UNIT 3: Social Epistemology

Similar documents
Can A Priori Justified Belief Be Extended Through Deduction? It is often assumed that if one deduces some proposition p from some premises

THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY Undergraduate Course Outline PHIL3501G: Epistemology

foundationalism and coherentism are responses to it. I will then prove that, although

Contemporary Epistemology

Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. Erik J. Olsson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Pp. xiii, 232.

Beyond Virtue Epistemology 1

Ethics is subjective.

Reliabilism: Holistic or Simple?

Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? Joseph Barnes

The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

CURRICULUM VITAE STEPHEN JACOBSON. (Title: What's Wrong With Reliability Theories of Justification?)

Rethinking Knowledge: The Heuristic View

Philosophy Epistemology. Topic 3 - Skepticism

- We might, now, wonder whether the resulting concept of justification is sufficiently strong. According to BonJour, apparent rational insight is

PHIL-210: Knowledge and Certainty

Review of Steven D. Hales Book: Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy

Belief Ownership without Authorship: Agent Reliabilism s Unlucky Gambit against Reflective Luck Benjamin Bayer September 1 st, 2014

Writing Module Three: Five Essential Parts of Argument Cain Project (2008)

Philosophy 427 Intuitions and Philosophy. Russell Marcus Hamilton College Fall 2011

On Dogramaci. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2015 Vol. 4, No. 4,

4AANB007 - Epistemology I Syllabus Academic year 2014/15

Epistemic Normativity for Naturalists

What Should We Believe?

Lecture 5 Rejecting Analyses I: Virtue Epistemology

Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge

Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to The Theory of Knowledge, by Robert Audi. New York: Routledge, 2011.

PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 7 : E P I S T E M O L O G Y - K A N T

THE SEMANTIC REALISM OF STROUD S RESPONSE TO AUSTIN S ARGUMENT AGAINST SCEPTICISM

From a Statement of Its Vision Toward Thinking into the Desire of a Corporate Daimon Frank Scalambrino, University of Dallas

PROSPECTS FOR A JAMESIAN EXPRESSIVISM 1 JEFF KASSER

Deontological Perspectivism: A Reply to Lockie Hamid Vahid, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran

Epistemology Naturalized

World without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Natural- ism , by Michael C. Rea.

Answers to 5 Questions in Social Epistemology

Class 4 - The Myth of the Given

On the Relevance of Ignorance to the Demands of Morality 1

Others may concern the reliability of methods for forming belief:

What should a normative theory of argumentation look like?

PL 399: Knowledge, Truth, and Skepticism Spring, 2011, Juniata College

PHL340 Handout 8: Evaluating Dogmatism

SCHAFFER S DEMON NATHAN BALLANTYNE AND IAN EVANS

ELEONORE STUMP PENELHUM ON SKEPTICS AND FIDEISTS

Epistemic Consequentialism, Truth Fairies and Worse Fairies

In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification, by Laurence BonJour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

Perry High School. Geometry: Week 5

Keith Lehrer on the basing relation

CRUCIAL TOPICS IN THE DEBATE ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL REASONS

Does Deduction really rest on a more secure epistemological footing than Induction?

Nagel, T. The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Conference on the Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, PUCRS, Porto Alegre (Brazil), June

THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia ISSN:

Abstract: According to perspectivism about moral obligation, our obligations are affected by

24.01: Classics of Western Philosophy

Warrant, Proper Function, and the Great Pumpkin Objection

ZAGZEBSKI ON RATIONALITY


SCHROEDER ON THE WRONG KIND OF

Modeling the social consequences of testimonial norms

Jeffrey, Richard, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 140 pp, $21.99 (pbk), ISBN

Let us begin by first locating our fields in relation to other fields that study ethics. Consider the following taxonomy: Kinds of ethical inquiries

John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

Nested Testimony, Nested Probability, and a Defense of Testimonial Reductionism Benjamin Bayer September 2, 2011

Philosophical Ethics. The nature of ethical analysis. Discussion based on Johnson, Computer Ethics, Chapter 2.

Today s Lecture. René Descartes W.K. Clifford Preliminary comments on Locke

Aboutness and Justification

THE ROLE OF COHERENCE OF EVIDENCE IN THE NON- DYNAMIC MODEL OF CONFIRMATION TOMOJI SHOGENJI

Stout s teleological theory of action

A note on reciprocity of reasons

Philosophy 5340 Epistemology Topic 4: Skepticism. Part 1: The Scope of Skepticism and Two Main Types of Skeptical Argument

The Unbearable Lightness of Theory of Knowledge:

REASON AND PRACTICAL-REGRET. Nate Wahrenberger, College of William and Mary

SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS Part III SCIENTIFIC EPISTEMOLOGY? David Tin Win α & Thandee Kywe β. Abstract

Quine s Naturalized Epistemology, Epistemic Normativity and the. Gettier Problem

Informational Models in Deontic Logic: A Comment on Ifs and Oughts by Kolodny and MacFarlane

Skepticism is True. Abraham Meidan

What is Justification?

Goldman s Knowledge in a Social World: Correspondence Truth and the Place of Justification

PH 1000 Introduction to Philosophy, or PH 1001 Practical Reasoning

Unit VI: Davidson and the interpretational approach to thought and language

LODGE VEGAS # 32 ON EDUCATION

INTERPRETATION AND FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY: DAVIDSON ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE. David Beisecker University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Introduction: Paradigms, Theism, and the Parity Thesis

Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument by Michael Huemer (2000)

PHIL 3140: Epistemology

Varieties of Apriority

Florida State University Libraries

Chapter 2 Ethical Concepts and Ethical Theories: Establishing and Justifying a Moral System

I assume some of our justification is immediate. (Plausible examples: That is experienced, I am aware of something, 2 > 0, There is light ahead.

The procedural epistemic value of deliberation

Different kinds of naturalistic explanations of linguistic behaviour

In Defense of Radical Empiricism. Joseph Benjamin Riegel. Chapel Hill 2006

5AANA009 Epistemology II 2014 to 2015

Seth Mayer. Comments on Christopher McCammon s Is Liberal Legitimacy Utopian?

Terence CUNEO, The Normative Web. An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 263 pp., 46.99, ISBN

Review of Constructive Empiricism: Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science

Constructing the World

A Solution to the Gettier Problem Keota Fields. the three traditional conditions for knowledge, have been discussed extensively in the

Kelly James Clark and Raymond VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief, Oxford UP, 2011, 240pp., $65.00 (hbk), ISBN

3. Knowledge and Justification

Introduction to Cognitivism; Motivational Externalism; Naturalist Cognitivism

Transcription:

UNIT 3: Social Epistemology Carlo Martini 27/04/ 09-11/05/ 09-18/05/ 09 COURSE: Epistemology (Instructor: Stephan Hartmann)

Session 10 (Apr. 27th): From Standard Analytical Epistemology to Social Epistemology. Session 11 (May 11th): Disagreement, Consensus and Judgment Aggregation. Session 12 (May 18th): Social Significance of Knowledge and Group Agency.

Session 10 (Apr. 27th): From Standard Analytical Epistemology to Social Epistemology. Session 11 (May 11th): Disagreement, Consensus and Judgment Aggregation. Session 12 (May 18th): Social Significance of Knowledge and Group Agency.

Relevant features of Standard Analytical Epistemology (SAE). Changes involved in switching from SAE to Social Epistemology (SE). Different conceptions of SE.

Session 10 (Apr. 27th): From Standard Analytical Epistemology to Social Epistemology. Session 11 (May 11th): Disagreement, Consensus and Judgment Aggregation. Session 12 (May 18th): Social Significance of Knowledge and Group Agency.

Why agreement and disagreement problems play a relevant role in SE. The role of aggregation and a survey into the aggregation literature. The downsides of aggregation: impossibility theorems.

Session 10 (Apr. 27th): From Standard Analytical Epistemology to Social Epistemology. Session 11 (May 11th): Disagreement, Consensus and Judgment Aggregation. Session 12 (May 18th): Social Significance of Knowledge and Group Agency.

The advantages of aggregation, group performance, democracies and deliberation. Groups With Minds on Their Own (P. Pettit) - Can groups be agents? A pragmatic view: SE and the society. Summary of the three lectures.

LECTURE 1 From Standard Analytical Epistemology to Social Epistemology.

Propositional Attitudes (e.g.: Believe that = B(P); Know that = K(P).) The JTB account of Knowledge What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for proposition P to be regarded as a member of the class of known propositions? P is known iff P is believed by person A & P is true & A is justified* in believing P. * What is justification? - Are there alternatives? (e.g. reliability, rationality, etc.)

A knows that : What is the role of agents in Epistemology? Knowing that... is: A goal oriented activity: Mary wants to know about... Means: testimony, experience, research, etc. Possession/Storage of Knowledge: Mary knows that...

Who are the agents in the JBT account of knowledge? Φ ( Mary ) testimony experience... K ( Mary )

Who are the agents in the JBT account of knowledge? Φ ( Mary ) testimony experience... K ( Mary )

Intuition: there other types of agents, other than individuals, and there are other types of practices, other than individual ones.

Social Epistemology A goal oriented activity: Mary wants to know about.... Means: testimony, experience, research, etc. Possession/Storage of Knowledge: Mary knows that.... The goal of the government is to protect the country s borders. The MIT research team is developing... The scientific research community believes that the transplanted stem cells may be able to regenerate dead or dying human tissue, reversing the progress of disease (NYT - Nov 1, 2000). How can groups have goals? Intentions (normally) are thought of as something related to the mind. Groups don t have minds. Is individual research or group-led research more reliable? (We want reliable knowledge). How can groups possess knowledge?

P is true/false : How does the role of truth change in SE? Must a proposition be true in order to be known? (Alvin Goldman: veristic social epistemology). Are there alternative conceptions? (Consensus Consequentialism, Pragmatic/Utilitarian SE, Proceduralism.) In general, the foundationalist program (see Descartes) is usually set apart in favor of a less radical approaches: non-skeptical stance.

What is veristic SE? The focus of VSE (veristic social epistemology) is still, as in SAE, truth in a realistic perspective. The veristic approach is part of the consequentialist approach (what is consequentialism?), that is, epistemic practices are evaluated on the basis of the consequences they produce, in this case, the desideratum is truth. E.g. : We want to know whether it will rain tomorrow (April 27, 2009). We can: check the past record of rainy days in the past 50 years in the North Brabant area on April 27; consult a fortuneteller (seems silly? ask Richard Nixon!); ask your grandfather, who s got rheumatism, (seems silly? not so much.). watch the fauna around you (heavy animal response to climatic conditions). Upshot (and shortcoming for veristic epistemology): each method needs to be evaluated and evaluation is a complex matter, involving, unfortunately, interpretation of the results (see Goldman, required reading).

ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF SE? Goldman (required reading) argues that alternative conceptions (all? see reading material) fail in some respect (pure consensualism) or need the concept of truth for their purposes. The veristic approach is part of the consequentialist approach (what is consequentialism?), that is, a knowledge-seeking practice is evaluated on the basis of its performance, a.k.a. consequences. All other epistemic practices mentioned in Goldman are consequentialist ones, exception made for Proceduralism (see Goldman, required reading). What is proceduralism? In general, under proceduralist standards an epistemic practice is not evaluated by its performance, rather in terms of its intrinsic merits (e.g.: Habermas approach promotes egalitarianism and the Lehrer and Wagner approach promotes rationality.)

WHAT IS SOCIAL ABOUT SE? We have seen that at least in Goldman s account, most of the main tenets of Standard Analytical Epistemology are still in place. However, the focus has passed from considering an individual in its isolation, to considering groups that have collective goals, and that pursue collective epistemic practices: that is, they try to gain knowledge as groups. Questions that remain to be answered: How do we account for groups as knowing agents? Why should we think of groups as knowing agents? Are there any problems arising from aggregating individual attitudes (e.g. know-that, believe-that) into group attitudes? What are the advantages deriving from group-epistemic practices? In other words, why should we pursue knowledge in groups rather than individually? (nota bene: the answer may be trivial in a selected number of cases (e.g. lab research and time/effort constraints) but we will see that there are non trivial answers also in the other cases).

ASSIGNMENTS - I (for A. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World, Chapter 3: The Framework, pp. 69, 100) What examples of truth-seeking social practices are illustrated in Goldman s text? What are the alternatives to Veristic Social Epistemology? For each, what are their tenets? What is the goal of Veristic Social Epistemology? What are the shortcomings we are faced with, when adopting Veristic Social Epistemolgy? How does Goldman suggest to solve the selection problem? Goldman refers to two types of circularity. Explain what each type is, and if and why they constitute a problem for veristic epistemology. What is the difference between fundamental veristic value and instrumental veristic value? EXCERCISE: see next page ASSIGNMENTS II. The preceeding exercise applies Goldman s theory of Veristic Analysis to a single credal agent. However, Social Epistemology is about groups. How does his theory applies to a group of credal agents? Carlo Martini (2009_04_27) pag. 1 of 2

ASSIGNMENTS - II (for A. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World, Chapter 3: The Framework, pp. 69, 100) EXERCISE: (this problems should be solved by considering Goldman s theory of Veristic Analysis as exposed in paragraph 3.4: pp. 87, 94, especially pp. 89-last paragraph, 90-bottom.) PROBLEM: Consider the proposition P: There is water on the moon. Stephan has a certain degree of belief over P. Initially, Stephan s degree of belief that-p [=BD(P)] is equal to.72. Stephan uses two diferent epistemic practices, π1 and π2, in order to check whether P is true or not; after using π1 Stephan s DB(P)=.4, and after using π2 Stephan s DB(P)=.73. TASK 1: Suppose P is true. Which epistemic, if any, practice is better according to Goldman s theory? Show why. Which one, if any, should be given positive credit? TASK 2: Carry out TASK 1, this time supposing that P is false. TASK 3: Formulate a similar problem where two different epistemic practices should both receive negative credit. LAST BUT NOT LEAST, check for mistakes!! Carlo Martini (2009_04_27) pag. 2 of 2

see you on May 11th!