Explanation and Experiment in Social Psychological Science

Explanation and Experiment in Social Psychological Science

John D. Greenwood Explanation and Experiment in Social Psychological Science Realism and the Social Constitution of Action Springer-Verlag New York Berlin Heidelberg London Paris Tokyo

John D. Greenwood Department of Philosophy City College City University of New York New York, NY 10031 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Greenwood, John D. Explanation and experiment in social psychological science : realism and the social constitution of action / John D. Greenwood. p. cm. Bibliography: p. Includes index. ISBN-13:978-1-4613-8803-6 (alk. paper) 1. Social psychology-methodology. I. Title. HM251.G7523 1989 302.01 '8-dcl9 88-37924 Printed on acid-free paper. 1989 by Springer-Verlag New York Inc. Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1989 All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the written permission of the publisher (Springer-Verlag, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden. The use of general descriptive names, trade names, trademarks, etc. in this publication, even if the former are not especially identified, is not to be taken as a sign that such names, as understood by the Trade Marks and Merchandise Marks Act, may accordingly he used freely by anyone. Typeset by ASCO Trade Typesetting Ltd., Hong Kong. 9 8 765 432 1 ISBN-13:978-1-46l3-8803-6 e-isbn-13:978-1-46l3-8801-2 DOl: 1O.1007/978-1-46l3-8801-2

For my mother and father In loving memory

Preface This book is about explanation and experiment in a science of human action. It aims to provide a philosophy of social psychological science that both embodies sound principles of scientific reasoning and is sensitive to the social psychological dimensions of human action. The guiding principle of this book is the belief that the logical forms of causal explanation and experimental evaluation can be effectively employed in the scientific analysis of meaningful human action. According to most accounts, social psychological science has been in a more or less constant state of crisis for the past decades, having been subject to a host of criticisms on moral, political, methodological, and philosophical grounds. Many of these critiques have been directed against the still dominant conception of social psychological enquiry as a causal and objective scientific discipline that is closely analogous to (if not to be identified as a branch ot) the natural sciences. Thus, many of the most vigorous debates have concerned the nature of explanation and the utility of experimentation in a social psychological discipline. Most psychologists maintain that their discipline is based upon principles of scientific reasoning. III fact, it has always been based upon a particular philosophical account of scientific reasoning that may be characterized as scientific empiricism. According to this account of science, causal explanation consists of the deduction of descriptions of events from "laws" that describe empirical regularities, which are confrrmed by observed instances of such regularities. Theories serve to integrate and systematize such descriptions of observable regularity. Standard accounts of social psychological science based upon these philosophical principles may be characterized as scientific psychology, since this title seems to have been commandeered by those who profess that the goal of social psychological science is the explanation, prediction, and control of human behavior via the identification of antecedent causal determinants (usually via laboratory experiments). Scientific empiricism has an obvious appeal to those concerned to provide a scientific account of human action, since it appears to promote objectivity by its restrictive emphasis upon the observable. The empiricist account of science has itself been the object of continuous criticism for the past half century. In particular, the traditional empiricist distinction between the observable and the

viii Preface theoretical has been dismissed as epistemologically naive. It has been argued that all observations are "theory-informed," and that the notion of a neutral empirical base for the evaluation of scientific theories is an intellectual fiction. Naturally enough, practicing psychologists have been disinclined to accept the implications of this relativist account of science, for this position is often interpreted (with some justification) as a denial of objectivity rather than an altemative conceptual framework for a science of human action. Some contemporary criticisms of scientific psychology have been drawn from this relativist tradition in the philosophy of science. More fundamental criticisms question the very idea of a causal science of human action. This critical position may be characterized as hermeneutical psychology, since most commentators who object to a putatively scientific analysis stress the meaningful nature of human action. This emphasis on the meaning of human action has led some hermeneutical theorists to deny that explanations of human action are causal explanations, and others to deny the objectivity of action identification. In consequence, most hermeneutical psychologists deny the appropriateness of experimental studies in a social psychological discipline. Over the years there has been no shortage of alternative meta-theories and "paradigms" that have promised to resolve the crisis, such as humanist psychology, hermeneutical-interpretative psychology, dialectics, sociorationalism, and social constructionism. Yet these have had litlle significant impact upon social psychological science. No doubt this is partly due to to ingrained commitments to scientific empiricism. However, it is no doubt also due to the justified belief among practitioners that to adopt the principles of such altemative paradigms would be to abandon a causal and experimental science. It would be to effectively abandon social psychological science. For most of the alternative paradigms are not alternative scientific psychologies. They promote altogether different forms of intellectual enquiry. In this respect the central crisis in social psychological science is a philosophical crisis concerning the identity of the discipline. Most of these debates about the nature of social psychological science are vitiated by the uncritical adoption of the scientific empiricist account of science. The empiricist account is hopelessly inadequate as an account of causal explanation in science. Since it is (historically and conceptually) based upon the phenomenalist idealism of classical empiricism, it effectively denies the possibility of causal explanation. Consequently, the empiricist account cannot support the logic of scientific practice. The attempt to accommodate experimentation to this account distorts the logic of experimentation. Most of the arguments of the scientific psychologist are vitiated because scientific psychology is not based upon the practice of causal and experimental sciences but upon an inadequate empiricist account. Most of the arguments of the hermeneutical psychologist based upon the meaningful nature of human action are vitiated for the same reason. The denials of the adequacy or appropriateness of causal explanations are not based upon contrasts with causal explanation in natural science but upon empiricist accounts of explanation. In consequence, the hermeneutical psychologist misconstrues the point and purpose of experimentation in a causal science.

Preface ix The most radical form of hermeneutical psychology denies the objectivity of action identification, via the claim that human actions are socially constructed. This relativist account is based partly upon the doctrine of the theory informity of observations and partly upon a correct intuition about the especially intimate relation between representation and ontology in social psychological science. Nevertheiess, this extreme position embodies a number of fundamental ontological and epistemological errors. Relativism is no alternative to empiricism. In fact it is a species of neo-empiricism that returns scientific empiricism to its roots in philosophical idealism. Opposed to these forms of empiricism and idealism is philosophical realism. This book is a presentation of a realist philosophy for a causal and experimental science of action. Realism provides a coherent rationale for causal explanatory and experimental activity in science, and reveals that many contemporary characterizations and criticisms of social psychological science are misconceived. This does not mean, however, that a realist philosophy of natural science can be uncritically mapped upon the social psychological domain. This would be to repeat the original empiricist error. A causal and experimental science of action must respect and accommodate the unique ontological characteristics of human action. This requires an applied experimental commitment to the meaningful nature of human action and the possibility of human agency or self-determination. Human action is meaningful because it is socially constituted. Human behaviors are constituted as meaningful actions by their social relations, and by participant agent and collective representations of them. Diverse human behaviors are constituted as the same form of action by their social location and intentional direction. The social constitution of action makes self-determination possible. Causal explanations of action in terms of human agency are not precluded by a realist science of human action, although neither is their accuracy conceptually guaranteed by realism or the social constitution of action. The social constitution of action-and the possibility of human agency--does not preclude an experimental science of human action. However, it does demonstrate that much contemporary practice is misconceived. Traditional accounts of the problems of an experimental social psychological science are firmly committed to the standard empiricist account. Consequently, most experimentalists simply fail to recognize the most fundamental problems that arise by virtue of the social relational and representational dimensions of human action. These are not the traditional (and misconceived) problems about the generalizability of experimental results. Rather, they are serious doubts about the identity of experimentally produced behaviors. According to a realist philosophy of experimentation in social psychological science, the logic of experimental enquiry must be employed via techniques that ensure that the identity of human action is preserved in experiments. A realist philosophy of social psychological science and a social constitutionist philosophy of action embody no theoretical, moral, or political commitments. This is how it should be if they are to provide a conceptual framework for a causal and experimental science of action. A realist philosophy of social psychological science does not entail a social constitutionist philosophy of action.

x Preface Yet they are uniquely consistent, since both preserve objectivity with respect to the identification and explanation of human action. This must also be the case if they are to serve as a conceptual framework for social psychological science, for a social psychological science that does not preserve objectivity is not really worth preserving.

Acknowledgments My greatest intellectual debt is to Rom Harre. It is a huge debt that I cannot even begin to document. Suffice to say that I remain grateful for his inspired teaching, constructive criticism, and his advice and support over the years. Also for his personal example which transformed my own moral career. A very considerable debt is also owed to Roy Bhaskar, who originally got me interested in these questions, and awakened me from my own "dogmatic slumbers" about causality. The influence of both these mentors on the present volume will be obvious to all who have read their work. I also owe a special thanks to Nicholas Capaldi and Paul Secord, who read earlier drafts of the book in manuscript form and provided me with much useful criticism. Also for their friendship and advice over the years. A number of other persons who contributed to the development of the arguments of this volume deserve special mention. Thanks to Chong Kim Chong, Jerry Ginsburg, James and Diana Herbert, Jarrett Leplin, Cheryl Logan, Richard McDonough, Peter Manicas, Joe Margolis, Catherine Morris, Glyn Owen, Harry Purser, Joe Rychlach, Michael Tay, and Cecelia Wee. Much of the material of this volume was rehearsed in courses on the philosophy of social and psychological science given at the National University of Singapore and the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. I thank the students who participated in these courses for their very often useful comments and criticisms. I am also grateful to Walter Salinger, Head of the Psychology Department at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro, for arranging for me to give a graduate psychology course entitled "Social Dimensions of Mind, Behavior, and Method" in the Spring of 1987. The present format of this volume is largely based on sections of that course. I have drawn on material previously published in academic journals. I thank the editors of Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Human Studies, and European Journal of Social Psychology for their permission to reproduce some of this material. Thanks to my wife Shelagh, son Robert, and daughter Holly for putting up with the periods of physical and mental distance during the writing of this volume. Finally, my greatest debt is to my late mother and father, for their moral support. This volume is dedicated to their memory.

Contents Preface... Acknowledgments... vii xi Chapter 1 Scientific Empiricism and Scientific Psychology Philosophy and Psychology... 1 Causality... 7 Confirmation... 13 Explanation... 15 Theory... 20 Chapter 2 Relativism............................................... 29 Neo-empiricism... 29 Popper: Falsification... 30 Lakatos: Research of Programs... 32 Kuhn: Paradigms... 32 Paradigms and Research Programs in Psychology... 34 Chapter 3 Realism... 38 Varieties of Realism... 38 Realism and Agency... 41 Chapter 4 Causal Explanation... 43 Causality... 43 Confirmation... 49 Explanation... 60 Chapter 5 Theory... 69 Theory and Observation... 69 Observation and Theory... 90 Antirealism... 106

XIV Contents Chapter 6 Hermeneutical Psychology 109 Explanation and Understanding... 109 Social Constructionism... 112 Chapter 7 Causal Explanation and the Meaning of Human Action. 117 Rules and Relations... 117 Explanation and Description... 124 Chapter 8 The Social Constitution of Action 127 The Social Constitution of Action... 128 Ontology and Explanation... 134 Natural and Social Psychological Kinds... 141 Chapter 9 Agency, Causality, and Meaning... 151 Agency and Causality... 151 Causal Powers and Human Powers... 156 Causality and Meaning... 159 Agency and Meaning... 160 Indeterminacy and Explanation... 165 Chapter 10 Explanation, Prediction, and Control... 168 Explanation... 168 Prediction... 172 Control... 173 Chapter 11 The Experimental Analysis of Human Action... 176 The "Crisis" in Experimental Social Psychology... 176 The Artificiality of Experiments... 177 Experimental Isolation... 178 Experimental Contamination... 181 Experimental Alteration... 184 Artificiality and Reality... 189 Chapter 12 Intensional Simulation... 196 The Deception Experiment... 197 Experimental Simulation... 201 Chapter 13 The Evaluation of Psychological Therapy... 212 The Interminable Debate... 212 The Social Psychology of Therapy... 213 Natural Negotiation Hypothesis... 217 Theory and Efficacy... 221

Contents xv Epilogue... 225 Notes... 227 References... 237 Author Index... 255 Subject Index... 261

Reason, holding in one hand its principles... and in the other hand the experiment which it has devised in conformity with these principles, must approach nature in order to be taught by it. It must not, however, do so in the character of a pupil who listens to everything that the teacher chooses to say, but of an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions which he has himself formulated. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason To define the limits of freedom and dependence is very difficult, and the definition of those limits forms the sole and essential problem of psychology. Tolstoy, War and Peace