Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

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Transcription:

TRISA OEA Team Threat Report Title Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Date OEA TEAM US Army TRADOC G2 TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) Threats South Waziristan commander Wali ur Rehman (R) and TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud (L) Publication Date: 16 March 2012 Information Cut-Off Date: 08 March 2012 US Army TRADOC G2 TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) Threats 1

Purpose To inform deploying units, trainers, and scenario writers regarding the terrorist group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Student Movement of Pakistan), commonly referred to as the TTP To identify the TTP s area of operations To discuss the TTP s ideology and goals To identify the TTP s leadership To highlight significant TTP attacks against U.S. targets To discuss the TTP s funding sources and media operations Product Caveat: This presentation has been developed from multiple unclassified sources and is primarily intended for use as a training product for the Department of Army. This briefing should not be considered a finished intelligence product, nor used in such a manner. 2

Executive Summary Explains the origin, goals, ideology, and area of operations of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Identifies the leadership of the TTP. Provides examples of TTP attacks on U.S. targets. Discusses the relationship between al-qaeda and the TTP. Discusses TTP funding and media. Covers recent developments within the TTP. 3

Map shows the areas of all Taliban groups influence or presence. The TTP primarily operates in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan. 4

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 1 The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a loose confederation of militant groups led by commanders who are often rivals. Majority of the TTP are members of the Mehsud tribe The TTP s primary objective is the overthrow of the Pakistani government and the installation of an Islamic emirate governed according to their fundamentalist Deobandi form of Sharia (Islamic law). The TTP formed in December 2007 with the purpose of facilitating the communication and cooperation between the numerous pro-taliban groups operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (previously known as Northwest Frontier Province) of Pakistan. The TTP carry out attacks on Pakistani security forces, Shias, and rival Sunni groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (Soldiers of the Pure). The 2007 suicide assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was the first high-profile attack attributed to the TTP. 5

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 2 Group Name variations: the TTP, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan, Pakistan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Student Movement of Pakistan, Taliban Movement of Pakistan Affiliated with: Al-Qaeda, Taliban (Afghanistan), Abu Sayyaf Group, Harkat-ul Jihad Islami (HuJI), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Jundallah, Lashkare-Islam, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Tehrik e Nefaz Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM) Areas of Operation: Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (previously known as Northwest Frontier Province) of Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States Ideology: Sunni Deobandi (believe Islamic societies have fallen behind the West because they deviated from the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad) 6

TTP Leadership 3 The U.S. State Department designated the TTP as a Foreign Terrorist organization on 01 September 2010. The Secretary of State also designated TTP as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, along with leaders Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali ur Rehman. Hakimullah Mehsud became the leader of the TTP after Baitullah Mehsud, the original leader of the TTP, was killed by a UAS strike in August 2009. While Hakimullah Mehsud is the overall leader of the TTP, important decisions are made by a shura (Arabic for consultation) council of TTP commanders. Maulvi Faqir Mohammed was the TTP s second in command until 02 March 2012, when he was demoted for speaking to the Pakistan government without Hakimullah Mehsud's approval. Wali ur Rehman (Mehsud) is the TTP leader in South Waziristan and is known for perpetrating attacks against the ISAF in Afghanistan. He is the TTP s financial manager. Hakimullah Mehsud belongs to the Bahlolzai branch of the Mehsud tribe, while Wali ur Rehman is from the Manzai branch, which historically has been in the lead of power politics in Mehsud territory. Wali ur Rehman was a deputy of Baitullah and the Mehsud Taliban in South Waziristan favored him to lead the TTP. Omar Khalid (aka Abdul Wali) is the TTP leader in Mohmand Agency of the FATA. Qari Shakeel is a sub-commander for Omar Khalid. 7

TTP Leadership (continued) 3 Asad Sayeed has a degree in medicine from Khyber Medical College and is another sub-commander for Omar Khalid. Azam Tariq was appointed as Hakimullah's spokesman in August 2009. Maulvi Noor Jamal (aka Maulvi Toofan) is the TTP leader in Kurram; known for brutality and attacks on Shia. Fazal Saeed Utezai (aka Fazal Saeed Haqqani) deputy commander in Kurram; known for attacks on Shia. Akhunzada Aslam Farooqui is the TTP leader in the Arakzai tribal agency Mufti Ilyas commands in Darra Adam Khel and is a deputy to Hakimullah Mehsud; He formed a group to assassinate Shia leaders. Tariq Afridi is the TTP leader in Khyber, as well as in regions in Peshawar, Kohat, and Hangu. Afridi was named the TTP's commander of Khyber in November 2009. Afridi is also the leader of the Commander Tariq Afridi Group. The Tariq Afridi Group also conducts attacks on Pakistani security forces in Arakzai, Kohat, and Hangu. Mullah Fazlullah is the TTP leader in Swat. In May 2010, he was thought to have died during a battle in Nuristan province but reappeared in July 2010. Fazlullah is known as Radio Mullah for his broadcasts on an illegal FM station condemning music, dancing, TV, DVDs, and barber shops. Moman Khan is the TTP leader in Mansehra. Khan previously claimed to be commander of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, an anti-shia terror group that was coopted by al Qaeda but he stated he no longer works with the group. 8

Al-Qaeda / TTP relationship 4 Al-Qaeda and the TTP share similar Islamist ideologies. Al-Qaeda is a global terrorist organization, while the TTP is a hybrid movement combining both local insurgency and elements of transnational militancy. Al-Qaeda provides expertise, advice, and propaganda to the TTP and acts as a negotiator between rival militant groups. Al-Qaeda receives sanctuary in TTP controlled areas. Al-Qaeda s influence is the most likely cause for the TTP s expansion of their operations from Pakistan into Afghanistan and the United States. Since January 2008 TTP leaders have repeatedly threatened to attack the U.S. homeland. The alliance has maintained close ties to senior al- Qaeda leaders. After Baitullah Mehsud s death in August 2009, Hakimullah Mehsud vowed to deploy suicide bombers in the United States. 9

TTP Attacks on U.S. Targets 5 30 December 2009: Jordanian physician Human Khalil Abu Mulal al- Balawi (also known as Abu Dujanah al-khorasani), posing as an al- Qaeda defector, conducted a suicide attack at FOB Chapman in Khost, killing seven CIA personnel. The TTP claimed responsibility for the attack and released a video showing al-balawi with Hakimullah Mehsud. 10

TTP Attacks on U.S. Targets 6 The TTP claimed responsibility for the 01 May 2010 attempted Times Square bombing. Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized American citizen from Pakistan, pled guilty to the bombing attempt and stated in court that he received funds and training from the TTP. The TTP released a video showing Shahzad urging other Muslims to carry out attacks: It is not difficult at all to wage an attack on the West, and specifically in the U.S., and completely defeat them, he stated. TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud stated after the attempted bombing, "Our fidaeen have penetrated the terrorist America, we will give extremely painful blows to the fanatic America." 11

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Funding 7 The Pakistani government banned TTP and froze its bank accounts in August 2008. The TTP developed various sources of fund raising: Bank robberies Kidnapping for ransom Wealthy industrialists, academics, Western aid workers and relatives of military officers are typical kidnapping targets Ransom demands typically range between $500,000 and $2.2 million, but the final price is often one-tenth of the asking amount Jiziyah (protection tax) In April 2009 the group extorted protection monies from the Sikh community living in the TTP-controlled Orakzai Agency region of Pakistan Illegal logging TTP controls the timber trade in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province and parts of the FATA Take-over of marble and emerald mining in the FATA Mining operations are taxed by TTP Fraud TTP members disguise themselves as government or aid workers and collect money meant for Internally Displaced Persons TTP members train and recruit people in security firms, banks, and money changing businesses These people facilitate the illegal transfer of money 12

TTP Media 8 The TTP utilizes FM radio broadcasts and the Internet as its primary media for distributing propaganda. Mullah Qari Fazlullah is known as Mullah FM and Radio Mullah for his use of illegal radio broadcasts to promote the TTP agenda. In Swat, his broadcasts preached jihad and called for the imposition of sharia law. He campaigned against girls' schools and polio vaccinations. Fazlullah also conducted campaigns where he organized the burning of DVDs, television sets, digital and video cameras, computers, and other electronics labeling them a source of sin. He condemned music, dancing, and barber shops, and ordered his followers to burn any places where such immorality existed. The TTP s Umar Media (previously known as Umar Studios) uses the Al-Qadisiyyah Media Foundation to distribute its online videos and statements. The Al-Qadisiyyah Media Foundation is a branch of the Global Islamic Media Front, a long-established transnational jihadi media network. 13

TTP Recent Developments 9 On 02 March 2012, nine senior TTP members approved the removal of the deputy commander, Maulvi Faqir Mohammed, following a written demand from the group's leader, Hakimullah Mehsud. Maulvi Faqir Mohammad was removed him from his post and demoted to the status of a regular TTP fighter. He was said to have been demoted for speaking to the Pakistan government without Mehsud's approval. The subject of Faqir s discussions was not revealed. Maulvi Faqir Mohammad insists he initiated peace contacts in his home district of Bajaur with the full knowledge of the TTP leadership as a "test case. They told me that first the peace process should take place in Bajaur and then be expanded," he told AFP by telephone. Mullah Omar, leader of the Afghan Taliban, reportedly asked TTP commanders to stop attacks while his group considers talks with the U.S. regarding the peace process in Afghanistan. Hakimullah Mehsud was the only TTP commander not to comply. After months of relative calm, attacks, including suicide bombings, are on the rise in Northwest Pakistan. 14

Analyst Comments Wali ur Rehman, the commander in South Waziristan, is the most likely candidate to replace Maulvi Faqir Mohammed as the TTP s second in command. Hakimullah Mehsud s personal views are more in line with al-qaeda than the Afghanistan Taliban. He is young and radical and less likely to be open to peace negotiations than some of the older TTP commanders. The TTP is loosely organized and scattered over a large area with many rival commanders operating independently. The rivalries between commanders and their individual differences are vulnerable to exploitation. 15

Training Implications The TTP presents a real-world example of an Islamic insurgency. The TTP can be used as a model for training or planning scenarios to provide a realistic means to enhance the challenge presented by the OPFOR. The TTP grew from an internal insurgency to a regional threat and then attempted an attack inside the United States. An OPFOR entity modeled on the TTP can be used to exercise many METL tasks, as well as staff and command functions. The TTP s ties to al-qaeda, rivalry with other armed groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, animosity toward Shia, and its creative funding methods illustrate the complexities of insurgent organizations. Such complexities can be incorporated into the design of OPFOR entities. The rivalry among TTP commanders is another example of circumstances that can duplicated in OPFOR organizations. These rivalries could be exploited to the benefit of the command undergoing training. 16

POCs OEA Team 913-684-7920 (COMM) 552-7920 (DSN) TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) 700 Scott Ave, Bldg 53 Ft Leavenworth, Ks 66027 17

AKO https://www.us.army.mil/suite/portal/index.jsp 18