Education and State Control in Turkey and Iran: Playing the Same Game, Following the Same Rules Kismet El Husseiny, Support Teacher at El Alsson International School kelhusseiny@gmail.com Introduction The Rise of Secularism Both Turkey and Iran were greatly exposed to the western world through the encroachment and retraction of empires, especially in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries. This exposure has led to a form of modernization in both countries. This also led both countries to seek the development of their respective educational systems, mainly in order to modernize their armies to protect their empires against external threats. Many scholars described this process as defensive modernization. Accordingly, schools and institutions providing technical areas of study during this time were secular, rather than theological, to serve the military and bureaucracy of the state. This need for defensive modernization led, in both countries, to the hiring of European instructors to transfer modern knowledge into national educational institutions, and to sending local students to study in Europe (Syzliowicz, 1969). The resulting increasing influence of western ideology led reformists in Turkey and Iran during the 1920s onwards to adopt the modern and secular form of Western education. Such a move was also accompanied by the stripping of the two countries educational systems from any religious content, as it was seen to be an impediment to the process of modernization (Syzliowicz, 1969). School curricula were revised by the reforming governments to modernise and secularise the content of all taught subjects. This spread of modern educational institutions created an educational system which both paralleled and opposed traditional religious methods (Syzliowicz, 1969). As a result, two educational systems came to exist within each country. One of these systems propagated religious ideology and was delivered to the masses, while the other propagated European ideology and was usually delivered to the elite. Kemalism By 1923, the Ottoman Empire in Turkey had fallen and given way to the founding of modern Turkey under the presidency of Mostafa Kemal (Ataturk) 1. Ataturk, who fervently sought to part ways with the empire s traditional methods, viewed secularism as a force with the ability to strengthen Turkey and propel it into modernization. Therefore, in 1924, Ataturk began the secularization process with the abolition of religious schools, and the placement of all educational institutions, including foreign schools, under the control of the Ministry of Education such that all religious instruction in schools were put under the control of the state 1 Ataturk was the name given to Mostafa Kemal who was the leader of the Young Turks Movement. It s direct meaning is father or the Turks. 1
(Syzliowicz, 1969, p.197). That way, the government believed, all children would grow up to hold dear the concept of secularism and more importantly, nationalism. Furthermore, the language reform that introduced the Latin alphabet to replace the Arabic alphabet, which aimed to signal a complete break with the Ottoman past, greatly restricted the spread of Islamic education. Mohamed Reza Shah Similar to Kemalist ideology, when Mohamed Reza became the of Iran in 1921, he took bold steps towards modernizing the country. He founded a national education system for the earlier schooling levels that attempted to curtail the power of the country s religious institutions, abolish religious instruction from state schools, and remove any religious http://turkey.blogactiv.eu/2010/06/15/why-persist-in-calling-turkey s-european-identity-into-question-israel-and-the-world/ The Shah was criticized by religious groups within Iran for introducing anti-religious elements into school textbooks. One such example is a 1975 social science textbook, which states that as religion is mixed up with superstition, the people who are well educated have ceased to hold religious beliefs (Mohsenpour, 1988, p.79). However, the modern educational system that was introduced in Iran was not as comprehensive as its counterpart in Turkey and affected mostly the elite. The spread of modern educational institutions such as schools and universities was also much slower than in Turkey. Moreover, a large movement led by the clergy was created to counteract the western ideological penetration, which they felt was being signalled into the country by the Shah (Syzliowicz, 1969). The Effects of Secularism As a result of the increased secularism and inflow of western ideology into Turkey and Iran, religious groups reacted 2 in strong opposition to the governments attempts to modernize, adopt Western cultures of authority, and separate religion from the state. This type of governance was seen to be alien to the vast majority of the Muslim citizens of Turkey and Iran (Guven, 2005). Furthermore it is important to note that the shift towards secularism led to an abrupt change in the power balances within the two countries. With the application of secularist policies, professionals tied to religious institutions as well as the clergy, found themselves stripped of their former power, influence, and economic comfort. Consequently, those who were harmed by the enforcement of secularism, often led the struggle for Islamic resurgence in both countries. 2 This form of reaction was later described by the more expressive term Political Islam. 2
The Struggle for the Rise of Islam s Influence in Turkey In the years following Ataturk s strong movement towards secularization, Islam embracing groups continued to work mostly underground, and were able to build alliances with other political parties such as the Democratic Party, which came to power in 1950 and ruled until 1961. By that date, the constitution was readapted to include an article, which proclaims that everyone is free in his/her own religious beliefs. However, it was not until Necermetin Erbakan founded the National Order Party (NOP) in 1970 that Islamic political principles were openly announced, campaigned for, and promoted as a party s political platform (Guven, 2005) (Zurcher, 2004). The increase in freedom for Islamic groups to proliferate their ideas led to exhibitions of the many varying interpretations of Islam that each of the existing groups held. Accordingly, it became increasingly difficult to control all of these different groups, thereby creating a threat to the maintenance of state unity and Kemalist nationalism. The abrupt and radical secularist movement led by Ataturk, had led to the polarization of the Turkish society largely into the proponents of secularism, and the more religious masses. There was also a lack of communication between the two poles, and the creation of a threatening image of the other. This societal divide caused a violent increase in tensions between the two groups bringing the country to the brink of civil war. It was not until 1980, when a bloodless military coup took place, serious attempts to reconcile the views of the Islamists and the secularists were initiated. By 1983, the new political system, which was overseen by the largely secular military, also saw a strengthening of the importance of the Islamic movement. The new power structure in Turkey led to the creation of a novel ideological concept, the Turkish Islamic Synthesis, which attempts to reconcile between Turkish nationalism and the Islamic community (Guven, 2005) (Kurt, 2010). Finally, in 2002, the Justice and Development http://www.google.com.eg/imgres?q=photo+school+children+iran&um=1&hl=en&client=safari&rls=en&biw=1103&bih=706&tbm=isch&tbnid=hjdtefpb6-_bqm:&imgrefurl=http://iranpoliticsclub.net/photos/rezashah/pages/reza%2520khan%2520%26%2520children%2520%40%2520school_jpg.htm&docid=fni_uz530u2msm&imgurl party (AK), a party with mild Islamic references, came to power after succeeding at the elections (Smith, 2005). It became noticeable afterwards that Turkey had witnessed a significant resurgence of the Islamic movement. The significance that Islam held within the contemporary Turkish society was embodied in the acceptance of Islam as a resource for educational policy, the allowing of Islamic scholarly activity in book writing and in holding seminars and discussions, and the appointment of Islamic scholars as advisors to ministers, as heads of universities, and as academic staff (Guven, 2005). 3
The Reaction Against Secularization and Europeanization in Iran Similar to the perception in Ataturk s Turkey, many in Iran, especially those who more strictly adhered to Shi ite beliefs, viewed the Shah s regime to be extremely hostile against Islam (Mohsenpour, 1988). During the reign of the Shah, in 1938, the increase in the number of private schools was claimed by the proponents of the Islamic revolution to have been used as a method of creating an elite class that was educated in a western way (Mohsenpour, 1988). They saw that the methods used in the Shah s modern educational system encouraged children to adopt alien western values. Some have even gone further to claim that the education policies under the Shah s rule aimed to spread atheism, weaken students religious beliefs, and even propagate polytheistic teachings. The pre-revolution curricula were also criticised for presenting the monarchy as the only viable political system (much as the current Islamic government presents itself in school textbooks today (Mohsenpour, 1988). The Evolution of Educational Provision In both countries, the educational systems and curricula came to include more religious and Islamic content over time, be it abruptly, as was the case in Iran post the 1979 revolution, or more gradually as was the case in Turkey. The difference in the extent of Islamic influence over education policies in Turkey and Iran, may be owed to the differences in the strengths of the political forces present in each of the two countries. Whereas Ataturk was able to build a large constituency of fervent secular nationalists in Turkey, Mohamed Reza Shah was not as successful, as his secular constituency was limited to an elite minority. Accordingly, in Turkey the rise of Islamic influence was met with fierce opposition from the large secularist base that led to the reaching of a compromise in ideology from both sides, which was reflected in the educational policies and curricula. Meanwhile, the Islamic movement was able to gain a strong hold of Iranian political life, which was reflected in post 1979 educational policies and curricula. The Slow Emergence of Islam in Turkish Education For many years after the spread of Kemalism and the secularisation of the state, any form of religious education was entirely banned from the Turkish educational system. It was not until 1949, when after much controversy and debate at the National Assembly, religious studies were permitted in the fourth and fifth grades of state primary schools, and a Faculty of Divinity established at Ankara University. Furthermore, during the decade of rule of the Democratic Party (1950-1961), the government introduced religious education in secondary schooling (Guven, 2005), which was further extended in the early 1960s to be included into the curricula of the first and second grades of middle school (Guven, 2005). By this time the concept of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was on the rise and became a key and dominant element in the Turkish education system from 1984 to 1989. By the end of the 1980s, there were more religious high schools in Turkey than there were technical vocational high schools (Guven, 2005). Yet it is apparent that the reforms that have taken place maintain government provision of such religious education. As such, the government tried to ensure that only its version and interpretation of Islamic education will be taught. Some scholars and political analysts consider this range of freedom to have been provided by the army to the Islamic groups as a tactical move to secure these groups support for the regime, and to keep religious education under the control and surveillance of the government (Guven, 2005). 4
Nonetheless, secular nationalists in Turkey have been even more worried since the beginning of the new millennium, by the permeation of Islam into school textbooks since the AK party took power. Examples of such permeation can be exemplified by the removal of Darwin s theory of evolution and its replacement by the concept of Creationism. In all cases, it has become apparent to modern Turkish governments that the Kemalist Straightjacket no longer fits modern Turkey Therefore, these governments are in a search to find ways to reconcile Islam, which the vast majority of the Turkish population adhere to, with modernity (The Economist, 2008). The Islamic Indoctrination of Iran In Iran the change in educational policies was less smooth. Abruptly, following the Iranian revolution in 1979, many school cultures changed, such as the morning national salutes, which were replaced by reciting Quranic verses, and prayers for the victory of Muslims (Mohsenpour, 1988). The revolution as such, was seen to be the process of resocializing the Iranians to Islamic ideals (Shorish, 1988, p.60). The post revolution theocratic government quickly revised and altered the school curricula in order to implant Islamic ideals and values that were believed to belong to the dawn of Islam (Shorish, 1988). All curricula, from history to sciences, were revised in order to remove all secular content, and replace it with Islamic content that reinforces the ideological base of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mohsenpour, 1988). School textbooks are currently filled with political symbolism to represent the great personalities in Islam, the current leaders of Iran, and the victory of the Islamic revolution over the assumingly atheist monarchy of the Shah (Shorish, 1988). In reality, both the Shah and the current Iranian leaders representation in textbooks have almost the exact same purpose politically, which is to build feelings of loyalty and submission towards the leaders, as well as patriotism among students (Mohsenpour, 1988). Very similar to the recent government attitude towards Islam in Turkey, the Iranian government also goes to great lengths in order to propagate and establish a certain understanding of Islam. The aim of the post 1979 educational policies in Iran was to consistently reinforce Islam in student curricula, in order to Islamize the people of Iran (Shorish, 1988). There are furthermore two major interwoven themes in Iranian textbooks, which are religion and patriotism. The textbooks in Iran also stress the importance of the prophets and imams as God s representatives on earth. By deduction, according to such texts, those mentioned imams would include the political leadership in Iran (Shorish, 1988). Therefore, it becomes very difficult to separate support for the Iranian leadership and faithfulness to God. Pressure continuously exists to consider loyalty to the leadership as equivalent to loyalty to God (Shorish, 1988). Conclusion The two countries researched in this essay share a common history of exposure to the West, followed by a strong movement towards modernization and secularization. Yet although each country seemingly took a different path of political evolution, many similarities exist between the two countries today. Indeed, governments of both Turkey and Iran shared, in essence, the goals and used similar tools to reach these goals. Both governments have tried, and continue to try, to maintain sovereignty and national unity through the implementation of educational policies especially with 5
regards to religious education, and the modification of religious content in national curricula. It is also interesting to note that the changes in state ideology in both Turkey and Iran, from Islam to secularism and back to Islam once again, have always been directly reflected in the shifting policies that governed public educational systems and the contents of national curricula. As such, educational policies can be seen to mirror the political struggles for power in both countries and the quests for state hegemony. References Behnam, D. (1973). Cultural Policy in Iran. Paris: UNESCO. CIA Factbook, Initials. (2011, April 6). The World Factbook: Turkey. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html Fathi, N. (2010, February 10). Iran disrupts internet service ahead of protests. The New York Times, Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/world/middleeast/11tehran.html Guven, I. (2005). The Impact of Political Islam on Education: "The Revitalization of Islamic Education in the Turkish Educational Setting". International Journal of Educational Development, 25. Retrieved from www.elsevier.com/locate/ijedudev Herrera, L. (2004). Education, Islam, and Modernity: Beyond Westernization and Centralization. Comparative Education Review, 48(3), Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/421179. Kurt, U. (2010). The doctrine of "Turkish Islamic synthesis" as official ideology of the September 12 and the intellectuals hearth Ayd1nlar Ocagi as the ideological apparatus of the state. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, 3(2). Landman, T. (2005) Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction. Second Edition. London: Routledge. Pp.4-59. Lewis, B. (1961). Emergency of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press. Mohsenpour, B. (1988). Philosophy of Education in Postrevolutionary Iran. Comparative Education Review, 32(1), Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1188474. Narli, N. (1999). The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 3(3). Shorish, M.M. (1988). The Islamic Revolution and Education in Iran. Comparative Education Review, 32(1), Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1188473. Smith, Thomas W. (2005). Between Allah and Ataturk: Liberal Islam in Turkey. The International Journal of Human Rights, 9(3), Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642980500170758 doi: 10.1080/13642980500170758 6
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