Chapter I Introduction The philosophical ideas propounded by John Locke have far-reaching consequences in the field of classical philosophy. However, his writings have been studied exhaustively by only a handful of philosophers. As correctly remarked by C.B. Martin, a serious study of Locke is not in fashion. 1 However, Locke was a versatile philosopher as he published his writings on a wide range of subjects. The Essay Concerning Human Understanding, one of John Locke s most important contributions, itself covers a large number of topics, e.g. epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, etc. Beside these, he has also written on religion, education, and politics. It is amazing therefore, that his philosophy has failed to arouse a general interest. Locke was no doubt inconsistent, obscure, and repetitious. However, his philosophical thoughts have not only influenced several philosophers of subsequent generations but also other professional disciplines. Hans Aarsleff said: 9
John Locke is the most influential philosopher of modern times. His Essay initiated the vigorous and lasting philosophical tradition that is known as British Empiricism, but Locke s importance reaches far beyond the limits of what has since his time become recognized as the professional discipline of philosophy. 2 It is impossible to understand properly the philosophy of his successors, especially Berkeley and Hume, without understanding Locke s philosophy. The object of the present work is three-fold. The first objective is to trace the central line of his argument along with its ramifications, which he put forward to demolish the doctrine of innate ideas in his Essay ; this concerns the destructive side of his theory of knowledge. The second objective is to ascertain and explain the exact nature of the claim or claims that Locke made in the Essay to establish his theory of knowledge. This is the constructive side of his theory of knowledge. The main theme and concern of Locke s Essay is knowledge and the capacity of the human understanding to acquire it. Here, Locke s principal objective is to enquire into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge. His three-fold aim is crystallized in the following lines of the introduction to the Essay : This, therefore, being my Purpose to enquire into the original, certainty and extent of human knowledge; 3 The third objective of the present work is to examine some major objections related to his theory of knowledge. The present work provides a critical examination of Locke s work in the Essay and in particular, the origin, certainty, and extent of 10
human knowledge, as discussed by him. With this objective in view the present work has been split into seven chapters, including the introduction. This chapter, the introduction, provides the motivation and the purpose of the work. It also provides a brief outline of the contents of the subsequent chapters. Before entering into any positive account of his theory of knowledge, i.e. empiricism, we may ask - why did Locke indulge in presenting a negative aspect to his theory? The answer has been suggested in the body of the discussion in Chapter II (pages 28-31). This chapter primarily discusses Locke s refutation of the doctrine of innate ideas and principles. Locke s polemic against the doctrine of innate principles laid the foundation of his empiricist contention that mind derives all the materials of reason and knowledge from experience. At the time of Locke, the doctrine of innate knowledge was held to be necessary for religion and morality. Two forms of the doctrine can be traced back; its dispositional form and the naïve form by Yolton. 4 The whole volume of Book I of the Essay, excluding the introductory chapter, contains Locke s arguments against the innate knowledge. In the second and the third chapter of the Essay, Locke has attacked speculative and moral principles, respectively. In the fourth chapter, Locke s aim was to refute innate ideas. However, the fourth chapter is concerned primarily with the innateness of principles. In order to complete the refutation of the doctrine of innate principles, Locke discussed the innateness of ideas. Therefore, the title of Chapter IV in the Essay is Other considerations concerning innate principles, both speculative and practical. Chapter II of the present work also discusses Locke s main intentions behind attacking the theory of innatism. Several questions arise in this context. The first of 11
these are - why did Locke involve himself with this kind of attack? Twenty-four years before the publication of the Essay, Samuel Parker had already refuted the epistemological purpose of the doctrine. 5 Beside this, the other query that perplexed all the scholars of Locke is - against whom was the polemic directed. The chapter discusses this at length with an attempt to provide an answer to the query. Here, we have critically discussed Locke s arguments against the innateness of speculative and moral principles with an endeavour to arrive at a conclusion. This study has led to the conclusion that it we can hardly claim that Locke has established the non-existence of innate ideas. According to Jenkins, 6 many commentators on Locke have pointed out that the arguments put forward by him to refute innate ideas do not show that there are no innate ideas. His arguments only show that there are no good arguments in favour of innate ideas. However, in recent years, Professor Noam Chomsky has contended that we must pre-suppose innate knowledge in order to explain acquisition of knowledge. Nevertheless, we must mention that Chomsky s argument is not above criticism. 7 Chapter III concerns the constructive side of Locke s theory of knowledge. It consists of six sections. The first section discusses the origin of ideas. In the second chapter of this work, we have established Locke s contention that mind contains no innate ideas and principles. It is a tabula rasa, i.e. devoid of all characters and without any idea. Therefore, the question that arises naturally is the following - from where do the ideas come? In answer to this question, Locke has said that they come from experience. By experience, Locke implied sensation and reflection. These 12
two are the fountains of knowledge from where we derive all our ideas. 8 The first section provides a critical discussion of the queries regarding sensation and reflection. The second section discusses the meaning of the word idea. This is the key word in Locke s philosophy. Locke himself has used the word frequently in his Essay. However, he has not used the word equivocally. In this section, we have attempted to bring out the different meanings of the word idea in the Essay. In spite of the different senses, there is a common core. The different senses of the word idea point to a unique function. This function is the representation of the external or internal world through sensation and reflection, respectively. The third section is concerning the function of Ideas and Locke s representative theory of perception. According to this theory, ideas act as intermediary object between the knowing mind and the ultimate object, both in perception and knowledge. We therefore, never know the outer world directly but only through ideas. Locke s theory of perception is generally known as the representative theory of perception. We find two extreme viewpoints regarding Locke s theory of perception. Some hold that Locke was an advocate of realism even though he is an original inspirer of representative theory of perception. On the other hand, some argue that although Locke appears to be a representationalist, he was, in reality a direct realist. The traditional and orthodox interpreters of Locke have interpreted his ideas as mental entity, locked up inside the mind. The relationship between the ideas and of which they are ideas are said to be analogues to the relationship of a picture to its original. From this interpretation of the word idea, it follows that Locke has adopted 13
the crude form of the representative theory of perception. This is the picture original theory of perception. However, we note that according to Locke, the picture original theory of perception is not applicable for the ideas of secondary qualities. In the introduction to his abridged version of the Essay, Woozley put forward arguments against the traditional interpretation of Locke that he held a picture original theory of sense perception. 9 Jenkins, 10 Mackie, 11 and Matthews 12 argued against Woozley and tried to show that Woozley s arguments were not conclusive. However, Woozley further commented that we could interpret Locke s idea as thought in spite of mental entity. 13 According to Locke, forming an idea is identical with understanding words. In this sense, we cannot consider ideas as a collection of pictures in the private gallery of our own mind. Jenkins has contended, in agreement with Woozley, that we need not always take Locke s ideas as mental entities. Jenkins referred to Jonathan Bennett 14 who made this point more clear. Jenkins pointed out that having an idea of something amounts to being able to say certain things about how it appears. It seems that this interpretation of the word idea argues in favour of direct realism rather than supporting Locke s representationalism. If we do not consider ideas as mental entities, acting as intermediaries between the object and the observer, then we must perceive the world directly. However, Jenkins noted that here, we also find a distinction between how things appear to be and how they really are, i.e. between appearance and reality. 15 Having an idea of an object amounts to being able to say something about how it appears to us. Talking about how things appear is always distinct from how things really are. This is evident from the acknowledgment that 14
when something appears to us in a certain way, we can always ask whether this corresponds with the actual object. This in turn points to a kind of representationalism that is not of the crude form. While criticizing the traditional interpretation of Locke s crude form of representative theory of perception, Woozley has shown, in the introduction to the abridged version of the Essay, that Locke s opinion regarding the knowledge of our self contradicts his representationalism. Locke held that we know our self immediately without the intervention of any idea. Moreover, Locke has shown inconsistency in his Essay. He sometimes identified ideas with qualities. This implies that we are in immediate contact with the external world while perceiving an idea. However, Aaron argued that Locke recognized his own fault and changed the definition of idea to make it compatible with his representationalism. Aaron believed that although Locke was a representationist, he did not accept the crude form of the picture original theory of sense perception. In conclusion, we can summarize that the opinions of Woozley and Aaron are not tenable. Locke did not discard the picture original theory of sense perception altogether. Locke was a representationist who has admitted the crude form of the theory as far as the knowledge of the external world is concerned but not so when it comes to reflection. His critics failed to realize this distinction in his understanding. As a result, they accused Locke of inconsistency. Locke has himself made a number of distinctions within the class of ideas. The fourth section presents a discussion on the distinction between simple and 15
complex ideas. Simple ideas are the materials of our knowledge. They come into our mind by sensation and reflection. Our understanding passively receives these ideas. Once our understanding has these ideas; it cannot refute, blot or alter them. It has no power to generate new simple ideas by itself. Simple ideas are atoms of our experience. John Hospers pointed out that Locke s simple ideas could be defined only ostensibly. 16 According to Locke, no one could frame a simple idea, which he had not received from either sensation or reflection. Simple ideas are divided into four kinds. These are simple ideas that come into our mind by (a) One sense only, (b) More senses than one, (c) Reflection only, and from (d) Both sensations and reflections According to Locke, complex ideas are made out of simple ideas. In generating complex ideas, mind voluntarily exerts power upon the simple ideas it has. Falckenberg has remarked that the mind is active but not creative in producing complex ideas. 17 Locke has recognized three types of complex ideas, viz. modes, substances, and relations. The fourth section also discusses some queries regarding simple and complex ideas. These are 1. Does knowledge begin with simple ideas? 2. Is the mind passive while receiving simple ideas? 3. How far do we accept Locke s simple ideas? 16
4. Is the distinction between simple and complex ideas tenable? In the fifth section, we attempt to distinguish between ideas and qualities. Locke, while explaining the origin of simple ideas of sensation, came upon the definition of qualities. He defined quality as follows: the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject wherein that power is. 18 Locke clarified this with the example of a snowball producing in us the ideas of white, cold, and round. According to him, the snowball can produce these ideas in us only because it has certain powers to produce these ideas in us. These powers are what Locke referred to as qualities. Section 6 discusses primarily the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Locke made several classifications while stating his theory on qualities. Qualities, which are utterly inseparable from the body, such as bulk, figure, texture, motion, etc., whatever changes it undergoes, are primary qualities. Beside these, other qualities or powers help us to take notice of bodies and distinguish them from one another. Some of these qualities produce ideas in us by immediately operating on our bodies. These are termed secondary qualities immediately perceivable. They produce various sensations in us about the objects, like colour, smell, taste, etc. by their primary qualities such as bulk, figure, texture, etc. Another class of qualities is mediately perceivable. This class of qualities is termed tertiary qualities. These qualities are powers in bodies, which do not produce ideas in us. They bring about certain changes of bulk, figure, texture, and motion in other bodies, so that the latter 17
operate on our senses in a way different from the way in which they operated before the change was brought about. Section 6 has further examined the question as to how we know the important truth that corporeal objects possess primary qualities with reference to Locke s assertion in the Essay. Subsequently, we have discussed the subjective nature of Locke s secondary qualities by using the arguments put forward by Locke. Although these arguments are not distinguishable clearly in the text itself, John J. Jenkins has stated these arguments in his book Understanding Locke. 19 Jenkins has shown, from a critical analysis of these arguments, that Locke s distinction between primary and secondary qualities is not tenable. Locke s definition of qualities raises some problems. It appears that Locke had two different notions of qualities in mind: these are (i) power and (ii) intrinsic properties of things. The first problem is how to connect these two notions of qualities. The second problem is - Is it utterly impossible to give a characterization of Locke s primary qualities in terms of power? Section 6 provides a discussion of these problems as well as some criticisms directed against Locke s conception of and distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Chapter IV consists of two sections. The first section analyses Locke s definition of knowledge and the problem that this definition raises. The second section concerns with Locke s classification of knowledge and some objections raised against this classification. 18
Chapter V discusses the criterion of truth. According to Locke, the truth consists of joining or separating signs, as the things signified by them agree or disagree with one another. He held that joining or separating signs means nothing but propositions. Therefore, truth belongs only to propositions. As there are two kinds of signs, namely ideas and words, there are two kinds of propositions, viz. mental and verbal. However, it is hard to distinguish between these two propositions. Since propositions are of two kinds and truth belongs only to propositions, there are two kinds of truth, viz. mental and verbal. According to Locke, ideas when put together or separated in the mind, as the things they stand for do agree or not, is mental truth. Again, in verbal truth, affirmation or denial is made by words, as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree. Verbal truth is two-fold; either purely verbal and trifling or real and instructive that is the object of real knowledge. The agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is when expressed by words is truth. The truth becomes real when these ideas expressed by words agree with their archetypes. This implies that Locke has accepted the correspondence theory of truth. Locke held that we could not perceive the world directly. In our sense experience, what we aware of are ideas, which are wholly mind depended. These ideas represent the objects of the external world, which causes them. This is a kind of correspondence theory, which is referred to as the copy theory of ideas or pictureoriginal theory of sense-perception. Different objections can be raised regarding the nature and application of this theory of Locke. These objections are discussed in detail in this chapter. 19
In the sixth Chapter, the aim is to clarify Locke s opinion regarding the extension of human knowledge. According to him, knowledge consists of the perception of agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas. Therefore it follows in the first place that we can have knowledge no further than the ideas that we posses. Secondly, it is impossible to extend our knowledge beyond our perception of the agreement or disagreement by intuition, demonstration, or sensation. Thirdly, Locke held that it is not possible for us to have intuitive knowledge regarding all of our ideas for we cannot examine or perceive all the relations they bear to one another immediately. We can distinguish intuitively an obtuse angle triangle from an acute angle triangle, both drawn on equal bases and between the same parallels. However, we cannot know if they are equal or not, by immediate comparison, without the intervention of other ideas. Therefore, it is evident from the above that our rational knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas. This is the fourth observation of Locke regarding the extent of knowledge. The fifth observation is that our sensitive knowledge extends no further than the existence of things actually present to our senses. It follows from Locke s definition of knowledge that we can have knowledge no further than the ideas we possess. However, according to Locke, the extent of our knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas. Therefore, it is necessary to examine Locke s opinion. In order to examine his view, it is necessary to observe how far our knowledge extends or can extend in each of the four forms of knowledge or the ways of perceiving the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. 20
Locke held that the perception of agreement and disagreement concerning our ideas might be of four kinds. These are identity, co-existence, relation, and real existence. Regarding identity and diversity, Locke opined that our intuitive knowledge extends as far as our ideas themselves. We can intuitively perceive every idea in the mind and the way it differs from any other idea. The second kind of agreement or disagreement, which is known as coexistence, consists of the largest and most material part of our knowledge concerning substance. However, in this sphere, our knowledge is very limited. An attempt has been made to clarify the causes of such limitations. Regarding the third kind of agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas in any other relation, Locke contended that it is difficult to determine how far it may extend. He said that it consists of the largest field of our knowledge and it is difficult to determine the extent of such knowledge because it is not easy to find what further improvements and helps, advantageous to other parts of knowledge, are possible yet, considering the immense capability of the sagacious mind of man. Locke s opinion regarding the limitation of the third kind of knowledge is also discussed in this section. As to the fourth kind of agreement or disagreement, viz. the real or actual existence of things, Locke said that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of the God. He further pointed out that we can know the existence of anything by sensitive knowledge, which extends not beyond the objects present to our senses. 21
According to Locke, our ignorance is infinitely larger than our knowledge. He held that there are primarily three causes of this ignorance. The first cause of ignorance is want of ideas. The second cause is our incapability of discovering connections between the ideas that we have and the third cause is the want of a discoverable connection between the ideas we have. These are discussed in detail in Chapter VI. The chapter also reviews Locke s contention about the extent of human knowledge. Chapter VII, the concluding chapter, provides a summary of the conclusions derived from this work. Here, an attempt is made to show that the entire discussion in the present work reveals that Locke cannot be called an empiricist in the strictest sense of the term. He was an empiricist in the sense that he believed that all the materials of knowledge come from experience, i.e. from sensation and reflection. However, he was not an empiricist in the sense that he thought that we could know only by sense presentation. There is a rationalistic flavour in his writing. It can be said that Locke has built a bridge between empiricism and rationalism. Many rationalist philosophers, especially Descartes, influenced Locke. We find many evidences of the influence of Descartes on Locke. In this chapter, we have tried to show Descartes s influence on Locke s philosophy. The terminology of clear and distinct ideas and perception, the account of intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, the four-fold function of reason in demonstration, the conception and definition of the term idea, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, the representative theory of perception and his explanation regarding the knowledge of our own existence in the Essay remind us of Descartes. However, it must be 22
noted that Locke s philosophy does not duplicate Descartes s. Locke has his own originality. We have further discussed Locke s originality in different aspects of his philosophy in this chapter. 23
Notes and References 1 Martin, C.B. and Armstrong, D.M.; Modern studies in philosophy A collection of critical essays - Locke and Berkeley; Macmillan; p.1. 2 Aarsleff, Hans; Locke s influence in The Cambridge Companion to Locke; Cambridge University Press; edited Vere Chappell; Chap. 10, p. 252. 3 Locke, John; An Essay concerning Human Understanding; Edited by Peter H. Nidditch; Oxford Clarendon; 1975, Book I, Chap. I, sec. 2, p. 43. 4 Yolton, John W.; John Locke and the way of Ideas, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 29. 5 Cited in Yolton, John W.; John Locke and the way of Ideas, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 44. 6 Jenkins, John J.; Understanding Locke, Edinburgh University Press, 1983, p.13. 7 See Chomsky, Noam, Explanatory Model in Linguistics in Nagel, Tuppes, Tarski, eds., Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, pp. 529ff. Also A Review of B.F. Skinner s Verbal Behaviour in Language, vol. 35, no. 1 (1959). Reprinted in Fodor and Katz [eds.] The structure of Language [Englewood Cliffs 1964] pp. 547ff. 8 Locke, John; An Essay concerning Human Understanding, edited by P.H. 24
Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, Book II, Chap. 1, sec. 2, p. 104. 9 Locke, John; An Essay concerning Human Understanding, edited by A.D. Woozley, Fontana Library, abridged, 1964, pp. 27-29 10 Jenkins, John J.; Understanding Locke, Edinburgh University Press, 1983, pp. 71-72. 11 Mackie, J.L.; Problems from Locke, Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 38-39. 12 Matthews, H.E.; Locke, Malebranche and the representative theory in Locke on 13 ibid. p. 30. Human Understanding, edited by I.C. Tipton, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 57. 14 Jenkins, John J.; Understanding Locke, Edinburgh University Press, 1983, p. 15 ibid. p. 80. 79. 16 Hospers, John; Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Allied Publishers, 1971, p. 106. 17 Falckenberg, Richard; History of Modern Philosophy, Progressive Publishers, 1968, p. 160. 18 Locke, John; An Essay concerning Human Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, Book II, Chap. VIII, sec. 8, p. 134. 19 Jenkins, John J.; Understanding Locke, Edinburgh University Press, 1983, p. 49ff. 25