsinki negotiations, and a principal instigator of the talks. Senior advisor to the negotiating team of the Government of Indonesia (GoI) from Jakarta. Mahmoud, Malik Prime Minister, principal mediator, and signer of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). MoU Memorandum of Understanding, the peace agreement signed in Helsinki, Finland on August 15, 2005 between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI). Solana, Javier High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (EU) during the Aceh negotiations. A close associate of Martti Ahtisaari, his involvement led directly to the involvement of Pieter Feith and the EU in the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian Military Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang President of Indonesia (2004-Present), a former Army general, cabinet minister under his two Presidential predecessors. Frequently known by the acronym SBY. Exhibit 2: Map of Aceh Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 12

Bibliographic Note (Incomplete) The abbreviated endnotes referenced below have been mainly derived from the following sources (abbreviations included) and will be completed in subsequent drafts: EA: Aspinall, Edward. The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh? Policy Studies 20. Washington, D.C.: The East-West Center Washington, 2005. JB: Braithwaite, John. (Working Paper #5, draft posted 2008). Aceh, Indonesia. Peacebuilding Compared Project, Australian National University. Archived as of August 2010 at http://peacebuilding.anu.edu.au/_documents/workingpapers/acehwebsitevers.pdf. MP: Merikallio, Katri. Making Peace: Ahtisaari and Aceh, translated by David Mitchell. Helsinki: WSOY Publishing, 2008. MM: Morfit, Michael, The Road to Helsinki, The Aceh Agreement and Indonesia s Democratic Development. International Negotiation 12 (2007) : 111-143. SAL: Special Autonomy Law No. 18. Government of Indonesia. (DATE) 1 JB 2-4 (For key to abbreviated sources, e.g. JB, see bibliographic note above) 2 JB 2-3 3 JB 3 4 JB 5 5 JB 3,5 6 JB 5 7 JB 5-6 8 JB 6 9 JB 6 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 JB 7-8 13 JB 9-10, MP 71 14 JB 9-10, MP 86 15 JB 8 16 Ibid. 17 JB 8-9 18 JB 9-10, 13-14 19 JB 9, MP 71 20 MP 68-69 21 MP 66 22 MP 69 23 JB 9-10 24 JB 15, JB 34 25 JB 8 26 JB 9-11 27 JB 12 28 [CITE] 29 [CITE] 30 MM 114 31 JB 12-13 32 JB 13 33 JB 11 Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 13

34 JB 12 35 JB 13 36 JB 18 37 JB 14, 16 38 JB 14, EA 5, SAL 39 MP 56 40 MP 56-7 41 JB 14, EA 5 42 MP 32 43 EA 7-9, MM 114 44 MM 114-15 45 EA 7-8 46 EA 8-9 47 JB 13 48 EA 31-3 49 MM 15 50 MP 43 51 MP 28 52 MP 29-30, 36 53 MP 34 54 MP 34 55 MP 35 56 MP 39, 62-65 57 MP 35 58 MP 59 59 MM 117-18 60 MP 63 61 MP 22, 64 62 MP 64-5 63 MM 117-18 64 EA 19-20 65 MP 19 66 EA vii 67 JB, 20 68 EA 30 69 MM 119, 125 70 MM 133 71 MP 19 72 MP 40 73 MP 13 74 Ibid. 75 EA 24-5, MP 23 Draft: Martti Ahtisaari and the Aceh Negotiations (A) v4.3. Do not cite or quote without written permission. 14