THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA. The Political Theology of David Hume A DISSERTATION. Submitted to the Faculty of the. School of Philosophy

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA The Political Theology of David Hume A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy Of The Catholic University of America In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy By Jonathan H. Krause Washington, D.C. 2015

The Political Theology of David Hume Jonathan H. Krause, Ph.D. Director: John McCarthy, Ph.D. Hume s concern for religion is evidenced by his references to it throughout his works. Indeed, he claims in the Natural History that every enquiry, which regards religion, is of the utmost importance. Commentators have often treated Hume s interest in religion as theoretical, as though he was primarily concerned to establish religion s truth or falsity. Yet in the Essays and History of England he indicates that disputes over religious forms and beliefs are frivolous and utterly absurd. This raises an obvious question: if disagreements concerning religion are frivolous and absurd, then why are inquiries regarding religion of the utmost importance? Hume s answer is political in nature. Religion, he says in the History, can never be deemed a point of small consequence in civil government. He there calls our attention to religious disputes not on detached theoretical grounds, but only so far as they have influence on the peace and order of civil society. This dissertation argues that the way to approach Hume on religion is through his understanding of the relationship between religion and political life, that is to say, through his political theology. To bring out different aspects of the political problem of religion, each of this dissertation s four chapters focuses on the textual analysis of a particular work: A Treatise of Human Nature, The Natural History of Religion, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and The History of England. The findings of this dissertation show that Hume s critique of various religions concerns their effects on the liberty and stability of society. The dissertation also shows that Hume s remedy for the oppressive and destabilizing effects of

religion does not involve its elimination from society, but rather the curbing of its negative social effects. Hume holds that a secular civic education, good government, state-established religion, the advancement of the arts and sciences, and material prosperity curb people s reliance on religion in moral, cultural, and political matters. Skeptical religious education, in particular, is central to Hume s remedy, for opinions and habits must be shaped in order for people to look at religious questions as secondary (or even inimical) to the peace of society.

This dissertation by Jonathan H. Krause fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in philosophy approved by John McCarthy, Ph.D., as Director, and by Michael Gorman, Ph.D., and Richard Hassing, Ph.D. as Readers. John McCarthy, Ph.D., Director Michael Gorman, Ph.D., Reader Richard Hassing, Ph.D., Reader ii

The Political Theology of David Hume Introduction..........1 Chapter One: The Political Theology of A Treatise of Human Nature Introduction......19 Goal and Method of Chapter One.... 22 1. Hume s Political Interest in Religion in the Treatise...24 1.1 The Religious Milieu during the Time of the Treatise..25 1.2 Political and Theological Indications in the Treatise.... 28 1.3 The Science of Man and Natural Religion..35 2. How can Hume Critique Superstition?...39 2.1 Hume s Theory of Perception 43 2.2 Hume s Theory of Fiction and His Critique of Superstition.....47 3. Hume s Critique of the Trivial Fictions: The Relation between Religious Superstition and the Poetic, Moral, and Political Fictions... 51 3.1 Poetic Fiction: Poetic Enthusiasm and Religious Superstition..52 3.2 Moral Fictions: God, Religion, Natural and Divine Law...55 3.3 The Political Fiction of Justice...62 3.3.1The Economic Basis of Justice....63 3.3.2 Hume s Genetic Account of Political Life and Justice...68 3.3.3 Religious Superstition and the Political Fiction of Justice. 74 4. Civic and Religious Education in the Treatise.78 4.1 The Method of Education: Belief, Custom, Sympathy....80 4.2 Regarding the Rules of Justice: A Means toward Industry and Prosperity.. 84 4.3 The Role of Pride and Reputation in Civic Education.....87 4.4 Why Religious Education is Ineffective....93 Conclusion....98 iii

Chapter Two: The Political Theology of The Natural History of Religion Introduction.. 101 Interpretations of the Natural History....103 Aim and Method............112 1. The Origin of Religion in Human Nature..115 1.1 The Stated Aims of the Natural History......115 1.2 The Principles of Polytheism...119 1.3 The Principles of Theism.....124 1.4 The Status of Christian Theism in the Natural History....130 2. Hume s Critique of Religion: Moral and Intellectual.. 138 2.1 Morality and Religion......139 2.2 Reason and Religion....149 3. Circumstances that Contribute to a Remedy for Religion..152 3.1 Education.....154 3.2 Good Government, Knowledge, Morality, and Economic Prosperity... 163 Conclusion....169 Chapter Three: The Political Theology of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Introduction.. 173 1. Pamphilus: Pedagogue and Pupil... 184 1.1 The Setting of the Dialogues....185 1.2 Pamphilus s Opening Remarks.... 187 2. The Methods of Instruction....194 2.1 Demea s Method: Vulgar Skepticism..195 2.2 Cleanthes s Method: Reason and Argument... 202 2.3 Philo s Method: Inculcating Indifference....215 3. Conclusion: Pamphilus s Final Words......248 iv

Chapter Four: The Political Theology of The History of England Introduction.. 255 1. Hume: Impartial Historian.264 1.1 Critical Commentary........264 1.2 The Politics of Impartiality..273 1.2.1 Authority and Liberty...273 1.2.2 Hume: Ancient and Modern.....277 1.3 A Humean, Historical Education.285 1.3.1 History: The Path to Progress...286 1.3.2 History as Vulgar and Political Education 288 2. The Politics of Catholic Superstition..293 2.1 The Papal Plan of Slavery...293 2.2 The Political Advantages of Catholic Superstition..307 3. The Politics of Puritan Enthusiasm....312 3.1 Rekindling the Spark of Freedom 313 3.2 Puritan Anarchy and Tyranny..318 4. Religious Establishment and Toleration....326 4.1 Religious Establishment...328 4.2 Toleration..... 334 4.2.1 The Origins of Toleration in an Age of Persecution...335 4.2.2 When Toleration Is Justly Rejected........341 4.3 Conclusion: The Pragmatic Basis for Toleration.....347 Conclusion....351 Bibliography..360 v

Abbreviations DNR: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Edited with introduction by Norman Kemp Smith. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947. DP: A Dissertation on the Passions, in A Dissertation on the Passions; The Natural History of Religion. Edited with introduction and notes by Tom L. Beauchamp. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. EHU: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited with introduction and notes by Tom L. Beauchamp. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. EPM: An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited with introduction and notes by Tom L. Beauchamp. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. References to A Dialogue will be cited from this edition. HE: The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to The Revolution in 1688. 6 vols. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1983. NHR: The Natural History of Religion, in A Dissertation on the Passions; The Natural History of Religion. Edited with introduction and notes by Tom L. Beauchamp. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. SE: Superstition and Enthusiasm, in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary. Edited by Eugene F. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987. T: A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited with introduction and notes by David F. and Mary J. Norton. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. All references to the Treatise, its Appendix, its Abstract, and A Letter to a Gentleman will be taken from volume 1 of the Clarendon edition of the Treatise. vi

For my beloved wife, Anne, and son, David-Immanuel. vii

Introduction Background and Originality of the Project For the past century, Hume has perhaps been the subject of more scholarly attention than any other philosopher in the English-speaking world. Hume scholarship has primarily focused on his epistemology and its implications for topics such as philosophical anthropology, ethics, and philosophy of religion. Up until the twentieth century, commentators often depicted him as a playful sceptic who... gleefully destabilises our beliefs, but has no positive doctrine of his own to put in their place 1 ; however, with Kemp Smith s influential publication in 1905, The Naturalism of Hume, the focus of scholarship shifted from Hume s skepticism to the positive contributions of his naturalism. 2 Smith claimed that far from being a mere skeptic, Hume showed that being a skeptic was impossible. Hume argues that belief is grounded in sentiment, custom, and imagination. Some beliefs are simply undoubtable what Smith calls natural beliefs even in the face of the severest critique by reason. 3 These so-called natural beliefs constitute what Hume calls common life. Twentieth century scholarship has been largely an attempt to account for these skeptical and naturalistic strains running through Hume s thought, 4 and this has 1 Samuel Clark, No Abiding City: Hume, Naturalism, and Toleration, Philosophy: The Journal of the British Institute of Philosophical Studies 84 (2009): 79. 2 See Norman Kemp Smith s, The Naturalism of Hume (I), Mind 14, no. 54 (April 1905): 149-73 and The Naturalism of Hume (II), Mind 14, no. 55 (July 1905): 335-47. On the importance of Kemp Smith s article, see Clark s No Abiding City, 79. 3 Ibid., Naturalism of Hume (I), 156. 4 See, for instance, Tim Black, Hume s Epistemic Naturalism in the Treatise, Hume Studies 37, no. 2 (November 2011): 211-42; R. J. Butler, Natural Belief and the Enigma of Hume, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 42 (1960): 73-100; Francis W. Dauer, Hume s Scepticism with Regard to Reason: A Reconsideration, Hume Studies 22, no. 2 (November 1996): 211-29; M. J. Ferreira, Hume s Naturalism Proof and Practice, The Philosophical Quarterly 35, no. 138 (January 1985): 45-57; Antony Flew, David Hume: Philosopher of Moral Science (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Robert J. Fogelin, The Tendency of Hume s Skepticsm, in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Myles Burnyeat, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 397-412; Don Garrett, Reasons to Act and Believe. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic 1

2 led to a more substantial understanding of his ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical views. Still, this renewed focus in Hume scholarship has been at the expense of other aspects of Hume s thought, particularly his significance as a political philosopher. 5 In 1966, F. A. Hayek lamented that the neglect of Hume as a legal and political philosopher was almost universal amongst scholars: Even in England, where it is now at last recognized that he is not merely the founder of the modern theory of knowledge but also one of the founders of economic theory, his political and still more his legal philosophy is curiously neglected. 6 Tradition 132, no. 1 (January 2007): 1-16; J.C.A. Gaskin, God, Hume and Natural Belief, Philosophy 49, no. 189 (July 1974): 281-94; J. Kemp, Ethical Naturalism: Hobbes and Hume, (New York: St. Martin s Press, 1970); Louis E. Loeb, The Naturalism of Hume and Reid, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 81, no. 2 (November 2007): 65-92; Miriam McCormick, Hume on Natural Belief and Original Principles, Hume Studies 19, no. 1 (April 1993): 103-16; Hugh Miller, The Naturalism of Hume, The Philosophical Review 38, no. 5 (September 1929): 469-82; H. O. Mounce, Hume s Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 1999); David Fate Norton, Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysican, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982);Terence Penelhum, Natural Belief and Religious Belief in Hume s Philosophy, The Philosophical Quarterly 33, no. 131 (April 1983): 166-81; Richard H. Popkin, David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of Pyrrhonism, The Philosophical Quarterly 1, no. 5 (October 1951): 385-407; Lou Reich, Hume s Religious Naturalism (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997); Wade L. Robison, Hume s Ontological Commitments, The Philosophical Quarterly 26, no. 102 (January 1976): 39-47; Paul Russell, On the Naturalism of Hume s Reconciling Project, Mind 92, no. 368 (October 1983): 593-600 and The Riddle of Hume s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Richard J. Soghoian, The Ethics of G. E. Moore and David Hume: The Treatise as a Response to Moore s Refutation of Ethical Naturalism (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979); Barry Stroud, The Constraints of Hume s Naturalism, Synthese 152, no. 3 (October 2006): 339-51. On this more balanced approach in Hume scholarship, see Clark, No Abiding City, 79. 5 When we look to some of the major works which purport to deal with Hume s central doctrines, for instance, they focus almost exclusively on metaphysical and epistemological issues while giving only cursory mention of his political or religious views. See, Terence Penelhum, David Hume: An Introduction to His Philosophical System (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1992); Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central Doctrines (London: Macmillan, 1941. Reprint, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Barry Stroud, Hume, The Arguments of the Philosophers Series, ed.ted Honderich (1977. Reprint, New York: Routlege, 1999). 6 F. A. Hayek, The Legal and Political Philosophy of David Hume, in Hume, ed. V. C. Chappell (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 339.

3 Although Locke was generally held to be the architect of modern liberalism, Hayek argued that of all Enlightenment thinkers, Hume gives us probably the only comprehensive statement of the legal and political philosophy which later became known as liberalism. 7 Since the time of Hayek, there have been some attempts to recover Hume s contributions to political philosophy. 8 Yet, even among those who have shown interest in his political thought, the place of religion in his philosophical treatment of politics has been neglected, or regarded as of secondary importance. 9 The treatment of religion as a theoretical or speculative question for Hume is by far the dominant trend. 10 This theoretical treatment is not only limited, but says little about Hume s marked concern with religion s relation to political life. Robert Sokolowski has noted the contemporary failure of those in the West to draw connections between religion, particularly the Christian religion, and politics: 7 Hayek, Political Philosophy of Hume, 340. 8 See, for instance, Christopher J. Berry, David Hume, Major Conservative and Libertarian Thinkers (New York: Continuum, 2009); Duncan Forbes, Hume s Philosophical Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Hume: Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. Rachel Cohon (Burlington: VT, 2001); Carol Kay, Political Constructions: Defoe, Richardson, and Sterne in Relation to Hobbes, Hume, and Burke (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Andrew Kolin, The Ethical Foundations of Hume s Theory of Politics (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1992); Neil McArthur, David Hume s Political Theory: Law, Commerce, and the Constitution of Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007); Kyle McGee, Machining Fantasy: Spinoza, Hume and the Miracle in a Politics of Desire, Philosophy and Social Criticism 36, no. 7 (2010): 837-56; David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume s Political Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Andrew Sabl, Hume s Politics: Coordination and Crisis in the History of England, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012; John B. Stewart, Opinion and Reform in Hume s Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Frederick G. Whelan, Hume and Machiavelli: Political Realism and Liberal Thought (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004) and Order and Artifice in Hume s Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 9 A notable exception is John B. Stewart s, The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume (1963; repr., Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977). Of the books written on Hume s political philosophy, Stewart provides an entire chapter entitled, Governments and Religion, 256-87. 10 In the words of A. J. Ayer, Hume was less interested in the utility of religious belief than in its pretension to truth (Hume: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press: 2000), 113).

In discussing how Christian experience differs from other kinds of human experience, it is especially important to show how Christian belief is related to the political life of human beings. The disaffiliation of religion from the modern state has inclined recent political philosophers to examine politics without paying much attention to religion, and it has inclined theologians to pay scant attention to political philosophy when they reflect on religious faith.... Such neglect is unfortunate and leaves the analysis of both religion and politics incomplete. 11 Hume is not guilty of this error. Rather, he is highly sensitive to Sokolowski s observation on the interconnectedness of religion and political life. There is a move of late to explore in depth the integral connection between religion and politics in Hume s thought. 12 As of yet, this movement is still in its infancy. This dissertation, building upon the limited treatment of this issue by other scholars, will provide a more thorough consideration of how Hume s interest in religion is not purely (or even primarily) theoretical, but political in scope. 4 11 Robert Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995): 157. 12 To date, no full-length book has been dedicated to the subject. See Samuel Clark, No Abiding City: Hume, Naturalism, and Toleration. Philosophy: The Journal of the British Institute of Philosophical Studies 84 (2009): 75-94; John W. Danford, The Surest Foundation of Morality : The Political Teaching of Hume s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, The Western Political Quarterly 35, no. 2 (June 1982): 137-60; James Farr, Political Science and the Enlightenment of Enthusiasm, The American Political Science Review 82, no. 1 (March 1988): 51-69; Stephen Foster, Different Religions and the Difference They Make: Hume on the Political Effects of Religious Ideology, Modern Schoolman 66 (May 1989): 253-74; Will R. Jordan, Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration of David Hume and Religious Establishment, The Review of Politics 64, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 687-713; Donald T. Siebert, Religion and the Peace of Society, in The Moral Animus of David Hume (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990): 62-135; John B. Stewart, Governments and Religion, in The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume (1963; repr., Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977): 256-87; Frederick G. Whelan, Church Establishments, Liberty & Competition in Religion, Polity 23 (1990): 168; Scott Yenor, Revealed Religion and the Politics of Humanity in Hume s Philosophy of Common Life, Polity 38, no. 3 (July 2006): 395-415.

5 Statement of the Problem and Purpose In The Natural History of Religion, Hume claims that every enquiry, which regards Religion, is of the utmost importance. 13 Yet he also states in his History of England that [d]isputes concerning religious forms are, in themselves, the most frivolous of any. 14 Elsewhere he asserts that disagreements regarding articles of faith are utterly absurd and unintelligible because such articles are little more than a few phrases and expressions, which one party accepts of, without understanding them; and the other refuses in the same manner. 15 If disagreements concerning religious forms and beliefs are in themselves frivolous and absurd, and thus by implication, not worth pursuing for their own sake, then why are inquiries regarding religion of utmost importance? Hume s answer is utterly political in nature. Religion, he says, can never be deemed a point of small consequence in civil government. 16 He calls our attention to religious disputes not on detached theoretical grounds, as though Hume was simply concerned to establish what was true or false, but only so far as they have influence on the peace and order of civil society. 17 Because Hume s primary interest in religion is political, his philosophy of religion might be said to contain a political theology of sorts. Hume s political theology centers on the effects 13 A Dissertation on the Passions; The Natural History of Religion (hereafter NHR), ed. Tom L. Beauchamp, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Intro.1. 14 The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to The Revolution in 1688 (hereafter HE), 6 vols. (1778; repr., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1983), 6:171. 15 Of Parties in General, in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), 57. All essays, including My Own Life, will be cited from the Liberty Fund edition. 16 HE 6:86. 17 HE 6:171.

6 of religion on public life. Because Hume finds the effects of religion to extend beyond mere religious issues and into many aspects of social and intellectual life, his references to religion pervade even his writings that do not make religion a thematic concern. On the one hand, he thinks religion contributes less to public life than is claimed by religionists, and that religion can be inimical to the public good unless subject to some form of moderating check or limitation. On the other hand, he thinks religion is rooted in human nature and thus cannot be eliminated from public life. In his view, a more serviceable religion is thus needed. This dissertation will examine Hume s account of the origins of religion in human nature, the species of religion that arise from these origins, and the problems these various religious forms cause in civil life. This dissertation will also look at Hume s view on the prospects for a reform of religion that would make religion less destructive. Some Concepts in Hume s Political Theology Before discussing the methodology and framework of this dissertation, it is useful to outline basic concepts to which we will refer throughout our navigation of Hume s religious and political philosophy. These concepts include Hume s notions of remedy, common life and political life, authority and liberty, and religion. Remedy Hume s notion of a remedy should not be confused with a solution. To seek a solution presumes that a problem can be solved definitively by reason. Solutions can be found in ideal sciences, like mathematics and logic, but not in the realm of political life where people are

7 constrained by the inherent limitations of nature, ranging from the scarcity of material resources to men s lack of intelligence and foresight. 18 Because Hume acknowledges these constraints, his notion of a remedy palliates a problem rather than cures it. A remedy for religion lessens its harmful effects, but does not rid society of religion itself. There can be no cure for religion, according to Hume, because the generality of mankind will always be influenced by vulgar, religious propensities. Despite our limitations, Hume indicates that with a greater understanding of human nature, a proper remedy can steer people s religious propensities toward the social good. Common Life Common life refers to the universal human belief in the bodies, minds, and causal relations that make up the world. 19 This universal experience is possible because all people possess a human nature constituted by common principles, mainly principles of association working in conjunction with imagination, memory, and custom. The modern view held by thinkers such as Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke led them to reject common life as a philosophical starting point due to what they deemed its unreflective prejudices. Since religion and political life stem from the vulgar customs of common life, these philosophers held that it was possible to improve religion and politics by basing them on reason instead. Hume does not 18 See Thomas Sowell s discussion of solutions vs. trade-offs. Hume s notion of a remedy is akin to a trade-off. See The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulations as a Basis for Social Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 135-42 and A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 17-20. 19 Donald Livingston emphasizes the role of common life in Hume s philosophy. See Hume s Philosophy of Common Life. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984.

8 deny that common life is populated by all kinds of prejudice and superstition, but he rejects the modern premise that humans, including philosophers, can completely disassociate themselves from common life. 20 Instead, he makes common life the first principle of his philosophy. As Scott Yenor notes, Hume grounds philosophy directly in common life to preserve appearances... and attain the imperfect wisdom to which human beings can aspire. 21 Rather than clearing philosophy of all its prejudices, he points to certain political fictions and religious superstitions that are useful in modern political life because they help secure stability and freedom. Political Life What is meant here by political life? It is not merely party affiliation, such as Whig or Tory. Instead, political life is better characterized by the Greek notion of politeia the specific way of life shared by a community. This wider sense of politics includes the social, cultural, religious, institutional, economic, and intellectual factors that shape a people s specific way of life. According to Leo Strauss, [w]e may try to articulate the simple and unified thought, that expresses itself in the term politeia, as follows: life is activity which is directed toward some goal; social life is an activity which is directed toward such a goal as can be pursued only by society; but in order to pursue a specific goal, which is its comprehensive goal, society must be organized, ordered, constructed, constituted in a manner which is in accordance with that goal.... 22 20 Yenor, Politics of Humanity, 395-97. 21 Ibid., 396. 22 Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy?, The Journal of Politics 19, no. 3 (August 1957): 363.

9 Hume s account of national character is similar in some ways to the notion of politeia. Even though Hume holds that the basic principles of human nature are necessary and uniform, he tells us that [t]here are also characters peculiar to different nations whereby some particular qualities are more frequently to be met with among one people than among their neighbours. 23 A national character, according to Hume, is the result of people becoming accustomed to the same sentiments, actions, and manners, that is to say, the same political life. 24 The moral causes of national character by which he means all circumstances, which are fitted to work on the mind as motives or reasons, and which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us include the nature of the government and revolutions of public affairs. 25 Since people cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without government, the differences in government and public affairs substantially affect the national character of a people. We can garner from Hume s definition of moral causes that religion too substantially affects the character of people and political life. Hume s political theology, then, involves diagnosing religion s effect on national character and how those effects are moderated or enhanced. Authority and Liberty The concepts of authority and liberty are also integral to understanding Hume s political and religious thought. The right balance between authority and liberty is central to 23 Of National Characters, 197 and A Treatise of Human Nature (hereafter T), eds. David F. and Mary J. Norton, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2.3.1.10; SBN 403. All references to the Treatise will be taken from volume 1 of the Clarendon edition of the Treatise. Two notation methods will be employed: (1) reference to the book, part, section, and paragraph number and (2) the page numbers of the Selby-Brigge edition (with revisions by Nidditch) designated as SBN. 24 T 2.3.1.9; SBN 402. 25 National Characters, 198.

10 his notion of a free, civil society. Though liberty is the perfection of civil society... authority must be acknowledged essential to its very existence. 26 Extremes in either direction are destructive to true liberty. 27 Governments, too steady and uniform, he tells us, are seldom free, for they abate the active powers of men; depress courage, invention, and genius; and produce an universal lethargy in the people. 28 At the same time, a notion of liberty that disregards the sacred boundaries of the laws is nothing more than license or the wild projects of zeal and ambition. 29 This dissertation focuses on Hume s account of how religious superstition and enthusiasm disrupt the proper balance of authority and liberty and how religion s effects can be effectively moderated. Religion In Hume s various criticisms of religion, it is common for him to make an exception for what he calls true or genuine religion; however, as B. M. Laing notes, it has been notoriously difficult for scholars to precisely define what Hume means by religion, much less true religion. 30 Scholars have characterized Hume as everything from an atheist to a theist. To 26 On the Origin of Government, 41. 27 HE 1:168. For Hume s discussions on authority and liberty, see Of the Liberty of the Press, 10-12; Of the Origin of Government, 39-41; Of the Parties of Great Britain, 65, 71, and 613. Hume comments extensively on authority and liberty throughout the History of England. On the dangers of lacking a proper balance between them, see HE 1:168-69, 215-16, 254-55, 237, 323-24; HE 2:174; HE 3:137, 212, 227; HE 4:145-46, 367; HE 5:492, 538, 545-46, 550, 572; HE 6:4-5, 54, 74, 85, 93, 117, 136, 286, 530-31. On the benefits that come when a proper balance is found, see HE 1:125, 161, 254, 311; HE 2:21, 519-22, 525; HE 3:212; HE 4:124, 145-46, 355; HE 5:240, 544-45, 556-57; HE 6:38, 531, 533. 28 HE 6:530. See also HE 1:168-69. 29 HE 5:492. See also HE 5:520 and 6:530-31. 30 B. M. Laing, David Hume (1932; repr., New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), 175.

11 a certain degree, when examining Hume s political theology, his personal religion or irreligion is beside the point. In looking at his political approach to religion we are primarily concerned with examining those circumstances Hume finds most effective in moderating religion s negative effects in public life. Whether he believes in genuine religion or none at all matters little. Yet, there is a sense in which Hume s various references to true or genuine religion are integral to his political theology. He sometimes suggests that he measures a religion s effects on political life by the standard of genuine religion. A genuine religion, however, need not necessarily be true as much as conducive to an ordered, free society. At other times, Hume implies that genuine religion is indeed a rational system of belief and that those who take the time to reflect on the arguments for genuine religion cannot but assent to its truth. In this way, then, it seems that Hume may very well subscribe to some sort of religious belief. When we look at the history of Hume scholarship, we see that Hume s contemporaries almost universally accused or suspected him of atheism. Within the last several decades, partially due to the spirit of rehabilitating Hume s positive contributions to philosophy, Hume scholarship has taken a turn in the opposite direction. In 1976, P. G. Kuntz claimed that with regard to Hume s views on religion, [t]he bulk of the interpretation of Hume has failed to do justice to the positive and has exaggerated the negative. We are now in a phase of work that stresses the positive. 31 By the mid-1980s we find Robert Fogelin stating as an obvious fact that, with regard to Hume, the charge of atheism has fallen away 32 just as with the former charge of skepticism. 1976): 402. 31 Paul Kuntz, Hume s Metaphysics: A New Theory of Order, Religious Studies 12, no. 4 (December 32 Robert J. Fogelin, The Tendency of Hume s Skepticsm, in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Myles Burnyeat (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 397.

12 The late twentieth-century literature confirms Fogelin s observation. George J. Nathan claims that Hume s own position, is an attempt to preserve what is sound in traditional theism, its emphasis on the intelligent and supreme causality of the deity, a position which is rationally supported. 33 Shane Andre argues that though Hume was unorthodox, his belief in some form of theism was never entirely abandoned. 34 Donald Livingston says that true theism, for Hume, is the belief in a perfect, supreme intelligence who created a universe governed by law. 35 This true theism is a belief won by a philosophical elite, and in the philosophical community is virtually irreversible. 36 Likewise, J. O Higgins holds that [o]nly the rare philosopher, moved, no doubt, by the passion of speculative curiosity, and... reflecting on the element of design in nature, reaches what Hume calls genuine theism a belief in a single intelligent creator. 37 Donald Siebert states that only those who can appreciate the Newtonian order of the universe, the physico-theologians, are counted among genuine theists for Hume. 38 Lorne Falkenstein characterizes these genuine theists as a small minority of contemporary, well-educated, and 148. 33 George J. Nathan, The Existence and Nature of God in Hume s Theism, in Hume: A Re-evaluation, 34 Shane Andre, Was Hume an Atheist? Hume Studies 19, no. 1 (April 1993): 157. 35 Donald Livingston, Hume on the Origin and Evolution of Religious and Philosophical Consciousness, Reason Papers 15 (1990): 5. 36 Ibid., 10. 37 J. O Higgins, J, Hume and the Deists: A Contrast in Religious Approaches, Journal of Theological Studies 22 (1971): 499. 38 Donald T. Siebert, Hume on Idolatry and Incarnation, Journal of the History of Ideas 45, no. 3 (July- September 1984): 380.

13 comparatively well-off individuals. 39 And Richard Popkin claims that Hume s religion is a reasonable monotheistic view that intelligent people would accept. 40 Though none of these scholars would say that Hume s view of genuine religion is terribly robust a minimal theism as Yandell calls it 41 they all concede that there is reason to consider him a theist (or deist in Gaskin s case). 42 Gaskin sums up the general tenor of this contemporary outlook: it is not surprising to find, as we do find, that Hume in his own person shies away from the appellation atheist not merely because of its opprobrious associations, but more importantly because in fact he was not an absolute atheist. 43 Hume, (March 2003): 1. 39 Lorne Falkenstein, Hume s Project in The Natural History of Religion, Religious Studies 39, no. 1 40 Richard Popkin, ed. and intro., Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company), xiv 41 Keith E. Yandell, Hume on Religious Belief, in Hume: A Re-evaluation, ed. Donald W. Livingston and James T. King (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), 115. 42 For other instances of those who appear to favor the view that Hume was a theist or are at least not unsympathetic to viewing him as such, see Wilbur C. Abbott, David Hume: Philosopher-Historian, in Adventures in Reputation with an Essay on Some New History and Historians (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), 142; J. B. Black, The Art of History: A Study of Four Great Historians of the Eighteenth Century (New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1926), 103-04; Nicholas Capaldi, Hume s Philosophy of Religion: God without Ethics, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1970): 234; Timothy M. Costelloe, In Every Civilized community : Hume on Belief and the Demise of Religion, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (2004): 171-85; M. J. Ferreira, Religion s Foundation in Reason : The Common Sense of Hume s Natural History, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 4 (December 1994): 566; John Immerwahr, Hume s Aesthetic Theism, Hume Studies 22 (1996): 325-37. See also Immerwahr s, Hume on Tranquilizing the Passions, Hume Studies 18, no. 2 (1992): 293-314; Will R. Jordan, Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration of David Hume and Religious Establishment, The Review of Politics 64, no. 4 (Autumn, 2002): 687-713; Ernest Mossner, The Religion of David Hume, Journal of the History of Ideas 39, no. 4 (October-December 1978): 653-63; Gerhard Streminger, Religion a Threat to Morality: An Attempt to Throw Some New Light on Hume s Philosophy of Religion, Hume Studies 15, no. 2 (1989): 277-93 and A Reply to Ellin. Hume Studies 15, no. 2 (1989): 301-05. 43 J. C. A. Gaskin, Hume s Attenuated Deism, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65 (1983): 164.

14 according to Gaskin, assented to the being of something which it would not be manifest deception to call god. 44 What is it about Hume s own presentation of his philosophy of religion that allows for such disparate interpretations? Does he, as many of today s scholars claim, genuinely aim at preserving what is true in the religious tradition or, as his own contemporaries believed, is his goal primarily destructive? How might Hume s ambiguity reveal his political intentions? This dissertation sheds light on these questions as it proceeds in exploring Hume s political theology. Rationale and Method of the Dissertation Hume s interest in religion permeates his writings. This dissertation will examine Hume s approach to religion in various works and with various audiences and will bring out different aspects of the political problem of religion and the remedies available. Each chapter of this dissertation will focus on textual analysis of a particular work. The division of the chapters will be the following: (1) Book 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature; (2) The Natural History of Religion; (3) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion; and (4) The History of England. Other religious essays, such as On Miracles, Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State, and Of Superstition and Enthusiasm will be discussed in the context of the chapters of this dissertation. The political essays, to the extent they deal with religion, will also be considered. 44 Gaskin, Hume s Attenuated Deism, 166. Gaskin states elsewhere that Philo s (Hume s) acceptance, if such it can be called, of the design argument [in the Dialogues] is so limited and qualified that it is of almost no significance as a religious affirmation and that Hume is almost wholly critical of almost every aspect of religion ( Hume s Critique of Religion, Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (July 1976): 301).

15 Outline of the Dissertation The first chapter of this dissertation will focus on Book 3 of the Treatise. Book 3 provides an account of the origin and end of political life and sets the stage for the dissertation s discussion of religion. Book 3 indicates the disagreement Hume has with Hobbes and Locke on the role of reason in political life. According to Hobbes and Locke, society s emergence from the state of nature is due to people s rational calculation of self-interest. Hume rejects this account as philosophical fiction because humans are more social and less calculating than Hobbes and Locke suppose. Yet, Hume does not reject their account simply because it is a fiction. The Treatise points out that some fictions are necessary for human existence, such as the fictions of common life. Others, like the poetical fictions, are simply pleasurable. Still others, such as religious superstition or certain philosophic fictions, are not only distractions but morally and intellectually corrupting. According to the Treatise, political society is based in the fictions of the rules of justice and custom. Though human beings are not compelled by nature to believe in these political fictions as they are with the fictions of common life, belief in and regard for the rules of justice are necessary for human well-being. For Hume, human life is always in some measure social. Curiously, Book 3 says almost nothing about religion. Yet, the secular, civic education Hume proposes in Book 3 is in stark contrast to the picture he presents of the inutility of religious education in Book 1. Hume s approval of the fictions of political life indicates that his critique of religion will not be based on its being a fiction ( superstition ) or on whether it harmonizes with rational self-interest. Rather, he will ask whether religion conflicts with the custom and justice of stable civic life.

16 Chapter two of this dissertation will investigate The Natural History of Religion. Lorne Falkenstein and Donald Livingston have considered the Natural History s treatment of the origins and history of religion, but they have not focused on whether its historical account should be read in light of Hume s philosophical and political understanding of religion. 45 Does the Natural History simply provide a disinterested history of religion? How might Hume s history also reflect his critique of religion? In what way might Hume s decision to write a natural history betray what he thinks about so-called revealed religion? The chapter will examine this history of religion and, in particular, Hume s account of the origins of religion in human nature. The chapter will also analyze the religious forms of superstition, enthusiasm, polytheism, and monotheism charted by the Natural History. Finally, the chapter will consider what means Hume thinks we have at our disposal to moderate religious sentiment and what a moderate religious sentiment might look like according to the Natural History. The third chapter of this dissertation will examine the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Commentators generally read the Dialogues in light of Hume s putative religious beliefs or its arguments concerning the nature of God. 46 Drawing upon John Danford s treatment of the Dialogues, 47 this chapter will explore how the dialogic form of the text provides a public 45 See Falkenstein, Hume s Project, 1-21; Livingston, Origin and Evolution, 3-23. 46 See Nicholas Capaldi, Hume s Philosophy of Religion: God without Ethics, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1970): 233-40; Norman Kemp Smith, introduction to Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), 1-75. For John Gaskin see, The Design Argument: Hume s Critique of Poor Reason, Religious Studies 12, no. 3 (September 1976): 331-45; God, Hume and Natural Belief, Philosophy 49, no. 189 (July 1974): 281-94; Hume on Religion, in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 2nd ed., David Fate Norton and Jacqueline Taylor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 480-513; Hume s Attenuated Deism, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65 (1983): 160-73; Hume s Critique of Religion, Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (July 1976): 301-11; Hume s Philosophy of Religion (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1978). 47 See John W. Danford, David Hume and the Problem of Reason: Recovering the Human Sciences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) and The Political Teaching of Hume s DNR, 137-60.

17 and educational setting for Hume s political discussion of religion. The Dialogue s treatment of piety and religion will be examined in light of the public good. The chapter will also look at the effect the Dialogue s use of skepticism and ridicule is intended to have on religious conviction. The fourth and final chapter of this dissertation will focus on the History of England. Throughout the History, Hume shows an interest in the various ways religion has shaped political life in England. Books 1 and 2 of the History draw out the negative influence of Catholic superstition in the pre-modern era and provide a clear warning of the loss of liberty that would ensue if it was ever allowed to return. Books 3 through 6 of the History draw on the effects of Protestant enthusiasm. Hume argues that the Reformation, despite its enthusiasm, paved the way for a liberal politics he deems worth endorsing the precious spark of liberty had been kindled, and was preserved, by the puritans alone; and it was to this sect... that the English owe the whole freedom of their constitution. 48 In light of Hume s support of constitutional English liberalism, the chapter will explore his cautious embrace of a more moderate public religion. The chapter will consider the claims of Will R. Jordan and Andrew Sabl 49 and will also look at Hume s portrayal of the Church of England as a moderator between religious superstition and enthusiasm. In this way the chapter will demonstrate the extent to which Hume distances himself in the History from the more secular politics presented in the Treatise. 48 HE 4:145-46. 49 See Will R. Jordan, Religion in the Public Square, 687-713; Andrew Sabl, When Bad Things Happen from Good People (and Vice-Versa): Hume s Political Ethics of Revolution. Polity 35, no. 1 (Autumn 2002): 73-92.

Chapter One The Political Theology of A Treatise of Human Nature 18

Chapter One: The Political Theology of A Treatise of Human Nature Introduction In January of 1739, Britain was introduced to the anonymous publication of David Hume s first two installments of A Treatise of Human Nature. 1 Book 1, Of the Understanding, explores the nature and limits of human knowledge, while Book 2, Of the Passions, examines the central role of the sentiments in human motivation. Between the publication of Books 2 and 3, Hume anonymously published An Abstract to the Treatise which sought to further explain the chief arguments of Books 1 and 2. In October of 1740, Book 3 of the Treatise, Of Morals, finally made its public appearance. In it, Hume examines how the understanding and passions contribute to moral and political life. The Treatise was not published again during Hume s lifetime. The work, he says, fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmur among the zealots. 2 He deemed, however, that the Treatise s want of success was more from the manner than the matter of its principles. 3 He therefore attempted to recast his ideas so they 1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (hereafter, T), ed. David F. and Mary J. Norton, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). All references to the Treatise, its Appendix, its Abstract, and A Letter to a Gentleman will be taken from volume 1 of the Clarendon edition of the Treatise. Two notation methods will be employed: (1) reference to the book, part, section, and paragraph number and (2) the page numbers of the Selby-Brigge edition (with revisions by Nidditch) designated as SBN. 2 My Own Life, in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), xxxiv. Hume notes in his autobiography that there were not many avid readers, much less critics, who anxiously awaited the third part of the Treatise. This lack of attention, however, is not entirely true, for, the 1745 publication of A Letter to a Gentleman, Hume s response to his critics of the Treatise, indicates that the work garnered enough attention that he deemed a defense necessary. Note: all references to Hume s moral, political, and literary essays, as well as My Own Life, will be taken from this Miller edition. 3 Ibid., xxxv. 19

20 would be more accessible to readers. 4 What followed were the publications of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748 and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals in 1751. Each work is an extensive re-working of Books 1 and 3 respectively. The Enquiries would go through various editions until 1772. In 1757, A Dissertation on the Passions was published as more-or-less a recap of Book 2 of the Treatise. 5 Reading the Treatise in light of Hume s concern for religion s effect on political life sheds significant light on the work as a whole. Book 3, in particular, benefits from such a reading because in it Hume gives his first public account of political life by providing a prolonged and systematic explanation of its genesis and the virtues that accompany it. Hume s genetic account of politics in Book 3, however, does not acknowledge the historical influence of religion on either society or morality. Hume s apparent silence on this matter has led many commentators to treat religion as a peripheral issue in the Treatise. J. C. A. Gaskin, for instance, claims that the Treatise is not directly concerned with religion, unlike the first Enquiry, which he describes as anti-theological and anti-metaphysical. 6 All one finds, according to Gaskin, are a few brief and apparently inoffensive references to the existence of god and to religion by which a modern reader might find it a little puzzling to know what aspects of the Treatise could possibly cause offence. 7 Gaskin s view is not uncommon. As Paul Russell notes, amongst today s commentators it is a point of near orthodoxy that in the Treatise Hume has no substantial or 4 My Own Life, xxxv. 5 Though the two Enquiries and A Dissertation contain insights pertinent to Hume s political theology, the present chapter of this dissertation will limits itself almost exclusively to the Treatise. 6 J. C. A. Gaskin, Hume s Philosophy of Religion (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1978): 1-2. 7 Ibid., 1.