HEARINGS COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

Marshall Testimony of March 4 and May 6, 1947 TREATIES OF PEACE WITH ITALY, RUMANIA, BULGARIA, AND HUNGARY HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON Executives F, G, H, and I MARCH 4, APRIL 30, MAY 1, 2, AND 6, 1947 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1947

TREATIES OF PEACE WITH ITALY, RUMANIA, BULGARIA, AND HUNGARY TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 1947 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D. C. The committee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 318 Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, chairman, presiding. Present: Senators Vandenberg (chairman), Capper, White, Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Connally, George, Thomas of Utah, Barkley, and Hatch. Also present : Senators O'Mahoney, Taft, and Pepper. (The committee met to consider Executives F, G, H, and I, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, appearing in Department of State Publication 2743, European Series 21.) The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. This is the first hearing on the treaties of peace with Italy Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania. The first witness is the distinguished Secretary of State, General Marshall. General, if you will proceed in your own way to make whatever statement you wish, the committee will welcome it. STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE C. MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF STATE Secretary MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, these treaties, which the President of the United States has submitted to you for your consent to ratification, represent the result of months of effort on the part of my predecessors, Mr. Byrnes, Senator Vandenberg, Senator Connally, and their staff to make a start on the road back to peace. Mr. Byrnes, Senator Vandenberg, and Senator Connally are naturally much more familiar with the provisions of these treaties than I am, and can explain them to you, their whys and wherefores, much better than I can. I wish only to say a few words upon the importance of what they have accomplished and upon the importance of the prompt ratification of these treaties. After any great war it is never easy for allies to avoid serious disagreement among themselves and to agree upon a common peace. They become acutely, and frequently in exaggerated degree, conscious of differences which were submerged during the common struggle for survival. They find it difficult to realize that common sacrifices are as necessary to achieve peace as they are to achieve military victory.

It was not easy, I am sure, for the Allies to reach common agreement on these treaties. Our delegation from the outset insisted that not only [p. 1/2] the four great powers, but all the nations which actively participated in the European war, should have a voice in making the peace with Italy and the Axis satellite states. The treaties were not dictated by the United States; they were not dictated by any other power; they represent the composite judgment of the nations whose fighting made victory possible. The principal provisions of the treaties are based upon recommendations of the Paris Conference adopted by a two-thirds vote of the nations which actively participated in the European war. That is the kind of international cooperation which we must encourage if we are to build enduring peace. These treaties, if ratified, will bring to an end the armistice regimes and will result in the withdrawal of occupation troops from Italy and the ex-satellite states except for a limited number of troops for a limited period in the Trieste area and a limited number of troops necessary to guard the Soviet communication lines in Hungary and Rumania to Austria. The ratification of these treaties will enable these countries, freed from the burden of occupation, to apply themselves to the urgent tasks of reconstruction. The important fact is that in these treaties we make a beginning of peace. The making of that beginning will give immeasurable help and encouragement to further progress along the road to peace. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that you wish to confine yourself this morning exclusively to a consideration of the peace treaties, and that under those circumstances your appearance is merely for the purpose of registering your general approval of the treaties and your desire for their earliest possible ratification, and that you are suggesting that the committee discuss the details with your predecessor, who was their chief author. Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. The CHAIRMAN. I hope the committee will be willing, under the circumstances, to let the Secretary return to the Department immediately, because we know what pressures he is under in preparations for his departure. Will the committee be content to withhold its examination for Mr. Byrnes? I think that is agreeable, and I would just like to say this to you, Mr. Secretary, as you leave: I know I speak for this entire committee and for the total Congress, and I doubt not for the Nation, when I tell you, sir, that our hearts, our hopes, and our prayers are your fellow travelers when you depart tomorrow upon your vital mission so fraught with destiny. Inexorable events force high responsibilities of leadership upon America in this restless, trembling world at this critical hour. In Moscow you will be at the core of things. You will speak for a great people who want nothing for themselves except the right to live honorably in a free world of free men. With a humble plea to Almighty God for His blessing upon your pilgrimage, we wish you success, good luck, bon voyage, and happy landing on your round trip back to home sweet home. Secretary MARSHALL. Senator Vandenberg, Mr. Chairman, that statement is a great encouragement to me, particularly coming from you, with your intimate knowledge of affairs in

Europe and also of conditions and traditions and feelings here in America. I am deeply grateful, and I can only say I will do my best. [p. 2/3] Thank you. Am I excused? The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you are excused, M. Secretary.

[p. 172 May 6, 1947] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, will you have a seat? The committee is meeting this morning in a final hearing on the peace treaty with Italy in particular, and Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania in general. We have thought that the Secretary of State should make one of the two final presentations. We would like very much, Mr. Secretary, to know your point of view down to date regarding the desirability or necessity of ratifying the Italian treaty in particular. You are familiar with the general attack that has been made, and we would be very happy to have the benefit of your comments in your own way. STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE S. MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF STATE Secretary MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, before, I left for Moscow, as you recall of course, I came in here for a very brief period merely to make the statement that I thought it was highly desirable that these treaties should he ratified as quickly as possible. I thought it would clarify matters and clear away some of the difficulties out of a very complex and difficult situation. Now, since then, I have been to Moscow, have had some experience in the character of the negotiations involved, and have returned. [p. 172/173] My view at the present time, I might say, is more emphatic in feeling that these treaties should be ratified as quickly as possible. To an important extent, they were the result of a very aggressive determined American effort to introduce into the settlement, into the war settlement, a democratic process of arriving at the basis for these treaties, and in opposition to any thought of treaty by dictation. The American interest in the matter was supported and led by a very distinguished group, with which you are all familiar, and ended in the successful endorsement by a majority, a two-thirds majority, of all of the states at war with the Axis who participated in the fighting. The further development of the final draft and its significance are familiar to all of you. But this was a community of the world, of the Allied side of the world, which endeavored to draw up the terms of the various peace treaties in a democratic manner. We were successful in that. The details of the procedure, the difficulties encountered, the compromises that were necessary, can be far better explained by Mr. Byrnes and by your own membership. But to me it would be a most serious affair if we now fail to go through with it. We really took the leadership in this affair. Now we would back away from it. That, to my mind, is fraught with, oh, most serious consequences. My own view, to state it very frankly, if we fail to ratify these treaties, is that the whole situation practically dissolves. That would be my own feeling in my own position in approaching any further conferences, because we would have again begun again what we did in 1919, '20, and '21. And the world would lose all confidence in our proposals and our leadership. I do not think we can afford that. I will not go into the various aspects of the treaties other than to say that I should imagine

it would be impossible, or has been impossible in history, even to draw up a treaty that met the approval of all parties concerned. Now, the longer these treaties remain unratified, the greater and greater will be the difficulty in securing ratification. So, speaking from my own recent experience in Moscow, and from the problems that lie ahead of me as long as I continue Secretary of State, I think it would be a very grave error to start to back-track at this time in connection with these treaties. I do not want to go into the various claims that are made as to why the treaty for Italy should not be ratified, because that is an endless procedure. In regard to the military force, I see no logic in their arguments. In regard to the reparations phases, that was worked out, dealt with, argued over, and finally an agreed solution arrived at. The attitude that is building up, it seems to me, at the present time, is on a more or less unilateral basis. In other words, the presumption would apparently be that we can dictate the terms of the treaty. I do not think we should. I think it is of great importance that the United States show good faith with the rest of the world with whom they have been drawn. Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, right at that point may I ask a question? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. [p. 173/174] Senator CONNALLY. General Marshall, have we any right to expect on hope that if we did not ratify it, or if we tried to renegotiate it, we could ever do any better than the present treaty? Secretary MARSHALL. I would go a little further than implied there, Senator Connally. I am afraid we would be encouraging almost the disintegration, the dissolution, of the situation that we have been struggling so hard to build up. Senator CONNALLY. What I have in mind. General, is, these witnesses that appeared here, each one has a particular slant that he thinks is wrong. Secretary MARSHALL. Oh, yes. Senator CONNALLY. Taking them all together we could never expect to renegotiate and get anything better than is in this treaty, according to my view. Secretary MARSHALL. I have my doubt as to how you could renegotiate them. I think you would be on an entirely new basis and a very serious one. The CHAIRMAN. Just at that point, Mr. Secretary, it has frequently been suggested in the hearings that your hand might be strengthened in connection with your negotiations for the Austrian and German treaties if the Italian treaty and these satellite treaties were held up pending their integration into a final over-all settlement of matters. I think your categorical statement covers that situation, but I would like to have you specifically state for the record whether you think it would help or hurt in the pursuit of further peace treaties with Austria and Germany if these treaties were either suspended or rejected. Secretary MARSHALL. If these treaties are suspended or rejected, I think it would be

exceedingly harmful to the prospect for completing a satisfactory treaty with Austria, and the development of one with Germany. As a matter of fact, to repeat again what I said before, I have decided fears that the situation would so deteriorate that I do not know quite how we would go about the further negotiations. It is already exceedingly difficult, as everyone knows. Now all we would do is make it more difficult, if not impossible. That is my view. The integrity of the position of the United States, its consistency, are tremendous factors in this matter, and the minute we appear to be wobbling this way or that way, and not going through with something that was adopted under the very conditions that we were aggressively pressing for, would be a very serious blow to us. I have been told, and I have read in the paper, of views that the situation has changed and therefore the whole matter should be reconsidered; that the Austrian treaty should be an accomplished fact before you go ahead with this treaty; that there have been many things that changed the picture. Well, I have been speaking as Secretary of State. I want to read a note to me from the President, which I received yesterday : MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Since your return, you and I have carefully canvassed the existing situation regarding the ratification of the Italian and the three satellite treaties now pending before the Senate. I understand that you will appear soon with Mr. Byrnes before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to conclude the hearings on these treaties. You are authorized to say that I concur wholeheartedly in the views which you and Mr. Byrnes will express, to the effect that it is in our opinion vital to our foreign policy that these treaties he promptly ratified. I understand that [p. 174/175] it has been urged that the inability to agree on an Austrian treaty at Moscow has made the ratification of these treaties inadvisable at this time, and that their provisions conflict with the views which I stated to the joint session of Congress on March 12. I do not share this view. These treaties are the result of months of effort by outstanding leaders of both parties in this Government and of other governments, to work out a common peace in this important area of the world. Nothing has occurred to render their efforts unsound or unwise. It is more than ever important that the Government of the United States should appear to the world as a strong and consistent force in our international relations. Treaties which have been worked out with the approval of so large a proportion of all the nations convened at the Paris conference represent the considered judgment of the international community. Moreover, many of the most difficult problems were resolved as the result of American initiative. It would be a great misfortune and a heavy blow to our country's leadership in world affairs should we now unilaterally withhold approval of these treaties. Sincerely yours, HARRY TRUMAN That, in a very brief way and much better way, expresses my own view. The CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement, Mr. Secretary? Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions? Senator Connally? Senator CONNALLY. I have already asked a question. The CHAIRMAN. Senator George? Senator GEORGE. No questions. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. No questions. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley? Senator WILEY. Yes; I would like to ask a few questions. Mr. Secretary, I listened to most of the testimony that was given here in the preceding sessions. Some very distinguished people testified, and their contention in the main was that the situation is so changed that in their opinion they felt that if action were suspended, it would result in getting what they thought was better treatment for Italy. You know what the treaty provided with relation to Trieste and with relation to the developments in the north, the waterpower, and so forth. Now, as I say, there are some very distinguished people who testified on that. I would like to have you tell us what your opinion is, and why. I think you have told us that you felt the treaty should be ratified at once. But why would delay be damaging to, say, the interests of Italy in seeking to get a more equitable arrangement? Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, I think first, as to Trieste, that is a very difficult situation. We had quite an intricate period in connection with Trieste in Moscow. If that situation is allowed to drift along without being given finality as to arrangement and procedure, such as this treaty would, I think it would rapidly go from bad to worse, and we would be in deep trouble. Senator WILEY. Right there may I ask, Mr. Secretary, is it your opinion that if the treaty is consummated the Trieste situation would settle down? It is pretty explosive now, is it not? Secretary MARSHALL. It is pretty explosive now, but it will undoubtedly, in my opinion, get much more explosive and, if not impossible, almost impossible, of ordinary resolution without a confirmation of the treaty. [p. 175/176] The point, to my mind, is if we leave all these things undetermined we leave everybody in a profound state of uncertainty. The world is a very confused affair in Europe, with all sorts of pressures, but most of all uncertainty. When that uncertainty in particular develops with regard to the policy of the United States, then that is a most serious state of affairs, because some of the people of the world, inarticulate, maybe, place their hope in our influence in this matter. Now nothing is done. It has been a long time since May 1945, the time of the surrender, and those people are living in most difficult conditions and suffering most of all from uncertainty and the effects of uncertainty as to the reconstitution of the countries. We prolong that agony. We exaggerate that uncertainty. That is very bad business, in my opinion, and I answered Senator Connally rather directly, I think, or maybe it was Senator Vandenberg, as to the question of whether or not we would get a better treatment. My worry is whether we get a treaty. What happens to these satellite treaties in a rapidly disintegrating situation such as I think would be provoked by our changing front here after this formal democratic process of arriving at these treaties and now go off on a new angle? We immediately create in the minds of all of our associates profound uncertainty as to how dependable we are in international relations.

These treaties, as I understand from my conversations with those who participated in their drafting, involve not only compromises, as we know they must, but compromises with all the various nations. One nation, another nation, and another nation took strong stands on this, strong stands on that, and strong stands on another question, and finally the thing was whipped into a treaty. Now we do not go through with it. We stand back and left the thing drift. Well, I think that is the most dangerous policy in the world in a thing of this kind, because you cannot allow matters to drift in Europe if there is any possible way to stop it. The great problem is, How can you avoid the drift? That was my worry at Moscow, because of the condition of the people, the reactions of the people, left in this prolonged state of uncertainty. Now, anything that we can do to fasten up this part, fasten up that part, to my mind is very, very important. I will repeat again my reply to Senator Vandenberg: I do not think you would improve your treaty by delay, and I think you would have a very grave risk to the world. Senator WILEY. And for the same reasons you have assigned you feel that unless the treaty is consummated soon it would interfere with the Austrian and German treaties, or are there some other reasons? Secretary MARSHALL. No. I am thinking now in the terms of how we go forward to these negotiations, if we can get anywhere, if we can reach an accord, which we are struggling so hard to do, yet at the same time, while we are struggling through this prolonged process of trying to reach an accord, we are suffering by the deterioration of the situation in Europe. This would add to it, in my opinion, very definitely. I repeat again, no treaty that I can conceive of has ever been satisfactory to all people concerned. You never can get that, and here we are drawing treaties that are following one of the most terrible wars in the history of the world, with displacement of people and ruination [p. 176/177] of countries and every conceivable difficulty in the way of approaching them in a detached, impartial frame of mind. It is a very difficult process, and I think from what I have seen, from what was reported to me in Germany and what I have learned in Moscow and out of Austria, that these delays are critical in their effect. That is my reaction to the situation, and that of all my associates, without exception. Senator WILEY. Would you mind answering one question that only indirectly applies to the situation? From your contact with Stalin, have you reached the same conclusion that Mr. Stassen did in his interview? Secretary MARSHALL. I would not care to answer that, Senator. You are getting me out on the end of a plank from which I do not care to dive. Senator WILEY. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capper? Senator CAPPER. No. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lodge?

Senator LODGE. No. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper? Senator HICKENLOOPER. No. Senator SMITH. I would like to ask one question, if I might. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith. Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you what the status is going to be so far as maintaining the peace in that area is concerned. If we ratify this treaty, as I understand it we draw out our troops. Italy has no force at all to protect herself, and Yugoslavia is well armed. That is one of the points brought out by the witnesses in these hearings. I am wondering whether you are figuring that the Security Council armament business will be set up to take care of the peace in that area in case there should be an outbreak of trouble, say, between Yugoslavia and Italy. Secretary MARSHALL. That is what we have to depend upon, but the important thing is to get the matter in such a way that it can be referred to the Council and it can take account of the situation. Senator SMITH. The only thought that occurred to me was that if we did not hasten the ratification of the treaty it might put the heat on to set up the machinery in the Security Council so that this thing could be taken care of. Could we logically take the position that we will refer action until the machinery is set up within the Security Council to take action in the event of an outbreak in that area? Secretary MARSHALL. Senator, I do not think I would care to condition ratification in that way. Senator SMITH. I was just raising the question, whether that was in the picture at all. You feel that the Security Council probably will be set up to take care of the point I am making. The peace of the world will be in jeopardy if we all withdraw. Secretary MARSHALL. That is our hope, and that is our pressure, to accomplish just exactly that. Senator SMITH. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally? Senator CONNALLY. General, there is one contention made here in the hearings, that on account of the Greek-Turkish bill, which has not yet passed Congress, this would interfere with that. I want to submit [p. 177/178] to you the question if, in your opinion, it would not tend to strengthen our stand on the Greek-Turkish position. In other words, we would be giving the view that we stood by our commitments, and we do what we promise to do, and in the Greek-Turkish situation our sincerity and earnestness and firmness are the chief benefits of that bill. Secretary MARSHALL. I agree with you entirely on that, Senator Connally. You go back to what I think is one of the fundamental considerations in this problem, our consistency

of action, our dependability before the world. Senator CONNALLY. On the matter of Trieste and Italy, while the United Nations has not yet set up the agreements between the nations as to the quotas of troops and categories of troops and so on, it is my own view that the Security Council, prior to that, if a breach of the peace should occur anywhere, would have, you might say under its sovereignty as an international organization, the right to call on nations that did have arms to put them at the disposal of the Security Council, and intervene in the case of a clash between Yugoslavia and Italy. I do not know whether that is sound doctrine or not, but that is my view. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, could you leave the President's letter with us? Some of the members of the committee were not here when you read it, and I would like to have them see it. We will return it to you later. Thank you. Would it be fair to say, Mr. Secretary, from the record, that the Government of the United States has displayed maximum friendliness toward the new democratic Italy, and has exhausted every effort it could make in connection with the negotiation of the Italian treaty to produce a treaty which would be as reasonable and as equitable as we could possibly make it in behalf of the new Italy? Is that not a fact? Secretary MARSHALL. I think that decidedly is a fact, Mr. Chairman. In all my conversations with those that have been involved in the treaty discussions it has appeared to me that the United States took the lead in defending the interest of Italy in every way possible. The CHAIRMAN. And in the future, is it not fair to say that whenever and wherever an opportunity may arise, under the language of the Charter of the United Nations or under any other circumstances which might invite changes in the future, our attitude is bound to continue to be one of the greatest sympathy with democratic Italy? Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is very much so. I think that is unquestionably correct. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions? The Senator from Kentucky. Senator BARKLEY. General, during a recent trip I took overseas, in which I visited Egypt, Turkey, Greece, Italy, and France, I discovered some confusion in the public mind as to the extent to which the United States would stand as a United nation behind its commitments, and some confusion as to who spoke for the United States in regard to those matters. Would not the indefinite delay, or any serious delay, in the ratification of these treaties this one in particular, and I put them all in the same category lend color to whatever uncertainty there does exist as to our attitude and as to our willingness to go through with our commitments, and would that [p. 178/179] not play into the hands of those who are seeking to add to the confusion for their own political purposes? Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is a correct statement, Senator. I think in a great

many cases it would be the confirmation of the belief that we cannot be depended upon as a consistent factor in international relations, and would cause a deep resentment because of the insistence, our insistence, on certain stipulations and certain arrangements. It would be opposed very much by those people who suffered a great deal, when we insist upon certain things and then back away from the commitment. Senator BARKLEY. If it were possible that the treaty should be delayed in the hope that a better treaty could be obtained, would it not make it more difficult to obtain not only a better treaty but any treaty at all? Secretary MARSHALL. I have just stated that several times. I concur entirely with what you have said. Senator BARKLEY. I got in a little late and did not hear you. Secretary MARSHALL. I said exactly that. Senator BARKLEY. What you say about the Italian treaty applies to all of the satellite treaties? Secretary MARSHALL. It applies to all of them. Senator BARKLEY. In your opinion, would the delay in ratifying these treaties add to the difficulty of getting one with Austria and Germany? Secretary MARSHALL. I think decidedly so. It would prejudice our actually arriving finally at an agreement under the ordinary processes of negotiation to which we adhere. Senator BARKLEY. Will any of these nations know exactly what its authority is and what its rights are until there is a stabilization growing out of the ratification of the treaties between them, to which we are a party? Secretary MARSHALL. I think it is correct to say that we leave the matter in a state of profound uncertainty. Senator BARKLEY. That is all. Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, the Secretary's last statement said it would leave the matter in profound uncertainty. That brings up this thought. Do you mean it would accentuate the uncertainty? We are pretty much in a state of uncertainty now, are we not? I have reference to your experience in Moscow. Do you know where we are on the general plan of world unity and world action? Secretary MARSHALL. I do not quite understand your question, Senator. Senator WILEY. I will say that what I got generally from your experience in Moscow was that you could not very well agree on anything. Now, a treaty is only as good as the validity of the parties that sign it, like a contract. Is there any assurance that, with Russia, we can carry on? Secretary MARSHALL. We have the assurance of another meeting; we have the assurance of the participation by the Soviet Union in the next meeting of the Assembly, and a

concurrent meeting of the Foreign Ministers, and then another meeting of the Foreign Ministers in November. We have the assurance of a commission that is meeting on the 12th of this month in Vienna in an effort to compose some of the differences there, in particular with experts to go into these as-[p. 179/180]pects that we have never been able to touch heretofore. That is some assurance. I give it to you just for what it is worth for your estimate of what its worth is. Certainly I would not say that we stop now and declare failure. That would be, to my mind, a most grievous attitude. In my own experience in campaigns we have a very hard time and we seldom settle them the first week, and they get worse and worse, and finally they get better I hope. yet. Senator WILEY. You are an optimist. Secretary MARSHALL. No, I am not an optimist. I am in a battle, and I haven't stopped Senator WILEY. Good for you! Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like to ask a question. The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Hickenlooper. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, on the question of the reparations that are established in this treaty, assuming Italy's inability to meet the terms of those reparations to Yugoslavia and perhaps some other country, and in that event if one of these countries decided that its course of action was to invade Italy or attack Italy, or in some manner to attempt to use the lack of reparations payments as an excuse for going across the border or for invasion in other ways, what force or what group would have effective jurisdiction in preventing such conflict? Would it be the United Nations or would it be the signatory powers of this treaty, and would they have effective jurisdiction. Secretary MARSHALL. Well, that is a very large question at this particular moment in the business of trying to get the United Nations on its feet, trying to get the Security Council on its feet, trying to get the treaty signed as a base. We have an 18-month period in there where the four representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and the United States, in Rome, enter into a balance of decision in matters where there are difficulties. We are in a transition period, the effort of which is to develop as quickly as possible and to resolve as quickly as possible into what we all hope is a United Nations set-up that has some chance of maintaining the stability and peace of the world. That remains to be proven. But we have not refused. We are trying to bring it about as best we can. Senator Connally has suggested one possibility during this interim period, while we are trying to reach adjustments. I do not know what the international legal view would be as to that, but it made pretty good sense as I heard it expressed by Senator Connally. The implication, I think, of part of your question was Italy's not being allowed by the treaty enough of a force to defend itself properly. Well, for Italy to have a large enough force to maintain itself in such matters would mean automatically almost financial bankruptcy beyond the power of recovery.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I am assuming in my own mind that Italy will not have a force with which it can defend itself. That is evident to me at the moment. But I am curious about the possibility if some nation elected to enforce its reparations rights by physical force of some kind, or took that excuse to take over territory or to invade. What power is there, or what would be an anticipated effective means to stop that? [p. 180/181] Secretary MARSHALL. It has been the policy of the United States, and I thought there was a general concurrence in regard to it, that we, were trying to build up the United Nations to protect us against exactly that sort of business. I referred to a transition period, in which we are all involved now, and a transition control in Rome with the representatives of four powers I have, mentioned. There is an 18-month period, I believe, after the treaty that is involved in that. As we get each one of these things sewed up, presumably, and I think logically, we move that much toward what we hope will be a lasting control by this international body. Other than that I have nothing to offer. Senator CONNALLY. May I ask a question? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator CONNALLY. General Marshall, with relation to the questions asked you by Senator Hickenlooper, if we ratify this treaty we are bound by it, and we have obligations under it, and if Yugoslavia, which is a party to the treaty, should attack Italy in violation of the treaty, why would not the parties to the treaty, the governments, have authority to step in and say, "Wait a minute, here We signed this treaty. You did. You can't do this. You are violating this treaty." Why could we not I say "we"; the nations that are interested use such means and such force as was necessary to enforce the respect for that treaty? I am just speaking as we would on any other question, aside from the United Nations. If the United Nations can do it, fine, we are all for it. But if it cannot do it and has not the means to do it, it seems to me that the signatories to the treaty, by reason of the treaty itself, would have authority to step in and say, "You can't violate this treaty. Here is your obligation." Secretary MARSHALL. They certainly have a very definite obligation to Italy in connection with it. The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else? Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lodge. Senator LODGE. The statement was made many times during the hearing which we gave that to ratify the treaty would be a feather in the cap of the Communists, and that ratification of the treaty would tend to throw Italy into the hands of the Communists, and that would be an extremely bad thing from many standpoints, particularly in view of our Greco-Turkish policy. What effect do you think ratification of this treaty would have on the growth of communism in Italy, or on Communist strategy generally?

Secretary MARSHALL. In the long term, from the long-term point of view, I think it would have a very beneficial effect for our democratic position. The consistency of our action, the fact that we had committed ourselves formally to a treaty concerning Italy and the satellite states, I believe would be very helpful in the long-term affair. It is possible in the immediate weeks or few months, in the mixed situation they have in Italy right now politically, and we have a mixed situation in France politically, that it might blow one way or might blow the other, but there is no question in my mind whatever that the demonstration of our consistency and our determination to [p. 181/182] go through with these things is the most important factor of strengthening our position in the world. Senator LODGE. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else? Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. You may be released if you wish, or we will be very happy to have you linger with us. sir. Secretary MARSHALL. I appreciate very much your courtesy. I will be very glad to go,