IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI JAMES LEE JOHNSON, III NO KA STATE OF MISSISSIPPI BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE

Transcription

1 E-Filed Document May :57: KA COA Pages: 18 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI JAMES LEE JOHNSON, III APPELLANT VS. NO KA STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE APPELLEE DOES NOT REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT JIM HOOD, ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA BYRD SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL MISSISSIPPI BAR NO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 220 JACKSON, MS TELEPHONE: (601)

2 Table of Contents Table of Authorities... ii Statement of the Issue... 1 Statement of the Case... 1 Statement of the Facts... 1 Summary of the Argument... 7 Argument... 8 Conclusion Certificate of Service i

3 Table of Authorities Cases Archer v. State, 986 So.2d 951 (Miss.2008)... 9 Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313 (Miss.1988)... 8 Dartez v. State, 177 So. 3d 420 (Miss. 2015)... 9 Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771 (Miss. 2006)... 8 Lowe v. State, 127 So. 3d 178 (Miss. 2013)... 9, 10 Manning v. State, 929 So. 2d 885 (Miss. 2006) Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426 (Miss.1991)... 8 Moss v. State, 977 So. 2d 1201 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)... 8, 9 Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832 (Miss.1983)... 9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)... 8 Wilcher v. State, 863 So.2d 719 (Miss.2003)... 8 Statutes Mississippi Code Annotated section ii

4 Statement of the Issue I. Whether defense counsel s performance was so deficient and prejudicial that this Court should find that Johnson s conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Statement of the Case James Lee Johnson III was indicted by the Grand Jury of Quitman County for acting individually, or while aiding, abetting, or acting in concert with Larry Gilliam Jr., to commit First Degree Murder of Curtis Mumford. (CP 4). Prior to trial, Gilliam s defense counsel filed jury instructions on his behalf, but then moved to sever the indictment. (CP 30-31; 32-40). The trial court granted the motion for severance, and, after Johnson s request for a mental exam was denied, Johnson was tried individually. (CP 42-44; 47-49; 50). After a trial by jury, Honorable Charles E. Webster, presiding, Johnson was found guilty as charged. (CP 65). Pursuant to the penalty statute for First Degree Murder, Johnson was sentenced to serve life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. (CP 68-69); See Miss. Code Ann Following the denial of his post-trial motions, the present appeal was timely noticed. (CP 76-77). Statement of the Facts On June 7, 2015, Troy Holmes was getting ready to go to church when James Johnson and Larry Gilliam came to his house and asked him whether he had paid Curtis Mumford for cutting his grass. 1 (TR ; 173). Holmes told them that he had paid Mumford $40, and Johnson said that he was going to walk over to Mumford s house to talk to him because Mumford owed Johnson some money. (TR ). Holmes testified that he had not seen 1 Holmes explained that Mumford, who was about the same age as him (61 years old), lived across the street from him, and often did handy work for him and cut his grass, but that he had told Mumford not to let anyone else on his property. (TR ; 170). 1

5 Mumford since the day before, and testified that, the day after Johnson and Gilliam visited his house, he noticed that Mumford s home was being investigated as a crime scene. (TR 172; 174). On Monday, June 8, 2015, Officer Darryl Linzy, of the Quitman County Sheriff s Department, received a request to do a welfare check at Mumford s home. (TR 263). Detective Linzy knew where Mumford lived, and went by his house to check on him. (TR 263). He knocked on the door, but no one answered. (TR 264). Then, Detective Linzy noticed that the door was unlocked, so he went inside. (TR 264). When he entered the home, Detective Linzy noticed that Mumford was lying on the floor, and was unconscious. (TR 264). After determining that Mumford could not be revived, Detective Linzy walked outside the home and contacted both the Quitman County Sheriff s Department and the Mississippi Bureau of Investigations for assistance. (TR 264). Detective Linzy secured the scene with yellow tape, and eventually went across the street to speak to Troy Holmes. (TR 265). After speaking with Holmes, James Johnson was identified as a person of interest, and Detective Linzy notified law enforcement agents from Coahoma County to be looking for Johnson. (TR 209; 266). Law enforcement agents from Quitman County, with the assistance of MBI agents, eventually located Johnson and brought him into custody. (TR 266). A deputy with the Quitman County Sheriff s Department picked Johnson up at his parents home. (TR 209). When Johnson was picked up, Johnson s father gave the deputy consent to search the house, and the deputy collected the bicycle which belonged to Johnson, as well as a shirt that Johnson s father said Johnson had worn the day before. (TR ). After Johnson was taken into custody, he was advised of his Miranda rights, and he agreed to waive those rights and speak to law enforcement officers. (TR 212). The interview lasted approximately one hour, and ended as soon as Johnson told officers that he wanted an 2

6 attorney. (TR 231; 233). But, during that interview, Johnson told officers details about how Mumford was killed. Detective Linzy, Bryan Sullivant, and Lieutenant Charles Hale were all present during the first interview; however, Sullivant was the primary interviewer. 2 (TR 213). Initially, Johnson denied being at Mumford s house. (TR 213). He said he had not seen Mumford or been at his home that day, but he did admit that he knew who Mumford was. (TR 213). Later, Johnson said that Mumford owed him $20 for his help in cutting his neighbor s grass, and Johnson had learned from the neighbor that Mumford had recently been paid. (TR 2113). Johnson told the officers that he went to Mumford s house to retrieve his money, but said that Mumford was not home, so he left. (TR 213). At that time, he was adamant that he did not go back to Mumford s house, and he never saw Mumford that day. (TR 213). Eventually, Johnson told Detective Linzy that he and Gilliam did go back to Mumford s home. (TR 213). He said that he talked to Mumford and asked about the $20 he owed him; Mumford told him that he d get it later; they watched the end of a movie Hangover Part III and Johnson said that he left after the movie, and that he did not touch Mumford. (TR 214). Finally, Johnson did agree to tell [his] side of the story. (TR 215). Johnson repeated the third version that he had already told, but admitted that Gilliam used a set of hedge clippers to stab Mumford. (TR 215). Johnson explained that, when Mumford told him that he did not have the $20 to give him, Johnson stood up and pushed Mumford. 3 (TR 216). After Johnson threw the first punch, he and Mumford began to fight, and, at one point, Johnson was choking Mumford. 4 (TR 216; 294). Johnson admitted that weapons were used, but denied that he used the weapons during the incident. (TR 217). He said that Gilliam had gone through the house and retrieved the 2 Sullivant and Hale were both agents with the Mississippi Bureau of Investigations. (TR 207; 213). 3 Johnson had planned to give Gilliam $10 of the $20 that Mumford allegedly owed him. (TR 278). 4 Johnson had bruises and scratches on various parts of his body. (TR 217). Initially, he told officers that they were old wounds, but he eventually admitted that they were from the fight with Mumford. (TR 217; 277). 3

7 weapons that he used against Mumford. (TR 217; 232). Johnson said that Mumford s blood might have gotten on his hands during the tussle. (TR 223). The initial interview eventually ended because Johnson asked for an attorney. (TR 233). However, the next day, Johnson requested to speak to Detective Linzy. (TR 233; 269; 271). Detective Linzy testified that he did not make any promises or threats to induce statements that Johnson made in the second interview. (TR 293). During the second interview, Johnson repeated the final version of what he had told the officers who interviewed him but added some details. (TR ). Johnson explained that, when the fight between himself and Mumford broke out, Johnson struck Mumford to the point that he had him on the ground, and was straddling him while Gilliam struck him with the hedge clippers. (TR 274; 294). When they finally stopped beating Mumford, Johnson and Gillliam used water and tried to clean themselves up. (TR 275; 294). They also grabbed some of Mumford s clothing and dried their hands off. (TR 275). Although Johnson initially told Detective Linzy that he hid the hedge clippers in some bushes, he later admitted that he and Gilliam hid them in a container inside Mumford s closet and covered them with clothes. (TR 275). Johnson told Detective Linzy that he hit Mumford in the face and chest area, and said that Gilliam struck Mumford in the back of the head. (TR 276). Johnson told Detective Linzy that they were probably in the house for about 5 minutes after the assault. (TR 283). Johnson said he got to his house at 1:30 a.m. and noticed that he had blood on his face, so he washed it off. (TR ). Although Detective Linzy could not recall whether Johnson told him that Mumford was dead by the time they left the house, at some point during the interview, Johnson told Detective Linzy, we killed him. I ain t gonna lie. (TR 281; 294). At trial, the State called four experts: Dywana Broughton was accepted as an expert in crime scene analysis; Steven Little was accepted as an expert in serology; Jana Burchfield was 4

8 accepted as an expert in DNA analysis; and Dr. Brent Davis was accepted as an expert in forensic pathology. (TR ; 305; 322; 335). Dywana Broughton, who worked for the MBI, was called by Detective Linzy to assist in identifying, preserving, and collecting physical evidence from the crime scene. (TR 236). She testified that she took photographs of the scene and collected all physical evidence. (TR ). The photographs revealed blood splattered throughout multiple rooms of Mumford s home, and portrayed the methods that Johnson and Gilliam used in their attempt to clean up after the incident. (TR ). Most of the physical evidence that she collected was sent to the Mississippi Crime Lab for testing. (TR 238; ). But buckets of water, that had a red tint to them and might have contained diluted blood, were not collected for testing. (TR 254). Instead, Broughton took photographs of an assistant pouring the water into a bathtub inside Mumford s home. (TR ). Steven Little, who worked for the North Mississippi branch of the Mississippi Crime Lab, examined items of evidence for the presence or absence of blood, and created a report based on his findings. (TR ). Little testified that law enforcement officers submitted Johnson s fingernail clippings, Johnson s clothing and shoes that had been collected from the jail, the hedge clippers and a hammer that were recovered from Mumford s home, and Johnson s bike seat so that they may all be tested for the presence or absence of blood. (TR 307; 308; 310; 312; 313). Little testified that every item of evidence that he examined tested positive for the presence of blood. (TR ). Little also testified that, some of the items contained such a small amount of blood that, rather than consume the entire sample, he conducted a presumptive chemical test which revealed that the item did have blood on it. 5 (TR 319). 5 Little conducted a presumptive test on Johnson s shoes, his bike seat, and the hammer. (TR 315; 316). 5

9 After the presence of blood was confirmed on the items, they were sent to the Crime Lab so that a DNA analysis could be conducted. Jana Burchfield tested the samples against known samples for Johnson, Gilliam, and Mumford. (TR 325). Fingernail clippings that were taken from Johnson s hands revealed that both Johnson s DNA and Mumford s DNA were present under Johnson s fingernails. (TR 326). The blood stain from Johnson s shoe matched Mumford s DNA. (TR 328). And blood on the blades of the hedge clippers matched Mumford s DNA. (TR 328). But the samples from the hammer and the bike seat cushion did not contain enough genetic information to be tested. (TR 329). Dr. Brent Davis performed Mumford s autopsy. (TR 336). He testified that Mumford suffered 13 stab wounds, in varying depths, to his chest, back, left arm, neck, and head. (TR 350; 353). He explained that one blow to his head caused a triangular-shaped defect to Mumford s skull bone. (TR 350). And one of the injuries to his chest penetrated through the pericardial sack and into his heart. (TR 351). Dr. Davis testified that all of Mumford s injuries would have caused him to bleed, but that none of them would have led to an instant death. (TR 352). Dr. Davis opined that the stab wounds would have been caused by a sharp weapon, but that the skull injury would have been caused by something with a flat edge, or by a single-edged knife of some sort. (TR 353). Dr. Davis testified that the hedge clippers would have been consistent with the injury to Mumford s skull, but could not say whether they were consistent with the stab wounds because he did not know the measurement for how wide the hedge clippers were. (TR ). In Dr. Davis s opinion, Mumford s cause of death was multiple sharp-force injuries, including stab wounds, and his manner of death was homicide. (TR ). After the State rested its case-in-chief, Defense Counsel moved for a directed verdict, and argued that there was no evidence that Johnson had aided, assisted, or acted in concert with Gilliam to commit murder. (TR 354). The trial court denied the motion and found that the State 6

10 had presented sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury. (TR 355). The defense rested its case without calling any witnesses. (TR 355). And, after considering the evidence that was presented and the instructions that were given, the jury found that Johnson was guilty of First Degree Murder. (TR 397). Summary of the Argument Johnson s sole claim on appeal is that his trial counsel was ineffective. He claims that his attorney s performance was deficient because i) he did not request funds to secure his own forensic expert; ii) he did not attempt to establish the voluntariness of Johnson s statements to police; and iii) he did not offer any instructions other than a peremptory instruction. (Appellant s Brief p. 5-7). However, the record reveals that i) defense counsel did not require the assistance of an defense expert to effectively cross-examine the witnesses called by the State; ii) Johnson s statements were voluntarily given; and iii) the instructions that were given fairly announced the law of the case and were favorable to both the prosecution and the defense. Accordingly, this Court should find that defense counsel s performance was adequate, and Johnson is not entitled to a new trial with new counsel. If this Court decides that the present record is not sufficient for the Court to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, then the Court should affirm Johnson s conviction and sentence, and preserve the issue so that he may present it in a properly-filed PCR petition. 7

11 Argument I. Whether defense counsel s performance was so deficient and prejudicial that this Court should find that Johnson s conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Standard of Review Criminal defendants are entitled to reasonably effective and competent counsel; however, they are not entitled to perfect counsel, or to an attorney who makes no mistakes at trial. Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771, 780 (Miss. 2006)(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Wilcher v. State, 863 So.2d 719, 734 (Miss.2003); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991); Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1988)). As our Supreme Court has noted, the United States Supreme Court has held that [t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052). In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Johnson has the burden to show (1) that his counsel s performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced his case so as to prevent a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct In making its determination of whether Johnson meets both Strickland prongs, this Court should examine the totality of the circumstances. Moss v. State, 977 So. 2d 1201, 1214 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In determining whether Johnson has met the first Strickland prong, this Court should weigh counsel s performance, keeping in mind that there is a strong presumption that counsel s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at As for the second prong, Johnson must prove prejudice by showing that there was a reasonable probability that but for counsel s errors, the trial court s result would have been different. Id. at

12 Our Supreme Court has held: [G]enerally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are more appropriately brought during post-conviction proceedings. Archer v. State, 986 So.2d 951, 955 (Miss.2008). An appellate court is limited to the trial-court record in its review of the claim(s), and there may be instances in which insufficient evidence and/or information exists within the record to address the claim adequately. Id. In such a case, the appropriate procedure is to deny relief, preserving the defendant's right to argue the issue through a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832, 837 (Miss.1983). We may, however, address an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal if the presented issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record. M.R.A.P. 22. Dartez v. State, 177 So. 3d 420, (Miss. 2015). This Court should either find that Johnson s trial counsel was not ineffective and affirm his conviction, or, it should affirm his conviction and preserve the ineffective assistance of counsel claims and allow Johnson, if he chooses, to argue the claims through a properly filed PCR petition. See Id. i. Defense counsel did not require the assistance of a defense expert to effectively cross-examine the witnesses called by the State. Johnson argues that, because the State used experts in its case-in-chief, defense counsel should have obtained his own experts, and his failure to do so amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. (Appellant s Brief p. 6). It is true, our Supreme Court has held that, where the State uses an expert to explain a highly technical theory of the case, the defense is entitled to its own expert. See Lowe v. State, 127 So. 3d 178, (Miss. 2013). But the Court did not indicate that every time the State calls an expert, the defendant should call his own. Instead, in order to be entitled to receive funds to hire an expert, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a substantial need for an expert to assist the defense. Id. at 181. In Lowe, the State relied on an expert in computer forensics to prove not only that child pornography images were present on the defendant s computer, but that the defendant downloaded them. Id. at 183. Defense counsel argued that he needed his own expert to refute the 9

13 State s expert s opinions, and to provide him with the necessary information to adequately crossexamine the State s expert. Id. The Supreme Court held that, by denying the defense s request for funds to hire its own expert, it denied him the raw materials integral to building an effective defense. Id. at 184. But the subject matter that each expert testified to in the present case is greatly distinguishable from the expert who testified in Lowe. And, unlike the expert in Lowe, none of the experts in the present case identified Johnson as the perpetrator of the crime. Furthermore, the record reveals that defense counsel had no difficulty cross-examining the State s witnesses. The State called an expert in crime scene analysis, an expert in serology, an expert in DNA analysis, and an expert in forensic pathology. (TR ; 305; 322; 335). The expert in forensic pathology offered his opinion as to the manner and cause of Mumford s death, which were not disputed. (TR 378). And the expert in crime scene analysis, who worked to preserve the crime scene, offered no significant expert opinion. 6 In fact, when the State tendered her as an expert witness, defense counsel objected and argued that it was unnecessary for her to testify as an expert because she was a fact witness. (TR ). While the serology and DNA analysis experts did testify about the presence or absence of blood, and who that blood and DNA evidence belonged to, defense counsel was able to use their testimony to his advantage because some of the items that tested positive for the presence of blood did not have enough genetic material to discover who the DNA belonged to. And some of the items that were tested were only presumptively positive for the presence of blood. Defense counsel realized the significance of this, and cross-examined the experts thoroughly. This is evidence of sound trial strategy, not deficient performance. See Manning v. State, 929 So. 2d 6 It might be argued that her testimony that the tinted water found in Mumford s tub was not something they would have collected for testing amounted to an expert opinion. (See TR 255). But the DNA analysis expert also testified that she does not usually test items that are wet or have been wet, so the testimony was cumulative, and was confirmed by another expert. (TR 330). 10

14 885, 902 (Miss. 2006)(finding that counsel is not deficient merely because he did not conduct the cross-examination... in every regard as [appellate] counsel asserts he should have done ). The Court s holding in Lowe does not stand for the proposition that, in every case where the State calls expert witnesses, the defendant should call his own expert witnesses. There simply was no need for defense counsel to hire his own experts in this case. Accordingly, this Court should find that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek his own experts. ii. Johnson s statements were voluntarily given. The record reveals that, although Johnson s initial interview was recorded, the recording of that statement was not admitted into evidence. (TR 214). The decision not to offer the recording into evidence so that it could be played for the jury was likely because the initial interview lasted at least one hour. (TR 231). But officers testified about Johnson s statements, without objection. (TR ; ). The record offers no indication that Johnson s statement was not voluntarily given. Yet, on appeal, Johnson argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge the admission of his statement on the ground that it was not freely and voluntarily given. (Appellant s Brief p. 6). The record shows that, before Johnson gave each of his statements, he was advised of his right to remain silent; he was advised that anything he said could be used against him at trial; he was advised that he had the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before any questions were asked of him; he was advised that a lawyer could be appointed for him; and he was advised that, if he decided to answer questions without a lawyer present, he would have the right to stop answering at any time until he had the opportunity to speak to a lawyer. (Exhibit S-42; TR 212). After initially being advised of his rights, he agreed to speak with investigators. (TR 212). And it appears that he did understand the rights that were explained to him because his first interview ended because he asked for an attorney. (TR 233). Later, he was interviewed a second time by 11

15 Detective Linzy, but only because Johnson requested, in writing, to speak to him. (Exhibit S-41; TR 269; 271). Detective Linzy testified that he neither threatened Johnson, nor promised him anything in exchange for his statements. (TR 293). And, at some point during his interviews, Johnson consented to having a DNA sample taken, and he voluntarily offered his hands so that an officer could collect fingernail clippings. (TR ; 279). The overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that Johnson s statements were voluntarily given. There is simply no evidence to suggest that defense counsel should have challenged the voluntariness of Johnson s statements, or that, had he done so, the statements would have been excluded. Accordingly, this Court should find that counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the admissibility of Johnson s statements. iii. The instructions that were given fairly announced the law of the case and were favorable to both the prosecution and the defense. Johnson claims that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not offer any defense instruction, other than a peremptory instruction. (Appellant s Brief p. 7). Without suggesting what instructions should have been provided, Johnson complains that [t]he jury was not instructed on any viable theory of defense. (Appellant s Brief p. 7). But, if this Court looks to the eleven jury instructions that were given in this case, 7 it will see that the instructions fairly announced the law of the case and that (at least) five of them were very favorable to the defense. 8 (CP 51; 55; 56; 57; 59). In fact, one of those instructions mirrored an instruction that had been presented by Gilliam s attorney before he moved to sever his indictment from Johnson s, and was similar to a separate instruction that Gilliam s attorney had proposed. (CP 32; 40; 59). 7 Eight of the instructions were presented by the trial court, and only three were filed by the State. (CP 51-62). 8 See C-2; C-4; C-5; C-6; C

16 It is clear from Johnson s trial counsel s closing argument that the theory of defense was that, although Johnson admitted that he was at the home when Gilliam beat Mumford, he was not responsible for Mumford s death. (TR 378). The fact that Mumford was killed, and that his manner of death was homicide was undeniable. (TR 378). But defense counsel attempted to cast doubt on the State s witnesses testimony by arguing that they might have misspoken about what Johnson said during his interview, and they might have forgotten some details. (TR ). Defense counsel also argued facts that would explain why Johnson had blood on him Johnson admitted he had been in a fight with Mumford. (TR 380). Essentially, defense counsel argued that there were holes in the evidence, and that the State failed to prove that Johnson (rather than Gilliam) committed First Degree Murder. (TR ). This Court should find that the instructions that were given fairly covered Johnson s theory of defense. In light of the fact that Johnson does not even suggest what instructions should have been offered, this Court should deny his request that this Court find that further instruction was necessary, and that counsel s failure to request further instruction amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 13

17 Conclusion This Court should find that counsel s performance was not deficient and that Johnson s conviction was not the result of a breakdown in the adversary process which rendered the result of his trial unreliable. Otherwise, the Court should preserve the ineffective assistance of counsel claims for presentation in a PCR petition. In either event, the State of Mississippi respectfully requests that this Honorable Court affirm Johnson s conviction and sentence. Respectfully submitted, JIM HOOD, ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: s/ Barbara Byrd BARBARA BYRD SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL MISSISSIPPI BAR NO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 220 JACKSON, MS TELEPHONE: (601)

18 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this day I electronically filed (and mailed by United States Postal Service) the foregoing pleading or other paper with the Clerk of the Court using the MEC system which sent notification of such filing to the following: Honorable Charles E. Webster Circuit Court Judge P.O. Box 998 Clarksdale, MS Honorable Brenda F. Mitchell District Attorney P.O. Box 848 Cleveland, MS Justin T. Cook, Esq. Office of State Public Defender P.O. Box 3510 Jackson, MS This the 9th day of May, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Post Office Box 220 Jackson, Mississippi Telephone: (601) s/barbara Byrd BARBARA BYRD SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 15