2ND BRAZILIAN WORKSHOP OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY in honor of John Nash, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Nash equilibrium.

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1 ND BRAZILIAN WORKSHOP OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY in honor of John Nash, on the occasion of the 6th anniversary of Nash equilibrium WEDNESDAY 78 LATE REGISTRATION PAYMENT THURSDAY 79 NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES Shmuel Zamir Hebrew University of Jerusalem) AUCTIONS Paul Milgrom Stanford University) COFFEE BREAK NETWORKS Matthew Jackson Stanford University) STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE THEOREMS TES Raghavan University of Illinois at Chicago) EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS John Wooders University of Arizona) GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRACY Steven Brams New York University) LUNCH

2 +,, %,& ) 1 % THURSDAY 79 &) &, & *+ *,&, %& ) &, 4 %5 6 7 %& * + ) 8,,,&

3 THURSDAY COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 1: FAPESP Students Session OPENING CEREMONY Chair: Robert Aumann IMPORTANCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM Roger Myerson University of Chicago) Chair: Roger Myerson WHERE NASH BARGAINING HAS LED Robert Aumann The Hebrew University of Jerusalem & SUNY at Stony Brook) Chair: Marilda Sotomayor CONVERSATION WITH JOHN NASH PRESENTATION OF USP CHORUS WELCOME RECEPTION

4 FRIDAY 7 NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES Shmuel Zamir COFFEE BREAK NETWORKS Matthew Jackson STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE THEOREMS TES Raghavan LUNCH SEMIPLENARY Chair: Alvaro Sandroni THE ROBUSTNESS OF INCOMPLETE CODES OF LAW Olivier Gossner Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics) Chair: Marina Núñez ENDOGENOUS NETWORK DYNAMICS Frank Page University of Alabama) SEMIPLENARY Chair: Olivier Gossner RATIONALIZATION Alvaro Sandroni University of Pennsylvania) Chair: Frank Page VON NEUMANN MORGENSTERN SOLUTIONS IN THE ASSIGNMENT MARKET Marina Núñez Universitat de Barcelona)

5 FRIDAY 7 5 & ) *+ 1 & > :;+ <, )? & 5 & = 1 %,, 4 % ) )5

6 FRIDAY 7 9 COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION %1 99 &, 99 9 & PLENARY PLENARY 5 67 A 1 9, 4, 1 8 ) 5 )& = Chair: Aloísio Araújo THE ALLOCATION OF A PRIZE & & *)% Pradeep Dubey SUNY at Stony Brook & Yale University) Chair: Pradeep Dubey GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, WARINESS AND BUBBLES Aloísio Araújo EPGEFGVRJ & IMPA) + A&

7 SATURDAY 71 NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES Shmuel Zamir COFFEE BREAK NETWORKS Matthew Jackson STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE THEOREMS TES Raghavan LUNCH SEMIPLENARY Chair: Paulo Klinger EGALITARIANISM UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION Geoffrey De Clippel Brown University) Chair: Federico Valenciano INTEREST RATE IN TRADE CREDIT MARKETS Humberto Moreira EPGEFGVRJ) SEMIPLENARY Chair: Geoffrey De Clippel A NEW APPROACH TO RENYS NASH EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE PROBLEM WITH DISCONTINUOUS PAYOFFS Paulo Klinger EPGEFGVRJ) Chair: Humberto Moreira QUATERNARY DICHOTOMOUS VOTING RULES Federico Valenciano Universidad del País Vasco)

8 SATURDAY 71 8%, )& 4 D : *B CA && % <=, 7 8 & 5 58 &&& C & *B

9 SATURDAY 71 9 COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 99 & > 99 * 5 & E E1>, +,&,) = : )% 1)= %& & & & CF= ;9 : *B % 7 % &, & 5 6 * %

10 SUNDAY 81 NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES Shmuel Zamir COFFEE BREAK NETWORKS Matthew Jackson STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE THEOREMS TES Raghavan BARBECUE AND FORRÓ MONDAY 8 AUCTIONS Paul Milgrom COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 8 EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS John Wooders GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRACY Steven Brams LUNCH PLENARY Chair: Robert Aumann ELECTIONS AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING Eric Maskin Princeton University)

11 MONDAY 8 < 1 & A & )7 + %& 55 A % & 4))%H 1 & H> && & & )1)1 ; ) ) & ) 5 % 8 %& 5 8 ) 7 +,, 4 & 1 %:, 4 *1 ))61 = 6 5 ) %& &,

12 MONDAY 8 9 COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION = 9 9 &= & )< 8 6 8%) % )7 & ),7= )5 )% ) % > < 5& 6& :, & E

13 MONDAY 8 PLENARY Chair: John F Nash, Jr GAME THEORY SOCIETY PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: DYNAMICS AND EQUILIBRIA Sergiu Hart The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Chair: Sergiu Hart THE AGENCIES METHOD FOR MODELING COALITIONS AND COOPERATION IN GAMES John F Nash, Jr Princeton University) GALA DINNER SPONSORED BY ORDEM DOS ECONOMISTAS DO BRASIL OEB) TUESDAY 8 8: 1: AUCTIONS Paul Milgrom 1: 1: COFFEE BREAK 1: 1: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS John Wooders GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRACY Steven Brams 1: 1: LUNCH 1: 14:15 ROUND TABLE TBA

14 : & &5 %& ) )=, 8 & 1 6 )%1) 5 % & E& = TUESDAY 8 : & 5 ) 7 ) & 6, 9,, ;) &&, % )7 6) &) E,8, 7 % 4 1 %< &, % %1

15 TUESDAY 8 9 COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION ) A % *B CA? )1 & & ) 9;& %: : 8: > 5) HIJ I+ + <), ) ) < *B ) %

16 PLENARY PLENARY TUESDAY 8 Chair: Gabrielle Demange ON THE VULNERABILITY OF ALLOCATION RULES TO MANIPULATION OF ENDOWMENTS William Thomson University of Rochester) Chair: William Thomson COLLECTIVE ATTENTION AND RANKING METHODS Gabrielle Demange PSEEHESS) CLOSING RECEPTION

17 WEDNESDAY 84 AUCTIONS Paul Milgrom COFFEE BREAK EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS John Wooders GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRACY Steven Brams LUNCH SEMIPLENARY SEMIPLENARY Chair: William H Sandholm DYNAMIC POLITICAL AGENCY WITH ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD John Duggan University of Rochester) Chair: Olivier Hudry REPEATED GAMES WITH BOUNDED MEMORY Hamid Sabourian Cambridge University) Chair: John Duggan EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY: OVERVIEW AND RECENT RESULTS William H Sandholm University of Wisconsin) Chair: Hamid Sabourian HOW DIFFICULT IS IT TO COMPUTE THE WINNER OF A GAME? Olivier Hudry Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications)

18 WEDNESDAY 84 < &&,& E 88& +) ) 4 HB * 7 % ) & % 8< 1 & 8 ),> 5 8 E 5)A, 6 5& 6& 6 7& E

19 WEDNESDAY 84 9 COFFEE BREAK AND POSTER SESSION E =B << &? )5 D)A %& ;,? E ) & B & )A, E & & )& = & A )& = 7 75 & : %, *C *& *B 1

20 9 PLENARY PLENARY WEDNESDAY 84 Chair: Abraham Neyman DYNAMIC CONTRACTS WITH MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION Motty Perry The Hebrew University of Jerusalem & The University of Warwick) Chair: Motty Perry A NEW DEFINITION OF DISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES AND STATIONARY PAYOFFS AND EQUILIBRIUM Abraham Neyman The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)