1 Alan Race, the Threefold Typology, and a Defense of Pluralism (Draft April 20, 2017) Alan Race thinks that Christians today are more aware of religious diversity than ever before. He, of course, knows that religious pluralism is nothing new. There have been many religions in many places for many years. But our awareness of religious pluralism is new. Knowledge of different religious traditions is no longer restricted to the world traveler or the fusty scholar or the foreign missionary. Today, we encounter people who practice a variety of faiths in our neighborhoods, in our places of work, and even in our families. Splendid introductions to the world s religions are readily available in bookstores and can even be found on the internet. As Race says, today ignorance about the world s religious history can only be regarded as culpable ignorance, a state of affairs which cannot be condoned when one comes to the theological problem of the relationship between the faiths. In light of this new awareness, theologians need to get to work! The task of a Christian theology of religions is to offer an account of religious plurality from the perspective of Christian faith. It is different from the history of religions, which seeks to compile, classify, compare and contrast the beliefs and practices of the world s faiths. Rather, a theology of religions seeks to make sense of Christian identity in light of the presence of other religions, and especially to make sense of Christian claims about transcendent and saving truth. Is the diversity of world religions part of God s will or a divergence from God s will? Are all religions equally valid paths to God and salvation? How should Christians relate to peoples of other faiths? In the past half century or so, Christian theologians have increasingly engaged questions like these, so much so that it may be hard for the uninitiated to know where to wade into this literature, and, once in, how navigate the tricky theological waters. Part of the task that Race set for himself is to bring some order out of what could seem like the chaos of Christian
2 responses to religious pluralism. To do this, he surveys the history of Christian approaches to religious pluralism, discerns distinctive character traits within the variety of approaches, and then groups them under family names. The result is Race s now classic three-fold typology of Christian theologies of religion as either exclusive, inclusive, or pluralist. Whether one agrees with Race s typology or rejects it -- and there are plenty of people on both sides -- Race s articulation of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism has become a touchstone in the theology of religions. The Threefold Typology Race offers the following thumbnail sketch of his threefold typology: exclusivists believe that Christ is the only source of transcendent vision and human transformation; inclusivists believe that Christ is the most complete of the religious choices on offer regarding transcendent vision and human transformation; and pluralists believe that Christ is one of a possible number of sources of transcendent vision and human transformation. Race s descriptions of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism have remained fairly consistent throughout his writings. However, the way Race talks about the typology itself has shifted over time. Early on, he spoke of it more in terms of a useful framework for describing the major orientations toward religious pluralism that have been found in the history of the church. In more recent writings, however, Race talks about the threefold typology as a logical schema that defines the range of possible responses to religious pluralism. Before looking at the three types, it is important to note the significance of this shift. Race originally introduced his typology as a useful guide to describe the spectrum of Christian attitudes to religious pluralism in the church. Individual thinkers were selected as representative of a broader theological type. There are, no doubt, differences among the thinkers
3 grouped under a single type, but these differences are more like variations on a particular theme than discordant notes. The typology was, to use a technical term, a heuristic device, a conceptual grid that helps to understand certain key relationships in a wide range of theological literature. As such, the types are somewhat fluid and permeable. The types don t stand for singular approaches but rather for families of related approaches. Moreover, individual thinkers may express ideas that fall under different types. For example, Karl Barth is classified by Race as an exclusivist even though some of Barth s statements about universal salvation would be better classified as inclusivist. The typology seen as a practical guide to the range of Christian attitudes to religious pluralism -- acknowledges a certain amount of messiness. Despite the messiness, Race and many others have found the typology a workable framework that helps us identify the key questions in the theology of religions and helps us see what is at stake in the answers given to those questions. As a heuristic device, the typology is open to modification and expansion. In a recent publication, Race says that the three-fold typology simply describes the available logical avenues of thought. By introducing the language of logical avenues of thought, Race s understanding of the typology shifts from a workable framework for understanding the variety of ways Christians have thought about religious pluralism to a comprehensive classification of options in the theology of religions. This shift in Race s understanding of the three-fold typology seems influenced by Perry Schmidt-Leukel s defense of Race s original typology. Schmidt-Leukel sees four possible answers to questions about the presence of salvific knowledge of ultimate or transcendent reality in the religions: 1) salvific knowledge is not given among the religions; 2) salvific knowledge is given among the religions, but only once; 3) salvific knowledge is given among the religions more than once, but within
4 only one singular maximum; and 4) salvific knowledge is given among the religions more than once and without a single maximum. Schmidt-Leukel thinks these are the only possible answers because they follow from a series of either-or questions. First, Is salvific knowledge a property of the religions or not? If not, then the answer is the atheistic or naturalistic response. If yes, then we ask a second question: Is salvific knowledge given only once or more than once? If only once, then the response is exclusivism. If more than once, we ask a third question: Is salvific knowledge given in one singular maximum or in no singular maximum? If it is given in one singular maximum, then the answer is inclusivism. If it is given in no singular maximum then the answer is pluralism. Since atheism or naturalism are not options for a Christian theology of religions, we are left with Race s threefold typology as providing the available avenues of thought. One may question the wisdom of this shift in Race s talk about the threefold typology. There would, no doubt, be an appeal in having a logically precise classification of the available options for a theology of religions. It would helpfully define the limits of the conversation. However, there are reasons to doubt that the threefold typology offers a comprehensive list of options in the Christian theology of religions. From a strictly logical perspective, one can easily see there are more options than Race provides. For example, one could think that the salvific knowledge mediated by Christ is less complete than the salvific knowledge that is maximally mediated by the Buddha. This would be a rather strange type of Christian faith, but there is nothing contradictory about it. On a more practical level, one would be hard pressed to say that Paul Knitter, who offers a fourfold typology, and Owen Thomas, who offers a sevenfold typology, are being incoherent because they have more than three options. Race s talk of the threefold typology as providing the available logical avenues of thought seems an
5 overstatement. His earlier talk of the threefold typology as workable framework for understanding Christian approaches to religious pluralism that is open to modification and expansion seems a better approach. Its value will lay not in its logical comprehensiveness, but rather in its ability to illuminate the general tendencies, major orientations, and key issues in the variety of Christian attitudes toward other religions. 1. Exclusivism Exclusivism, according to Race, is the view that only in Christian faith can the authentic truth of God s offer of transcendent vision and human transformation in the world be found. It may be helpful to think of the phrase transcendent vision as standing for what many Christian theologians call revelation and the phrase human transformation as standing for what many call salvation. Race s description of the exclusivist type relies heavily upon theologians (Barth and Kraemer) who speak primarily in these terms. We might rephrase his definition of exclusivism to say it is the view that only in Christian faith can the authentic truth of God s offer of revelation and salvation in the world be found. Race s articulation of the exclusivist type begins with a brief historical preamble, and then turns to a summary and analysis of a couple major twentieth century theologians. There is a certain sketchiness in his approach. One is tempted to fill in some details. I suspect some will also take issue with Race s selection and interpretation of representative theologians. I will try to resist the urge to tinker too much with Race s description of the type. There will be time for criticism at the end of this chapter. Rather, I will try to offer an accurate snapshot of Race s take on exclusivism. To this end, I will begin with a couple moments from Race s historical preamble, and then I will offer brief analyses of the approaches of Karl Barth and Hendrik Kraemer who function as the exemplars of this type for Race.
6 Race claims that exclusivism has been the predominant attitude in the history of the church. He begins by quoting a couple of verses from scripture which have been used to support the exclusivist position. In Acts 4:12, Peter says of Jesus that there is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved, and in John 14:6, Jesus says, I am the way, and the truth and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by me. The only comment Race offers on these passages is to say, the negative evaluation of other faiths which these two texts suggest is hard to ignore. Perhaps. One can see how some Christian thinkers may use these passages to support an exclusivist position vis a vis other religions. But to say that the biblical passages in historical context are speaking about the relationship between Christianity and other world religions is to read a whole lot into them. These passages aren t so much talking about other faiths as they are about the centrality of Jesus in God s economy of salvation. That is why inclusivists can also use these passages to support their claim that God s offer of salvation in Christ is available to non-christians. The issue is Christ s mediation of salvation. How wide that salvation may reach is another question. Exclusivists answer this question narrowly, but it isn t the only scripturally informed answer. Race also notes the role the axiom extra ecclesiam nulla salus (outside the church no salvation) has played in the church. He is, no doubt, correct that the axiom has for the most part been used to support an exclusivist orientation toward other religions. However, it is worth noting that the axiom has been interpreted in a variety of ways in the history of the church, sometimes more narrowly and sometimes more widely. The first use of the phrase was not, in fact, about Christianity s relationship to other religions, but rather about the relationships between Christian groups that were wrangling in the 3 rd century. In Cyprian of Carthage s The Unity of the Catholic Church, he says of Christian schismatics, they cannot live outside since
7 there is only one house of God, and there can be no salvation for anyone except in the church. It was not until Augustine in the 4 th century that the axiom was applied to pagans and Jews born after the time of Christ. Henceforth, the axiom was reiterated in a variety of ways. Perhaps the most narrow take on it is that of the Council of Florence (1431-450) which said that those not living within the Catholic Church, not only pagans, but also Jews and heretics and schismatics cannot become participants in eternal life, but will depart into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels unless before the end of life the same have been added to the flock. Here the possibility of salvation is limited to those who belong to the Catholic Church. However, after the so-called discovery of the New World and the subsequent awareness of the millions of people who had never heard the Gospel, theologians tried to find ways to include people who were, on the one hand, outside the visible Church, as also, on the other hand, somehow within the church through notions like implicit faith or baptism by desire. In this case, the axiom was interpreted in an inclusive rather than an exclusive way. While Race is right to note the exclusivist use of the phrase no salvation outside the church, we should also be aware of the ways it has been interpreted more widely in the history of the church. After Race s brief preamble, he devotes the bulk of his treatment of exclusivism to an exposition of two 20 th century theologians: Karl Barth and Hendrick Kraemer. He does mention some other theologians whom he sees as exclusivist (e.g., Emil Brunner and Leslie Newbigin), but theirs are bit parts in Race s sketch of the major characters of Barth and Kraemer. Race notes that there are different emphases in Barth s and Kraemer s approaches to other religions, but sees them sharing the same basic orientation. The best way to understand Race s description of exclusivism, therefore, is to understand his analyses of Barth and Kraemer.
8 The key concept in Barth s theology of religion is revelation. Revelation is God s free and sovereign self-offering and self-manifestation. 1 Moreover, God s revelation of Godself does not fit into, mesh with, confirm, or complete any human ideas about God based upon human resources of wisdom or insight. Rather, God s revelation points out that all attempts to know God from a purely human standpoint are completely futile. In revelation, God tells us something new that apart from revelation human beings could not know. Confronted with the self-manifestation of God we realize that God and God alone is Lord of all creation. For Barth, the final and ultimate self-manifestation of God is Jesus Christ. As such, the person of Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, is the focus of revelation. The word of God in scripture and the word of God in Christian proclamation are not revelations in and of themselves, but they may become revelation to the extent that God uses them to occasion an encounter with Christ. The Word of God that we encounter in revelation is always a person and an event, not a collection of doctrines. In revelation, Jesus Christ reveals himself, not information about himself. Therefore, only in the self-manifestation of God in Christ can we know God as God. The flipside of God s self-manifestation in revelation is an awareness that human beings are powerless and sinful. Revelation makes known our inability to know God through our own wisdom and our incapacity to save ourselves by means of our own energy or strength. Left to our own devices, we are helpless and subject to self-destructive impulses. Our only hope is found in God s unconditional love given to us through Jesus Christ, God s full and final selfrevelation. The grace of God that we know in Christ is discontinuous with our prior attempts to save ourselves. God s revelation in Christ does not complete any religious projects human beings may have started, nor does Jesus fit into any human philosophy. Revelation replaces all 1 CD ½, 301.
9 our attempts to save ourselves. All attempts to know God based upon our human powers of reason or upon some kind of religious experience are empty. God s revelation makes us aware of the fact that our justification and salvation have been accomplished once and for all in Jesus Christ. An implication of Barth s understanding of revelation is that religion is unbelief. To understand what Barth is saying about religion, we have to put aside many of our ideas about religion and allow him to define it in his own terms. Religion, according to Barth, is the human attempt to replace God s revelation of himself with an arbitrary picture of God made up by humans and to replace God s gracious work on our behalf with self-centered human works. Whereas revelation begins with God, religion begins with human beings. And if you begin with human experience you will end up with human experience. The error of so much theology of Barth s time was that it made human religion the criterion by which to assess the revelation of God. As soon as you do this, Barth says, the war is already over. Our psychological, sociological, and pathological human conceptions of God and the good life have replaced the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. In this sense, Barth agrees with folks like Feuerbach and Freud who see religion as a human projection, which masks our infantile desires for a cosmic daddy figure. And that s when it s benign! Tie the illusions of religion to the hateful ideology of something like Nazism and you get the nightmare Barth lived through in the twentieth century. The religion that Barth has in mind first and foremost, therefore, is Christianity, especially the Christianity that rolled over and capitulated in the face of totalitarianism in Germany. In the church s religion its worship, theology, morality -- you find the active idolatry and self-righteousness that is the hallmark of religion. Barth s negative judgment on all religions as unbelief is an extension of this judgment on Christian religion as unbelief.
10 Given Barth s harsh judgment on Christian religion, it may come as a surprise that he also thinks Christianity can be seen as the only true religion. Christianity as a religion is caught up in unbelief like all human religions. Nevertheless, in God s sovereign freedom God has decided to reveal himself through the Christian church. As we have seen, this has nothing to do with the worth, value, or truth of Christianity as a religion. Rather, we can speak of Christianity as the true religion only in the way that we can speak of people as justified sinners. That is, human beings are sinful and there is nothing we can do to make ourselves acceptable to God. God saves sinners out of God s pure unmerited grace. God does for humans what humans cannot do for themselves. Therefore, justified sinners cannot claim any righteousness of their own. Similarly, Christianity, despite the fact that it is caught in unbelief and is yet another form of our denial of God, has been chosen by God for the salvation of all. Christianity has been made true by the alien righteousness of God. It cannot claim any innate worthiness or superiority over other religions. God could have chosen any religion and made it the place where God revealed himself as sovereign Lord. It just so happens that God in God s freedom chose Christianity. With this qualification in place, Barth can say that Christianity is the true religion. As a human institution Barth has no problem seeing similarities between Christianity and other world religions. But even in their noblest elements they are still exercises in futility from the perspective of revelation. The truthfulness of Christianity rests on nothing but the fact that God has chosen to reveal Godself in Jesus Christ. Here, the light of Christ falls on the world of religions making Christianity the true religion. The light of the Church is not its own. It is the light of the Son. Hendrik Kraemer s theology of religions may be described in Race s terms as an openminded exclusivism. Kraemer was trained as an Orientalist, was a missionary for the Dutch
11 Bible Society, and was a professor of the history and phenomenology of religion in Leiden. That is to say, Kraemer had extensive knowledge of the world s religions. While he maintained the basic Barthian distinction between revelation and religion in his approach to other religions, he nuanced his understandings of both in light of his expertise and experience. Kraemer is open to seeing not only commonalities among the religions, but also God s revelation. As an historian of religion he acknowledges that similar ideas, intuitions, and symbols can be found in Christianity and other religions. As a student of the Bible, he recognizes that God has revealed himself throughout the world, even among other religions. Through general revelation God makes himself known in creation, truth, beauty and conscience. Kraemer criticized Barth for failing to see that God is at work everywhere in the world. However, even though Kraemer shows more openness to other religions than Barth, he still maintains the discontinuity between religion and revelation. Kraemer sees religions as holistic, which means they are comprehensive systems. While the religions may share some common features, these have to be understood within the context of the worldview of the particular religions. This means that certain features of the religions that look similar on the surface may turn out to be quite different when they are understood within the whole context of their respective religions. For example, the notion of transience is found in both Buddhism and Christianity. But transience in a Buddhist construal only makes sense within a non-theistic worldview, whereas a Christian construal of transience only makes sense as part of a theistic worldview. So while there are some commonalities among Christianity and the religions there is also real discontinuity. The basis of the deepest discontinuity between Christianity and the religions is the unique revelation of God in the person of Jesus Christ. Kraemer is convinced based upon his biblical
12 realism that salvation is only available in Christ. Despite his greater openness and sensitivity to the world s religions, Kraemer believes at some point we must evaluate all religions in light of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. When we do so, Kraemer says, in regard to their deepest, most essential purport they are all in error. The Christian religion, with all its weaknesses and in all the ways in which it too stands under the judgment of God in Christ, is still the highest religion. The person of Jesus Christ is the sole authority who judges all religions. For Kraemer, in the end, the goal of Christian mission is to persuade the non-christian world to surrender to Christ as the sole Lord of Life. 2. Inclusivism Inclusivists, according to Race, believe that Christ is the most complete of the religious choices on offer regarding transcendent vision and human transformation. As was the case with exclusivism, it may be best to rephrase Race s description of inclusivism in terms of revelation and salvation. The ideas of revelation and salvation are more familiar and understandable to most readers, and the theologians he draws on to exemplify inclusivism speak primarily in these terms. Therefore, we might rephrase Race s description to say inclusivists believe that Christ is the most complete of the religious choices on offer regarding revelation and salvation. Inclusivism tries to balance two basic theological affirmations: on the one hand, God s universal will to save all people, and on the other hand, the belief that God s salvation has been made effective in the world through the particularity of Jesus Christ. The challenge for inclusivists is to find the right balance between the universality and the particularity of Christian faith. The universalism in Christian faith leads inclusivists to affirm the power and presence of God in other religious traditions. The particularism in Christian faith leads them to affirm that
13 salvation wherever it is found is always through Jesus Christ. The to and fro between the universal and the particular is the hallmark of inclusivism. Race s articulation of inclusivism, like his treatment of exclusivism, is heavily weighted toward 20 th century thought. However, he does offer a more substantial historical preamble than he did in the case of exclusivism. It is still sketchy, but it does provide a bit more analysis. The Gospel of Luke and the Book of Acts, according to Race, provide more fruitful scriptural resources for an inclusive theology of religion than other New Testament writings, and the Logos theology of the 2 nd century apologist Justin Martyr supplies an example of inclusivism from the early Church. After the preamble, Race turns his attention to developments in 20 th century thought especially as it is found in Roman Catholic theology. The achievements of the Second Vatican Council and Karl Rahner are the dominant voices in Race s articulation of inclusivism. For the sake of offering a helpful snapshot of Race s description of inclusivism I will focus on his treatments of Luke-Acts, Justin Martyr, the Second Vatican Council, and Karl Rahner. In the Book of Acts, Race notes a number of passages that speak of a knowledge of God found among the Gentiles. In the story about the Roman Centurion Cornelius, Peter says, Truly I perceive that God shows no partiality, but in every nation anyone who fears him and does what is right is acceptable to him (Acts 10:35). At the Roman colony of Lystra, Paul says to the crowd, In past generations he [God] allowed all the nations to walk in their own ways; yet he did not leave himself without witnesses (Acts 14:16). And in his speech at the Areopagus, Paul tells the people of Athens that he can see that they are very religious because he observed their altar with the inscription to an unknown God (Acts 17:22-23). In each of these passages, there is an acknowledgement that, in some fashion, an awareness of God is found among the Gentiles. The religions of the nations are not bereft of value.
14 However, as we might expect, this universalism of Luke-Acts is balanced with particular claims about God s salvation in Jesus Christ. Luke s idea of salvation history is the device by which he achieves this balance of universality and particularity. Oscar Cullmann defines salvation history as a connected series of events, within God s plan (or economy) of salvation, which belongs to history, and of which the centre and norm is Christ s death on the cross. In Luke-Acts, salvation history has three phases: 1) the period of Israel, from creation to the appearance of John the Baptist; 2) the period of Jesus, from the baptism to the ascension of Jesus; and 3) the period of the church and of the spread of the word of God. The universal framework of salvation is apparent. It begins with creation and will persist to the end of time. It includes God s dealing with people in the whole of human history from the beginning of time and it will extend to people outside God s chosen people until the end of time. However, Jesus is the center and fulfillment of history. The life, death and resurrection of Jesus are decisive for the salvation of world, constituting at once the fulfillment of all the promises of God and the beginning of the last days. Luke s conception of salvation history allows him to affirm, on the one hand, God s providential activity in all of human history, and, on the other hand, the fulfillment of God s actions on behalf of the world in Jesus Christ. In this schema, Race sees the elements that go into the delicate balancing act of inclusivism: the universal affirmation of the presence and activity of God in the world and in the world s religions, and the particular affirmation of the culmination of God s presence and activity in the person of Jesus Christ. In the early Church, Justin Martyr stands out as a forerunner of inclusivism. Justin claims that truth and goodness can be found in all human beings to the extent that they speak and act rationally. In his context, Justin was especially concerned to show how this was so in
15 relationship to Greek philosophy, but in principle it applied to all people. For the purposes of a theology of religion, this means that truth and goodness can be found in non-christian religions. Justin bases these claims on his understanding of Christ as the divine Logos. In the beginning of John s Gospel, Jesus is identified as the eternal Word or Logos through whom all things were made. The Logos is the true light which enlightens everyone (Jn 1:9), and in him we can see the truth of God. The idea of the Logos in John s Gospel has roots in the Old Testament idea of the Word of God as wisdom, who was before the world, the agent of creation, and the means for knowing God s secrets. It may also have roots in the Stoic concept of the Logos as the rational principle that gave form to all of creation. In either case, the divine Logos is seen as the cosmic wisdom or rationality, which pervades the universe and is the principle of enlightenment in all human beings. Justin draws on the idea of the Logos found in John s Gospel and relates it to Greek philosophy. Christ the Logos was speaking in Greek philosophers and poets. As in the parable of the sower, the seeds of the Word or Logos were spread throughout the world, and to the extent that any person spoke truly they shared in these divine seeds. Christ is the Logos and so Christ inspires whatever truth we find in the world. Moreover, because they participated in the seeds of the divine Logos, non-christian thinkers not only had access to parts of Christian truth, they could also be considered to be Christians. As Justin says, Christ is the Word of whom every race of men were partakers; and those who lived reasonably are Christians, even though they have been thought atheists; as, among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and men like them. For Justin, Christ the divine Logos accounts for the truth to be found in the religions. And yet, even though non-christians are in touch with the divine Logos, they are in touch with only part of the divine Logos. Full-fledged knowledge of God comes only through the
16 incarnation of the Word in Jesus Christ. Participation in part of the Logos is different than personal knowledge of God through faith in Christ. This explains the errors that are found in non-christian thought. As Justin says, because they did not know the whole Logos, they often contradicted themselves. So for Justin, there is both continuity and discontinuity between Christianity and non-christian religions. Christ had sowed seeds of truth among the Greeks. The Logos was active in every human being. Therefore, non-christian could have genuine goodness and truth. But they lacked personal knowledge of God. Because of this lack, they often erred in what they said and did. When Christ appeared he affirmed what was true in Greek thought and corrected what was wrong. So Christ represents the fullness and completion of the seeds of the Logos found in non-christian religions. The universal Logos that is found in all human beings is known most fully in the particularity of the incarnate Word in Jesus Christ. After the historical preamble, Race fast-forwards to the twentieth century. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to Roman Catholic developments beginning with the Second Vatican Council. This is understandable given the importance of the Second Vatican Council and Roman Catholic post-conciliar thought for the theology of religions. Race briefly mentions that Orthodox Christians and Mainstream Protestants would largely fall under the inclusive type as well. In light of the concern of this book with Anglican approaches to the theology of religions, one wishes Race spent a little time on figures like F. D. Maurice, B. F. Westcott, and Alan Boquet (about whom we will hear in a subsequent chapter) who would fall under this type. This would have given not only some Anglican voices, but also some inclusive voices from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But, to be fair, Race is not trying to offer an exhaustive history of inclusivism. He is describing a type. Insofar, as developments in Roman Catholic theology since the mid-twentieth century have dominated the conversation in the theology of
17 religions, Race s focus is apt. In the following, we will examine his treatment of Vatican II and Karl Rahner. Race sees the documents of Vatican II on non-christian religions as at once a breakthrough and retrieval. On the one hand, the statements of Vatican II signal a shift in the official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church from exclusivism to inclusivism. The older exclusive interpretation of the axiom no salvation outside of the church has given way to an acknowledgement of revelation and the presence of the Holy Spirit in other religions. On the other hand, this acknowledgement, according to Race, doesn t say anything substantially different from what we find in early Christian Fathers like Justin. Rather, Vatican II made history by appealing to a neglected, early tradition of the Church and incorporating its inclusivism into its statements on the relation of Christianity to other religions. The breakthrough of Vatican II is the shift in the official position of the church. The theology itself is ancient. Race s assessment of Vatican II is debatable. However, his claim that the balancing act of inclusivism between universalism and particularity is at work in the documents is fair enough. We see this in most clearly in the Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions (Nostra Aetate). In it, religions are praised for the ways they have responded to the profound mysteries of the human condition, and Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam are specifically said to contain the truth that enlightens every human being. After accurately describing and praising their impressive achievements (a milestone in itself!), Nostra Aetate continues by saying, The Catholic Church rejects nothing of what is true and holy in these religions. She has a high regard for the manner of life and conduct, the precepts and doctrines which, although different in many ways from her own teaching, nevertheless often reflect a ray
18 of that truth which enlightens all men. The universalism of the inclusivist position is apparent in the openness to the truth and holiness to be found in other religions. If Christians look into the teachings and customs of the great religions of the world, they will find a ray of truth that enlightens all. However, the universalism of the passage is immediately balanced with a statement about the particularity of God s salvation in Jesus Christ. Nostra Aetate continues, Yet she proclaims and is in duty bound to proclaim without fail, Christ who is the way, the truth, and the life (Jn 14:6). In him, in whom God reconciled all things to himself (2 Cor 5:18ff) men find the fullness of their religious life. The truth and holiness found in other religions are only partial. The revelation of God in other faiths and the presence of the Spirit is in order to prepare people to receive the Gospel. The fullness of God s truth and salvation is found only in Jesus Christ. Nostra Aetate s balancing of the universal and the particular in the church s attitude toward the religions is indicative of the inclusivism found in Vatican II. Karl Rahner s theology of the anonymous Christian is the leading example in Race s description of inclusivism. And rightly so. Rahner was one of the greatest Roman Catholic theologians of the twentieth century and his inclusivist theology of religions was a major influence on Vatican II and post-conciliar Roman Catholic theology. Rahner s inclusivism can be summarized in four theses. First, Christianity understands itself as the absolute religion. Christianity proclaims Jesus as the Christ, God s final and unsurpassable revelation, and, therefore, no other religion speaks with the same authority as Christianity. Christ is the unique incarnation of the Word of God, and the church is Christ s continuing presence in the world. However, even though Christianity understands itself as the absolute religion, this exalted status is qualified. Several of the world s
19 religious traditions existed before the birth of Christ and the foundation of the church. Surely, these religions are not without significance in the eyes of God. Moreover, there are many people who, since the time of Christ up until the present day, have not had the Gospel shared with them in a way to which they could respond in an authentic manner. Think of all the ways Christians have distorted and continue to distort the message of Jesus. Surely, for some people conversion to Christianity and baptism in the church are not genuine options. Christianity may be the absolute religion in a general sense, but the church must also acknowledge that the import of this claim for particular people depends on that person s historical circumstances. Rahner s second thesis, that non-christian religions may be considered supernatural revelations intended by God for the salvation of the world, follows from the qualifications of Christianity as absolute religion. Christianity s call to conversion becomes binding only when a person is really able to hear the good news of the Gospel and to respond to it in freedom. However, this has not been possible for all people. The church s mission to share the gospel with all people does not mean, therefore, that non-christians religions are made obsolete with the coming of Christianity. God may intend non-christian religions to play a continuing role in God s overall plan of salvation. Non-Christian religions are not merely products of human wisdom and creativity. God has chosen to be revealed through them. This means that non- Christians are recipients of a supernatural revelation in which God desires to enter into their lives in order to bring them to salvation. Rahner does not shy away from the implications of this insight. He boldly claims that God may save non-christians through their religions, not despite them. The infinitely loving God, who desires the salvation of all people, enters into history not only in Christ and the Church, but also though religions like Buddhism and Hinduism and Islam. Non-Christian religions may lead to the same salvation enjoyed by Christians.
20 Rahner s third and fourth theses draw out the implications of the first two for the way Christians ought to relate to their non-christian neighbors. Rahner s third thesis notes that when Christians deal with non-christians they are not encountering people who are strangers to God s saving grace. Moreover, because all grace is Christ s grace, non-christians are really not strangers to Christ either. Non-Christian religions are positively included in God s plan of salvation and that salvation always culminates in the finality of Jesus Christ. Therefore, Christians must look at non-christians like Daoists and Sikhs and Muslims as anonymous Christians. Christianity does not have a monopoly on God s revelation to the world. In the practice of their religions non-christians are transformed by the saving grace of Jesus Christ. Therefore, they cannot be utter strangers to the church. They are Christians without the name. Rahner s fourth thesis deals with the implication of the theology of the anonymous Christian for the mission of the church. If non-christians are actually anonymous Christians, what is the purpose of evangelization? If salvation is available to Buddhists through Buddhism, why should they become Christian? Hasn t Rahner gutted the church s mission? Rahner thinks not, although he calls for a reevaluation of the church s role in the world. Even though Christianity remains the absolute religion, salvation is the work of Christ, not the work of the church. The church, therefore, is not the exclusive ark of salvation, but rather the conscious embodiment of the universal salvific power of Christ. The church in Rahner s fourth thesis is the historically tangible vanguard and historically and socially constituted explicit expression of what the Christian hopes is present as a hidden reality even outside the visible church. Christian mission is not about bringing salvation to people, but rather about sharing the good news with people in order to help them to become fully aware of who they already are as the beloved children of God called into the life giving and saving grace of Jesus Christ.
21 3. Pluralism Pluralists, according to Race, believe that Christ is one of a possible number of sources of transcendent vision and human transformation. In our discussion of Race s descriptions of exclusivism and inclusivism, I suggested that we might substitute the terms revelation and salvation, for Race s phrases transcendent vision and human transformation. I thought the substitutions better represented the thought of the exclusivist and inclusivist theologians he dealt with and were more easily understandable to most readers. With pluralism, however, I think it best to stick with Race s terminology. Pluralist are engaged in a project of reinterpreting traditional Christian language in a way that provides for a more open theology of religions. The broadness of the expressions transcendent vision and human transformation are representative of the expansiveness of the pluralist project. Pluralists are seeking ways to articulate the genuine parity they find among the world religions. Finding a language that doesn t unfairly privilege the Christian tradition vis a vis other religions is part of pluralism. Race s descriptions of pluralism have progressively focused on John Hick s theology of religion. This focus is justified because Hick is undoubtedly the ablest and most important proponent of pluralism. In Race s early book, Christians and Religious Pluralism, Hick was the dominant figure in the chapter, but Race included other theologians (e.g., Ernst Troeltsch and Wilfred Cantwell Smith) who contributed to the emerging pluralist position. Because Race considers the pluralist approach to the theology of religions as virtually non-existent before the modern period, he doesn t begin with an historical preamble as he does with the other types. His one reference to the fifteenth century theologian Nicholas of Cusa as a forerunner of pluralism is strained at best. In more recent writings, Race narrows his description of the pluralist type to dealing with what is essentially Hick s position. As mentioned, given Hick s importance, I think
22 this focus justified. For the sake of offering an accurate snapshot of Race s understanding of the pluralist type, I will follow his lead and focus on John Hick. Hick calls for Christianity to undergo a Copernican Revolution in the understanding of its relationship to the world s religions. In the 15 th century, Copernicus overturned the Ptolemaic view of the universe by placing the sun, not the earth, at the center of the universe. Hick s analogy calls for a theocentric theology of religions that places God alone at the center and Christ, the church, or any other religion, for that matter, must be seen as revolving around that one true light. God is the sun whose light all the religions reflect in their own ways. Exclusivism, according to Hick, is the theological equivalent to the Ptolemaic model. For exclusivists, Christ and the Christian Church are at the center of the religious universe. Inclusivists, according to Hick, are like the medieval astronomers who came up with the increasingly elaborate and convoluted system of epicycles in an effort to save the Ptolemaic view from the mounting evidence that the earth was not really at the center. Rahner s theology of the anonymous Christian is, in effect, a cumbersome and implausible theory meant to preserve the traditional teaching about Christ as the absolute savior in the face of increasing knowledge of the world s religions. It is the theological equivalent of epicycles that will succeed only in avoiding the inevitable. As Christians awareness of religious pluralism has increased, Christianity s claim to be the only true religion is hopeless. In light of our knowledge of religious diversity, Hick claims, Christians will have to abandon their traditional teachings about Jesus Christ as absolute savior. Hick calls for a radical transformation in our conception of the universe of faiths and the place of our own religion within it. It demands a paradigm shift from a Christianity-centered or Jesus-centered to a God-centered model of the universe of faiths. One then sees the great world religions as different human responses to the one divine Reality,
23 embodying different perceptions which have been formed in different historical and cultural circumstances. Hick claims that there is one divine reality that lies beyond and behind all the great religions of the world. But how can one maintain this claim of a single divine reality when there are innumerable images of gods, symbols, doctrines, ethical rules and rituals found in the religions? Hick defends his claim of one divine reality reflected among the religions in different ways with two sets of arguments, one religious and one philosophical. The religious argument is that all the great religions make a distinction between the words we use to speak of divine reality and the divine reality that transcends all human conceptions. For example, in Hinduism there is a distinction made between Nirguna Brahman, God without attributes, and Saguna Brahman, God with attributes. Religions know that the words we use to speak of God and to express our relationship with God always fall short of the transcendent reality of God. All religious doctrines, concepts, and symbols point beyond themselves to the incomprehensible and inexpressible mystery of God or Ultimate Reality. The philosophical argument draws on Immanuel Kant s distinction between a thing as it is in itself and a thing as it is experienced by the human mind. Kant limits human knowledge to objects that can be experienced by the cognitive faculties of the human mind. That is, we have knowledge of objects only as they are experienced in accordance with the sensible conditions (i.e., in time and space) and the categories of understanding (e.g., totality, plurality, cause and effect) of human beings. Things as they are in and of themselves apart from our experience of them in accordance with our cognitive faculties are unknowable. Hick equates Kant s distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear to human minds with Kant s phenomenal-noumenal distinction (which is actually a bit more complicated, but we won t
24 quibble). The phenomenal is the world as it is humanly experienced and the noumenal is the world as it is in itself. Hick applies this distinction to the Ultimate Reality, distinguishing between the Real as humanly experienced and the Real as it exists in itself. Hick builds on Kant s idea that we experience the world in accordance with the cognitive faculties of the mind by claiming that our knowledge is also shaped by the languages we speak and our historical and cultural traditions. The divine mystery at the center of the universe of faiths always remains transcendent and can never be known as it is in itself. Human beings and the great religions of the world experience the divine noumenon in terms of their cultural backgrounds and expectations. God or the Real is the ineffable center of the universe or religious faiths. The Defense of Pluralism The Basic Hypothesis The Real Experience of the Real Soteriological Transformation Myth, Metaphor and the Incarnation Interreligious Dialogue Between Mission and Dialogue
A Proposal for Interreligious Insight 25