Thomas Aquinas The Treatise on the Divine Nature Summa Theologiae I 1 13 Translated, with Commentary, by Brian Shanley Introduction by Robert Pasnau Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Indianapolis/Cambridge 2006
124 Question 13. 35 40 45 50 55 prophetic visions. And sometimes God even forms sensible things or voices in order to express something divine, as when at the baptism of Jesus the Holy Spirit was seen in the form of a dove and the voice of the Father was heard: This is my beloved Son. 48 Response to 1. Although through the revelation of grace we do not know in this life what God is, and thus we are joined to him as to one unknown, nevertheless we know God more fully insofar as many and more excellent effects of God are shown to us, and insofar as we can attribute things to God on the basis of divine revelation, things which natural reason cannot attain, such as God s being three and one. Response to 2. Through phantasms, either those received from the senses according to the natural order or those formed by God in the imagination, more excellent intellectual knowledge will be had where the intelligible light in the person is made stronger. Thus through revelation by phantasms a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of divine light. Response to 3. Faith is a kind of knowledge (cognitio) insofar as the intellect is determined through faith to something knowable. This determination to some one thing does not come from the vision of the one believing, however, but rather from the vision of that in which one believes. Thus insofar as faith lacks vision, it falls short of the kind of knowledge that is had in demonstrative knowledge (scientia), for demonstrative knowledge determines the intellect to some one thing through vision and through the understanding of first principles. Question 13 The Names of God Having considered what pertains to our knowledge of God, we must turn now to a consideration of the divine names, for something is named by us insofar as it is known by us. There are twelve questions to be asked: a1. Is God nameable by us? a2. Are any of the names said of God predicated substantially? a3. Are any names said properly of God, or are they all attributed to God metaphorically? a4. Are the many names said of God synonymous? 48 Matthew 3.19.
Question 13. Article 1. 125 a5. Are any names said of God and creatures univocally, or are they said equivocally? a6. Supposing that some names are said analogically, are they said primarily of God or creatures? a7. Are any names attributed to God beginning at a certain point in time? a8. Does the name God refer to the nature of God or the actions of God? a9. Is the name God communicable? a10. Is the name God used univocally or equivocally, as it signifies God by nature, by participation, and according to opinion? a11. Is the name He Who Is the most proper name of God? a12. Can affirmative propositions about God be formed? Article 1. Is God nameable by us? 1 It seem that no name is suitable to God: 1. Dionysius in the first chapter of On Divine Names says that Of God there is neither name nor opinion. 2 Moreover, Proverbs 30.4 says, What is God s name, or the name of his son, if you know it? 2. Every name is said either abstractly or concretely. But names that signify concretely cannot belong to God since God is simple; neither can names that signify abstractly, since they do not signify a complete subsisting thing. Hence no name can be said of God. 3. Nouns signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify temporally; pronouns are either demonstrative or relative. Now none of these are appropriate to God, since God is without quality or any accident, without temporality, cannot be perceived so as to be demonstrated, and cannot be signified relatively since relative terms track something previously spoken of either a noun, a participle, or a demonstrative pronoun. Therefore God cannot be named by us in any way. 5 10 15 On the contrary. Exodus 15.3 says: Like a warrior, Almighty is the name of the Lord. Reply. According to the Philosopher, words are signs of thoughts, and thoughts are likenesses of things. 3 So it is evident that words refer to the 20 1 1S 22.1; DDN 1.1 and 3. 2 PG 3.593. 3 On Interpretation I.2 (16a3).
126 Question 13. Article 1. 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 things they signify through the mediation of a conception in the intellect. Accordingly, insofar as something can be known by our intellect, so it can be named by us. Now it was shown above [12.11 12] that God cannot be seen by us in this life through the divine essence, but that God is known by us from creatures, inasmuch as God stands to them as their source, through the ways of both excellence and denial. Accordingly God can be named by us from creatures in this way, but not in such a way that a name signifying God expresses the divine essence as it is, as the name human being expresses by its signification the essence of human being as it is because it signifies its definition, which states its essence. For the concept (ratio) that a name signifies is the definition. Response to 1. God is said not to have a name, or to be beyond naming, because God s essence is beyond what we can understand of God and beyond what we can signify through words. Response to 2. Because we come to the knowledge of God through creatures and name God from creatures, the names that we attribute to God signify in a mode befitting material creatures, the knowledge of which is natural to us, as was said above [12.4]. Among creatures of this kind, those that are complete and subsistent are composites, whereas a form they have is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather that by which something is. Thus every name imposed by us to signify a complete subsisting thing signifies concretely, inasmuch as it applies to composite things. But the names that are imposed to signify simple forms signify something not as subsisting, but as that by which something is, just as whiteness signifies that by which something is white. Accordingly, since God is both simple and subsisting, we attribute to God both abstract names, in order to signify God s simplicity, and concrete names, in order to signify God s subsistence and completeness (perfectionem). Both kinds of names, however, fall short of God s own mode [of being], just as our intellect in this life does not know God as God is. Response to 3. To signify a substance with quality is to signify some subject (suppositum) with the determinate nature or form in which it subsists. Hence just as some names are said of God concretely in order to signify God s subsistence and completeness (as was just said [Response to 2]), so some names are said of God signifying a substance with quality. Verbs and participles implying temporality are said of God because eternity includes the whole of time; for just as we cannot apprehend and signify simple subsistent things except by way of what is com-
Question 13. Article 2. 127 posite, so we cannot understand or express in words the simplicity of eternity except by way of temporal things, because of the natural affinity of our intellect for composite and temporal things. Demonstrative pronouns are said of God insofar as they serve to demonstrate what is understood rather than what is perceived, since a thing is subject to demonstration insofar as it is understood by us. Thus according to the way in which names and participles and demonstrative pronouns are said of God, so too can God be signified by relative pronouns. 65 Article 2. Are any of the names said of God predicated substantially? 4 It seems that no name is said of God substantially: 1. Damascene says: It must be that none of the things that are said of God signify what God is substantially, but rather show what God is not, or some relationship to something, or something of what follows from God s nature or action. 5 2. In the first chapter of On Divine Names, Dionysius says: You will find every hymn of the holy theologians distinguishing the names of God clearly and praiseworthily in keeping with the good processions from the Supreme Godhead. 6 This means that the names assumed by the holy teachers in the divine praise are distinguished according to the processions of God. But what signifies the procession of something signifies nothing pertaining to its essence. Therefore the names said of God are not said of God substantially. 3. Something is named by us insofar as it is understood by us. But God is not understood by us in this life according to his substance. Therefore no name imposed by us is said of God according to his substance. On the contrary. Augustine says in Book VI of On the Trinity: This is what it is to be God: to be strong, or to be wise, or whatever else you will say about that simplicity. By this, God s substance is signified. 7 Therefore every name of this kind signifies the divine substance. Reply. The names that are said of God negatively or that signify God s relationship to a creature obviously in no way signify God s substance, but rather the denial that he has some characteristic or the relationship of God to something else or rather of something to God. But there 5 10 15 20 25 4 1S 2.2 3, 25.1 ad 2; DV 2.1; SCG I.31; DDN 1.3; DP 7.5. 5 On the Orthodox Faith I.9 (PG 94.833). 6 PG 3.589. 7 Chapter 4 (PL 42.927).
128 Question 13. Article 2. 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 have been many opinions regarding the names that are said of God absolutely or affirmatively such as good, wise, and predicates of this kind. Some have said that all these names, although they are said of God affirmatively, nevertheless are found to deny things of God rather than to impute things to God. Hence they claim that when we say that God is living, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing, and that something similar is the case with other names. This was the view of Rabbi Moses. 8 There are others 9 who say that these names are imposed to signify some relationship of God to what is created: so that when we say that God is good, the meaning is that God is the cause of goodness in things. And the same reasoning is applied to other names. Both of these views seem to be unacceptable for three reasons: First, on neither of these positions could one assign a reason whereby certain names are more appropriately said of God than others. For God is the cause of bodies just as God is the cause of good things. So if nothing else is meant when we say that God is good other than God is the cause of good things, then it can similarly be said that God is a body since God is the cause of bodies. Moreover, in saying that God is a body, it is denied that God is only a potential being, like prime matter. Second, it would follow that all the names said of God would be said derivatively (per posterius) of God, just as heath is said derivatively of medicine because it signifies only that medicine is the cause of health in an animal, whereas health is said of the animal primarily (per prius). Third, this is contrary to the intention of those speaking of God. For when we say that God is living, we intend something other than that God is the cause of our life, or that God differs from inanimate bodies. Thus something else must be maintained: that names of this kind signify the divine substance and are predicated of God substantially, but that they fall short of a representation of God. This is made plain as follows. Names signify God insofar as our intellect knows God. But since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows God insofar as those creatures represent God. But it was shown above [4.2] that God, being universally and absolutely perfect, prepossesses in himself all the perfections of creatures. Thus any creature represents God and is like God to the degree to which it has any perfection. It does not represent God as though they were of the same species or genus, however, but rather as 8 Guide for the Perplexed I.58. 9 Alan of Lille is one such theologian. See his Rules of Theology (PL 210.631 and 633).
Question 13. Article 2. 129 an effect falling short of the form of its surpassing principle which yet, as an effect, has some likeness to its cause, just as the forms of terrestrial bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained earlier [4.3c] when we considered God s perfection. Accordingly, the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but do so imperfectly, just as creatures imperfectly represent the divine substance. Hence when we say God is good, it does not mean that God is the cause of goodness or that God is not bad; rather, this means that what we call good in creatures preexists in God, albeit in a higher mode. From this it does not follow that it belongs to God to be good insofar as God is the cause of goodness, but rather just the opposite: that because God is good, God diffuses goodness to things, as Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine: Because God is good, we are. 10 Response to 1. The reason Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is is that none of them perfectly express what God is. But each one does signify God imperfectly, just as creatures represent God imperfectly. Response to 2. In the signification of names, there is sometimes a distinction between that from which the name is imposed to signify and that which the name is imposed to signify. For example, the term rock (lapis) is imposed from its injuring the foot (laedit pedem), but it is not imposed to signify what injuring the foot signifies rather, it signifies a certain species of body; otherwise, everything injuring the foot would be a rock. Accordingly, the response is that divine names of this kind are indeed imposed from the processions of the deity, for just as creatures represent God, although imperfectly, according to the diverse processions of perfections, so our intellect knows and names God according to each procession. But these names are not imposed in order to signify the processions themselves, as if when it is said that God is living the meaning were that life processes from God. Rather, this name is imposed to signify the very principle of things insofar as life preexists in it, although in a more eminent mode than we can understand or signify. Response to 3. We cannot in this life know the essence of God as it is in itself, but we do know it as it is represented in the perfections of creatures. Thus the names imposed by us do signify God s essence. 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 10 Book I.32 (PL 34.32)
130 Question 13. Article 3. Article 3. Are any names said properly of God, or are they all attributed to God metaphorically? 11 5 10 15 20 25 30 It seems that no name is said of God properly: 1. Every name we say of God is taken from creatures, as was said earlier [a1c 27 ]. But creaturely names are said of God metaphorically, as when we say that God is a rock, or a lion, or something else of this kind. Therefore all the names said of God are said metaphorically. 2. No name is said properly of something when it is truer to deny it than to predicate it. But all names of this kind good, wise, and the like are more truly denied of God than predicated of God, as Dionysius makes clear in Chapter 2 of On the Celestial Hierarchy. 12 Therefore none of those names are properly said of God. 3. The names of bodies are not said of God except metaphorically, since God is nonbodily. But every name of this kind implies certain bodily conditions, since it signifies with time, composition, and other such things that are conditions of bodies. Therefore all such names are said of God metaphorically. On the contrary. In Book II of On Faith, Ambrose says: There are some names that obviously express what is proper to divinity and some that express the clear truth about the divine majesty; there are others, however, that are said of God metaphorically through some likeness. 13 Accordingly, not all names are said of God metaphorically; rather, some are said properly. Reply. As was already said [a2c 55 60 ], we know God from the perfections flowing to creatures from God, which perfections are in God according to a more eminent mode than in creatures. But our intellect apprehends these perfections according to the mode they have in creatures, and insofar as it apprehends so it signifies through names. Accordingly, in the names that we attribute to God there are two things that need to be distinguished: namely, the very perfections signified such as goodness, life, and the like and the mode of signifying. As regards what names of this kind signify, these names apply properly to God, indeed more properly to God than to God s creatures, and they are said primarily of God. As regards their mode of signifying, however, they are not properly said of God, for they have the mode of signifying that belongs to creatures. 11 1S 4.1.1, 22. 2, 35.1 ad 2; SCG I.30; DP 7.5. 12 PG 3.141. 13 Prologue (PL 16.583).
Question 13. Article 4. 131 Response to 1. Some names signify perfections of this kind proceeding from God to created things in such a manner that the imperfect mode by which a creature participates in the divine perfection is itself included in the very signification of the name as rock signifies a material being. Names of this kind cannot be attributed to God except metaphorically. Other names signify the perfections themselves in an absolute way, without any mode of participation included in their signification such as being, good, life, and the like. Such names are said properly of God. Response to 2. Dionysius says that names of this kind are negated of God because what is signified by the name does not belong to God according to the same mode that the name signifies, but rather according to a more excellent mode. Hence in the same place Dionysius says that God is beyond every substance and life. Response to 3. The names that are said properly of God imply bodily conditions not in the very signification of the name, but in the mode of signifying. In contrast, those names that are said of God metaphorically imply bodily conditions in their very signification. Article 4. Are the many names said of God synonymous? 14 It seems that the names said of God are all synonymous names: 1. Names are said to be synonymous when they signify exactly the same thing. But these names that are said of God signify the exact same thing in God because the goodness of God is God s essence and so too for wisdom. Therefore these names are exactly synonymous. 2. If it is said that these names signify the same thing, but according to diverse concepts (rationes) on the contrary, a concept to which nothing in the thing corresponds is empty; thus if there are many concepts, yet the thing is one, then it seems these concepts are empty. 3. Something that is one both in reality and in concept (ratione) is more one than what is one in reality but multiple in concept. But God is supremely one. Therefore it seems that God is not one in reality and multiple in concept. Thus the names that are said of God do not signify diverse concepts and so are synonymous. On the contrary. Whenever you put synonyms together with each other, you get something superfluous, as when clothing garment is said. Accordingly, if all the names said of God are synonymous, then it 35 40 45 50 5 10 15 14 1S 2.3, 22.3; SCG I.35; DP 7.6; CT 25.
132 Question 13. Article 4. 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 could not be appropriately said that God is good or anything else like that. But in Jeremiah 32.18 it is written: Strongest, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is your name. Reply. Names of this kind are not synonymous when said of God. This would be easy to see if we were to say that names of this kind are introduced to deny something or to designate a causal relationship with respect to creatures, for thus there would be different concepts for these names according to the different things negated or according to the different effects connoted. But, in keeping with what was said [a2], that names of this kind signify the divine substance, albeit imperfectly, it is also obvious from the foregoing [aa1 2] that they have diverse concepts. For the concept (ratio) that the name signifies is the conception (conceptio) in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. Now our intellect, when it knows God from creatures, forms conceptions so as to understand God that are proportioned to the perfections proceeding from God to creatures. These perfections preexist in God as a unit and simply, whereas in creatures they are received as divided and multiplied. Accordingly, just as to diverse perfections in creatures there corresponds one simple principle, represented through diverse perfections in creatures in varied and multiple ways, so to the varied and multiple conceptions in our intellect there corresponds a completely simple unity, which is imperfectly understood through these conceptions. Thus although the names attributed to God signify one thing, nevertheless they signify it under many and diverse concepts, and so are not synonymous. Response to 1. The solution to this objection is thus obvious, since names are said to be synonymous that signify one thing according to one concept. For those names that signify diverse concepts of a single thing do not signify one thing primarily and intrinsically, since the name signifies the thing only through the mediation of a conception in the intellect, as was said [a1c 21 ]. Response to 2. The multiple concepts belonging to these names are not useless and empty, since to all of them there corresponds something simple and one that is represented multiply and imperfectly by all of them. Response to 3. It pertains to God s perfect unity that what is multiple and divided in other things be simple and one in God. This is why God is one in reality and multiple in concept, since our intellect apprehends God in multiple ways, just as things represents God in multiple ways.
Question 13. Article 5. 133 Article 5. Are any names said of God and creatures univocally, or are they said equivocally? 15 It seems that the names said of God and creatures are said of them univocally: 1. All equivocal terms resolve into univocal terms, as many resolve to one. For if the word dog is said equivocally of a barking thing and a sea creature, it is necessary that it be said of something univocally namely all the barking things or else there would be an infinite regress. Now some agents are found to be univocal, and these agree with their effects in name and in definition, as when a human generates a human. Other agents are equivocal, as when the sun causes heat, even though it is hot only equivocally. Accordingly, it seems that the first agent, to which all other agents are resolved, is a univocal agent. Thus what is said of God and creatures is predicated univocally. 2. No likeness follows from equivocals. Accordingly, since there is some kind of likeness between creatures and God according to Genesis 1.26: Let us make man in our image and likeness it seems that something is said univocally of God and creatures. 3. A measure is homogeneous with what it measures, as it says in Metaphysics X [1053a24]. But God is the first measure of every being, as it says in the same place. Therefore God is homogeneous with creatures, and thus something can be said univocally of God and creatures. On the contrary. Whatever is predicated of various things according to the same name but not according to the same meaning (rationem) is predicated of them equivocally. But no name belongs to God according to the meaning that it has when it is said of creatures, for wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God, and a change in genus is a change in meaning, since the genus is part of the definition. The same reasoning applies to other cases. Therefore whatever is said of God and creatures is said equivocally. Furthermore, God is more distant from creatures than any creature is distant from another creature. But because of the distance between some creatures, it happens that nothing can be predicated of them univocally, as is the case with things that do not share any genus. Much less, therefore, is anything predicated of God and creatures univocally, but rather everything is predicated equivocally. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 15 1S 1.2 ad 2, 1.2.3, 19.5.2 ad 1, 35.4; DV 2.11; SCG I.32 34; DDN 1.3; DP 7.7; CT 27.
134 Question 13. Article 5. 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 Reply. It is impossible that anything be predicated of God and creatures univocally. For every effect that does not match the power of the agent cause receives from the agent a likeness that is not of the same nature (ratio); rather, it receives it in a lesser way, with the result that what exists in the cause simply and in the same way exists in the effects in a divided and multiplied way. Thus the sun, in virtue of a single power, produces many and varied forms in terrestrial things. In the same way, as was said above [a4c 33 ], all the perfections of things, which are divided and multiplied in created things, preexist in God as a unity. Accordingly, when any name pertaining to perfection is said of a creature, it signifies that perfection as distinct from others in keeping with the account expressed by its definition; for example, when the term wise is said of a human being, we signify some perfection that is distinct from the essence of that person, as well as from the power, the existence, and everything else of that sort. But when we say that name of God, we do not intend to signify something distinct from the essence, power, or existence of God. Thus, when the term wise is said of a human being, it in some way describes and comprehends the thing signified; this is not true when it is said of God, however, for what is signified remains incomprehensible, exceeding the signification of the name. So it is clear that wise is not said of God and human beings according to the same meaning (ratio). Similar reasoning applies to other names. Thus no name is predicated of God and creatures univocally. But neither is all predication purely equivocal, as some have said, 16 since this would entail that nothing can be known or demonstrated about God, but rather would always be subject to the fallacy of equivocation. This would be contrary to the philosophers, who prove many things about God through demonstration, and contrary to the Apostle, who in Romans 1.20 says: The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made. It therefore must be said that names of this kind are said of God and creatures according to analogy, that is, according to proportion. This can happen with names in two different ways: either when many have a proportion to one, as health is said of medicine and urine insofar as they both have an order and proportion to the health of an animal, one being the sign of health and the other being its cause; or when one has a proportion to another, as health is said of medicine and an 16 Aquinas probably has in mind Moses Maimonides in his Guide for the Perplexed I.59 and Averroës, Commentary on the Metaphysics XII, comm. 51.
Question 13. Article 5. 135 animal insofar as medicine is the cause of health in the animal. It is in this latter way that something is said of God and creatures analogically, and not by pure equivocation or univocally. For we can name God only from creatures, as was said above [a1c 27 ]. And thus whatever is said of God and creatures is said according to some ordering of creatures to God as source and cause in which all the perfections of things preexist in a more excellent way. This kind of commonality lies in between pure equivocation and simple univocity. For when things are said analogically, there is not a single meaning (ratio) in common, as there is in the case of univocal terms, nor is there a completely diverse meaning, as in the case of equivocal terms. For a name that is said analogically of many signifies diverse proportions to some one thing, as health when said of urine signifies the sign of an animal s health and health when said of medicine signifies the cause of the same health. Response to 1. Although in the case of predication it is necessary that all equivocal terms be resolved to univocal terms, nevertheless in the case of action it not necessary that a univocal agent precede a nonunivocal agent. For a nonunivocal agent is the universal cause of the entire species, as the sun is the cause of the generation of all human beings. A univocal agent, however, is not the universal agent cause of the entire species; otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is itself a member of the species. Instead, it is a particular cause with respect to a determinate individual that it constitutes as a participant in the species. Accordingly, the universal cause of the entire species is not a univocal agent. Moreover, the universal cause is prior to a particular cause. However this universal agent, although it is not univocal, is also not completely equivocal, since then it would not make something like itself; rather, it can be said to be an analogical agent, just as in predication all univocal terms resolve into one first term which is not univocal, but analogical that is, being. Response to 2. A creature s likeness to God is imperfect, since it does not represent the same thing even in genus, as was said above [4.3c 47 54 ]. Response to 3. God is not a measure proportionate to what is measured. Therefore it is not necessary that God and creatures be contained in one genus. Regarding the claims made On the Contrary, they conclude that names of this kind are not predicated of God and creatures univocally; they do not prove, however, that they are predicated equivocally. 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110
136 Question 13. Article 6. Article 6. Are names said primarily of God or creatures? 17 5 10 15 20 25 30 It seems that names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God: 1. We name things in the way that we know them, since names, according to the Philosopher, are signs of thoughts. 18 But we know creatures primarily, rather than God. Therefore the names imposed by us belong primarily to creatures rather than to God. 2. According to Dionysius in his book On Divine Names, we name God from creatures. 19 But names applied from creatures to God are said primarily of creatures rather than God such as lion, rock, and names of this kind. Therefore all names that are said of God and creatures are said primarily of creatures rather than of God. 3. All the names said in common of God and creatures are said of God as the cause of all things, as Dionysius says. 20 But what is said of something by virtue of its being a cause is said of it secondarily, for health is said primarily of an animal rather than of the medicine that is the cause of its health. Therefore names of this kind are said primarily of creatures rather than of God. On the contrary. In Ephesians 3.14 it says: I bend my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named. Similar reasoning seems to apply to the other names said of God and creatures. Therefore names of this kind are said primarily of God rather than of creatures. Reply. All names said of many by analogy are necessarily named through a relationship to some one thing, and thus one must be found in the definition of them all. Now since the concept (ratio) that the name signifies is the definition, as it says in Metaphysics IV [1012a23], the name must be said primarily of what is found in the definition of some and secondarily of other things, according to the order whereby they approach what is first to a greater or lesser degree. For example, healthy said of an animal enters into the definition of healthy said of medicine, which is called healthy because it causes health in the animal; it likewise enters into the definition of healthy said of urine, which is called healthy insofar as it is a sign of an animal s health. Accordingly, all the names that are said metaphorically of God are said primarily of creatures rather than of God, since what is said of God 17 1S 4.2.1, 22.2; DV 4.1; IE 3.4; SCG I.34; CT 27. 18 De interpretatione I.2 (16a3). 19 I.6 (PG 3.596). 20 On Mystical Theology 1.2 (PG 3.1000).
Question 13. Article 7. 137 in this way signifies nothing other than a likeness to such creatures. For just as to say that a meadow is smiling signifies nothing other than that it is similar in beauty when it flowers to a person who smiles, according to some likeness of proportion, so too the name lion when said of God signifies just that God is the sort of being that acts powerfully in his works, just as a lion is. So it is clear that when these terms are said of God, their signification cannot be defined except through what is said of creatures. In the case of other names, not said metaphorically of God, the account would be the same if they were only said causally of God, as some have maintained. 21 For if when God is said to be good, this meant nothing other than that God is the cause of the goodness of creatures, then the term good as said of God would contain in its idea (intellectu) the goodness of creatures, and then good would be said primarily of creatures rather than of God. But it was shown above [a2] that names of this kind are said of God not only causally but also essentially. For when it is said that God is good or wise, this signifies not only that God is the cause of wisdom and goodness, but also that these preexist in God in a more eminent way. Accordingly, it should be said that with respect to the thing signified by the name, it is said primarily of God rather than creatures, since perfections of this kind flow from God to creatures. But with respect to the imposition of the name, it is imposed by us first on creatures, which we know first. That is why these names have the mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as was said earlier [a3]. Response to 1. This objection concerns the imposition of the name. Response to 2. The account is not the same for names said metaphorically of God and for other names, as was said [in the reply]. 35 40 45 50 55 60 Response to 3. This objection would work if names of this kind were only said causally of God and not essentially, as healthy is said of medicine. Article 7. Are any names attributed to God beginning at a certain point in time? 22 It seems that the names that imply a relationship to creatures are not said of God beginning at a certain point in time: 1. Every name of this kind signifies the divine substance, as is commonly said. Hence Ambrose says that this name Lord is a name based 21 Alan of Lille, The Rules of Theology, 21 (PL 210.631). 22 1S 30.1, 37.2.3; ST I.34.3 ad 2.
138 Question 13. Article 7. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 on power, 23 which is the divine substance. Also, Creator signifies an action of God, which is God s essence. But the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore names of this kind are said of God not beginning at a certain point in time, but rather eternally. 2. Whenever one thing belongs to another beginning at a certain point in time, the latter can be said to have become; for what is white beginning at a certain point in time becomes white. But it does not befit God to have become. Therefore nothing is predicated of God beginning at a certain point in time. 3. If any names are said of God beginning at a certain point in time because they imply a relationship to creatures, by the same reasoning it seems that this would be true of all the names that imply a relationship to creatures. But some names implying a relationship to creatures apply to God from eternity, for God has known and loved creatures from eternity, as Jeremiah 31.3 says: I have loved you with an everlasting love. Therefore the other names that imply a relationship to creatures, such as Lord and Creator, are likewise said of God from eternity. 4. Names of this kind signify a relationship. Accordingly, it is necessary that this relationship be something in God or only in creatures. But it cannot be something only in creatures, since in that case God would be called Lord by virtue of the opposing relationship which is in creatures, and yet nothing is named by virtue of its opposite. It follows, then, that the relationship is something in God as well. But nothing can be in God beginning at a certain point in time, since God is beyond time. Therefore it seems that names of this kind are not said of God beginning at a certain point in time. 5. Something is said relatively on the basis of a relationship lord, for instance, on the basis of lordship (just as white on the basis of whiteness). Accordingly, if the relationship of lordship is in God not really but only conceptually, then it would follow that God is not really Lord, which is patently false. 6. In the case of relative things that are not simultaneous in nature, one of them can exist without the other s existing. For instance, What is knowable exists without the existence of any knowledge, as it says in the Categories [7b30]. But the relatives said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore something relative to creatures can be said of God even if creatures do not exist. And thus names of this kind, such as Lord and Creator, are said of God from eternity and not beginning at a certain point in time. 23 On Faith I (PL 16.553).
Question 13. Article 7. 139 On the contrary. Augustine says in Book V of On the Trinity that the relative name Lord belongs to God beginning at a certain point in time. 24 Reply. Some names implying a relationship to creatures are said of God beginning at a certain point in time and not from eternity. In order to make this clear, it must be known that some have said that a relation is not something real in nature (res naturae), but a being of reason (res rationis) only. 25 Yet this is obviously false, because things themselves have a natural order and relation to one another. Still, it must be known that, since a relationship requires two terms, there are three ways in which a relationship can be something real in nature or a being of reason. Sometimes it is just a being of reason on both sides of the relationship, namely when the order or relationship between two things can exist only on the basis of the apprehension of reason, as when we say that a thing is identical with itself. For insofar as reason apprehends the same thing twice, it constitutes it as two, and thus apprehends a kind of relationship of the thing to itself. It is the same in every relation of being to nonbeing, which reason forms insofar as it apprehends nonbeing as some kind of relatum. The same goes for all relationships that follow from an act of reason, as genus and species, and others like this. In other cases, the relations are real in nature on both sides, namely when there is a relationship between two things according to something that really belongs to both. This is true of every relationship that is based on quantity, such as large and small, double and half, and others of this kind, for there is quantity on each side. It is similar in all relationships that follow from action and passion, such as mover and moved, father and son, and the like. In other cases, the relation is real in nature on one side while on the other it is only a being of reason. This happens sometimes when the two sides are not of the same order. For instance, sensation and knowledge are related to what is sensed and what is known; these latter, insofar as they are certain things existing in natural existence, are outside the order of sensible and intelligible existence. Thus in the case of knowledge and sensation there is indeed a real relationship because they are ordered to the knowledge or the sensation of things; yet the things themselves, considered in their own right, are outside this kind of order. Thus in them there is no real relationship to knowledge or sensation; instead, 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 24 Chapter 16 (PL 42.922). 25 According to DP 8.2, the disciples of Gilbert of Poitiers.
140 Question 13. Article 7. 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 the relationship is according to reason alone, insofar as the intellect apprehends them as relata of the relationships of knowledge and sensation. Therefore the Philosopher says in Metaphysics V [1021a29] that they are not said to be relative because they themselves are related to something else, but because others are related to them. Similarly, right is not said of a column except insofar as it is located on the right of some animal; a relationship of this kind is not real in the column, but in the animal. Accordingly, since God is outside the entire order of creation, and every creature is ordered to God but not vice versa, it is manifest that created things are really related to God. But in God there is no real relation to creatures; rather, it is only according to reason, insofar as creatures are related to God. And thus nothing prevents names of this kind, implying a relationship to creatures, from being predicated of God beginning at a certain point in time, not because of any change in God, but because of a change in creatures. This is like when a column comes to be on the right of an animal not by any change occurring to the column, but by the movement of the animal. Response to 1. Some relative terms are imposed to signify the relative relationships themselves, as lord, servant, father, son, and others of this type; these are relative according to existence. Other relative terms are imposed to signify things from which certain relationships follow, as moving and being moved, head and being headed, and others of this kind; these are said to be relative according to speech. Thus when it comes to divine names, this twofold distinction must be kept in mind. For some names signify God s very relationship to creatures, such as Lord. Names of this kind do not signify the divine substance directly, but rather indirectly, insofar as they presuppose that substance, as lordship presupposes the power that is the divine substance. Other names signify the divine essence directly, and imply a relationship following from it, as Savior, Creator, etc. signify the action of God, which is the divine essence. Both kinds of names are said of God beginning at a certain point in time with respect to the relationship they imply, either principally or as a consequence, but not with respect to signifying the divine essence, either directly or indirectly. Response to 2. Just as the relations that are said of God beginning at a certain point in time are not in God except according to reason, so too neither can to become or to have become be said of God except
Question 13. Article 7. 141 according to reason, without any change occurring in God. This is the case when it is said: Lord, you have become our refuge. 26 Response to 3. The activity of the intellect and the will is in the agent, and so names that signify relationships that result from intellectual or volitional activity are said of God eternally. But those that result from actions proceeding, on our way of understanding, to exterior effects are said of God temporally, such as Savior, Creator, and other names of this kind. Response to 4. The relations signified by names of this kind that are said of God beginning at a certain point in time are in God only according to reason; the opposing relations, however, are really in creatures. And it is not unfitting that God be named from relationships that are really in things, insofar as our intellect understands correlatively the opposing relationships in God. Thus God is said to be related to creatures because creatures are related to God; just as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics V [1021a30] that something is said to be knowable relatively speaking, because knowledge is related to it. Response to 5. God is related to a creature in the same regard in which the creature is related to God. Because the relationship of subjecthood is really in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not only according to reason, but also in reality. For God is said to be Lord in the same way in which a creature is subject to God. Response to 6. In order to know whether relative terms are simultaneous in nature or not, it is not necessary to consider the order of the things the relative terms are said of, but rather the significations of the relative terms. For if one contains the other in its very idea (intellectu) and vice versa, then they are simultaneous in nature, such as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one contains the other in its idea but not vice versa, then they are not simultaneous in nature. This is how knowledge and what is knowable are related. For what is knowable is so called on the basis of its potential, while knowledge is so called on the basis of a disposition or actuality. Thus the knowable exists before the knowledge according to the mode of its signification. But if the knowable is taken as actual, then it is simultaneous with its knowledge in actuality, for nothing is known unless there is knowledge of it. Accordingly, although God is prior to creatures, nevertheless since the signification of Lord contains having a servant, and 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 26 Psalms 90.1.
142 Question 13. Article 8. 160 vice versa, so these two relative terms Lord and servant are simultaneous in nature. Hence God was not Lord before having a creature subject to him. Article 8. Does the name God refer to the nature of God or the actions of God? 27 5 10 15 20 25 30 It seems that the name God is not a name of God s nature: 1. Damascene says in the first book 28 that God is said from theein, which means to run and to nourish all things; or from aithein, which means to blaze, for our God is a fire consuming all evil; or from theasthai, which means to view all things. But all these names pertain to action. Thus the name God signifies action and not God s nature. 2. Something is named by us insofar as it is known by us. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore the name God does not signify the divine nature. On the contrary. Ambrose says in Book I of On Faith that God is the name of God s nature. Reply. That from which a name is imposed to signify is not always identical to that which the name is imposed to signify. For just as we know the substance of a thing from its properties or actions, so sometimes we name the substance of a thing on the basis of an action or a property. For example, we name the substance of a rock (lapis) from one of its actions, since it injures the foot (laedit pedem); even so, this name is imposed to signify not this action, but rather the substance of the rock. In contrast, if there are things that are known to us in themselves such as heat, cold, white, and the like they are not named from something else. Therefore in the case of things of this kind, what the name signifies and that from which it is imposed to signify are identical. Accordingly, since God is not known to us in his nature, but becomes known to us through his actions and effects, we are able to name God from these, as was said above [a1c 27 ]. Hence this name God is a name of an action with respect to that from which it is imposed to signify. For this name is imposed from God s universal providence over things, since everyone speaking of God intends to name him from the fact that he has universal providence over things. Hence Dionysius says in Chapter 12 of On Divine Names that the deity is that which sees all things 27 1S 2 exposition of the text. 28 On the Orthodox Faith, Chapter 9 (PG 94.835).
Question 13. Article 9. 143 with perfect providence and goodness. 29 But although the name God is derived from this action, it is imposed to signify the divine nature. Response to 1. Everything that Damascene says pertains to providence, from which the name God is imposed to signify. Response to 2. Insofar as we can know the nature of some thing from its properties and effects, so we can signify it by a name. Thus since we can know the substance of a rock as it is in itself from its properties, knowing what a rock is, the name rock signifies the nature of rock as it is in itself, for it signifies the definition of rock, by which we know what a rock is. For the concept (ratio) that the name signifies is the definition, as it says in Metaphysics IV [1012a23]. Now from the effects of God we cannot know the divine nature as it is in itself so as to know what that nature is; rather, we know the divine nature through the modes of eminence, causality, and negation, as said above [12.12c]. Thus the name God signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something that is above all, is the principle of all, and distinct from all. For this is what people naming God intend to signify. Article 9. Is the name God communicable? It seems that the name God is communicable: 1. When what is signified by a name is communicable to something, then the name itself is communicable to that thing. But as was said [a8], the name God signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, as 2 Peter 1.4 says: God has given to us great and precious promises so that through this we might become sharers in the divine nature. Therefore the name God is communicable. 2. Only proper names are not communicable. The name God is not a proper name, however, but a common noun (appellativum). This is obvious from the fact that it has a plural, as it says in Psalms 82.6: I have said that you are gods. Therefore the name God is communicable. 3. The name God is imposed from action, as was said [a8c 24 ]. But other names that are imposed on God from actions or effects are communicable, such as good, wise and others of the kind. Therefore the name God is communicable. On the contrary. Wisdom 14.21 says: They gave the incommunicable name to wood and rocks, speaking of the divine name. Therefore the name God is an incommunicable name. 35 40 45 5 10 15 29 PG 3.969.